planning to make ahistorical panzer divisions

[Dalwin]

Just please, please make it slightly more historical.

Armored divisions went from very tank heavy (2:1 ratio to infantry) to the opposite by the end of the war. Ridiculous heavy armor builds should be punished by making them unable to defend or do much of anything in any sort of difficult terrain.

Ultra heavy armor should have severe supply and maintenance issues.

And, please, please get rid of armored cars as a unit.

I'd like to see the combined arms bonus adjusted to reflect accepted observations. Anything more than, say, 45% hard should be punished and there should be major penalties for anything over, say, 60%.

You needs lots of infantry, artillery and, especially, recon.

Just becasue it happened historically does not make the opposite "ridiculous." If fact if anything was ridiculous it was the reason why the Germans changed the structure to the one with fewer tanks. It was not becasue the new structure made for a more effective division. It was becasue Hitler's plan for invading Russia called for a certain number of Pz divisions and they could not possbily have constructed that many under the old TOE.

The new structure was not only not more effective on the battlefield it was also leff efficient logistically as well. It was a lose/lose proposition; a bad military decision made for political reasons.

So the new structure let him see the right number of tank units advancing on various objectives even if they were badly watered down.

Your other points about combined arms and about heavier tank models are all well taken but have little to do with the TOE of a division being 2:1 armor to infantry.

 

[mursolini]

Just becasue it happened historically does not make the opposite "ridiculous." If fact if anything was ridiculous it was the reason why the Germans changed the structure to the one with fewer tanks. It was not becasue the new structure made for a more effective division. It was becasue Hitler's plan for invading Russia called for a certain number of Pz divisions and they could not possbily have constructed that many under the old TOE.

The new structure was not only not more effective on the battlefield it was also leff efficient logistically as well. It was a lose/lose proposition; a bad military decision made for political reasons.

So the new structure let him see the right number of tank units advancing on various objectives even if they were badly watered down.

Your other points about combined arms and about heavier tank models are all well taken but have little to do with the TOE of a division being 2:1 armor to infantry.

And what was the reason Allies arrived to similar proposition?
And what was the reason German armor being far less capable of fighting far behind the frontlies in Poland than it was in France or Russia?
And why did Soviets decrease the number of tanks in an armored division later in war despite having a tonne of tanks to throw around?
And why did during the battle of Kursk, German division that got aloted a lot of more tanks than usuall division, failed miserably to do anything usefull?

You don`t seem to be wiling to accept that tanks to operate properly need a certain amount of infantry supporting them and other various personell, which brings the number of tanks that a "division" formation can effectivly support roughtly to what the late war armored division looked like.

For a second, both Allies and Soveits had tonns of tanks to throw around, and yet, their numbers in a single division decreased.

 

[Dalwin]

And what was the reason Allies arrived to similar proposition?
And what was the reason German armor being far less capable of fighting far behind the frontlies in Poland than it was in France or Russia?
And why did Soviets decrease the number of tanks in an armored division later in war despite having a tonne of tanks to throw around?
And why did during the battle of Kursk, German division that got aloted a lot of more tanks than usuall division, failed miserably to do anything usefull?

You don`t seem to be wiling to accept that tanks to operate properly need a certain amount of infantry supporting them and other various personell, which brings the number of tanks that a "division" formation can effectivly support roughtly to what the late war armored division looked like.

For a second, both Allies and Soveits had tonns of tanks to throw around, and yet, their numbers in a single division decreased.

Did the division that suddenly had extra tanks in tme for Kursk also have the proper support for them? Did they have enough mechanics, spare parts, recovery vehicles etc. as if they had been designed to have that many tanks? Then again, sometimes the performance of a unit depends on its commander or other factors besides the TOE. To say that division did nothing useful thereby invalidating the unit structure is quite a leap of logic.

I am also not saying that the infantry support is not required. If you read my original post I clearly said that combining my panzers into fewer divisions with more tanks in each went hand in hand with having extra motorized divisions to accompany them. It is the same overall ratio but divided differently at the division level.

I am not even argueing that my way is better, though I think it is a bit arrogant for you to offhandedly label such a thing as "ridiculous," especially considering there is historical precedent for it and that divisions of this structure performed adequately in 1939 and 1940.