Not at all! Welcome back!!!Hope you guys haven't minded the hiatus.
Not at all! Welcome back!!!Hope you guys haven't minded the hiatus.
Air Marshal Ivan Taube said:“ Our existing designs may well have been suitable for campaigns against waning powers and the emergencies that faced us. Indeed, the Empire should be proud of its pilots and all that they have accomplished. That said, the next potential threats we face are not primitive cavalry armies or revolution wracked territories in the Balkans. The newest syndicalist bombers are four engined heavy aircraft with significant defensive armament. Their fighters are modern monoplanes, some mounting as many as eight machine guns. Re-equipping our units is a process that must thus be both ambitious and rapid."
War said:
The Imperial Russian Air Service entered 1940 blooded, confident and with strong political backing. Hundreds of aircraft had been lost to all causes during the last three years of wars, but those conflicts had purchased valuable experience and kept the air-force at the centre of Markov’s plans for a modernised Imperial Russian military.
That said, delays in development, the need to give industry a chance to adapt, and the more pressing requirements of the Army and Navy meant that 1940 was not to be a year of free and open ended construction contracts or unlimited Government funding.
The air force itself continued to expand, albeit at a far more moderate rate than was envisioned. The frontline air strength had increased to 4,300 aircraft, excluding reconnaissance, transport and utility planes. The Imperial Russian Air Service, on paper at least, could also call on the single largest fighter force in the world.
It was also well served in leadership and pilot quality. Russian air commanders had gained years worth of experience in bombing and ground attack operations over the last three years while the release of experienced, professional pilots from combat duty meant that there was an overabundance of qualified trainers capable of cementing those lessons in the minds of the next generation of aircrew.
The commitment of the force to training, extending beyond basic and into quite advanced training concepts. An “aggressor” wing was formed with the task both of evaluating foreign aircraft designs but also familiarising themselves with and simulating hostile tactics. While known by a variety of names, these training units would collectively come to be colloquially known as “Red forces” or “Red brigades” due to their adoption of the commonly used Internationale red star symbol to mark them out during training exercises. Still embryonic in 1940, this practice of aggressor training and analysis would become a valuable and defining feature of Russian aviation in years to come.
None the less, Russia's air-forces were hardly of a continental standard. The I-15 and the improved 'chaika' bi-plane fighters remained the backbone of Imperial fighter strength and, outside of the Imperial Guard's aerial component, most of the bombers dated back a decade. By comparison, even the most dated of the Internationale's designs were now modern, monoplanes of ever increasing performance.
That was to say nothing of the newer designs, such as the Union's "Hurricane" which, while in only low rate production, was clearly a deadly threat with its 8 machine gun armament.
While a paltry number of newer, intermediate designs were deployed on a small scale basis, the air-force as a whole continued to pay the price for the policy of delaying technical upgrades during the wars of restoration. Just as the army laboured with worn out rifles and equipment, the air-force suffered with outdated aircraft, but filled with the confidence that it would be less than a year before new designs would be selected for mass production.
For that reason, one can think of 1940 less of a year defined by the air forces themselves. Rather, it was a year that belonged to the Russian aviation industry and its plethora of skilled designers who were now free to proceed free from the dire economic shackles that had restricted their work in years passed.
Under Kerensky, the aviation industry had become fragmented and distorted by government interventions that reflected special interest and political necessity rather than market reality or the needs of the state, somehow failing to achieve the benefits of either the free market systems or the disciplined regimentation of syndicalism.
In the name of advancing science and engineering, as well as developing national prestige, Kerensky's government had funded the creation of dedicated design bureaus and teams. New aircraft were useful propaganda tools, and the act of designing and prototyping them was affordable when compared to mass production.
The lack of a similar treatment for the manufacturing side of the aviation industry left a significant disconnect between the designers and the organisations that would build any new aircraft in commercial quantities. New planes could be designed but Russia had little ability to build them at competitive rates and costs.
Beginning with the Pavlovich reforms that began to change. The industry began to consolidate and embrace a model of vertical integration, manufacturers allying with designers throughout the lifetime of a project and beyond. For designers, it meant avoiding a competitive bidding process and mitigation of risk, for the manufacturers, it offered a chance of cornering a market and deriving great profits if a designed aircraft proved popular. It also meant that cooperation between design and manufacturing teams could take place throughout the design process, ensuring that there would be a far shorter lead time between prototyping and quantity production...and that quantity production would be easier and cheaper when (and if) it commenced.
This shifting tide of industry organisation was combined with an influx of new technology and expertise from overseas and freely available investment given the anticipation of large, profitable government contracts set to be issued in 1941.
For all in the industry, stakes were high. A winning design promised immense profits for victorious corporations, both from production in their own factories and the sale of production licenses.
A failure meanwhile, would mean building another companies designs and likely financial oblivion. Few expected teams which lost out would continue to exist for long.
Exactly what sort of planes they would be building was itself an area of intense competition within the military and civilian wings of Government and lobbying, threats and impassioned arguments brewed and propagated freely.
The future of the Imperial fighter program in particular had been a point of some contention. Many of the Air-Service's older pilots stood by the Russian tradition of light-weight, low altitude, manoeuvrable fighters. They came up against an alliance of bomber advocates, desperate for a design better matched to escorting their air-craft, and the disparagingly called “Amerikanski” advocates lead by Alexander Prokoriev de Seversky and Alexander Kartveli who had folded numerous American emigres, as well as American style thinking, into their operations.
The fight was never likely to have a winner. The military was on a political high after the wars of re-unification while Seversky was close to the Czar and an accomplished politician. In a classic case of compromise, the titanic fighter contract was split in two.
The Frontal Fighter Program was the child of traditional thinking. It called for a rugged, lightweight and manoeuvrable fighter for air-superiority and front support duties. Designers as diverse as Lavochkin, Yakovlev and Petlykov had already announced their desire to enter the competition by the beginning of 1940, although their final designs were still a year off. Some of the early designs followed closely the path set out by continental developments, featuring low powered liquid cooled engines and wood heavy air-frames.
In the High-Altitude Fighter space, Seversky his Amerikanski thinking had a clear lead. Using American radial engines, they had already prepared a design, the S-43 “uhlan” which had its first flight in November of 1939. Designed more as a bomber escort and high-altitude aircraft than a low-level fighter, the uhlan was five hundred kilograms heavier, stockier and generally “un-russian” in terms of design when compared to its frontal competitors. In many ways the plane gave the Company a clear lead over potential competitors, but development was already proceeding on an entirely new design ahead of final decisions being made. Seversky remained concerned that the design was inferior to the new aircraft likely to come out of the Internationale and Germany given time, and his comrade Kartveli pushed for rapid progress on the newer, still heavier design.
The air-force need for a substantial number of flexible medium level bombers was arguably the most profitable of the contracts on offer, if only because most of those in power foresaw it going to the manufacturers of the already successful IL-4 design which had been vindicated by service with the Imperial Guard during the move against Minsk.
Augmenting the tactical bombers, the plan called for two new designs. Firstly a strategic aircraft with either 2 or four engines, built for true long range work. The specifications were ambitious but clearly envisioned the ability to fly sorties from Scandinavia deep into the Union of Britain if necessary. Few competitors aspired to this particular requirement, despite the generous per-unit price forecast, given the extreme technical demands involved.
More accessible was the contract for a fast, short-ranged, close support dive bomber. The successful use of Stukas by the German task-group Condor in Russia had long caused the Russians to covet a domestically manufactured alternative. The initial designs were varied. Some proposed virtual copies of the German design, others suggested removing dive-bombing capability and instead producing a heavily armoured strafing aircraft. Others still, suggested twin-engined designs with an emphasis on speed and flexibility. Only time would tell which concept would finally win the lucrative contract, but as 1940 dawned, at least one promising design had already undertaken its first flight.
Unlike the continental air-forces, the Imperial Russian Air Service was not a battle ready world beater come 1940. It did not benefit from a syndicalist aviation industry geared up to war or the cutting edge design of Germany’s single seat fighters. What it did have was skilled pilots, money and singularly talented designers.
Given time, there was every chance it would become a winning combination.
What is that gunmetal plane? Hellcat? Wildcat?
Also what is the current insignia of the Imperial Air Service so I can reskin my Warthunder planes with Imperial insignia![]()
What is that gunmetal plane? Hellcat? Wildcat?
Also what is the current insignia of the Imperial Air Service so I can reskin my Warthunder planes with Imperial insignia![]()
I think it's a P-35 OTL