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This reminds me of a quote made by cpt. Blackadder in the welleuh blackadder series.
Can't find it on wikiquote but it goes like this.
"We should've better stayed home and killed 50 000 men each week."
You know, with all these hindsight and all.
I mean why fight if you know you are going to lose. Better run and fight another day if this is possible. It was not like rorke's drift, where you could'nt flee.
Can't find it on wikiquote but it goes like this.
"We should've better stayed home and killed 50 000 men each week."
You know, with all these hindsight and all.
I mean why fight if you know you are going to lose. Better run and fight another day if this is possible. It was not like rorke's drift, where you could'nt flee.
theusje said:And about the resistance thingy:
let's start bashing holland because there was like no resistance at all ...
Just read some books.
I'm living 100 meters of a old Gestapo prison. It got raided in the war to get resistance people out. Strange if there wasn't any resistance at all...
Please don't make the same mistake as Kozym!
Radbod
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Radbod said:Just read some books.
I'm living 100 meters of a old Gestapo prison. It got raided in the war to get resistance people out. Strange if there wasn't any resistance at all...
Please don't make the same mistake as Kozym!
Radbod
And it can also be pointed out the Dutch *did* fight on from their colonies - which greatly helped the Allies against Japan.
The Germans specifically did offer the Dutch the choice to collaborate a la Vichy, but the Queen turned the offer down...
Courage is always a relative quality to what your being courageous for. The Imperial Japanese soldiers were shouting banzai for an empire few of us could find noble and "defending" their homeland from a war they started. If their cause had been more sympathetic we would praise them a lot more.
I think the major gripe is the feeling the French underperformed to their potential, (as opposed to say, Belgium or Norway) over a peroid of decades. All things being equal (the relative economies, population, and so on) the 1939 original allies of Poland, France, the UK and Commonwealth had substantial advantages over Germany. Even a France vs. Germany match up alone should be fairly close, with perhaps German victory after a rather bloody war.
Of course all things were not equal, the Germans had a better doctrine. But that edge was apparently so yawning that Germany could knock out their major rival in a peroid of weeks with very low casualties, and then be fresh to conquer some more. The idea that Germany, a weakened isolated nation could dominate all of Europe was far from a foregone conclusion in 1935, or IMO even in 38.
The defeat of France made the domination of Europe possible. It was a shock to all the observers at the time who felt they should have done better. So we're hard on France, and we're hard on the policy of appeasment and Chamberlain, and we're hard on FDRs policy of isolation, because perhaps it could have all been avoided.
I think the major gripe is the feeling the French underperformed to their potential, (as opposed to say, Belgium or Norway) over a peroid of decades. All things being equal (the relative economies, population, and so on) the 1939 original allies of Poland, France, the UK and Commonwealth had substantial advantages over Germany. Even a France vs. Germany match up alone should be fairly close, with perhaps German victory after a rather bloody war.
Of course all things were not equal, the Germans had a better doctrine. But that edge was apparently so yawning that Germany could knock out their major rival in a peroid of weeks with very low casualties, and then be fresh to conquer some more. The idea that Germany, a weakened isolated nation could dominate all of Europe was far from a foregone conclusion in 1935, or IMO even in 38.
The defeat of France made the domination of Europe possible. It was a shock to all the observers at the time who felt they should have done better. So we're hard on France, and we're hard on the policy of appeasment and Chamberlain, and we're hard on FDRs policy of isolation, because perhaps it could have all been avoided.
Mr. Domino said:
Only if you're taking Germany and France, removing them from the planet entirely, and dumping them in some cosmic void where nothing exists outside of their borders. In that scenario, the Maginot Line would have stopped Germany cold, and even then, the war would have been a stalemate. In no other scenario would France have stood any chance against Germany by 1939. It would have been obvious from the start that they had no hope.
In 1936, Germany's economy was roughly twice the size of France's. Germany had a population of 67 million, France 40 million, and Germany had a proportionately greater population between the ages of 15-40; essentially a 2.5:1 edge in manpower fit for service. Germany had far more natural resources than France, and didn't need to rely on importing any from its colonies, since it didn't have any. You don't even have to bring doctrine or the comparative quality of the officer corps into the picture to see that France would have been very lucky to survive one-on-one against Germany. You take that superior doctrine, communications, and logistics technology and give Germany the option of going through Belgium, and the probability of a German victory in a conventional war are pretty much 1.
People are too hard on France in hindsight. The British fought the Germans in what, essentially, was a side show for the German army in North Africa for how long? Got chased back all the way to Egypt. And they got kicked out of France quite rapidly as well. Then there are the Norway and Greece disasters, in which daring and ingenuity led to German victories. Had the British faced Germany with the geographic reality of a land border, I'm not so sure they would have done much better. The Soviets could buy time with land, the Americans with a vast ocean between them and Hitler. In essence, the only major power that had nowhere to run and nowhere to hide, got hammered. Not that strange and not very typically French, I'd say.
To swilhelm73 and Radbod I'm not stupid
I said that because most of the troops stationed there had stomac complaints etc
the so called "maag en darm divisies"
I said that because most of the troops stationed there had stomac complaints etc
the so called "maag en darm divisies"
I think some people are overlooking a key aspect of the criticism.
France certainly had plenty of ability to still continue to fight effectively through their colonies when they surrendered historically
With regards to the Dewoitine 520...
"By the time of the armistice at the end of June, 437 D.520s had been built and 351 of these had been delivered. In that time they had 108 confirmed kills and 39 probables, losing 54 to enemy action."
http://warships1discussionboards.yu...t-if-Vichy-France-declares-war-on-the-UK.html
Basically this means that a significant number of Dewoitine 520s were available, and the plane was quite comparable to its Axis opponents during the period in question.
France also had around a couple hundred Hawk 75A fighters still available at this point. These were not far behind the top Allied and Nazi fighters in service during this period, and historically from "1939-1940, French pilots claimed 230 confirmed and 80 probable victories in H75s against only 29 aircraft lost in aerial combat."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P-36_Hawk
France would round out these forces with other fighters which might be less effective but were still perfectly militarily usable.
France's bombers include the 4 Farman 222 squadrons, which were 4 engined long range bombers which give France quite a few options on targets to potentially hit from its North Africa airbases. (This potentially includes some military specific targets within France where the threat of collateral damage to civilian targets is limited.) They also had 12 additional more capable Farman 223 4 engined bombers in service.
If France employed its Air Force units properly, the Battle of Britain should not be much of a fight in the first place because the Luftwaffe is still substantially preoccupied elsewhere.
The French Navy of the time is really pretty capable and includes around 12 cruisers, 77 submarines, and 66 destroyers. Those cruisers and destroyers would be especially useful as escorts to help in the battle of the Atlantic. France also had basically 8 completed battleships at the time. The Dunkerque and Strasbourg are particularly useful because they potentially have the speed to intercept a German Scharnhorst Class Battleship and the capability to ensure that in a one on one engagement the Scharnhorst Class ship is either sunk or at least too badly damaged to escape other battleships by the end of the engagement.
The Richelieu was about 95% completed at the time, and if it could eventually be completed in the US for instance, it has the speed and capability to defeat the Bismarck in a one on one engagement.
The French Navy and Air Force would also make it very difficult for either Italy or Germany to send significant reinforcement to deal with the French forces in North Africa. In the longer term the French reinforcements would make it easier for the UK to send more naval reinforcements to deal with Japan, which could have all sorts of consequences.
Basically France fighting on had the potential to shorten the war and make it less costly for the allies, which is a crucial reason why the French actions in WW2 are often looked upon so negatively.
(Its true there are ways their continued involvement could have conceivably kept the USSR out of it or the US out of the war for longer, but those certainly were not part of the reason France surrendered and I would argue the end result would have almost certainly been better for the western allies when you evaluate the possibilities.)
France certainly had plenty of ability to still continue to fight effectively through their colonies when they surrendered historically
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1985/sep-oct/kirkland.html
With regards to the Dewoitine 520...
"By the time of the armistice at the end of June, 437 D.520s had been built and 351 of these had been delivered. In that time they had 108 confirmed kills and 39 probables, losing 54 to enemy action."
http://warships1discussionboards.yu...t-if-Vichy-France-declares-war-on-the-UK.html
Basically this means that a significant number of Dewoitine 520s were available, and the plane was quite comparable to its Axis opponents during the period in question.
France also had around a couple hundred Hawk 75A fighters still available at this point. These were not far behind the top Allied and Nazi fighters in service during this period, and historically from "1939-1940, French pilots claimed 230 confirmed and 80 probable victories in H75s against only 29 aircraft lost in aerial combat."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P-36_Hawk
France would round out these forces with other fighters which might be less effective but were still perfectly militarily usable.
France's bombers include the 4 Farman 222 squadrons, which were 4 engined long range bombers which give France quite a few options on targets to potentially hit from its North Africa airbases. (This potentially includes some military specific targets within France where the threat of collateral damage to civilian targets is limited.) They also had 12 additional more capable Farman 223 4 engined bombers in service.
If France employed its Air Force units properly, the Battle of Britain should not be much of a fight in the first place because the Luftwaffe is still substantially preoccupied elsewhere.
The French Navy of the time is really pretty capable and includes around 12 cruisers, 77 submarines, and 66 destroyers. Those cruisers and destroyers would be especially useful as escorts to help in the battle of the Atlantic. France also had basically 8 completed battleships at the time. The Dunkerque and Strasbourg are particularly useful because they potentially have the speed to intercept a German Scharnhorst Class Battleship and the capability to ensure that in a one on one engagement the Scharnhorst Class ship is either sunk or at least too badly damaged to escape other battleships by the end of the engagement.
The Richelieu was about 95% completed at the time, and if it could eventually be completed in the US for instance, it has the speed and capability to defeat the Bismarck in a one on one engagement.
The French Navy and Air Force would also make it very difficult for either Italy or Germany to send significant reinforcement to deal with the French forces in North Africa. In the longer term the French reinforcements would make it easier for the UK to send more naval reinforcements to deal with Japan, which could have all sorts of consequences.
Basically France fighting on had the potential to shorten the war and make it less costly for the allies, which is a crucial reason why the French actions in WW2 are often looked upon so negatively.
(Its true there are ways their continued involvement could have conceivably kept the USSR out of it or the US out of the war for longer, but those certainly were not part of the reason France surrendered and I would argue the end result would have almost certainly been better for the western allies when you evaluate the possibilities.)
theusje said:To swilhelm73 and Radbod I'm not stupid
I said that because most of the troops stationed there had stomac complaints etc
the so called "maag en darm divisies"
Not a top fit garrison doesn't mean no any resistance at all.
Also the geographic condition of the Netherlands, almost the entire country cultivated no forest, hill etc, meant it was difficult to hide but there was resistance.
Ps.
Jij kijkt ook naar "andere tijden"?
Unless one actually believes military victory or defeat is a consequence of some form of moral virtue of a nation, the French defeat in that Battle of France is neither inexplicable nor particularily damning.
However the shock of it was such that a lot of people at the time actually groped around for conclusions about it and came up with the assumption that France was somehow "useless". The US State Department might be the most famous case, but large parts of the French public did become convinced of the same. It was part of the package of Vichy policies as well, how the Nation must be saved from divisive politics, democracy, republicanism etc. which had somehow "cuased" the defeat.
Which was why de Gaulle adressed the issue in some of his BBC speeches from the time, taking care to explain how France had been defeated by "a superior mechanical force", not by moral factors, which also meant that the way to turn things around was to build a yet superior "mechanical force", something de Gaulle as early as 1940 was indicating would be something the US would en up doing.
What is a blot on the French nation in WWII is the political jockeying, and the way in which the Vichy government came into being. It muddled the issue for the French no end.
Without it the legitimate French government, the Reynaud cabinet, can escape to London to fight on from the French overseas colonies. And as Mordoch has already explained, the airforce and navy would make a very useful addition to the British means.
Without the Vichy internal resistance in France would have gotton on the way in scale a year or two ahead of history.
Provided enough money and gear could be procured, probably only from the US, French North Africa might even have spawned a credible new French army a couple of years ahead of they it did historically.
Obviously the defeat of 1940 is a low point in French history, but the shameful bit is really only the Vichy. Which was precisely how de Gaulle and the Free French saw things; in order to have a France worth a damn post-war, France would have to reenter the war and be in on the kill in the end.
However the shock of it was such that a lot of people at the time actually groped around for conclusions about it and came up with the assumption that France was somehow "useless". The US State Department might be the most famous case, but large parts of the French public did become convinced of the same. It was part of the package of Vichy policies as well, how the Nation must be saved from divisive politics, democracy, republicanism etc. which had somehow "cuased" the defeat.
Which was why de Gaulle adressed the issue in some of his BBC speeches from the time, taking care to explain how France had been defeated by "a superior mechanical force", not by moral factors, which also meant that the way to turn things around was to build a yet superior "mechanical force", something de Gaulle as early as 1940 was indicating would be something the US would en up doing.
What is a blot on the French nation in WWII is the political jockeying, and the way in which the Vichy government came into being. It muddled the issue for the French no end.
Without it the legitimate French government, the Reynaud cabinet, can escape to London to fight on from the French overseas colonies. And as Mordoch has already explained, the airforce and navy would make a very useful addition to the British means.
Without the Vichy internal resistance in France would have gotton on the way in scale a year or two ahead of history.
Provided enough money and gear could be procured, probably only from the US, French North Africa might even have spawned a credible new French army a couple of years ahead of they it did historically.
Obviously the defeat of 1940 is a low point in French history, but the shameful bit is really only the Vichy. Which was precisely how de Gaulle and the Free French saw things; in order to have a France worth a damn post-war, France would have to reenter the war and be in on the kill in the end.
Radbod said:Not a top fit garrison doesn't mean no any resistance at all.
Also the geographic condition of the Netherlands, almost the entire country cultivated no forest, hill etc, meant it was difficult to hide but there was resistance.
Ps.
Jij kijkt ook naar "andere tijden"?
I know I know, there's no way I can talk meself out of this héy?
What I meant was things like blowing up trains and supply lines etc
And I know from the Battle for Arnhem there was Ducht Resistance etc etc ...
Ps
Kan zijn, heb ooit eens een docu erovergezien op de nederlandse tele
Mordoch:
How do you think the frech could supply there forces? GB got out of France with most of here army but not with there equipment so GB needs to equip here army first.
And you have to look at it like a frech guy in '40. They had the best army in the world and it got destroyed in 3 months...
How do you think the frech could supply there forces? GB got out of France with most of here army but not with there equipment so GB needs to equip here army first.
And you have to look at it like a frech guy in '40. They had the best army in the world and it got destroyed in 3 months...
Basically France should be able to pull out a certain amount of equipment, supplies, and spare parts as they pull out of France proper. They certainly retain the navy to protect materials being transported over. While they presumably can't justify mostly withdrawing without a sufficient fight, moving over a large portion of the materials in advance to North Africa probably is something they can get away with.Middelkerke said:
These supplies should mostly tide France over for awhile, equipment doesn't immediately fall apart when you have some spares after all. In the case of aircraft France may also transport over some uncompleted aircraft which they cannibalize for spare parts. In the longer run France is going to start relying upon the US heavily for supplies and additional equipment, France does have some gold still in its possession and this should help tide it over until lend -lease starts. Another major detail that often is neglected in these kinds of scenarios is France still has its colonies which do export some items and these could be sold in order to generate some additional hard currency.
Regardless of the shock, it should have been obvious that France had the ability to effectively fight on from North Africa and the other colonies even at the time.
Well, as has been said, they didn't surrender so "easily" to the Germans. At the same time it's important to remember that the German Ardennes plan which allowed the Germans to win (appearing out of a forest road nobody thought they'd use) was only made at the last minute when their real plan (which would've run them smack into the French, British and Belgian forces which were preparing for them and most likely would've resulted in their defeat) had to be abandoned because an officer with copies of it was forced to crash-land and was found by the French. Bad luck on the part of the French and quick thinking on the part of the Germans caused their downfall, not much more.
Besides, they showed a very real capacity for learning from their mistakes/enemies. The Groupe Mobile (a composite of the Kampfgruppe) was used effectively by them in Indochina and they pioneered the use of helicopters and tactics related to them in Algeria before the Americans were in Vietnam. Not lacking in military tradition/accomplishments at all.
Besides, they showed a very real capacity for learning from their mistakes/enemies. The Groupe Mobile (a composite of the Kampfgruppe) was used effectively by them in Indochina and they pioneered the use of helicopters and tactics related to them in Algeria before the Americans were in Vietnam. Not lacking in military tradition/accomplishments at all.
theusje said:
That was about WWI, though.
I believe WWII was worth fighting, from a British perspective. We sacrificed our empire to save the world, I'm quite proud of that, even if we're just a small relatively unimportant island these days.
Which is akin to suggesting that in a similar scenario the US could have fought on from Hawaii. Your case seems to be that the French military should have either extensively prepared for its defeat prior to the war (and thus provided a major logistical and operations base in Algeria) or, in the space of a month, somehow exported its entire military and logistical infrastructure and assets in order to put them in the hands of the US and the UKMordoch said:
Hawaii is considerably smaller and much further away from USA then Algiers and Britain from France.
Suvorov said:
Well, all "French are only good in surrendering" is just silly American joke series, on similar level of quality as jokes about Irish, Mexicans or Poles. "Let's laugh from this division that got steamrolled in Ardennes in 1944, those were morons and cowards, haha - so funny".
At the very same time, it's perfectly visible that French society in general didn't have will to conduct long war in the first place and this mindset was present though the whole war. I would rather blame Great War losses experience, relatively low level ruthlessness of occupants and political troubles of the republic then some sort of mythical french flaws. Comparing it with Poland doesn't make sense at all - Frenchmen were never under threat of biological extinction, which was always present possibility for the population of Poland (with some of the ethnic group prioritized, but others waiting in the queue for it).
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