Occupied France / Vichy France - why were there two?

[DystopianAlphaOmega]

A conspiracy would be organised and proactive...
Opportunism is reactive, and it was, here, an opportunistic motive.



The timeline is:
The 7th of March, German Armies enter in Rhineland.
The 8th of March, the French council of ministers, albeit it was indeed divided, order a partial mobilization of the army, with the aim of a military action in Rhineland. IIRC, Sarraut, the president of the French Council ordered to Gamelin, the head of French High Command to immediately expel Germans troops out Rhineland... and Gamelin refused to obey to the government... It is as simple as that.
There were strong factious feelings within the army and especially the High Command, feed by defeatism, obviously, but also by anti-republicanism and anti-parliamentarism (and, paradoxically, by Anglophobia).

So, facing this refusal of the high command, and, informed by the High Command that there were many more German Forces in the Rhineland than in reality, and the army refusing to act. The divided council, now facing the insubordination of the High Command, lost its willingness, was dominated by "doves" and seek British and Italian support, like you describe it.

But it have to be added that the watchword of the right-wing politically close to Pétain and many others generals, at the time of the re-militarization of Rhineland was: "No Jewish Crusade [against Germany]" or "We'll not fight for Jewish". That also enlighten how Hitler's threat was perceived, and indeed it seem it wasn't what appeared to be the main threat in High Command's mind. A defeat would be a blessing in disguise and they indeed lauded the defeat as a divine providence.

On the Rhineland, as I understand it, Gamelin basically said that if the French Government wanted to oppose it and invade Germany, they would need a full mobilization (in case it led to a full-blown war with Germany). This was less politically and economically viable to the caretaker French government than if he had said they could succeed with just their standing forces on the Maginot, but hardly represents defying his political masters. He was not aware of how much of a bluff the remilitarizatuon was or that Germany was prepared to back down. In fact, as I understand it, he believed more of the German Army was in the vicinity than Germany had public ally claimed (surprisingly, the Germans were telling the truth about only sending token forces into the Rhineland). French intelligence also counted paramilitary and militarized police units in the Rhineland. While they Obviously weren’t as well trained or equipped as the German Army and portraying them as such was misleading, completely discounting them in considering a possible war situation would have been a mistake.

Once the decision was made not to intervene, the French government did its best to blame its Locarno allies by basically saying it was ready to intervene as soon as Britain and Italy were, and then offering to “back down” in exchange for closer Franco-British planning and cooperation.

More broadly, while high command defeatism/willingness to collaborate certainly played a role in events once France was defeated in Europe, I still struggle to see how it was the cause for said defeat. The French military and its leadership did perform poorly, but it’s hard to say they weren’t trying to win because they preferred a German victory, at least until said German victory in continental France had already happened.

 

[Captain Frakas]

Here's what I see your claim as:

I know what I've wrote and I know what my aim is, but, as I said in my last post, I would like you to formulate, not quote, what you've understood my claim would be before continuing. I'll answer you (and to Eric in the same post) after that

 

[DystopianAlphaOmega]

Well, I don’t presume to speak for anyone else, but basically, as I see it, defeatism and political opportunism amongst certain French politicians and high command allowed for the collaboration government to be created as opposed to fighting on. However, I dispute that said defeatism/opportunism/sympathy for Nazism meant that French high command intentionally tried to lose the war or significantly contributed to that loss (As seems to be the crux of your claim, although I understand this is a simplification). They affected the results of that loss (collaboration instead of fighting on from Britain/the colonies), but don’t really seem responsible for the loss itself.

 

[demanvanwezel]

tbh in those early days of the war capitulating rather then continueing to fight in order to save lives was the norm rather then the exception

 

[Rubidium]

So, no, Petain's government certainly hadn't more legitimacy than Ch. de Gaulle... It isn't exactly the good word to label his situation.

Petain's seizure of power was legally dubious, but that really doesn't address the issue of "legitimacy" in the immediate period, which is a matter of perception. And essentially everyone (French, Allied, Neutral and Axis) initially recognized Vichy as the legitimate government of France. De Gaulle had very little support at first; the remaining French forces (including the French forces currently in Britain) and almost all of the colonies remained loyal to Vichy initially. Vichy forces actively resisted Allied attempts to seize French territories in Africa and the Middle East. It's only as the war went on, with the Axis both becoming increasingly unpopular and increasingly obviously losing, that the Free French forces really take off (helped by the Allies seizing most of the French colonies and turning them over to De Gaulle; the majority of "Free French" soldiers were drawn from these colonies, rather than from France itself, even though Free French propaganda played down this aspect).

So the Vichy government did exactly what the Germans wanted it to do: largely removed the French colonial empire as a threat initially (and also let them play diplomatic games with French colonies, most notably arbitrating the Franco-Thai War in favor of Japan-aligned Thailand as part of their courtship of Japan), governed the unoccupied zone at minimal expense for Germany, and allowed Germany to garrison the Atlantic seaboard with its ports and potential cross-channel invasion routes. Once the Allies were defeated, Germany would presumably withdraw from the occupied zone (minus portions such as Alsace-Lorraine and probably some areas annexed by Italy) and restore it to Vichy France as a sufficiently cowed puppet state to secure its Western border while the Germans continued to expand in the East. It was never more than a temporary measure until Britain surrendered (which the British, of course, refused to do).

 

[hkrommel]

I know what I've wrote and I know what my aim is, but, as I said in my last post, I would like you to formulate, not quote, what you've understood my claim would be before continuing. I'll answer you (and to Eric in the same post) after that

A direct quote should be good enough but oh well.

1. Many French generals wanted to lose the war because they didn't like the government
2. Because they wanted to lose, they disobeyed orders
3. The disobedience of these orders was "the main problem" with the French military

To repeat myself from before:
1. You have not shown that these generals wanted to lose the war because they disliked the government.
2. You have not shown that certain orders were not followed because of this desire to lose
3. You have not shown that, even if 1 and 2 are correct, this was the "main problem" with the French military

In order to show 1, you need to demonstrate that this dislike of the government actually transformed to an active desire to lose to a foreign power.

In order to show 2, you need to show that this desire to lose to a foreign power was the main reason for not carrying out certain orders. Not a desire to save men who were otherwise lost, not an inept government ordering impossible counteroffensives, not other reasons.

In order to show 3, you need to demonstrate that all this was the main problem. Not mobilization issues caused by draft resistance, not inconsistent and strike-ridden industry, not doctrinal issues, not poor leadership or organization.

In order to do that, you need to show that 1 and 2 occurred often enough, with enough generals, in important enough situations, so that the desire to lose was the main problem with France's ability to fight. You essentially have to argue that if these generals had followed orders in the way you imagine, the outcome might have been different. You need to show that it made a difference.

 

[Acheron]

A direct quote should be good enough but oh well.

1. Many French generals wanted to lose the war because they didn't like the government

... what?

 

[hkrommel]

... what?

The other poster wanted me to explain what I understood his/her argument to be. Look at what I'm quoting.