Primary and Secondary Sources on the Gallispanian Elections of 1835
Excerpt from ‘Early Political Factions in Gallispania’
by Stephen Daring
Duverger’s law teaches us that first-past-the-post electoral systems favor a two-party system. In the first half of the 19th century, the 100 seats in Gallispania’s Cortes Generales were elected every 5 years in single-member districts through first-past-the-post. As a result, two political factions grew organically to represent the various interest groups who had voting rights at that time. On the left, the Progresista had organized relatively early under the leadership of Manuel Godoy, the first modern Prime Minister of Gallispania. The Progresista united the interests of the intelligentsia and industrialists and represented the main liberal force in Gallispanian politics. They favored political and economic reform and as such they were responsible for most major reforms since 1800. Other prominent subjects on the liberal agenda included anti-slavery, anti-clericalism, laissez-faire economics and electoral reform.
Between 1800 and 1835, the Progresista had provided 3 of the 4 Gallispanian Prime Ministers. Manuel Godoy was the first of them. He had been appointed to the position by Ferdinand VI in 1800 and was charged with leading a Cabinet of both reformers and conservatives. Godoy quickly realized that without a strong united liberal faction in the Cortes Generales, it would be difficult to push through reforms. As a result, Godoy and the liberals presented a united front in the 1805 elections. By organizing internal primaries ahead of the elections, the Progresista ensured that the left wouldn’t split their votes among multiple candidates and prevented conservative candidates from winning pluralities in otherwise divided districts. The result was a landslide victory for the Progresista and 5 more years of Godoy as Prime Minister. By 1810, however, the conservatives had organized in a similar fashion and took back control of the Cortes Generales, resulting in the first conservative Prime Minister, Mariano Luis de Urquijo.
Manuel Godoy (left) and Mariano Luis de Urquijo (right).
Under Urquijo, the interests of the landowners, Catholic Church and armed forces were all united in government. As a result, a series of protectionist measures were implemented. In addition, Urquijo’s time as Prime Minister marked the end of the period of relative peace that had existed under Godoy’s leadership. Two subsequent wars against Burgundy and Austria, both Protestant states, led to a costly consolidation of Gallispania’s borders along a more defensible frontier. However, as revolution broke out in Bohemia, fears began to arise that it might spread to Gallispania. Both liberals and conservatives responded to the Bohemian Revolution with disgust. The terror of Radetzky’s regime and its swift transition to authoritarianism quickly discouraged any sympathizers who might have thought of importing the Revolution to Gallispania. In response to the Bohemian revolution, the conservatives adopted the so-called Doctrine of Toledo, a set of principles outlining their vision of Gallispanian society., eventually lending its name to the Doctrinarios. Two principles were central to the Doctrine of Toledo; traditionalism and legitimism. Traditionalism was to be a counterweight to the rapid era of change which had come to define Europe. Catholicism and feudalism formed the two pillars of traditionalism. A paternalistic, stratocratic and moralist society would form the defense against the excesses of the Bohemian revolution. Legitimism, as the second guiding principle of the Doctrine of Toledo, provided an answer to the question of the constitution; how could the Constitution of 1800 be reconciled with traditionalism? The Doctrinarios’ answer was fairly simple. As long as the Constitution had the support of Gallispania’s legitimate and lawful ruler, the Emperor, it should be regarded as an extension of his will and thus as the legitimate set of rules governing the Empire. In other words, the legitimacy of the Constitution depended on the willingness of the ruling Emperor to abide by it. These two principles would define conservative politics in the early 19th century.
The liberal response to the Bohemian revolution was mainly aimed at preventing the spread of radical ideas among their own ranks. Godoy’s influence in the party had waned as a new leading figure was emerging: Carlos de Talleyrand. Talleyrand shaped Progresista doctrine around absolute acceptance of the 1800 Constitution, and thus of the monarchy, and made it clear that liberal reforms would only be successful if they were enacted by the system itself. As a result, followers of his brand of liberalism quickly became known as ‘moderados’, or moderates. In 1820, Talleyrand and the moderate Progresista came to power as the Doctrinarios were punished for the costly wars of the 1810s and the loss of Gallispania’s colonial empire in the Columbias. Between 1820 and 1830, Talleyrand proceeded to ensure that his brand of liberalism would ultimately prevail by defeating Radetzky and his radical followers during the Revolutionary War.
Nonetheless, radical groups persisted, both on the left and the right. On the left, the radicales disagreed with Talleyrand’s slow approach to reform and preached a total overhaul of the system. Many of them sympathized with the Italian Revolution in the 1830s and secretly hoped for a similar revolution to overthrow the Emperor and install a democratically elected government. Some radicales were also heavily opposed to the idea of Gallispania itself. According to them, the Empire had been the result of the feudal system and had no uniting institution other than the Emperor. Unsurprisingly, these radicales often resorted to regionalism and aimed to liberate the Spanish, French, Italian or Greek nation from the Gallispanian state.
On the right, radicalism presented itself in the rejection of the Doctrine of Toledo, more specifically in the rejection of the legitimacy of the 1800 Constitution. There were those who claimed Ferdinand VI had been pressured to accept constitutionalism by radical liberals. There were also more radical voices who claimed Ferdinand VI himself wasn’t the legitimate ruler of Gallispania at the time he signed the Constitution.[1] Although this latter group would fade out of existence upon Ferdinand VII’s ascension to the throne, its influence on the right would remain for decades to come. The one thing they had in common was the strong belief in the feudal hierarchy as it had existed for centuries and support for the institution of the monarchy. As such, they became known as the ultrarealistas, or ultra-royalists.
Excerpt from ‘Spanish Society at the End of Ferdinand VII’s Reign’
by Carlos Marichal[2]
THE ARISTOCRACY OR LANDED OLIGARCHY
Up until 1800, the aristocracy, very often great landowners, formally constituted the seigneurial nobility and were represented as such in the regional Cortes of Spain, France, Italy and Greece. However, the Constitution of 1800 made an end to the formal representation of the three estates in government. Additional reforms, pushed through the Cortes Generales, further curtailed the feudal practices which lended the aristocracy their strength. As a result, the aristocracy quickly splintered into political factions across different interest groups. In 1830, the aristocracy remained the dominant class in Gallispanian society. Although they had lost most of their feudal privileges, the vast majority of them were still great landowners with access to revenues from agriculture. In the army, they continued to enjoy the Emperor’s favor and thus continued to play an important role in military affairs. In addition, throughout the period 1800-1830 the aristocracy held many important positions in the governments of Ferdinand VI and Ferdinand VII.
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There were regional differences between members of the aristocracy, the result of Gallispania’s sheer size and the economic activities in each region. There was a large concentration of landowners in the south of Spain and Italy, due to the predominance of the so-called ‘latifundia’, large estates often producing olive oil, wine, fruits and sometimes wheat, and worked by a class of landless rural workers. The nature of their products as cash crops turned the aristocracy of Southern Spain and Italy into a wealthy group of families with international commercial connections.
In Catalonia, Occitania and Northern Italy, the landed aristocracy continued to be the wealthiest class. However, the largest estates in those regions were often in the hands of Castilian or French nobles who resided in Madrid and Versailles respectively. In addition, Catalonian, Occitan and Northern Italian nobles were increasingly rivaled by a growing group of industrial bourgeoisie. As a result, the landed nobility in these regions often turned to the ultrarealistas, the fringe movement of reactionary conservatives associated with the Doctrinarios.
Finally, in Castile and Northern France, the landed nobility focussed primarily on local economic activities such as wheat or wool production. Once represented by the Mesta, a powerful association of sheep ranchers, their power was heavily reduced since their privileges were revoked in 1793. Due to the lack of capital investment in agriculture in these regions, the landed nobility came to embody the main advocate for protectionism in the Cortes Generales.
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The Gallispanian landed aristocracy of 1830 remained one of the most dominant political and economic powers in the Empire. They were closely bound to both Emperors’ balancing acts between the Progresista and the Doctrinarios and to key financial and commercial institutes in the capital. Yet, the landed aristocracy was also a divided class. A considerable part of the traditional nobility was displeased with the gradual loss of feudal privileges. They opposed the rise of liberalism, embodied by the numerous Progresista governments since 1800. They feared the attacks by men like Mendizábal against the power and authority of the Catholic Church would eventually be aimed against them. This discontented group included aristocrats in all parts of the Gallispanian Empire. The majority of them would find an ally in the Doctrinarios, the conservative faction within the Cortes Generales. However, a small minority turned to the ultrarealistas, an increasingly radicalized group not afraid to use violence to enforce their demands.
THE CLERGY
For most of Gallispanian history, the clergy was a class of enormous social, economic and political importance. The clergy owned a great number of rural and urban properties, it controlled the universities and most of primary and secondary education; it exercised a singularly powerful ideological and spiritual influence over all sectors of Gallispanian society. As a social institution, the Church was superior in influence to the nobility. The clergy represented roughly 2% of the total population, or about 1 in 50 or 60 persons, (probably a higher proportion than in any other European country). Like the nobility, the clergy was a non-productive sector of society who lived off rents and feudal tribute.
The Church was divided into two branches, the secular clergy and the regular clergy. The secular clergy consisted of the parish priests and of the ecclesiastics attached to the churches and cathedrals, as well as members of the Church hierarchy. The regular clergy was made up of the members of the religious orders, the monks and nuns. By tradition the regular clergy had more extensive landed properties than the secular. Most rural convents of monks or nuns were large agricultural establishments. The religious rented their extensive properties to the local peasantry, or hired day laborers to cultivate the land and tend the flocks. Numerous religious orders in Spain had huge herds of sheep, whose wool was sold at the great wool markets of northern Castile. There were also numerous convents in the cities. The urban establishments were famous as centers of charity: many offered a daily soup to the urban poor and indigent. They also administered hospitals for the sick, aged and infirm. A great part of the social welfare of the Gallispanian population was in the hands of the Church rather than the State.
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The other branch of the Church, the secular clergy, was a top-heavy bureaucratic apparatus with less landed property than the religious orders, but with almost the same amount of wealth, mainly derived from tithes. The tithes taxes were collected and administered by the Church hierarchy, the bishops and their assistants. In this way they exercised pecuniary control over all subordinate sectors of the secular clergy. The secular clergy was clearly more concentrated in urban than rural areas. This huge ecclesiastical bureaucracy obviously could serve little productive purpose, but its very size gave the Church an enormous source of patronage.
The stability of the Catholic Church seemed unquestionable until the confiscation of Church properties in the Bohemian and Italian Revolutions and the anticlericalism of Juan Mendizábal, who became Prime Minister of Gallispania in 1830. After the elections of 1830, Mendizábal entered into an unholy alliance with the landed nobility. As a member of the Progresista, Mendizábal sought to rid the State of Church influence, while the landed nobility saw an opportunity to expand both their influence at the court as well as their property holdings back home. The result was a set of decrees expanding on the 1803 land reform bill, setting in motion the expropriation and privatization of monastic properties in Gallispania. In 1833, the Inquisition was abolished, further weakening the clergy. Their anger was only tempered by Ferdinand VII’s campaign to invest in monasteries and churches across the country.
But the clergy was not satisfied. Don Jerónimo Castellón y Salas, former Inquisitor General and Bishop of Tarazona, demanded the reestablishment of the Inquisition. He declared: “I should state as Bishop and Counsellor of State that Catholicism and the integrity of Gallispania are dependent upon (the restoration of) the Inquisition”. According to historian Luis Alonso Tejada, this attitude was shared by the rest of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Tejada writes: “It can be said that in the historical circumstances of the 1830s, the Catholic Church… considered the Inquisition not as a remedy against evil doctrine and books, but, above all, as the chosen instrument to conserve the monolithic religious and political unity of all Gallispanians under the legitimate and absolute throne…”.
Unsurprisingly after 1830 religion and politics became increasingly indistinguishable. Some Progresista attributed the evils of Gallispanian society to the excesses of the Church. The clergy turned to the Doctrinarios, in some cases even the ultrarealistas, in order to eliminate liberalism and anticlericalism. The result was a rapid political polarization. The degree of politization among the Gallispanian clergy was remarkable. Documentary evidence indicates that the ecclesiastics, instigated and participated in a great number of clandestine right wing terrorist organizations between 1825 and 1835. This alliance between fanatic royalists and ecclesiastics split the Doctrinarios between a moderate wing, willing to govern Gallispania in alliance with moderate liberals, and a radical wing trying to push the balance of power to the right. The annexation of Papal territories after the (liberal and anticlerical) Italian Revolution in ‘33 further radicalized the clergy. By 1835 the majority of the ecclesiastical hierarchy and the regular clergy were either ultrarealistas or had sympathies for their cause. The Gallispanian Church was determined to defend the traditional order: the monarchy, feudal privileges, and religious intolerance.
Excerpt from ‘Juan Álvarez Mendizábal, Architect of the Unholy Alliance’
by Francisco Bello
In 1830, the Progresista lost their parliamentary majority after a strong campaign of the Doctrinarios against the excesses of liberal government. Talleyrand’s failure to secure territorial gains against the Ottomans in the Congress of Versailles, questions surrounding supposed bribes from Brandenburger diplomats in the lead-up to Versailles, a financial crisis and a scandal involving a married woman all contributed to the poor performance of liberals in 1830. As a result, Carlos de Talleyrand lost his position as leader of the Progresista to Juan Mendizábal, a significantly younger and more energetic politician who could sway allies and enemies alike in a manner which Talleyrand could no longer produce. Mendizábal was notorious for his anticlericalism, a trait which many thought would render him unable to construct a broad alliance of moderates on the left and right wing of the Cortes Generales. They were wrong. Today Juan Mendizábal is remembered as the primary architect of the Unholy Alliance.
After the 1830 elections, the Progresista doubted that Ferdinand VII would call on them to form a government. However in the lead-up to their electoral defeat, Mendizábal had secretly negotiated with Victor de Broglie, a representative of the Doctrinarios and a member of the landed nobility. De Broglie was worried about the growing influence of the radical right wing of his faction and sought to reduce the ultrarealistas’ hold on the Doctrinarios. As such, his goals were aligned with those of Mendizábal. During their secret meeting, the two men agreed on a set of policies which would be carried out by a hypothetical moderate Progresista-Doctrinarios government, the first of its kind since the early days of Godoy’s government.
During the first session of the newly elected Cortes Generales in June of 1830, Victor de Broglie was elected as its President. To the surprise of many right wing Doctrinarios, de Broglie had somehow managed to secure votes from the moderate wing of the Progresista. Unbeknownst to them, de Broglie’s election as President of the Cortes Generales was part of the deal and would set in motion the formal formation of the Unholy Alliance as the ruling government of Gallispania. In his function as President, de Broglie was invited to the Imperial Palace by Ferdinand VII to discuss the Emperor’s preferences for a new government. According to the Gallispanian Constitution of 1800, appointing ministers was the sole right of the Emperor, and elections did not necessarily have to coincide with a new government. However, Ferdinand VII had made it an informal tradition to shake up his Cabinet after every election to ensure that the Cortes Generales and the government would be on one and the same line and Prime Ministers often resigned after disastrous elections for their faction. This had proven to be especially important during the Revolutionary Wars and as such Ferdinand VII was reluctant to deviate from this new tradition.
During de Broglie’s meeting with the Emperor, he subtly mentioned Mendizábal’s as a possible contender for the position of Prime Minister. De Broglie spoke about Mendizábal’s time in the military, his experience in the civil administration and his brief time as Cabinet Member under the Ministry of Finances in Talleyrand’s government. Ferdinand VII was not blind to what had happened and realized that de Broglie and Mendizábal had struck a deal with each other. Nevertheless, he recognized the value of an alliance between the moderate wings of both factions in the Cortes Generales and proceeded to appoint Mendizábal to the position of Prime Minister.
Mendizábal’s years as Prime Minister of Gallispania were characterized by a careful balance between liberal policies and concessions to his conservative partners in government. Mendizábal’s main concern was to eliminate the debt crisis that had engulfed Gallispania in the aftermath of the Revolutionary War. As part of his recovery plan, Mendizábal confiscated monastic properties and privatized them, hoping that it would generate enough income for the state coffers to allow short-term economic measures. The Prime Minister’s conservative allies, the landowners, greatly benefitted from the ecclesiastical confiscations of Mendizábal, further cementing the alliance between Mendizábal and De Broglie.
The 1835 elections presented itself in the form of an existential threat for the Unholy Alliance. Due to Gallispania’s voting laws, only about 0.4% of the country, or around 300 000 people[3], had the right to vote. In addition, the Cortes Generales was elected indirectly through provincial electoral colleges. This system heavily favored the Spanish provinces. Even though the Spanish electorate represented roughly 20% of Gallispania’s voting population, it elected around a third of the 100 seats in the Cortes. In comparison, the Italian electorate represented roughly 35% and elected only 20 seats. Electoral reform would be a continuous campaigning point of the Progresista, but here they encountered wide resistance from the Doctrinarios and ultrarealistas. As a result, and with the 1833 Italian Revolution in recent memory, all the signs were on the wall that the Unholy Alliance would break up after the 1835 elections.
The Liberal Herald, June 12 1835
Cortes Generales Elections
The result of the elections has somewhat disappointed us. Our correspondent in Madrid has written to us that Mendizábal’s liberals have performed poorly. Our favored candidates have suffered defeats, much to our dissatisfaction and regret. The objective of the Church is obtained; a large number of conservative candidates elected are members of the Catholic Church and will represent its interests, being opposed to the anticlericalism of the Progresista. As such we expect Mendizábal to hand in his resignation as Prime Minister to the Emperor later this week and a new conservative Prime Minister to be sworn in soon after. To easily represent the new balance of power in the Cortes Generales, we have organized the results in the table below, sorted by ballot.[4]
Ballot | Votes | Seats |
Progresista | 115 662 | 36 |
Doctrinarios | 122 429 | 43 |
Independent Candidates | 69 520 | 21 |
Total | 307 611 | 100 |
Excerpt from ‘Gallispanian Conservatism, 1834-1900’
by Stanley G. Payne[5]
The dismal start to the reign of Ferdinand VII (1811-1835) made it clear that neither Catholic neotraditionalism nor royalist despotism offered a functional alternative to the decade of liberalism which had preceded it. Unlike their counterparts in Great Britain, the royalist ultra-right in Gallispania were unable to adjust their institutions to the new conditions of the nineteenth-century. They failed to represent the new social and economic interests, could not at all accommodate themselves to nineteenth-century culture, proved inept at diplomatic, imperial and military affairs, and failed even to administer the existing system with minimal efficiency. Thus within ten years, conservative rule foundered, and in 1820 was the first modern European government to break down over the issue of unsuccessful colonial war and repression when they were voted out and replaced once again by the liberals.
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Gallispanian conservatives were given a second chance to govern the country in 1830, when Mendizábal and De Broglie struck a deal to form the Unholy Alliance between moderate liberals and moderate conservatives. It was the threat from the ultra-right that first placed conservative liberalism in direct control of Gallispania’s destinies. Against the menace of the reactionary ultrarealistas a common cause was initially formed among the moderate liberals and the pragmatic conservatives, who banded together behind the tandem Mendizábal-De Broglie, putting the former up for the position of Prime Minister. However, against the backdrop of the Unholy Alliance, moderate conservatives and ultrarealistas were slowly coming to terms with each other as governing with the liberals became increasingly difficult.
It is during this time that the classic conservative position in modern Gallispanian politics began to take shape as a compromise between moderate conservatives and reactionaries, and with the traces of the Doctrine of Toledo clearly still visible within. It rested on four fundamental principles: firm emphasis on monarchy under limited constitutional restrictions; social elitism, expressed politically through extremely restricted suffrage for parliamentary elections; in economics a poorly coordinated combination of national protectionism with staunch defense of private property (a clear reaction to Mendizábal’s confiscations); and an attempt to achieve a compromise on the religious issue by maintaining the Catholic identity of the state and trying to regain the political support of the Church.
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Going into the 1835 elections, Victor de Broglie made a special effort to mobilize the major conservative business and economic interests of the upper-middle and upper classes. In addition, he secured the support of the Church by promising to block any future attempt by anti-clerical liberals to push through hostile legislation aimed against weakening the Catholic Church. The result was a victory of conservative candidates, followed by Mendizábal’s resignation as Prime Minister. In the wake of Mendizábal’s resignation, the liberals appeared too weak to govern and were quickly replaced by a conservative cabinet by Emperor Ferdinand VII, who by now was weeks away from his deathbed. Victor de Broglie became Gallispania’s fifth Prime Minister, the second to be born in France, the last to server under Emperor Ferdinand VII and the first to serve under Empress Victoria.
Outlook on Gallispanian politics around the time of Empress Victoria’s ascension to the throne in 1836.
[1]: See
Chapter 27 of ‘Two idiots discover America’, Ferdinand VI was in fact illegitimate, but this was covered up to prevent a succession crisis.
[2]: This is largely based on a chapter from Carlos Marichal’s book ‘Spain 1834-1844’.
[3]: Around 65 000 Spaniards, 107 000 Italians, 130 000 French and 4 200 Greeks voted in the 1835 elections, however their votes did not count equally due to Gallispania’s electoral system.
[4]: Ever since the 1810s, it became a standard practice in Gallispanian elections to vote using a standardized ballot distributed by the political factions themselves. These ballots presented the name of the faction’s leader at the top, even if that leader did not stand in the district in question. The bottom half was usually reserved for a list of candidates standing for election in a certain district.
[5]: This is based on a real article by Stanley G. Payne titled ‘Spanish Conservatism 1834-1923’.