Castro said:
You would have lost the Empire anyway. You sacrified men to stop Hitler, not the Empire. Nationalism killed that one off.
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You would have lost the Empire anyway. You sacrified men to stop Hitler, not the Empire. Nationalism killed that one off.
As it turned out the French political leadership in 1940 was not willing to fight on, well not enough of it.Alojzy said:
In the end the Frenchy army lost 100 000 men kia in 1940. But it lost another 140 000 fighting Nazism between 1943 and 1945, which is hardly indicative of an unwillingness or inability of fighting in the later stages of the war.
The amazing bit about the reconstruction of French military fortunes in WWII is that it was based on the loyalty of the overseas colonised peoples. Which is why, yes Algeria would definately have been a useful base for continued French fighting even after the fall of "la mère Patrie" in 1940. It was technically a French department like Picardie, Auvergne or any of the other, and it did contain at least a million ethnic Frenchmen (the pied noirs), and a number of millions of Berber and Arab Algerians, all of which chipped in considerably to man the French 1st Army the Allies took with them into the Italian campaign in 1943. But it had to be supplied by the British and Americans. By 1943 the 1940 equipment the French army used in the battle for Tunisia was terribly obsolete, and the French troops paid for it in blood.
Kozym said:
Nobody is going to answer this question. I know where you are going to with this question and I won't have it.
ComradeOm said:
I disagree strongly. There was a sizable amount of men who wanted to fight on from North Africa, including Jean Zay (killed by Germans), Georges Mandel (also eventually killed by the Germans), Édouard Daladier and 24 other deputies (and one senator). General Nogues (commander of North Africa) was reported to have told Petain (in the book The Collapse of the Third Republic by William Shirer) that North Africa was ready to fight and the popular was ready to support him. I can get the exact quote if you would like me to.
As well, there was a fairly significant portion of the parliament that would have been willing to leave at that time had Petain and Laval not gotten in the way and spread misinformation.
Not to mention that Algeria had ~1 million Frenchmen and there were plenty more people from the colonies who could fight for France. French colonials (such as Senegalese and Indochinese) had been fighting in the war as well and would continue to fight in the Free French forces until 1945. It would be nothing like the US gov't fleeing to Hawaii.
The Real Enemy for most French politicians of the time was another bunch of French politicians, not the Germans.Gigalocus said:
France's greatest service was having the German armed forces in Biarritz on June 25th rather than on the English Channel thus debunking Sealion counterfactualists the world over. A noble sacrifice.
Many of the flaws of your comparison have already been covered, but a really glaring issue is the French colonies in total had a population twice the size of France proper. Remember it isn't just Algeria were are talking about here since the French colonies included much of Western Africa, as well as French-Indochina along with a variety of other smaller possessions. While there were limits on the support they could count on from the non-ethnic Frenchmen, they still could get plenty of support overall. The situation simply didn't even remotely resemble your example.ComradeOm said:
While there are limits on how much could be transferred over in time, France could definitely still transfer over plenty of equipment, and many of the aircraft had ALREADY been transferred over by the time France surrendered historically. They won't be able to transfered everything logistically, but they can cover many of the key elements.
As far as the navy is concerned, its very easy to move active units from bases in France proper to North African ones. France also had some substantial naval ports in North Africa which they would be able to utilize. It also is true that they would probably CHOOSE to deploy some of the units to help the UK while basing them in Great Britain.
An obvious mistake you're making is that with those colonies its definitely not a matter of simply putting its forces into the hands of the UK and the US. Its true that in the long run France will need significant supplies from the US or the UK to keep its units functioning effectively, but France always has the potential threat of of seeking a separate peace with Germany to leverage against the other allies in this scenario. If anything the French position might actually be stronger if they eventually negotiate with Germany in this situation given the remaining French forces are in positions where its hard for German forces to to try to reach and attack them. Basically if the allies try to compromise the French forces too much, the obvious French alternatives should ensure that France maintains its own bargaining position and doesn't end up with it being forced to simply use its forces the way the allies want them to.
You're right.Mordoch said:
Considering how de Gaulle made Roosevelt and Churchill back down from overstepping French sovereign territory every time they tried something of that order, with feck all in the form of resources in his corner to back him up, a French government with control over substantial manpower, territory, resources and military assets would definately have been in a better position to do the same.
And it would have been in an infinately better position to provide substantial aid and support of the allied war effort a damn sight sooner, which matters more. The French jokes would never be the same again though...
On the other hand, it was in no way predictable for the French leaders of the time that America had any real desire to enter the war on their side (and in fact, they only did so when attacked by Japan), nor was it all too obvious that Britain would continue fighting once the French had been defeated on the continent.L.J. Hiertha said:You're right.
Considering how de Gaulle made Roosevelt and Churchill back down from overstepping French sovereign territory every time they tried something of that order, with feck all in the form of resources in his corner to back him up, a French government with control over substantial manpower, territory, resources and military assets would definately have been in a better position to do the same.
And it would have been in an infinately better position to provide substantial aid and support of the allied war effort a damn sight sooner, which matters more. The French jokes would never be the same again though...
L.J. Hiertha said:And it would have been in an infinately better position to provide substantial aid and support of the allied war effort a damn sight sooner, which matters more. The French jokes would never be the same again though...
I'm guessing a hostile France dooms Italian North Africa much more quickly then IRL, and with the French and British fleets in the Med makes the Italian Fleet even less successful...
swilhelm73 said:
Not too familiar with France in the WWII era, but isn't one reason that Vichy occured because of French fear of Italy grabbing territory in France itself? I could be very wrong-it is just a vague recollection...
mlipo said:
More or less, yes - the possibility that Italy would retain the appearances of neutrality was still there in the mind of french politicians, and the Italian declaration of war and subsequent move into Nice, Savoie and Provence around the 20th, with the Ligne Weygand already overrun over most of its length, was pretty much the last straw for the defeatists.
The Fascists were quite open about the fact that they now wanted the western part of Italia irredenta* - of course, the cynic in me would probably shrug her shoulders and consider it as poetic justice for the way France tried to sell ww1 to Italy.
*I seem to recall a contemporary commenting on the issue of Italian demands in the Great War that there were more Italians in Marseilles alone than the whole population of the Fiume Gebiet in AH.
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how different would things be if the french had keep on fighting? The best they could do was to contribute in secondary theaters, (Africa, etc). The decisive theater was already irretrievably lost. Germany could not be defeated unless another major land power entered the war (which the SU did). Its hard to imagine the UK and France would be able to reopen a western front without massive US contributions.
junrui said:
Of course it would matter.
War in Africa would have never really started - Italy would have no chance against combined forces of UK and France.
Japan would not obtain bases in Indochina.
UK would got huge boost in terms of defensive potential during the Battle of Brittain (evacuated planes and pilots). Whole deal would end faster.
Italian Fleet would be sunk by combined French and UK fleets and with the threat to Sicily, Italy would have to stop acting agressive in Balkans and focus on defense.
French Fleet could be then used to keep Italians at bay and free RN for convoy duty.
Nevertheless, they choose differently.
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Mordoch said:
How large portion of the French economy proper were from the colonies and territories?
Sure they got raw materials (if they could transport them...) but what good are raw materials without industry to use them.
Population means nothing, especially since most of the population in for example indochina would probably be more inclined to join with the axis for a vague hope of independance than to fight for the French against Japan.
Evacuating ones homeland to fight on is something I've never heard of anyone managing to do successfully.
The French got defeated nothing more nothing less.
peo said:
The only part of the colonies that really mattered to continue the war was north africa (The middle east had potential too but the french presence there (and i don't speak militarily) was too light to be able to mobilize the energy and ressources of the population).
Algeria was a french department and a settlement colony so there was a few industries, the infrastructures weren't that bad and the relatively important european population meant that the colony could be mobilised from the upper echelons.
Alger was a big city trying to rivalise with other french city like Paris or Marseille by then.
Then, north africa was the area where the colonial troops had the more infrastructures too (naval bases, major ports, some airfields and the various caserns of the armée d'afrique).
Lastly, it was closer to the metropole.
The rest of africa was too lightly populated or developped to be of use and indochina too far, if the japanese tried to invade it i doubt France would be able to defend it.
On another forum it was suggested that if USA had been in the war since 1939 (or at the very least by the time of Fall of France) France would not have surrendered but kept on fighting. I find it a credible position, considering that things looked very dark indeed in 1940 with only UK left as a major ally. It seemed then that Germany was bound to win, and win quickly, as it was not yet known that only a mere year later it would also be fighting the USSR and USA. Had the French had Americans as their allies in 1940 they very probably would have kept on fighting from the colonies.
But as it was, surrendering in 1940 did seem sensible in the prospect of the war being over soon in any case.
But as it was, surrendering in 1940 did seem sensible in the prospect of the war being over soon in any case.