So could you give me an example how much time an US CA would have needed to get refueled by 1 tanker ?
https://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/GSBO/GSBO-17.html
Now this was during very rough seas (they eventually had to abort the entire operation because, even with these numbers, it was taking too long and causing too much damage) and they had to stop many times to fix broken lines when they parted in the rough seas. Yes, they are destroyers, but they still managed to run out 800 barrels per hour. Talbot got 830 barrels 40 minutes.
This example is during the Wake invasion. This is early in the war with converted tankers from the 20's and they still managed 800 barrels/hour under extreme weather conditions. By midwar when dedicated replenish came along this only increased speed. Under ideal conditions I would expect somewhere close to 1500-1600 barrels per/hour or better. 1400-1500 if you include the time to set up the rigging. Hard to tell when the example I have is one of a worse case scenario, not ideal scenario.
" The important capabilities of the fast, highly maneuverable 25,000-ton, T3 oilers was not long in coming. One week after the
Neches sinking, the
Platte fueled the entire
Enterprise (TF-11) task group during a marathon dawn to dusk operation in preparation for the high-speed run-in for the planned attack on Kwajalein and Roi in the Marshalls. Developed during the fleet problems of the 1930s, the highspeed run-in was a tactic devised by carrier forces for attacking enemy air bases. Carriers were considered highly vulnerable to attack from land-based aircraft so it was deemed necessary to launch a surprise raid on the enemy's base before the carrier's presence became known. This could only be achieved by approaching the target under cover of darkness so that the carrier would arrive at the scheduled launching point just before first light, allowing for a dawn attack on the enemy's airbase to catch his planes on the ground. Similar tactics were employed by the Japanese on their highly successful attack on Pearl Harbor.
An eight- to ten-hour run-in at 25 to 30 knots was generally required to meet these objectives, and could be easily accomplished by the ships in the task force provided the carrier and her escorts had sufficient fuel reserves needed for the high-speed sprint to the target, any ensuing action that might develop, and the high-speed withdrawal. In preparation for the task, the entire
Lexington group beginning with the escorts commenced refueling in the early morning hours on 28 January. At dawn, the first of the escorts approached the oiler to take on fuel urgently needed to fill her nearly depleted bunkers. In preparation for this task,
Platte's crew spent the predawn hours rigging the specialized gear that would soon be called upon to transfer thousands of tons of "navy special" fuel oil carried by the big ship (when fully loaded the
Platte displaced almost as much as the
Enterprise). As each ship came alongside in an unending progression that would last well into the night, a heaving line would be passed to the approaching ship followed in rapid succession by messengers, hawsers, a telephone line, and finally the fuel hoses that had to be secured before the pumps could be started.
It was dark by the time the
Enterprise came alongside for her turn. No heavy ship had ever been fueled in the open sea at night, but the carrier had to have oil for the fast run-in. Smoothly and steadily, Capt. George Murry eased the carrier toward the
Platte to a position close abreast "as if it were a summer noon in Long Island sound." The seamen and engineers did the rest. Below decks the "oil king" and his helpers on both ships directed the flow of oil from one tank to another as the two ships steamed side-by-side for five and a half hours. As the gap between the two vessels widened and contracted the topside crew tended the lines and hoses making sure that none parted, though ironically, other men stood by with axes to cut everything away in the event of enemy attack or other emergency.
Replenishing
Enterprise's depleted bunkers or for that matter any large ship while under way at sea was, as it continues to be today, an exacting task that demands superb seamanship. The dynamic forces involved when a 30,000-ton (or larger) aircraft carrier and a 25,000-ton oiler are maneuvering at 8 to 12 knots within 50 feet of each other are difficult to comprehend or image. Yet the two vessels had to steam at identical speeds within 20 to 70 feet of one another for hours while a trickle of black oil flowed through 6-inch rubber fuel hoses suspended from saddles rigged to booms projecting over the oiler's side. Quick, skilled hands and precise judgment were necessary to keep the two ships separated. It may have looked easy, but it wasn't, and although collisions did not occur often, they could have disastrous effects. On one occasion,
Kaskaskia lost every one of her portside booms and had to put into Pearl for emergency repairs after being sideswiped by the
Yorktown."
The Enterpise took a little over 5 hours, again, in less then ideal conditions. Doesnt say how many barrels they pumped into her or if that also involved aviation fuel.