5 kilometers southwest of Grodno
May 11, 1942
Timoshenko shook his head to clear the fog from it. For some reason he felt as if he was a man returning to a project after some time away from it, unsure exactly of where he had left off and where he needed to go from there. Of course, he knew in general terms what was happening: the German fascists and their perfidious Albion allies were invading the Soviet Union. He also knew in general terms what he needed to do: help stop the invaders and then drive onward toward Berlin to end the war and allow Stalin to dictate terms to the German Reich. What he did not feel like he was adequately grasping, however, were the specifics of the situation so he resolved to overview them in an attempt to break the mental fog that was obscuring his perception of the conflict and allow him to make meaningful contributions to end the war successfully. He was, after all, the coordinator of the northern fronts.
Late on the 9th of May, the Germans assaulted the area around the Lithuanian town of Alytus in force, attacking the 2nd Baltic Front under the command of General Antonov from two directions: Konigsberg and Suwalki. Forces were matched evenly though the Germans were very armor-heavy, as opposed to the primarily infantry Soviet Fronts. Nevertheless, a combination of German exhaustion and the poor weather seemed to be giving the Soviet defenders an edge in the battle. German logistics seemed to be poor from what Timoshenko could infer; replacements for casualties were not coming up nearly quickly enough to the front for them, as opposed to the Soviets’ own efficient system. Some German units seemed even to be as low as half-strength, particularly in the predominantly-infantry motorized divisions. Timoshenko smiled grimly; it seemed like, if the war turned into one of sheer attrition as the Western Front during the Great War had been, the Soviets would win.
The battle for Alytus, with the German attack apparently failing.
Second on his list of events to review was the battle of Pinsk, launched by the Germas mid-afternoon on the 10th. The German encirclement threat seemed momentarily broken, as the Soviet Fronts in southern Belarus had two corridors through which to receive supplies. Additionally, the Germans themselves were surrounded and isolated at Rowne, 30 German armored and motorized infantry divisions were stranded around that town and awaited destruction. They were, however, most certainly not passive. The Germans were attacking Pinsk, the cornerstone of one of the supply corridors. The capture of Pinsk would also allow them to link up with the Germans at Rowne; as such, the Germans were throwing 42 divisions from both sides of the corridor into the struggle. Against them were 33 Soviet divisions, all of which were very badly battered and nearly all of them lacked any sort of defensive capabilities, they were so disorganized from battle. The Germans were little better in that regard, but enough so that it seemed likely that they would win, despite the marshes.
Timoshenko had reacted to this pressure on Pinsk by launching an impromptu counter-offensive toward Slonim within hours of the opening of the Pinsk battle. He was throwing in his entire Front, 24 divisions, against the rear of Field Marshal Hausser’s 24 armored and motorized divisions. Though distracted by his drive toward the undefended town of Baranowicze and the battle around Pinsk, Hausser was able to devote enough attention to the new threat to make Timoshenko’s drive very difficult and likely a failure. Timoshenko grimaced at that.
The failing attack on Slonim to take pressure off of Pinsk.
Timoshenko’s counterattack brought another counterattack as well, a German counterattack against him! Fortunately, the German counterthrust was minor and consisted only of 12 divisions on two axes. Of these divisions, the majority was much disorganized and many had taken quite heavy casualties in previous heavy fighting in the region. Much as Timoshenko’s own counterattack was failing, so was the German one. Both were sideshows at the moment, to the drama that was taking place to the south.
Defending Grodno from a failing German counterattack.
The final event of the 10th capped a dramatic day, as Zhukov began his assault on Rowne. He attacked with 27 divisions, less than the 30 divisions defending the town, but hoped that his divisions were in better shape than the Germans’. Despite all the Germans’ troubles, however, reports circulated so far augured that the attack would fail as the Germans were too well entrenched despite their lack of supplies, and the Soviets were not attacking in great enough numbers. Additionally, the Germans were moving on Kowel, attempting to open another supply corridor to Rowne. Kowel was undefended by the Soviets. This, when combined with Pinsk, would have the result of encircling any Soviet forces left in southern Belarus, which could not be allowed.
Zhukov’s failing attack on Rowne.
Timoshenko grimaced and shook his head at the situation. It was very much in the balance. 30 German divisions trapped at Rowne, potentially up to 36 Soviet divisions trapped in southern Belarus if the two German thrusts toward Pinsk and Kowel succeeded. The situation was incredibly delicate, Timoshenko hoped that he, Vasilevskij and their commanders were up to the task that faced them. Timoshenko sighed in a determined sort of way, despite the difficult situation he was already looking toward the end he hoped for, a victory over Germany.