the increasing use of labour force transfers from occupied Mexico and Red Africa.
Hmm.... I've seen that before, but where...
What was it called again...
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the increasing use of labour force transfers from occupied Mexico and Red Africa.
Nah, it's not slave labor if your reward is to see socialism thrive.Hmm.... I've seen that before, but where...
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What was it called again...
As much as I hate the USSA, I feel like this is a little unfair, even for the forcibly transferred Mexican workers they seem to be getting fairly paid and will eventually be well treated.Hmm.... I've seen that before, but where...
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What was it called again...
@Teivel the chronicle style summary of historian events is a new style element in your AAR, isn't it? Are you planning to cover time more quickly in this way?
I think it might be more roundaboutI'm sure Germany's attempt to stay a military superpower will go just peachy for them in a way that definitely won't fail and radicalize a budding far right movement already angered by Russian influence over the Kaiserreich
China really is in a bad shape, as a country.363: The Restless East - Part 1
Shanghai - January 1949
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The Austrian, von Steiger, puffed gently on his pipe as the Chinese server placed another pot of tea in front of them, retreating with a deep bow. The evening view over Shanghai harbour from the legation hotel was, it had to be admitted, quite something. “What I don’t understand Ivan, is why you think you need us.”
Ivan didn’t have an official role to claim, his dealings with the Imperial Government were at arms length, but most around here understood that on legation matters, he was as good as a telegraph line to Saint Petersburg. “Meaning what?”
Von Steiger finally set down the pipe after one last puff. The bustling noise of Shanghai washing over them both. “You have the Belgian and British votes I presume, and that pet Congress of Americans you keep around in Vladivostok. That gives you four, so unless I’m missing something obvious, you’re kingmaker. You back Berlin, that’s the five they need, you side with your Japanese friends….much the same. So why…” he tapped his fingers on the table “are you talking to me, and not them?”
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Ivan drank the tea, casting a quick eye around to make sure the Nepalese toughs he’d posted outside their booth were keeping the prying eyes away. “Because, as often seems to be the case these days, you want the same thing we do.”
“Meaning?”
“You know exactly what I mean.”
Von Steiger gave a resigned nod. “Berlin wishes to re-establish herself as a great power in Asia, and to drain China dry. Japan wishes to confirm her prominence…and drain China dry. You and your Motherland want…”
“Quiet. Quiet peace and prosperity. A China more concerned with recovery, growth, and cooperation.”
“You mean, Ivan” interjected von Steiger with a rap on the table “one that will accept her territorial losses in Manchuria and refrain from any action to challenge them so long as she can take steps towards becoming a modern nation.”
Ivan was silent for a moment. “Is it too much to want quiet, my friend? And THAT” he said, pointing his cane over the balcony railing at the sixty five thousand ton Prussian battleship in the bay, main guns dwarfing the small tugs and ferries saturating the harbour “is not what I would call quiet.”
It was in that moment, as if to emphasise his point, that a cracking boom broke over the harbour, as a sheet of flame and water erupted against the Tirpitz aft-starboard quarter.
From - "The Xuantong Era"
Military victory in the early 1940s had nominally left the Qing and the Zhili clique as the sole internationally recognised legitimate government of China, but it had also left the country diminished and decrepit.
Economically, public and private finances in the Qing realm were shot to shreds. The Beijing had gone into the war heavily indebted to domestic and foreign lenders alike, and had been forced to exacerbate that state of affairs to keep the war moving forward. The situation was far worse in the South. There, the Republicans had embarked on great public war-bond issues, gathered up rare metals and, when all else failed, began selling concessions off the circling foreign powers.
With the Republicans defeated, the bankers and common people of the South would see no interest or principal for their bonds, no return of their precious metals or compensation for billions of hours of conscripted labour. The wealth of entire provinces evaporated, only to be exacerbated by widespread looting, corruption, and exploitation by the ill disciplined militias and paramilitaries that made up so much of the Qing Southern campaign.
The result was famine, with different provinces impacted seemingly every year. The Central Government would squeeze the South in turn, holding it ‘responsible’ for the war and trying to use supplies from there to offset famines further North, exacerbating the situation and souring many Southern Chinese against their ‘occupying’ Generals turned Governors.
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Industrial production too was in distress. A liquidity crisis, collapse in foreing confidence, and chaotic market conditions put a hard stop to the industrial development pushed by German investors in the 1920s and 1930s, forcing many in the country to fall back on traditional crafts and artisanal production to survive.
And the situation was not much better from a strategic or political perspective.
Strategically, China had been much reduced during her decades of comparative weakness. Tibet and the North West had been first dominated by Sternberg, and then rebuilt as client states of the distant RRE throne. Manchuria, the homeland of the Imperial line, had been swallowed whole by the bear on dubious pretences during the restoration wars. And then there were the losses of the 1940s. When Germany had collapsed, Japan had been quick to occupy the German concessions and extend the ‘security zone’ around them further than the Germans had ever pushed it. When war against the Republicans came, Tokyo went further, collaborating with its Thai ally to occupy “safe zones” for the preservation of international property and civilians.
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Southern Yunnan and the Island of Hainan had been occupied, becoming havens for fleeing Republicans who now published anti Zhili propaganda from behind a wall of Japanese bayonets. Japan had stalled all negotiations on the return of these holdings until it was given guarantees that Beijing would honour the foreign debts of the Republic, and acknowledge the various property and resource rights that Japanese investors had bought up from the KMT in its dying days. With Japanese pulsejet batteries in Tianjin within range of Beijing, the Japanese presence loomed large over the Chinese position.
Now, with Germany reasserting rights to repayment for past debts and compensation for, or the return of, the industrial infrastructure of German companies in Southern China, the Qing’s financial position seemed even more dire.
Had the Qing been a private company, a decent economic advisor might have suggested that the entire organisation simply default; that it accept a temporary elimination of its right to foreign capital in exchange for the relief of interest pressures on the budget, and begin again using China’s population and agricultural and industrial potential to steadily rebuild its bottom line and creditworthiness.
But Beijing, unlike almost any other company or Government, couldn't default.
The reason for that lay in the final aspect of the strategic calamity faced by the Qing.
For decades now, the International Mandate for the Concessions, Settlements and Legations in China had administered China’s China’s greatest trading ports (which doubled as its great banking and commercial centres).
The cities were in some way both China’s greatest strength, and her most obvious weakness. The cities brimmed with foreign capital and expertise, well developed dockyards and infrastructure and even some reasonably modern factories. They had escaped the wars and depressions of the last three decades, continuing on as rich melting pots of cultures while generating an overwhelming share of Chinese commercial and trade activity.
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They were also, as the name suggested, under foreign governance.
If China were late on debt payments, it was within the power of the Legation council to simply raise taxes on goods entering or exiting China through those ports, throttling access to desperately needed machinery imports and diminishing the profitability of exports. Businesses operating within the Legation cities never paid a cent of their taxes to Beijing, and Chinese troops were barred from the territories. This consolidation of foreign concessions, from Hong Kong to Shanghai had been conceived as a partial concession to China, acknowledging the cities as Chinese territory…but with such caveats and limitations that the situation gave no comfort to Beijing.
In 1949, both Japan and Germany publicly flirted with the idea that their candidates for the Legation council would consider using this power in order to discharge the Qing’s foreign obligations, potentially at great cost to the Chinese state. Germany, to reassert her relevance in the region and overcome her financial challenges at home, Japan, to maintain prominence in the region and advance their plan to increase their commercial and political penetration of China, rather than extract funds directly.
In the face of these myriad challenges, the now ‘united’ China could hardly speak with a unified voice.
The dominant power was still the Zhili clique and their Harmony Association.The Zhili had lost some of their influence through the erosion of their military resources during the war, but looting, seizure of businesses and land, and the placement of allies in governorships of the newly taken regions had introduced some new life into the old establishment. The clique still largely controlled the debates of the Assembly, filtered the decrees of the court, and had the final say on international affairs (with many Zhilli generals exploiting this to get rich through involvement in foreign investments or projects). But challenges were mounting, as the delicate dance of trying to manipulate both democracy and the crown at the same time grew ever more intricate and difficult.
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The Imperial Court and its allies in the Zongshe Party had been intended to be powerless figureheads by the Zhili Generals, but increasingly, the court wielded power through a growing, parallel military establishment that raised imperial taxes directly, administered territory, and sporadically enforced Imperial writs and rulings. Behind closed doors, they aspired to a true restoration of the Imperial system, so that the foreigners could be dealt with on a more even level.
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There were more grass roots and dangerous local actors too. They ranged from the Young China Party, and its array of aggressive, nationalistic modernisers who wanted to reshape China into a strong, centralised, modern state, to an array of quasi mystic movements that had been embedded in power since Bejing had cut its deal with the likes of Zhang Tianran to bring the paramilitaries into the Imperial fold.
Perhaps the least organised, but most dangerous, were the array of anti-foreign extremist movements, whether they grew out of religious movements, Chinese nationalism, or mere banditry cloaked in nationalism. These bands preyed on all signs of foreign influence in China, and were becoming an ever greater threat even in the Legation cities. The Beijing Government claimed it was too badly resourced to detect and crush these groups, many foreigners quietly claimed it was more a matter of will.
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Finally, there were those movements that served as foreign proxies.
The Chinese Republican movement lived on, a proxy of Imperial Japanese intelligence to leverage against Beijing. Regionalists thrived in Manchuria where they had first been stoked by the Zhang and were now tolerated by the RRE as a bulwark against Qing propaganda and infiltration.
The Prosperity Party had reinvigorated its ties with German business, but now also flirted with Japanese and Russo Roman interest as well, continuing its general pro-business agenda while trying to encourage rapprochement with the foreign powers over confrontation.
Socialist movements too had infiltrated the country. In the cities, leftism and even modern Syndicalist thought still circulated, wherever the Qing police were too poorly manned…or too well bribed to suppress them. Gandhian revolutionary inspirations were far stronger in the countryside, where the idea of a village based, socialist societal model with a strong spiritual foundation found fertile soil to grow.
All of this (by no means exhaustive) list is intended merely to show that the political spectrum of China was fragmented, stressed by economic malaise, corruption, and deep ideological divides. Different movements sought different backers, and few could claim to have common goals.
It was in this fragile climate that the campaign to elect the next head of the Legations council commenced, with all China and the great powers of the world looking on intently.
It was in this fragile climate, that a homemade explosive, disguised in the hull of a tugboat, detonated against the hull of the German battleship Tirpitz in Shanghai harbour.
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Oh yeah, I definitely don't think that Wilhelm III dying means Germany's at all out of the woods; in fact Louis Ferdinand's reign is likely to be incredibly difficult. I just don't see the German far right being able to consolidate the power Wilhelm III gives them between a hostile Kaiser and a Russia that isn't too much of a fan of their attitudes towards the eastern border. Of course, if Louis Ferdinand has to rely on Russia to keep them out of power, that could lead to bad things for him in the long term, but there's no way Russia's countenancing such a hostile power right on its border.snip
Well, they wouldn't be hostile right away, wouldn't they? A bit of national populist chest thumping, of course, antisemitic rants, of course, but the Tsar isn't a Jew and doesn't even know what German or Russian antisemitism feels like (having been raised in Canada) so why would he care. Plenty of old fashioned Russian military types and anti modernist aristocrats would even cheer at antisemitic rants coming from Germany anyways.Oh yeah, I definitely don't think that Wilhelm III dying means Germany's at all out of the woods; in fact Louis Ferdinand's reign is likely to be incredibly difficult. I just don't see the German far right being able to consolidate the power Wilhelm III gives them between a hostile Kaiser and a Russia that isn't too much of a fan of their attitudes towards the eastern border. Of course, if Louis Ferdinand has to rely on Russia to keep them out of power, that could lead to bad things for him in the long term, but there's no way Russia's countenancing such a hostile power right on its border.