There's another historical parallel to that. Soviet Army concentrated insane amount of tube and rocket arty at scherpunkts as compared to Germany. The numbers were really really crazy. Yet if you look at the total tonnage of ammo spent per tube -- the RL measure of arty save for the effectiveness of counterbattery fires -- the overmatch of Soviet arty becomes much less of an overmatch. The insane concentration of Soviet arty was not a sign of strength but rather the one of weakness. Soviets due to a huge MIL industrial base can accumulate the ammo stores yet because of logistics inefficiencies they cannot go on supplying the arty over the extended period of time. And (wisely) that was an integral part of the strategy/tactics as well.
No limits for number of divisions related to infra, climate, terrain and supply?
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During the winter War of 39, it did not exist yet.The first regiment of rocket artillery was formed in 41.
That's very insightful, provided taken within the context and knowing the Soviets for sure planned their own offensive 'west of the their borders'. If you have more to say on this or maybe provide sources, that would be greatly appreciated.
Yes, I think this might offer at least a partial explanation. A mix of bad intel and exaggeration. Still, curious claims in Soviet historiography lived on for decades, some still survive to this day. For example the six-volume History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945 (История Великой Отечественной войны Советского Союза 1941-1945) from 1960-65 makes the claim that there were 1,000 American pilots (!) aiding the Finns in the Winter War.
Prior to the war Stalin had relied on an NKVD spy ring in England called the Cambridge Five, which promised that the West will not care if he attacks Finland, that there we will be no reaction. When there then was a reaction of public outrage in the West, and England and France began making plans for intervention on behalf of the Finns, and the Swedes began selling arms en masse to the Finns, Stalin began ignoring the Cambridge Five's intel and switched to relying on his NKVD spies in France instead, centered around Paris. The French were a lot more eager to genuinely help the Finns, while the English were more inclined on using the Winter War as an excuse to open a Northern Front against Germany in Scandinavia, and hurt German oil imports from Russia. A lot of exaggerated claims of plans to help the Finns flew around in Paris, bloated figures on how much equipment and men have been sent or are going to be sent, etc. which may be one source for the exaggerated amount of materiel delivered to the Finns that can be found in Russian sources. These claims btw then made their way to Stalin, and very likely influenced his decision to make peace with the Finns.
Here's also something I posted on the topic about a year ago, that may be of interest to you:
26.1.40 Ivan Maisky warns Molotov in a lengthy letter that time is running out. Around the same time Molotov's substitute, V.P. Potemkin speaks of the need to be prepared for a general great war.
February 1940, Britain sees USSR as Nazi ally. British Chiefs of Staff Committee plans for operations against the Crimea, Ukraine, Caucasus, Baku and drawing Turkey in against Russia. Chiefs of Staff report predicts a general breakdown of the Russian military, industrial and agricultural systems might ensue if Soviet oil supply were substantially reduced.
21.2.40 Maisky: The Red Army's advance is too slow, we must hurry off the danger zone.
10.2.-5.3. NKVD intelligence reports to Moscow: Following aircraft already sent to Finland: From France 176, from England 164, from America 44, from Italy 35; plans ready to send to Finland 3 divisions, which Sweden will allow through regardless of declared non-belligerence; French army already distributed 20,000 snow suits and the same amount of mountaineer backpacks; refugee Poles joining, with at first one, then two divisions. Stalin sends peace terms over Finland to the Brits before sending them to the Finns.
5.3.40 Molotov: The threat of foreign intervention is great.
9.3.40 Voroshilov sent to reinforce defence of the Caucasus against potential British intervention.
14.3.40 NKVD reports from Paris the same intelligence Mannerheim had received 10 days earlier. The intervention of the Allies had serious problems; Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax had said it was impossible to send the 100 bombers requested by the Finns, just as it was impossible to send 50,000 men in March. At the most 12,000 could be sent. And Sweden had, as expected, categorically denied transit. When this information reached Moscow, Molotov had already signed the peace treaty.
Source: Kimmo Rentola's Stalin and the Fate of Finland: 1939, 1944, 1948, 1950.
Rentola btw argues that it wasn't so much the plans for the Anglo-French expedition that scared Stalin to signing peace, but the threat of intervention in the south, around the Caucasus, the Crimea and the Ukraine. Bad intelligence by the NKVD seem to have played a significant role in this.
https://histdoc.net/pdf/1940-03-00_committee_report.pdf
^ the Chiefs of Staff report mentioned above. Printed in March based on plans formulated in February.
Also related, from Carl-Fredrik Geust's Red Wings in the Winter War 1939-1940 (click to enlarge):
I'll have to check this a little later, need to get some work done now.
I'll probably also move the conversation to PMs, so as to not provoke the wrath of the forum mods too much for derailing the topic.
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They didn't plan this.This is a "post-perestroika" fake.(it was based on the total size of the army without reference to quality) There was nothing to advance with. (for example, there were 26,000 tanks.Of which 12,000 are in combat readiness, but 3,000 of them are new types of tanks) There were no troops on the border.Only border units. Airfields, on the contrary, were under reconstruction. In most divisions, there was a substitution in the match.Horses were already being taken out, and vehicles were not arriving due to low production rates. The USSR could not even theoretically conduct offensive operations for at least 3-4 years. + a very bloody "unsuccessful fast war" with Finland.
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I recommend that you, as an obviously Russian-speaking person (judging by the quote in the caption, which seems to have been taken out of context), study historical sources.Or at least the "Archive Revolution" project.
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Operation Unthinkable -Have you heard anything about it?
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To add to your post, the USSR had on 22.6.41 about 20,000 category 1 or 2 tanks (2,612 brand new and 17,366 used, but operational tanks respectively). The other about 6,000 were category 3 and 4 (2,775 requiring medium repairs in local workshops and 3,179 requiring major repairs in central workshops or factories respectively). Of course, being category 1 or 2 is not necessarily the same as "combat ready" (fueled and supplied). Indeed, some Red Army tank units on 22.6.41 only had HE shells, for example.
See also my post here: https://forum.paradoxplaza.com/foru...om-hoi4-updated-to-nsb.1400279/#post-26671947
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According to the last ones I saw, the number of tanks of the 1-2 category did not exceed 14,000, of which 60% of the elements are light T26, and floating tanks on their base. There were not enough armor-piercing shells. There was not enough fuel either. The mechanized corps had practically no artillery and infantry in their compositions.
- I was not able to get access to country-wide stats specifically for the period of Y39 - 2H40 so I had to dig deeper. Federal Russian railway is actually a combo of regional railways and each of them have their own local periodicals, annual "wall of fame" publications, archive of sources etc. They are much less regulated.
- Country-wide stats you can rebuild from the KPIs I gave in the previous posts. It's hard to believe they drastically change within six months. Like you have the number of incidents per engine per year/quarter suddenly growing hundreds of percent for a known number of engines -- both are available stats -- with a known number of incidents per 1K km for 1939. I'd say probably mileage changed since there are secondary available stats of the number of freight wagons per train has not changed (available stat as well).
- You don't need to concentrate on these KPIs only. When you have the numbers available you can think of the ways to go around. It won't be a 99% or even 95% precision yet it will give you a magnitude of what was going on.
- I was either going to the archives in person and writing post-stamped snail-mails. They ignore calls or emails yet post stamped mail was/is dirt-cheap in Russias. It's just whatever is stamped commands respect in smaller towns. I am and won't be able to repeat this exercise in the future
- It was 30s -- everyone was scheming to attack everyone be it democracy or not.
- Staff planning is not any measure of the real intentions. No joke I'm sure JCS have some plans for an alien invasion. Generic ones yet they oughtta have at least some. No joke. In peacetime staff officers are paid for writing whatever crazy plans one can think of.
- An impartial measure of intentions is where one puts his/her money in. If one invests a hell of money into fortifications as Stalin did -- however predictably useless they happened to be -- probably one does not REALLY planning to take over the world.
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now the situation has improved.Computers appeared there)
And there is a large amount of information on the created resource memory of peoples.
And if you have the largest border in the world that needs to be protected somehow, and there are countries next to you that sign pacts against you.. Doesn't that mean it's better to prepare?
And Germany's actions since the 36th year, to put it mildly, have not been peaceful..
Let's develop an idea. Britain continued to build and expand the fleet, which was already the largest in the world. Obviously, they were going to fight..
And if you have a sexual organ, then you are clearly a rapist, at least a potential one))))
PS
Fortifications, this is probably a line of pillboxes along the old border..Which, to put it mildly, were not completed. And the Maginot line in France does not say that they were going to fight? Almost 30% of the military budget was spent on its construction.
Where else but on the forum, even if it is very pop, but nevertheless a historical strategy for war, you will meet real lovers of military history.
I respect interested and enthusiastic people
I respect interested and enthusiastic people
I'd venture to say you haven't tried with (at least) Russian archives. They are in no hurry (or have no budget or the task) to put docs online. For the real stuff you have to go for offline.
I'm well aware of that bunch of leftists. Isaev's take on the Winter War was particularly painful to hear. Fortunately, they have no monopoly on speaking.
The quotation stems from her speech on the 25th of February. I'm unable to find the TV broadcast record, but the notorious ria.novosti provides all the context you need.
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Winter War was particularly painful to hear. - Do you prefer the course of "debunking the USSR" by paid historians promoted by the "current" leadership of the Kremlin? "current", because they seem to exist constantly since the time of the 1st President of Russia.
It seems that there is also a center of this very president. It is financed by the current.There is continuity of power in everything))
A lot of that debunking and subsequent damage control are both rather childish for my taste. I.e. I don't see much of a problem (from a historical viewpoint, that is) aknowledging the fact that nations do go into wars against each other every now and then, and military planning and buildup are necessary elements to that. And once they do, the normal course of action is taking as much as one can get away with. Much like in EU4.
Saying that the Soviets were 'forced' to 'pacify' Finland in advance (as per Alexey Isaev, who simply follows the old rusty Kremlin line) and that their aspirations were limited to taking a few narrow strips of land for future 'self-defense' seems very inconvincing to me, given what was later done to the Baltic states, what Mannerheim wrote in his memoirs, and the international consternation that was growing and arguably became the main reason for the Soviet halt.
They did intend to go on later, though. It should hardly be suprising at all, provided it's true that they also laid claims on nothing less than Denmark (Hitler's War, David Irving), and to my knowledge the overblown greed of that sort led to their eventual split with Germany, failure to agree on Romania being the most notable case.
On the other hand, I don't comprehend how in a contemprorary world planning to attack Hitler could be considered a bad thing, provided what we are tought and supposed to think of him. It should have been right the reverse, the Soviet and post-Soviet propaganda should have clung to idea of pre-empting the war against the evil, praising the fore-thinking of their overlords.
Regarding the Russian-speaking historians (or historical authors, as they label those out of favour), Mark Solonin is also a decent fellow as long as he speaks on purely technical and military matters (his background obviously helps him to stay precise, brief and right to the point), but too is obviously of no authority when it comes to politics or racial theory (i.e. Corneliu Codreanu he scorns off as a mere 'fanatic'). That's the main problem, being a human everyone's got his own bias
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If for you the authority of a writer-publicist, and not a historian, such as Solonin, has at least some weight... I feel sorry for you. Sincerely. It is strange to consider the attempts to throw mud at the country from which he emigrated to be true.It doesn't matter what country he's from.A lot of that debunking and subsequent damage control are both rather childish for my taste. I.e. I don't see much of a problem (from a historical viewpoint, that is) aknowledging the fact that nations do go into wars against each other every now and then, and military planning and buildup are necessary elements to that. And once they do, the normal course of action is taking as much as one can get away with. Much like in EU4.
Saying that the Soviets were 'forced' to 'pacify' Finland in advance (as per Alexey Isaev, who simply follows the old rusty Kremlin line) and that their aspirations were limited to taking a few narrow strips of land for future 'self-defense' seems very inconvincing to me, given what was later done to the Baltic states, what Mannerheim wrote in his memoirs, and the international consternation that was growing and arguably became the main reason for the Soviet halt.
They did intend to go on later, though. It should hardly be suprising at all, provided it's true that they also laid claims on nothing less than Denmark (Hitler's War, David Irving), and to my knowledge the overblown greed of that sort led to their eventual split with Germany, failure to agree on Romania being the most notable case.
On the other hand, I don't comprehend how in a contemprorary world planning to attack Hitler could be considered a bad thing, provided what we are tought and supposed to think of him. It should have been right the reverse, the Soviet and post-Soviet propaganda should have clung to idea of pre-empting the war against the evil, praising the fore-thinking of their overlords.
Regarding the Russian-speaking historians (or historical authors, as they label those out of favour), Mark Solonin is also a decent fellow as long as he speaks on purely technical and military matters (his background obviously helps him to stay precise, brief and right to the point), but too is obviously of no authority when it comes to politics or racial theory (i.e. Corneliu Codreanu he scorns off as a mere 'fanatic'). That's the main problem, being a human everyone's got his own bias
He is the same propaganda liar as Rezun-Suvorov or Solzhenitsyn.
Joseph Telman, a veteran of the Great Patriotic War, candidate of historical Sciences, believes that Solonin "does not possess either the methodology of history or sufficient concrete historical knowledge," "experiencing an acute shortage of new ideas, and ideas in general, Solonin did not find anything better than to embark on the path, albeit not complete, but the rehabilitation of the Nazis. He makes the Wehrmacht appear white and fluffy, not involved in the crimes of the Nazis."[8]. The head of the Center for Military History of Russia of the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Historical Sciences G. A. Solonin ranked among the most zealous falsifiers. Kumanev[11], as well as a graduate of the Faculty of History of the Moscow State University, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, researcher at the INION RAS S. A. Ermolaev[12].
A.V. Isaev, Candidate of Historical Sciences, criticized Solonin's concept regarding the impossibility of the complete defeat of Soviet aviation on the ground [9]. Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor of the Department of Modern Russian History of the Historical and Archival Institute of the Russian State University A. A. Kilichenkov assessed Solonin's book "June 22, or When did the Great Patriotic War begin?" as "another commercial project, the product of the "commercialization of history"". The professor gives an explanation of why such a phenomenon of folk history as that of Corned beef is successful[7]:
The extreme mythologization of the events of 1941-1945, which followed in the post-war period, coupled with the direct concealment of ideologically "inconvenient" pages of the war, created the main prerequisite for the volcanic upheavals of the late perestroika of the 1980s and the early democratization of the 1990s in the assessments of the war.
Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor D. V. Gavrilov stated that Solonin's writings contain many errors and falsifications, ending his article like this[6]:
Legislators in the coverage of historical events are increasingly not professional historians, but representatives of the mass media (radio and television reviewers, journalists, publicists, writers), most often accidentally joined the "fashionable" historical topic. The voices of professional historians, whose works are published in scanty editions of several hundred, at best - in several thousand copies, drown in a stream of pseudo—historical books published in tens and hundreds of thousands, innumerable articles, radio and television programs, the echo of which was the "historical bestseller" by M. Solonin. Such essays on the problems of the history of the Great Patriotic War, in which, it seems, the goal is to justify the fascist aggression against the USSR, to discredit, or even refute the victory of the Soviet Union and the feat of the Soviet people in the war of 1941-1945, it is appropriate to equate to a crime deserving of criminal responsibility. It is gratifying that this is being discussed at the state level.
Senior researcher at the Center for Humanitarian Studies of RISI, Candidate of Historical Sciences D. A. Maltsev ranked M. S. Solonin among the "denigrators" of the history of the Great Patriotic War and called some of Solonin's statements "the spread of gossip that Soviet fighters went into battle at gunpoint of commanders and commissars, at gunpoint of the squadrons"[3].
Yu. A. Nikiforov (PhD), noting that "on the basis of a "clip" selection of images, modern Russophobic ideologists draw conclusions that are false from beginning to end," cited Solonin as an example of this, whose conclusions cannot be supported by documentary evidence in any way, since such documents do not exist[32]. Nikiforov also counts Solonin among those who, by overthrowing "totalitarian myths", took up the baton of Viktor Suvorov in constructing a "new mythology"[33].
V. N. Baryshnikov (Doctor of Historical Sciences) identified M. Solonin as a follower of V. Suvorov, who decided to surpass his "teacher", and above all by the number of books published by him[34]. In his review of Solonin's book "June 25. Stupidity or aggression?" Baryshnikov noted that having found no documents "that would confirm his fantasies," Solonin attracted and interpreted superficial archival materials in his own way, making "incredible conclusions" from them. Also, according to Baryshnikov[35]
Such a primitive construction of the work looked so ridiculous that it could not fail to be noticed not only by professional researchers, but also by ordinary readers, who frankly began to draw Solonin's attention to his very naive frauds, which could only be calculated for an absolutely ignorant reader.
At the same time, Baryshnikov noted that, judging by the most ridiculous mistakes from the very beginning of his narration — "history" as a scientific subject, Solonin, in fact, does not know [36]. Baryshnikov believes that Solonin's works demonstrate ignorance, stupidity, superficial judgments and incompetence of the author[37].
B. A. Ruchkin (Doctor of Historical Sciences) stated that after the appearance of V. Suvorov's Icebreaker on the mass book market, a stream of historical falsification, "black myths" began to pour out on the heads of contemporaries"authored by liberal researchers, among whom M. Solonin, demonstrating "high-level disinformation, falsehood". He called the latter "the main modern classic" of the myth that in 1941 the Red Army, which Solonin called a "huge armed crowd", did not fight because it did not want to die for the "Stalinist regime"[38].
I. P. Kamenetsky (PhD) and V. L. Razgon note that M. Solonin is characterized by the same tendentiousness of conclusions and selectivity in the selection of facts as Suvorov. They also pay attention to the fact that[39]
indeed, a very respected historian. But he is popular on "Radio Liberty." That's where he was promoted, isn't it?)
As for the question of Finland.At least one of his own and reasonable arguments that could prevent Stalin from capturing or simply annexing Finland after the war or towards its end.And half of Europe as a whole? Allies? It's just ridiculous.The USSR at that time had the strongest army in the world.
I'm not Solonin, so I can't speak for his arguments, but I can answer the question on what stopped the Red Army from occupying Finland in 1944, which you also asked me in the PMs.
The short answer is simple: the Finnish military.
The longer answer is that the Russian Karelian Offensive of summer 1944, also known as the "Vyborg-Petrozavodsk Offensive", celebrated in Kremlin-authorised Russian historiography for almost 80 years as "Stalin's Fourth Blow" actually completely failed in its primary objective, which was the destruction of the Finnish Army. The plan was to encircle the bulk of the Finnish Army on the Karelian Isthmus, destroy it and then proceed inland to occupy the rest of the country. Stalin even had Russian-made Finnish occupation marks printed in 1944, to be issued by the Red Army and distributed as the only legal tender in occupied Finland. Here's e.g. a 1,000 mark bill of such occupation money. It reads "Red Army's Brass" on the top and "Acceptance of the currency in all transactions is mandatory" and "Counterfeiting will be punished according to wartime laws" on the bottom.
With this so-called "fourth blow" in reality running out of steam smashing against the Finns on the VKT and U Lines on the Karelian Isthmus and Ladoga Karelia respectively, and almost losing two entire rifle divisions in the bogs east of Ilomantsi in North Karelia, Stalin could not launch another offensive against the Finns without pulling more forces away from other fronts, and the Western Allies were getting closer to Berlin. Getting to Berlin first was more important to Stalin than occupying Finland. Besides, surely Finland could be turned communist later through internal coups backed by the USSR, as was done in most of Eastern Europe.
Well, prior experiences with the Finns, the Weapons Cache Case, which saw the Finns hide enough weapons for 35,000 men in the countryside for a guerrilla war against Russian occupation, which the Russians learned about in the fall of 1944 after the Continuation War, the Finns playing ball with exorbitant Russian war reparations demands, which in reality well exceeded the official amounts demanded by the peace treaty, which already were the harshest war reparations per capita that any country in history to my knowledge has ever been demanded of, let alone actually paid (Finland was also the only country on the Axis side to pay her war reparations in full), as well as with the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (YYA Treaty), seemed to have dissuaded Stalin from further attempts at occupying the country.
Still, curiously as late as 26.4.1951, Stalin summoned his old Finnish puppet, Otto Wille Kuusinen, nominal head of the Finnish Democratic Republic during the Winter War and subsequently the Karelo-Finnish SSR, after years of not speaking to him or in fact even meeting him face-to-face (Kuusinen fell out of favour with him after 1944 because Stalin then wanted to maintain good relations with Finland, and Kuusinen was something of a persona non grata to the Finns because of the latter's past as Stalin's puppet), and told him that "he should move to Moscow and begin aiding Finnish comrades" (Finnish communists), "if he wanted to become Finland's president". This information comes from Rudolf Sykiäinen, an ardent Finnish communist who was present in the room at the time.
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Thank you, this is really interesting information for me. This is usually bypassed in the sources of that time. "suddenly" Finland sided with the USSR and declared war on the Reich.
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Otto Wille Kuusinen -Yes, I have read in some sources that he has completely lost all significance in Finland.
however, in my opinion from the outside, could the Russians not afford to lose more than 2 divisions? They still had a large army in the east.
however, in my opinion from the outside, could the Russians not afford to lose more than 2 divisions? They still had a large army in the east.