The Portuguese External Policy
The second world war had a major political and socio-economical impact on the neutral and peripheral Portugal. If in a sense it started what was the first crisis from the regime founded by the 1926 coup d’etat, it also enabled, in no small part due to the skillful political play from Portugal's prime minister António de Oliveira Salazar, that the regime would endure almost 35 additional years.
We could say that the external policy wasn’t very important for the
Estado Novo until the start of the Spanish Civil War in 1936. This is owed due to the priority given to the solving of Portugal’s internal problems. So the Estado Novo re-assumes the external policy from the 18th century - it assumed a semi-peripheral position when regarding the Political and Economical centers.
In this way it’s external policy was mainly a defensive one:
- The defense of the Portuguese national independence regarding the “Spanish Threat” - The fear of a Spanish annexation had risen due to the Spanish Civil War. Portugal was afraid of the consequences from a Republican victory, it’s socialistic ideas could trigger more support for the Portuguese opposition. Also there was fear that the Falangist Spain could’ve invaded Portugal.
- The defense of the colonial patrimony was due to the fact that Portugal feared an attempt from the European Powers to re-divide it’s colonial empire.
- The defense of the regime. Protecting the Estado Novo from the “Red Threat” and from the victorious democracies of the 1st world war.
Therefore, the pillars of Salazar’s diplomacy were:
The isolation from Portugal relative to the European continental policies and it’s disturbances. Portugal was an “Atlantic power, clinging with Spain due to their nature and leaning political and economically to the sea and the colonies.” If possible, Portugal should avoid getting involved in European conflicts. It should maintain the peninsular friendship and focus on developing the potential of it’s colonies. With the Estado Novo there was an open return to the Atlantism. The Spanish Civil War was accounted as the delaying of the conflict in central Europe. Portugal helped the Falangist faction in an effort to “exorcise” the victory of the socialist backed Republicanism.
The cornerstone in Portuguese strategy was the Luso-British “Old Alliance”. Although this wasn’t a Portuguese choice, but a structural reality that constrained Portugal, internal and externally. Great Britain was still the master of the seas and they had a vast border with the Portuguese possessions in Africa and India. They were also the major provider for the Portuguese economy and it’s main client and receiver of the bulk of Portuguese exportation. On top of that they were the biggest foreign investor and creditor of Portugal. Portugal always acted calm and meticulously when regarding it’s relation with Great-Britain, specially when concerning the Spanish Civil War and the 2nd World War. Nonetheless they pressed Britain with the fact that now Germany was also a continental power and would use this to leverage terms more in it’s personal interest, with the attention of never to break the “Old Alliance”.
Peninsular friendship. It guaranteed the political safety and the territorial integrity of Portugal. It dispelled the danger of annexation under the form of the “Red Threat” (Aid to the Falangists), also of the expansionist ways of certain Falangist means and Franco’s army (Non-aggression Pact- which was instrumental, during the autumn of 1942, to the defeat of Serrano Suñer and the interventionist and Germanophile sectors in the Falangists and the Spanish Army).
Before we pass to the thorough description of Portugal’s position regarding the 2nd World War, we’ll talk about the main aspects of the Neutrality Policy.
The Portuguese neutrality declared at the war’s onset was of British interest, since it was of their concern to draw away the Iberian Peninsula from the conflict.
A neutral Portugal and actively neutralizing (political and economically) of the Franco’s regime was an important asset of that British policy, which we can consider successful in the autumn of 1942.
With Spain under control, Portuguese neutrality became more “collaborative” to the allies, not disregarding the brutal negotiations that Salazar had with Great Britain and the United States regarding the lease of facilities in the Azores. This collaborative (Pro-Allies) side was more active on the political rather than the economical side.
To the Estado Novo, Portuguese neutrality, collaborative to the allies, had to be conducted in a fashion that didn’t create disagreements with Germany, susceptible of endangering Portuguese sovereignty. This pro-British neutrality was the only possible way for Salazar, since a further alliance could trigger a Spanish-German invasion. Internally, this neutrality policy had no real alternative even for the Salazarist opposition.
The maintenance of the neutrality until the end of the war could never have been attained, specially during the critical period of 1939-42, if it wasn’t also in the interest of Germany. Berlin had benefits with the Portuguese neutrality, specially in the economical field. However we can say that the biggest factor of which Portugal benefited, so that it wasn’t invaded by Germany (Operation “Félix” October 1940), was the fact that Hitler decided to invade the USSR.
As we’ve said, Portuguese external policy was a policy of neutrality.
Therefore, in September 1st 1939, Portugal declared it’s neutrality.
It declared only neutrality and not non-belligerence. With this decision it distanced itself from Great-Britain.
Politically active neutrality, specially regarding Spain, which in the Luso-British strategy was also wanted neutral.
In this context, Portugal had an important role to play in the containment of the Germanophile and interventionist faction of the Francoist Regime. Pedro Teotónio Pereira, Portuguese ambassador to Spain played a major role in that policy, which culminated in the Portuguese–Spanish Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression and resulted in the resignation of Serrano Suñer.
With the Portuguese–Spanish Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression, signed in March 17th 1939, Portugal allowed to maintain the Iberian Peninsula outside of the 2nd World War.
This treaty established:
“1) Mutual respect of borders and territories, abstention of acts of aggression, invasion or of violent action against the integrity and inviolability of territory;
2) To not provide aid to a third party agressor;
3) Non-participation in pact or alliance against the other part;
4) Non-assumption of future commitments, with third parties, upholding always the commitments defined in this pact;
5) Consider the duration of 10 years for it’s effectiveness, admitting it’s extension, if there’s no complaint in 6 month’s advance.
And 6) Entry in effect on the date of ratification”
From 1939 to 1940
During this period, Portugal barely felt any consequence from the war. The peninsula was far from the conflict, which end, was thought to be coming soon.
Having this in mind, Portugal maintained good relations with Great Britain, a relation of friendship with both Germany and Italy and a Treaty of Friendship with Spain. Only in an economic standpoint was Portugal feeling some effect from the war.
From 1940 to 1942
With the French capitulation in June 1940, the position of the Iberian Peninsula, namely Portugal, came to a radical change. This because Germany had reached the Pyrenees and was waiting to start “Operation Félix” (Invading Spain - to conquer Gibraltar - and, should the need arise, Portugal).
Germany increased this way it’s pressure on both the Spanish and Portuguese governments (meeting between Hitler and Franco in the border at Hendaye). The Portuguese government, fearful for it’s metropolis independence, managed to persuade Spain to sign an additional protocol to the Non-Aggression Pact. It achieved the non-entry of Franco in the war, even against the pressure that he felt from the Axis countries. At the same time, and unbeknownst to Portugal, the Allied powers were planning to invade the Portuguese overseas territories in the Atlantic.
Already with the knowledge of Portugal, from December 1940, military negotiations start, to assure the protection and support of the British to a withdrawal plan from the Portuguese government to the Azores, in the event of a German attack.
At this point, the war invades the Portuguese quotidian. To Salazar, it seemed unlikely to expect either a German or a British victory. For him, peace would come through compromise between both factions in conflict. For all this, the collaborative neutrality position proceeds.
It’s also during the talks for the government’s withdrawal that the Luso-British relations get strained. This because Salazar was unwilling to immediately retreat to the Azores, as soon as the Germans crossed the Pyrenees, as the British wanted and also because they couldn’t reach an agreement in respect of the amount of infrastructure destruction to delay the German advance.
What impacted decisively the Portuguese neutrality and independence was, at June 22nd 1941, the German attack on the USSR, unfurling in Europe the banners of the “Anti-Bolshevik Crusade”. In Portugal the political consequences did not wait. The regime’s Germanophile faction rejoiced. Once again the economic ties with Germany tightened.
In hand with this, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor brought the USA to the conflict, beginning to turn the tides of the war and bringing a new threat to Portugal. This because, in a speech from Roosevelt, the north american president posed the invasion of Portugal and it’s overseas territories as an option. To this, Salazar answered with a protest and with orders on the Portuguese troops to contest any attack from any force (either Allied or from the Axis). In the end Roosevelt issued an apology granting a diplomatic victory over the USA.
With the German attack on the USSR and at their request, the allies opened a new front on the Middle East, the Mediterranean and in Africa, which lead to the dispersal of the Axis armies.
If the attack on the USSR soothed Salazar, the same cannot be said with the opening of the new fronts which brought again worries to Portugal.
This problems were solved in two fashions. The first was a new meeting with Franco in Seville, where Spain again reassured it intention in staying away from the conflict. Second, the problem was solved when the British government gave guarantees that the military operations wouldn’t affect Portugal’s neutral position. Despite the guarantees, Salazar ordered the Portuguese garrison in the Azores to fight back against any attempt of invasion from Germany and issued the state of alert and vigilance of the telegraphic submarine communications.
From 1943 to 1945
It’s safe to say that 1943 was “the” year for the Allied victory.
To Salazar’s regime, this is a time of change, since the threat of an invasion of the Iberian Peninsula would at this point hardly come to be.
This way, the pressure from the Allies on Portugal gets stronger. Great Britain and the USA needed the Azores to proceed with their effort in the war and, if the British were wiling to privilege the diplomatic channel, the rest of the allies had no intention of accepting a refusal from Salazar: He was in the brink of being ousted when he resisted the embargo on Tungsten.
So the British government requested, on June 18th 1943, the cession of facilities in the Azores while invoking the “Old Alliance”. Salazar, after an almost suicidal resistance, yields.
The studies on the transfer of the facilities went slowly and under the tight control of Salazar.
The main agreement was signed on August 17th 1943 and the date established for it’s implementation would be on the 8th of October from the same year. Portugal committed itself to cede the Lajes Air Base, as well as resupply British ships. The defense of the Azores was under the responsibility of the Portuguese with the exception of the Lajes Air Base and it’s surroundings.
Salazar didn’t commit to this agreement without first having some guarantees for Portugal. This way the start of the transfer was depending on:
a)”Full commitment from the British government to aid Portugal in the event of an attack”;
b)”Commitment in the joint elaboration of a defense plan of Portugal. A Portuguese delegation was to be sent immediately to Great Britain”;
c)”Supply of war material and expert staff, in terms fixated in the annex”. There was also an assurance for the protection of the Portuguese merchant shipping as well as the review of previous trade agreements in an effort to solve the troubles with food and fuel supply in Portugal.
In some days Portugal received also from the British, the guarantee that when the hostilities ceased, the British, South African and Australian troops would respect the sovereignty of Portugal over it’s colonies.
The consequences of this active collaboration with the allies led Salazar to fear the worst from Germany and Spain. Although when Salazar signed the agreement, the danged of an invasion coming from Germany was very small already. Spain had its relations with Portugal reinforced from the meeting in Seville, so this new Portuguese stand was only met with a small protest from the German ambassador in Portugal.
Since the USA weren’t included in the first deal, they also wanted to have benefits as good or better than these. Salazar agreed and it was established that the USA were to build an airport in the island of Santa Maria, albeit at the end of the war these facilities were to become property of the Portuguese state.
And this was the way in which Portugal integrated itself in the International Relations of the 2nd World War.
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