FOREWORD
Russia and China are the two largest, neighboring countries of the world, with a nearly four-century history of mutual contacts and ties. The interaction of the two powers was objectively due to their geographical proximity. To change this position or just to ignore it is impossible. Historically, the very fate of Russia was entrusted with the function of serving as a bridge and at the same time an outpost between the East and the West, bringing together the entire huge Eurasian continent.
Despite its neighborhood, Russia and China historically personify completely different civilizations: Slavic-Orthodox and Confucian-Chinese. The differences between the two states and civilizations are enormous and manifest in the differences in the national-ethnic composition, the dissimilarity of the national character and mentality, and the absolute incompatibility of cultural-historical development. The differences between the two civilizations are so striking that any attempts to compare them and identify common features are doomed to failure.
However, by the will of fate, those put in the position of their nearest neighbors, Russia and China, inevitably interacted, interact and will interact. Each side has its own interests, expressed in foreign and military policy (national security policy). Each of the countries is trying to find and compare the strengths and weaknesses, both their own and their neighbors, and on this basis build their own foreign policy strategy.
In the history of relations between the two states there were periods of confrontation, as well as eras of peaceful and good-neighborly relations. The study of the lessons of these relationships, ways of overcoming differences and mistrust, strengthening mutual understanding in the military field is an important and urgent task set by time. Over the long centuries, many problems have accumulated in relations between Russia and China, and the current and future state of Russian-Chinese military-political relations largely depends on their solution. Relations between the two powers cannot be built “from scratch,” however attractive this idea may be. An underestimation or at least partial disregard of the centuries-old experience of Russian-Chinese relations is fraught with errors today, which tomorrow may turn into the most tragic side. This, in particular, was one of the reasons for the Soviet-Chinese confrontation of the 60-70-ies of the XX century.
The need for knowledge and consideration of the historical experience of relations between our two powers is even more relevant for the development of the military-political ties of today's Russia with its great eastern neighbor. That is why it is so important for us to objectively and impartially, on the basis of real documents and materials, analyze the history of the formation of military-political relations between Russia and China, identify trends that have developed over several centuries and features of their development, and formulate conclusions for today and tomorrow.
This task is especially difficult due to civilizational, spiritual, cultural, national and psychological differences between our two countries. Ignoring this leads to tragic errors, misunderstandings and conflicts. This should also be taken into account as much as possible in the development of Russia's military-political relations with China. At one time, Lieutenant-General D.I. Subotic, who commanded the Russian troops in Manchuria in 1900, noted: "Remember that in Asia you have to be always on the alert."
The problem of Russian-Chinese relations in the military-political field originates in fact from the first contacts between the two countries - from the end of the 16th to the beginning of the 17th century. All the first diplomatic contacts, both in form and in content, can be fully characterized as military-political ones. However, if the political component of these contacts was thoroughly studied by the national school of Sinology, the military aspects of the problem were usually taken out of the framework of research. It is to these aspects that more attention is paid in this work.Consciously ignoring other aspects of Russian-Chinese relations, such as: trade, economic, cultural, allows the author to focus only on military-political aspects.
This work can not claim and does not claim to complete and detailed coverage of the 300-year history of Russian-Chinese relations in the military field from the XVII century to 1917. Nevertheless, the most important stages and events of this story are reflected in the pages of the book offered to the court.
The narrative in the form of essays made it possible to move away from a strictly “academic” presentation of the material. The author considered it his duty to preserve the language and style of the era, as reflected in documents and historical materials. There is not a single fictional fact in the book; all conclusions and assessments are based on real historical knowledge.
Striving towards the most objective description of the events of history, the author cites not only the Russian point of view, but also in some cases the assessments of Chinese specialists. Such an event was, for example, the heroic epic of the defense of the Russian fortress Albazin.
Some of the most significant and interesting documents from the history of the military-political relations of Russia and China in the first three centuries of their interaction, as well as excerpts from China from several books and brochures of Russian diplomats and military experts, are included in the documentary appendix of the book.
Documents and historical materials cited in the book, many of which in the past were available only to learned Orientalists and, as a rule, were ignored on a practical level, are rich in thoughts and assessments that have not lost their relevance until now. Opinions and assessments of some authoritative political and military leaders of the past about China and its political and military power may be considered “politically incorrect” today, but their silence or “correction” is fundamentally dangerous. Knowledge of these documents and materials allows us to better understand China today and to predict possible steps and responses of Chinese partners in the negotiations, including in the field of big politics.
All this makes this work a serious help for politicians, specialists dealing with problems of national security and international relations, practitioners involved in the development of relations of our country with China, as well as for all readers interested in the history of Russia and the history of the East.
CHAPTER 1.
QING CHINA MILITARY POLICY
Military-political characteristic of Qing China
The year 1644 was a milestone in the history of the great Chinese empire: the Minsk dynasty that prevailed for about 300 years collapsed. The last emperor of the Minsk dynasty, Chung Zhen, committed suicide. The leader of the peasant uprising, Li Zicheng, led the popular rebels, entered Beijing. However, after 40 days, he was forced to flee: a new enemy was standing at the gates of the ancient Chinese capital. The Manchus, who founded the Qing Dynasty, which ruled China for 267 years, from 1644 to 1912, seized the throne by force and cunning. Nonetheless, for nearly 300 years, the Manchus held political and military power in China.
The Qing Empire inherited all the norms and traditions of imperial China and, in the form of government, was an absolute monarchy. The emperor (bogdykhan) was declared the Son of Heaven, who rules the universe at the behest of Heaven.
The supreme body that decided the most important state affairs was the Supreme Imperial Council. It included members of the imperial family and the highest dignitaries. The main executive authorities were orders (chambers or ministries): the Imperial Secretariat (Neige), Foreign Affairs Order, Official Order, Tax Order, Ceremony Order, Military Order, Criminal Order, Public Works Order, Council of Censors.
Relations with the countries located to the north and west were in charge of the Department of Dependent Territories Affairs - Lifan-Yuan, established in 1638 instead of the Mongol administration, which operated under the Manchu court until the capture of Beijing. It was this department of Qing China that was in charge of diplomatic ties with Russia.
Initially, the most important military and civil affairs were in charge of the Imperial Secretariat, created in 1671 from an equal number of Manchu and Chinese dignitaries.
In 1732, the Military Council (Junjichu) was created to more quickly guide military operations against the Dzungars. With its establishment, the decision of all important state affairs was transferred to this new body. The quantitative composition of the Military Council was determined by the emperor. Manchurians were appointed to it, as a rule, and much less often Mongols and Chinese, who proved loyalty to the Qing court. Relying on the Military Council, Bogdykhan appointed senior officials to decide military, judicial, financial and other cases, despotically exercising supreme legislative and executive power in the state.
From 1732 to 1796, in the Military Council, the Manchus constituted 56% of the total composition of its members, and the Chinese - only 37%. The remaining 7% of Council members were Mongols.
The Manchus formed the highest class of the Qing Empire - hereditary aristocracy and military nobility. Making crafts and trading them was prohibited as a shameful thing. The Chinese nobility, although they belonged to the ruling class, were not hereditary.
The entire vast mass of the Chinese population — the peasantry — was in a depressed state. Farmers could not dispose of themselves or their families or property. Even more disenfranchised slaves.
P.A. Badmaev, in his note of February 13, 1893, analyzing the situation in Manchu China, wrote: “The history of China for over 200 years shows that this powerful people in all respects was ruled by its own law, issued by philosophers, but in fact the rulers of China were various foreigners for the most part purely Mongolian tribes, few in number, uneducated in Chinese, not understanding the meaning of labor, industry and commerce, even completely unfamiliar with writing. Some of the rulers of China from foreigners, after they had fully acquired and assimilated Chinese civilization, were expelled from China by other aliens, also uneducated. In the same way, successively, small, crude, completely uneducated Manchus, who still control it, have seized China.The Manchurian dynasty is completely overwhelmed; at present, the Chinese themselves, as well as the Mongols, and the Tibetans, oppressed by the official world of the Manchurian dynasty, look at it with hostility.
The Chinese themselves, in whatever favorable conditions they may be, obviously, not only cannot rule other nations, but do not even seek to have rulers from their own nation: a 20-century history confirms this opinion. If a real Chinese ever ruled them, he was nevertheless made by the lord of China quite by accident, having often been an ordinary leader of a gang of brigands, or these rulers were at least real Chinese, but were pupils of foreigners.
In general, the Manchu dynasty is discredited in the eyes of the Chinese, the Mongols and the Tibetans. Only with the help of cruel measures and completely extraneous and accidental circumstances, it retains its power. Russia helps it retain power in the north-east, in the north and in the north-west ”{2}.
Foreign policy of the Qing Courtyard in the XVII — XVIII centuries. had an active, aggressive nature, especially after the conquest of the southwestern territories of China and the subordination of Taiwan.
One of the first objects of military expansion of the Qing became Mongolia. Back in the middle of the XVI century. it broke up into three parts: the southern, northern and western. In northern Mongolia (Khalkha) by the end of the XVI - beginning of the XVII centuries. three rulers stood out: Tushetu Khan, Dzasaktu Khan and Tsetsen Khan. However, already in 1646, under the pretext of persecuting the Manchu emperor who had previously passed under the authority of the Manchu emperor, and then the Ching troops who had fled to Halcha to Tsetsen Khan, invaded the territory of Northern Mongolia. The fight took a long time.
In Western Mongolia, in the vast expanses of Dzungaria, various tribes of Oirats, relatives of the Mongols, roamed. At the beginning of the XVII century. as a result of the unification of the four main groups of Oirat tribes (choros, khokhots, Torgouts and Derbats), a powerful Dzungarian khanate was formed here, headed by a representative of the Choros house, Batur-juntaji. On his initiative, in 1640, the all-Mongolian congress of sovereign princes was convened, at which a collection of laws was adopted in order to stop the strife and join forces against the common enemy - Manchu.
After the death of Batur-huntaiji, his son Galdan (1671-1697) entered the throne of Dzungarian. He and his heirs successfully fought Khalkha, but gradually the Chinese took over his land. Galdan was forced to retreat to Kobdo in 1690, and by 1697 it was finally defeated.
In 1762, the post of Manchurian amban was established in Mongolia. Simultaneously with the Manchu Amban, the post of the Mongolian Amban-Co-Emperor was introduced. Nominally, the Mongolian Amban was supposed to give advice to the Manchurian Amban in all matters, practically everything was the opposite - the Mongol only followed the instructions of the latter.
One of the main tasks of the foreign policy of Qing China was the destruction of the Dzungarian Khanate. Political and diplomatic intrigues, military force and deception Qing conquered Central Asia. In 1758, the whole of Dzungaria was conquered by the Manchu-Chinese troops, the male population was almost completely slaughtered. Military settlements were created on the devastated lands, where the Qing began to evict the Chinese peasants en masse, turning them into colonial soldiers. In the same year, the Qing troops conquered Kashgaria. The conquered lands were incorporated into the Qing Empire, called Xinjiang (“New Frontier” or “New Territory”).
The aggressive policy of Qing China was carried out in a southerly direction - against Taiwan, Vietnam, and Burma. By the end of the XVIII century. The Qing Empire included vast spaces. The lands conquered from the neighbors remained mostly uninhabited and uninhabited. The aggressive policy of the Qing led to the economic degradation of not only the occupied lands, but also China itself.
The most serious danger to the Qing Courtyard was continuous unrest and revolts in China itself. In the XVII century. in China, a huge number of secret societies, religious and mystical organizations arise: the Triad Society, the Elder Brothers Society, the White Lotus Society. China in the XVIII — XIX centuries. shook the large-scale popular uprisings, which had anti-Manchu and anti-feudal orientation. This forced the Qing authorities to throw a huge number of troops primarily to pacify internal unrest.
The most important pillar of the Qing monarchy was the army. It consisted of two components: the Manchurian Eight-Banner Forces (Bazi) and the Chinese forces of Luin, the troops of the Green Banner.
The eight eminent troops were the elite of the armed forces of the Manchu Empire, the main force in establishing Manchu domination in China. Even before the invasion of China in 1644, the Manchu Qing Dynasty had an army consisting of eight Manchurian banners (corps), as well as eight Mongolian and eight Chinese banners (corps). The Chinese corps were staffed with Hanjuns - the Chinese who voluntarily transferred to the service of the Qing court. The main backbone of the Eight-banner troops were the Manchus - the descendants of the Jurchen tribe.
The name of the Eight-Famous Forces - these troops received corps flags: yellow, white, blue, red, yellow with a red border, white with a blue border, blue with a white border and red with a yellow border.
Eight banners were divided into two groups: the top three flags and the lower five flags. The top three flags, which included the yellow flag without a rim, the yellow flag with a red border and the white flag without a rim, were the personal guard of the emperor and were in his personal submission.
Under the command of the warlords appointed by the emperor were the lower five flags: a white banner with a red border, a red banner without a border, a red banner with a blue border, a blue banner without a border, and a blue banner with a red border.
In one of the three banners of the personal guard of the Manchu emperor, the descendants of Russian Cossacks, captured by the Manchus in 1685 during the conquest of Albazin {3}, served in the yellow with red border.
By the time of the invasion of China, the number of eight-banner troops was 200 thousand soldiers. Approximately the same number of them remained throughout the era of the Qing dynasty in China (1644-1912).
After the conquest of China, the Eight-Famous Forces carried mainly garrison service, rarely taking part in military operations against external enemies. They were stationed in 72 key strategic military locations and settlements of China, with half of all Manchurian flags concentrated in Beijing, where the capital was transferred from Mukden.
Initially, in the 17th century, the Eight-Famous Forces, and above all their Manchu components, represented a formidable military force, but over time the army lost its warlike spirit and turned into a parasitic caste. By the end of the XVII century. the decline of the Manchu troops became apparent. In fact, they performed internal functions in the Qing Empire, engaging to provide economic activity and to fight the rebels. The implicit military system of the Qings, the absence of modern weapons and the utter disregard for the problems of the army led to the fact that the Eight-Famous Forces repeatedly showed their complete incapacity in the fight against external enemies (especially during the “opium war” periods).
The troops Lucien (abbreviated Luins), the troops of the green banner, were recruited by recruiting the Chinese in the provinces, where they served. They submitted to the supreme provincial commanders and were fully supported by the local authorities. The number of these troops was almost three times the Eight-Famous and by 1812 it was over 660 thousand soldiers and officers, but their combat readiness was significantly lower than that of the Manchurian troops . Luin's troops were poorly armed, but even the available weapons were of extremely poor quality. The supply and support of the troops of Lwin was very bad. The senior and senior officers of the green banner sometimes included Manchus, but much more often Chinese Hanjuns who proved their loyalty to the Qing court. Middle and lower commanders were staffed by Chinese, but their promotion was limited by Ching laws and regulations.
The Taiping uprising and the peasant war in China (1850–1864) were of decisive importance for the development of the military organization of the Qing Empire. The inability of the Eight Banner Forces, as well as the local Lwin troops, to suppress anti-government demonstrations in China, showed the weakness of military-feudal China, who was unable to maintain order and calm inside the country.
The Taiping events were used by England and France as a pretext for military intervention in China. The troops of the Western powers in the period 1856-1858. conducted several military operations, the result of which was the adoption by China of the enslaving conditions of unequal treaties with the great powers.
The most severe political upheavals forced the Qinsky Court to set a course for reforming and rearming national armed forces. To this end, China had no choice but to resort to foreign aid.
In the autumn of 1861, a military training program began for a group of Chinese military personnel by Russian instructors in Kyakhta. Three months later, this program was practically curtailed by the Chinese side, and the position of the British embassy played a significant role here.
From February 1862 in Tianjin began the training of Chinese soldiers from the Eight-Banner Forces by English instructor officers.
In parallel with this, the Qing government took a whole series of measures to reorganize and reform the Eight-Banner Forces, primarily stationed in the Beijing area, bringing them to a modern state and equipping them with firearms. As a result, by 1864 only around one Chinese capital there were several connections and parts with a total of about 30 thousand people “trained by the European order”.
In 1865, the Chinese Defense Ministry and the Ministry of Finance decided to form six corps in the province of Zhili with the troops of Lwin trained according to the European model. This was the beginning of a new type of military formations in China, which were called Lianjun - Trained troops. Soon, modern units and formations of the Chinese armed forces, trained and armed European, appeared in other provinces. From the very beginning, they were under the control and guidance of the local sovereigns of Beijing, who had unlimited powers in their provinces. The most combat-ready formations of the new Trained Forces appeared in Zhili, at the governor Li Hong-chzhan, and in Xinjiang, at the viceroy Zuo Tszintang.
In addition to measures to reform the army, the Qing government took a number of measures for their material and technical support. So, at the end of 1885, a large military factory for the production of rifles, cartridges and gunpowder was built in Girin. By the mid-1890s, there were large military factories and workshops in Shanghai, Nanking, Hanyang, Tianjin, Fuzhou, Cheng-du, Guangzhou, Lanzhou, and other cities. Some of these enterprises were equipped with foreign technology and equipment and were able to produce even modern guns and artillery. However, the bulk of Chinese weapons enterprises could only produce outdated (as compared with the armament of European armies) weapons and ammunition samples.
The policy of the Qing authorities to strengthen and retrain their armed forces gradually bore fruit, but the Chinese army as a whole was still incapable. So, as of the spring of 1886, in Manchuria there were 280 thousand soldiers from the composition of znamenny troops. Of this number, only 100 thousand people were armed with modern guns, and the rest were armed with bows, spears or wick guns. However, even among those who had modern guns, only 30% were trained in the European order.
The military transformations in Manchuria were carried out under the leadership of the former chief of the Manchu troops in Fujian My Tushan Province, who in early 1886 set about reorganizing the armed forces in Shengjin, Heilongjiang and Jilin provinces.
For three years of its activity in Manchuria, My Tu-shan has formed three new corps of Trained Troops with a total number of 13,500 people. Each corps consisted of 8 infantry battalions and 2 cavalry squadrons with 20 field guns.
Erupted in the years 1894-1895. The Sino-Japanese war once again demonstrated that the armed forces of the Chinese empire were not able to seriously oppose external aggression, to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. The inept leadership of the fighting, the lack of modern weapons in the troops, poor tactical training of troops - all this led to the complete defeat of China.
The defeat in the war with Japan forced the Qing government to once again once again pay serious attention to the state and reform of its armed forces. Influenced by the lessons of this war, the German army was adopted as a model for training the Chinese troops, which was guided by the armed forces of the winner - Japan.
In December 1898, Empress Cixi approved the plan for the creation of the Northern - Beiyang - Army, trained in European style and armed with the latest weapons. It consisted of four previously formed corps under the command of generals Yuan Shikai, Ne Shicheng, Dong Fuxian and Song Qing, and a new corps commanded by Rong Lu. The new army was not under the control of the provincial authorities, but under the leadership of the Qing government.
The war of 1900-1901, which arose as a result of the anti-imperialist movement of the "boxers", ended with the defeat of the Qing. The Final Protocol signed in September 1901 obliged the Manchu government, in particular, to destroy all defenses built between the coast and Beijing; for two years, do not import weapons, ammunition and military materials from other countries. China was forbidden to have troops in the capital district, and foreign powers received the right to keep a contingent: their troops in North China. In Beijing, a special embassy quarter was created, the management of which was controlled by the foreigners themselves, where they had the right to keep their military units to protect the embassies.
Again, under the influence of an external threat factor, the Qing Yard was forced to come to grips with military reforms. On September 12, 1901, an important decree was published, which recognized the unsatisfactory condition of the existing formations and stressed the need to create a modern regular army in the country.
Russian military experts who monitored the state of the Chinese armed forces reported on events held in the country and analyzed their danger to the position of Russia in the Far East. In one of the notes of the former military agent in Beijing, Colonel General Staff D. Putiata, written by him in 1902, it was noted: the construction of fortresses and device arsenals. But, having accumulated a lot of military material, he did not create either an army or a fleet and needed a lesson to make sure of the mistakes he made. If now China realizes that it must radically change its military system, put an end to the tyranny and the freezing of the mandarins, then with its material resources it will become a more formidable neighbor than it has been up to now. ”
In June 1902, the governor of the province, Zhili Yuan Shikai, who took up this post after the death of Li Hongzhang, presented to the Qing Courtyard a project for the formation of a standing army - Changbeijun - with a reserve and reserve due to the transition to recruitment to the army.
This idea was favorably received in Beijing, and in October of the same year the first division of the new troops was formed. Over the next two years, similar formations appeared in Hubei, Jiangsu, Shanxi, Shaanxi, Jiangxi, Guangxi, Guizhou and Yunnan. According to the plans of the Manchu leadership, by 1913 it was assumed that in the standing army there should be 36 divisions staffed, trained and armed in accordance with the most modern requirements.
To study the foreign experience of military construction and the reform of its armed forces, a special committee was established at the Qing Court, which prepared and sent several important documents to the emperor. May 19, 1904 the results of the meetings were reported to the emperor in the form of a report. In particular, the document stated:
“Among the numerous works of the present time, the most difficult is the organization of the army. How to recruit, content, arm and train the troops of the capital and provinces? How to convert provincial troops? We order the officials of Lien-ping-chu (Lien-ping-chu — a collegiate institution formed at the end of 1903; it is in charge of the organization of the army and its administration; this is something like a high council, also invested with by the executive branch). discuss these issues and provide us with your findings. Respect for this order!
We believe that in every state the army is a great and important factor.
In ancient times, the army was the whole nation. If necessary, called the entire population. By passing the need, everyone returned to their fields.
Later, to form an army, people began to be chosen from experienced hunters, i.e. of those who knew how to wield weapons. Little by little the army separated from the nation. The size of the army fluctuated, and, of course, the more warriors there were, the more people had to be fed (...).
All foreign countries have a strong army, ready for war, in order to avoid the latter. Their population enjoys powerful defense always in readiness troops. With a comprehensive discussion it becomes clear that we can not do without an army. If you create an army, you need to make a charter, which should be one for all (...).
On land, the wind sweeps sand in heaps; loose hair can not splash themselves. Luin is outdated. The rules for recruiting him in each province are different. There can be no monotony, and therefore the great warfare has become a little difficult. That is why it is necessary to establish immutable laws.
In the old days when recruiting soldiers did not care about the consequences; Now you need to think about the future, because you can not trust only one favorable or unfavorable chance.
Before service life was not limited; Now it is necessary to carefully consider this issue in order to avoid wasting funds.
Formerly, soldiers and officers did not need knowledge; to fight, they had to possess only strength and courage. Now the laws of war are changing every day: it is necessary to constantly learn and prepare for command and control.
Before it was not necessary to learn the possession of weapons, it was easy; just armed man was ready for battle. Now the armies are numerous, strength and agility are not enough to win, and firearms give the best results only with well-trained people.
Management will be sensible or not, depending on whether the training system is good or bad. The training system will be good or bad, depending on whether the military laws are strict or not, as well as on how the provisions on training and monetary allowances are made.
You need to use everything to help make a plan.
The old time is not similar to the present, which means that the chiefs cannot be guided by the same methods.China and other states are not alike; military laws cannot be exactly the same with them.
To form an army, it is necessary to take into consideration the system of other states, as well as the state of each of our provinces. It should be taken as a rule: do not destroy anything and do not spoil anything (...).
Do not hide that the costs will be high. It is necessary to use all efforts to use all fit people. It will also take some time to train the army; but if you take care of a soldier, then it will improve every day.
To ensure uniform training, we suggest sending trusted people from time to time to check the provincial troops. For this, we respectfully ask for the orders of Your Majesty.
8 military laws should take into consideration not only courage and strength. In peacetime, strength or weakness, in wartime — agility or ignorance depends on the laws of war, which themselves derive from a state of education, the basis of which is the laws established in the army. Chiefs and privates, big and small, should help each other, how the body uses the hand, and the hand - with a brush ...
An accurate description of the new Chinese military reforms was given by the colonel of the Russian General Staff L.M. Bolkhovitinov in his military-political review of the armed forces of this state: “In the development of its armed forces, the Chinese government is guided by the following principles set out in the memo of Yuan Shikai dated June 8, 1902: -
- gradual transition from recruitment to military service;
- education stock trained people;
- establishing uniformity in the organization and training of troops;
- improvement of officers and army personnel in general ”.
New troops were formed, as a rule, on the basis of the Eight-Banner Manchu units and formations. However, officer positions were often occupied by indigenous Chinese, more competent in general educational and military relations by Chinese officers. Primary attention was paid to the arming of new divisions with modern models of small arms and artillery.
The service in the ranks of the new Chinese troops was structured as follows. All those entering the service were enrolled, first for 3 years, to the permanent (field) army, then for 3 years - to the reserve. Being in the reserve, they lived an ordinary civilian life, but were annually called up for military training. Upon expiration of their service in the reserve, the soldiers were transferred to the reserve (militia), where there were another 4 years {10}. This system, according to Yuan Shikaya, could provide the country's armed forces with the necessary number of well-trained personnel.
By mid-1911, the Chinese new army consisted of 11 divisions and 25 separate brigades, with 160,000 infantry in their ranks, consolidated into 285 battalions; 14 thousand cavalry, consolidated in 62 divisions (squadron). Artillery was represented by 169 batteries with a total number of barrels - 1 thousand. In service with the new troops there were 130 machine guns {11}.
Serious transformations also began in the system of military education and the training of the officer corps.
In February 1905, a decree was issued on the establishment in the capital and provincial centers of lower military schools with a 3-year term of study. Then graduates were sent to continuing education in secondary cadet schools. After studying for two years, the cadets had to go through a six-month internship in the military, and then they could enroll in officers' schools with a one-and-a-half-year training period. With such a system of military training, the first graduation of officers could take place only in 1912, i.e. when new troops are basically to be created.
For the speedy replenishment of troops with officer personnel, it was allowed to create on-site officer schools and schools with an accelerated training period of 1.5–2.5 years. The cadets were recruited from among the literate urban youth, and all the training was reduced mainly to military disciplines. As a result, since 1908, the new army began to receive annually up to 1,500 officers.In one of the Chinese documents aimed at the Bogdykhan himself, it was said: “In peacetime, there are numerous cadres in peacetime, regardless of the cost, so that in wartime everything was in order ... According to our old military organization, there were too few officers in the army. Hence our constant weakness. We must follow the example of other nations who are not afraid to increase the number of their officers in order to be strong at the moment of the struggle ”.
To prepare candidates for the most responsible officer positions, the Qing authorities resorted to sending young educated people to study abroad, primarily to Japan, Germany, England, and the United States. In total, from 1900 to 1911, about 700 Chinese officers received military education in Japan alone.
All the changes and innovations that took place in the military sphere of China did not affect the fate of the old Eight-Famous Forces, which had long been a huge burden to the state. Fully decomposed, unable to act as an organized armed force, not only to repel external aggression, but also to maintain order within the state. Eight-famous troops inevitably had to be subjected to fundamental reforms. Despite the prolonged reluctance of the Qinsky Court to deal with this problem, in the end, in December 1908, a program was drafted for the gradual 9-year reorganization of the Eight-Famous Forces, which was to be completed in 1915.
On the basis of the Manchu znamennyh troops from 1908 began the formation of a new palace guard - Jing-weijun. By September 1911, there were 12 thousand people in it, and it was the most combat-ready units of the Chinese armed forces.
Conceptual foundations of the military-political strategy of Qing China
China is one of the most ancient centers of human civilization, a country with a rich culture and unique traditions. For many centuries of its development, China was isolated from the processes of the formation of Western civilization, developing on its own, internal, traditional foundations. This left its mark on China’s perception of the world and its place in it. For many centuries, the foreign and military policy of this state was formed on the basis of unique, specifically Chinese sources, which include:
- Traditional Chinese-centric ideas about China and its place in the world;
- The system of traditional Chinese stratagems;
- the conceptual foundations of philosophical, ethical and ideological teachings - Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, etc .;
- The provisions of the military treatises of Tai Gung, Sima, Sun Tzu, Wu Tzu, Wei Liaozi, Huang Shiguana, Li Weigong.
In accordance with the ancient, traditional Chinese ideas about the world order, the Universe was a boundless sky, a dome covering a square Earth. In the center of the earth square was located China - the Middle State. Hence the traditional names of China: Zhongguo (“Middle State”); Zhonghua (“Middle Blooming State”); Tianxia ("Celestial"),
The most important principle of the structure of the universe, according to ancient Chinese notions, consisted in strict systematicity and hierarchy. ” The Middle State ”was ruled by the emperor, who was called the Son of Heaven (“ Tianzi ”) or the Heavenly Emperor (“ Tianwan ”). All subjects of the empire were called slaves - “Nutsay”.
Being the "center of the Earth", the "Middle State" was surrounded on four sides by the "barbarians" who were classified on the cardinal points.
The “middle state” was considered as the cradle of civilization, order, and high culture. District "barbarians" by the very order of things were doomed to worship China, to obey and obedience. It is characteristic that such ideas about the Universe did not change in China even in the middle of the 17th century, when the “barbarous” Manchu Qing dynasty came to power in China. The Manchu rulers organically “inscribed themselves” in the historical and cultural context of Chinese civilization, remaining absolutely loyal to the traditional Chinese ideas about the world and world order.
In the system of "barbarians" there were two categories - near and far. The former were referring to the nearest geographical neighbors of the “Middle State”: the tribes of the nomads of Manchuria and Mongolia, the Turkic peoples of the “Western Territory”, the southern tribes and peoples.
The distant "barbarians" were those peoples and states that did not directly border on China and about whom in Beijing there was extremely poor knowledge.
For Qing China, Russia acted as a “distant barbarian”: until the XVII century, they knew practically nothing about Russia (and did not want to know!). Russia, like all the other “barbarians”, by the mere fact of its existence “interfered” with the well-established, normal order of things in the Middle Kingdom.
Providing their interests in the periphery of the Celestial Empire, in China they acted in accordance with the traditional principles of relations with the "barbarians":
- “i i zhi i” (“Manage barbarians with the help of barbarians”);
- “i i gun i” (“Attacking barbarians with the help of barbarians”);
- “i i zhi i” (“To restrain barbarians with the help of barbarians”).
The implementation of foreign and military policy in the “Middle State” was considered unthinkable without the use of traditional Chinese stratagems, which largely determined the national Chinese style of diplomacy and military policy. Stratagems are a combination of historically formed techniques and principles of activity that ultimately achieve the achievement of strategic goals by means of tactical concessions, clever traps, and the ability to hide their true intentions.Stratagem became a feature of the national character of the Chinese, and the ability to act in accordance with traditional stratagems was considered and is considered the highest achievement not only of a politician or a military leader, but also of a commoner.
As noted by one of the leading domestic sinologists B.C. Myasnikov, by the concept of "stratagem", means "a strategic plan in which any trap or trick is made for the enemy", and "bin zhimou means both ingenuity, ingenuity, and resourcefulness". In this regard, V.N. Myasnikov said: “So, stratagem is a fusion of strategy with the ability to arrange hidden from the enemy trap ... Knowledge of ancient stratagems, drawing up ingenious plans has become a tradition in China, and not only a tradition of political life concerning diplomacy or war ...
The ability to make stratagems testified to the abilities of a person, the presence of a plan instilled in the performers confidence in the success of any business. Therefore, at all levels in China, they are accustomed to respecting the strategy and the plans developed by the strategies with due respect. From the most important political problems to the game of Chinese battles "wei-chi" - everywhere there was a competition in the design and implementation of strategy games. There was even a special term - zhidou, which meant such competition. Straightness has become a feature of national character, a feature of national psychology. But this does not mean that the Chinese are a nation of clever schemers, cunning and deceivers. Not. These are people, first of all who are able to think strategically, make long-term plans both at the state and personal level, who are able to calculate the situation for a sufficient number of moves ahead and use stratagem traps to achieve success ”.
The total number of stratagems per se is unlimited, but Chinese specialists, as well as prominent Western and domestic scholars, identify 36 traditional Chinese stratagems. It is believed that they describe in one way or another almost all the other "smart plans." It is precisely these stratagems that determine the diplomatic practice and military actions of China in relation to the outside world.
The Swiss scientist Harro von Zenger based on his many years of research activity for the first time in European Sinology formulated in a holistic form all 36 traditional Chinese stratagems from the most ancient treatise "Sanshilyu Ji Miben Binf":
1. To deceive the emperor to cross the sea.
2. To besiege Wei to save Zhou.
3. To kill a stranger with a knife.
4. At rest expect a weary enemy.
5. Rob during a fire.
6. To make noise in the east, to attack in the west.
7. Extract something from nothing.
8. For a view, repair wooden walkways, secretly speak in Chentsang.
9. Watch the fire from the opposite bank.
10. Hide a dagger behind a smile.
11. Plum tree dries out instead of peach.
12. Take the sheep off with a light hand.
13. Beat on the grass to scare the snake.
14. Borrow a corpse to bring back the soul.
15. Lure the tiger from the mountain to the plain.
16. If you want to catch something, release first.
17. Throw a brick to get jasper.
18. In order to neutralize the robber gang, you first need to catch the leader.
19. Secretly enclose brushwood under the boiler of another.
20. Fish in troubled waters.
21. Cicada sheds its golden skin.
22. Close the door and catch the thief.
23. Unite with a distant enemy to beat your neighbor.
24. Declare that you are only going to pass through the state of Go, and seize it.
25. Steal beams and replace them with rotten props.
26. Hide acacia and point to the mulberry tree.
27. Make crazy gestures without losing your balance.
28. Lure to the roof and clean the stairs.
29. Decorate dry trees with artificial flowers.
30. Turn the guest role into the host role.
31. Stratagem beauty.
32. Stratagem of open city gates.
33. Stratagem sowing discord.
34. Stratagem samostrela.
35. Stratagem "chains".
36. Flight (with complete hopelessness) is the best stratagem.
An analysis of the Manchu policy toward Russia shows that from the 17th century onwards. Beijing has successfully applied many of the classic stratagems. The principle of "killing with someone else's knife" was implemented in the instigation of the local peoples of the Amur region to resist the Russian Cossack detachments. Stratagem number 23 "Unite with a distant enemy to beat your neighbor" manifested, for example, during Beijing's attempts to enter into an alliance with Russia to conquer Dzungaria in the first half of the XVIII century.
The stratagem “To hide a dagger behind a smile”, which has a different interpretation - “To appease words, to bear evil in the heart,” throughout China’s diplomatic history (as well as other states!) Was fundamental. It was fully applied by both China and Russia during bilateral negotiations on territorial delineation and diplomatic relations.
As historical experience testifies, not only China, but also all the powers that had been in contact with it over the past few centuries, actively used stratagems in their policies. The classic example in this regard, the Chinese side considers the policy of territorial seizures, pursued in China by the European powers in the XIX century. In accordance with strategy number 5 "Rob during a fire" "Tsarist Russia took advantage of the fire to rob, snatching off a piece of our territory".
Ancient Chinese stratagems organically entered, in interpreted form, into the classic treatise on the art of war "Sun Tzu Binf" (VI-V century BC), which, in turn, became the basis of the military policy of the Chinese empire. This treatise in the most holistic and concentrated form expresses the essence and features of Chinese diplomacy and the Chinese method of warfare. The provisions of this treatise were actively used by the Qing Empire in the development of diplomatic and military-political relations with other states, including Russia. Sun Tzu in his treatise formed the traditional Chinese approaches to the concept of war:
“War is a big deal for the state, it is a matter of life and death, the way of existence and destruction ...
War is the way of deception. Therefore, if you can do anything, show your opponent that you can’t; if you are using something, show him that you are not using it; even if you were close, show that you are far away; even if you were far away, show that you are close; lure him with profit; take him upset and take him; if he is full, be ready; if he is strong, shy away from him, provoking anger in him, bring him to a state of frustration; taking a humble look, call in him conceit; if his strength is fresh, wear him out; if he is friendly, disconnect; attack him when he is not ready; perform when he does not expect. All this ensures the victory of the warrior; however, it is not possible to indicate in advance any reception. ”
Sun Tzu devoted a separate chapter to the principles of using cunning, both on the tactical battlefield and in a strategic context.The third chapter of the treatise is called "Offensive military cunning" {23}:
“Sun Tzu said: according to the rules of warfare, the best thing is to force the adversary’s state to submit intact, and second place is to defeat this state; the best is to force the opponent's jun to submit intact, in second place - to break him; the best is to force the enemy to submit intact, in second place to smash him; the best is to force the adversary's tsu to submit intact, in the second place to smash him; the best is to force the enemy to submit intact; in second place - break it. Therefore, to fight a hundred times and win a hundred times is not the best of the best; the best of the best is to conquer the enemy army without battling.
Therefore, the supreme art of war is to destroy the enemy’s plans for war; in the next place is to upset his unions; in third place - smash his army; the worst thing is to besiege the fortress. According to the rules of the siege of a fortress, such a siege should be carried out only when it is inevitable. For the manufacture of large shields, siege chariots, the procurement of various military equipment will take three months; for the construction of embankments around the walls still need three months. However, the commander, not having overcome his impatience, throws his warriors into an attack like a flock of ants and therefore loses one third of his warriors, and yet the fortress remains unused. These are the ill effects of the siege.
Therefore, one who skillfully wages a war, conquers another's army without a battle, captures other people's fortresses without a siege, crushes other states without long campaigns. By all means keeping everything intact, he fights for supremacy in the Middle Kingdom. Therefore, without resorting to war, you can have a benefit. This is the rule of the onset of military cunning.
Therefore, there is a rule of warfare - if your forces are ten times superior to the enemy, then you need to surround him; if your strength is five times superior, you need to attack the enemy; if your forces are twice the strength of the enemy, you need to skillfully fight; in case of equality of forces, it is necessary to divide the enemy forces into parts; if you have less strength, you need to defend; if your forces are inferior to the enemy in all respects, manage to avoid the battle. Therefore, small forces can wage a stubborn struggle, but still they may become prisoners of larger enemy forces.
A commander for a state is the same as the mount of a cart: if this mount is tight, the state will certainly be strong; if the mount is dispersed, the state will certainly be weak.
Therefore, the army suffers from its sovereign in three cases:
When he, not knowing that the army can not advance, orders him to advance; when he, not knowing that the army should not retreat, orders him to retreat. This means that he binds the army.
When he, not knowing the essence of the affairs of the troops, intervenes in his daily administrative affairs; then the commanders in the army come to confusion.
When he, not knowing the tactics of the troops, intervenes in the management of the army; then the commanders in the army are in disarray.
Since confusion and confusion will appear among the troops, the princes will take advantage of these difficulties. This means to disorganize their troops and give victory to the enemy.
Therefore, there are five conditions that determine victory: the one who knows when to fight and when not to win wins; the one who is able to control both large and small forces wins; the one who has common desires from top to bottom wins; the one who is cautious and expects the opponent's negligence wins; the one who is talented and the sovereign does not interfere in his management wins. These five conditions are the knowledge of the path of victory.
Therefore, it says: if you know it and know yourself, conduct at least a hundred battles, and you will be invincible; if you know him and you do not know yourself, you will win once, once again you will fail; if you do not know yourself or him, every time you fight, you will be defeated. ”
The treatise Sun Tzu contains many fundamentally important provisions on the strategy of warfare, which themselves became stratagem. Among them are, for example, the following:
“The rules of warfare are: if the enemy is on high ground, do not go straight at him; if behind him is a hill, do not attack him from the front; if he pretends to run away, do not pursue him; if he is full of strength, do not attack him; if he gives you the bait, do not go to her; if the enemy army returns home, do not stop it; if you surround the enemy troops, leave one side open; if he is in a bind, do not push him. These are the rules of warfare ...
There are roads that do not go; there are troops that are not attacked; there are fortresses that do not storm; there are areas for which they are not fighting; there are commands of the sovereign who do not fulfill ...
First, be like a shy virgin - and the enemy will open the door. Then be like a hare escaped - and the enemy will not have time to take measures to protect. ”
The main provisions of Sun Tzu’s military treatise later found their continuation in numerous works on the art of war by other Chinese authors, who acted both as interpreters of Sun Tzu’s main ideas and as independent theorists of military art.
One of the most famous military theorists of antiquity, who continued Sun Tzu’s work on the principles of military art, was Wu Tzu. Unlike his half-legendary predecessor, U Zi (U Qi) was a real and well-known political figure (440 BC - 361 BC). In ancient China, he was revered as the founder of the theory of government and the military sphere. In accordance with historical chronicles, while serving in the service of different rulers, Wu Qi did not lose a single battle in his life.
In his treatise, he noted: "A wise ruler ... certainly develops civilian principles in his country, but keeps his military strength ready against external enemies."
“Winning the battle is easy,” Wu said his ruler, “it’s difficult to keep the victory. Therefore, it is said that when states fight in the Middle Kingdom, the one who wins five victories will face misfortune; whoever wins four victories will exhaust his strength; whoever wins three victories will become the hegemon; whoever wins two victories becomes the ruler; whoever wins one victory becomes the emperor. Therefore, those who conquered the world thanks to numerous victories are very few; those who died in the process are many ”{24}.
Like Sun Tzu, Tzu paid special attention to the need for a thorough and thorough study of the enemy: “When waging war, you need to find out the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy and hurry in order to take advantage of his weak spot.”
Deep thoughts about the strategy of state administration and military strategy are contained in three military writings attributed to the famous commander and strategist Jiang Shang, better known by the name of Tai-gun (1st century BC):
“The essence of the army and the state lies in studying the minds of the people and fulfilling one hundred duties of government.
Give peace to those who are in danger. Give happiness to those who are in fear. Bring back those who rebelled. Be lenient to those who have grief. Investigate (complaints) those who ask for pardon.
Exalt the lower. Suppress the strong. Destroy the enemy. Enrich the greedy. Use vanity. Hide the timid.Attract strategists. Investigate slanderers. Reproach violators. Destroy the naughty. Keep passionate. Drop the haughty. Call upon those who have submitted humility. Grant life to those who obey. Release surrendered ...
Relate to the enemy to take action and crush him. Rely on strategic force (shi) to destroy it. Spread false speeches and make him go wrong. Spread the net to catch him ...
The key to waging war is to first examine the position of the enemy, look at its barns and arsenals, assess food reserves, determine strength and weakness, find its natural advantages, see its emptiness and fissures ”{25}.
The ideas of the classics of ancient Chinese military art were echoed by the well-known commander Zhuge Liang, who already lived in the 3rd century AD. AD: “In hostilities, attacking minds is the main task, attacking fortifications is a minor task. Psychological warfare is the main thing, combat is a secondary matter. ”
In general, a brief overview of the basic principles and postulates of China’s foreign and military policy toward Russia allows us to draw some conclusions.
The concepts and real practice of China’s foreign and military policy were based on the principles of stratagem, which in the Middle State were traditionally considered the norm of the behavior of states in the international arena and the most important principles of military art. The stratagems and principles of the ancient military canons, which developed these stratagems, were perceived by the outside world as cunning and deceitfulness of the Chinese. That is why both Western countries and Russia found it so difficult to “build bridges” in relations with China. That is why so many problems and distrust arose and accumulated in Russian-Chinese relations over the centuries.
China-centrist model of perception of the surrounding reality gave Beijing a distorted view of itself, its strength and the outside world. Neighboring countries, as well as remote states of the world, were perceived in China only as tributaries, “barbarians”, obliged to pay tribute to the Middle Empire. Faced with the first contacts with the European powers with a different model of diplomacy based on the principles of mutual respect and the pursuit of equality, China, in order to maintain the age-old fundamentals of its policy, was forced into a state of self-isolation. The orientation towards self-isolation, inertia, fear of change, and fear of progress ultimately led China to tragedy in its first contacts with Europeans.
This was fully manifested in the whole complex of relations between China and Russia, including in the military-political field.
"Strategic plans to pacify the Russians"
The foreign and military policy of China in relation to Russia since the XVII century. began to be built in accordance with a single strategic concept, which incorporates the main provisions of traditional Chinese principles of politics and diplomacy. This concept in China at that time received the name "Pindin Locha Fanlue" ("Strategic plans for the pacification of the Russians") {26}. Thus, China’s foreign and military policy towards Russia from the very beginning had, as it were, two components: a common conceptual framework and a specific anti-Russian program.
The program of the struggle against the Russians, the concept of “Pindin Locha Fanlue”, was a collection of teachings and instructions of the emperor, reports of Manchurian military leaders from the Amur region. The historical documents included in the “Pindin Locha Fanlue” described in detail the experience of the first contacts of the Manchus with the Russians and formulated lessons for the future.
First of all, Russians, according to traditional Chinese ideas, were considered “distant barbarians”. The very first contacts with the Russians, and these were the Cossacks who had mastered the boundless expanses of Siberia and the Amur region, caused a "cultural shock" among the Manchus and the Chinese. The bearded newcomers from the north were strange to the Manchus and the Chinese, the Caucasoid features of their faces seemed ugly. It is not by chance that the Russians immediately received the nickname “Chanbitzi” -"long-nosed". They wore “strange clothes”, spoke an incomprehensible adverb, were absolutely uncivilized (they had no idea about hieroglyphs!).The Russians in the view of the Manchus were "rude, greedy and uncultured." The Chinese document noted:
“Russians are subjects of the state of Olosa. The Russian state is at a distance, in the extreme north-west, and since ancient times has not had relations with China. Russians are mostly all rude, greedy and uncultured. Those who settled on the borders not far from Heilongjiang were called Daura and Solon. They were outraged, killed and robbed, took defectors from our side, [constantly] causing evil at the borders. ” Further in the Chinese documents the conclusion was made: “The Russian state never had connections with the Middle State. Russians are extremely fierce in nature and difficult to subdue. However, at present they are submissive and sincerely willing to turn to culture. The lands, on several thousand liing on the slopes of Khingan facing the Middle State, beginning in the far north, and the desert, will become entirely belong to the Middle State. ”
The Ching government planned to fight the Russians in indirect ways. Experience has shown that a direct military confrontation was usually not in favor of the Manchus. Therefore, the Ch'ing emperor developed a “other plan” - to take the Russian into oblivion: “In view of the fact that the Russians have long occupied our border territories, accept our deserters and sow discord, we should immediately exterminate them. But Your Majesty, moved to all living feelings of love, allows them to die a natural death. " In “Pindin Locha Fanlyue” it was stated: “You, Your Majesty, having made sure that their customs are like moral animals, understood that without simultaneous use of methods of beneficence and power, that is, extermination and attraction to their side, Russians will never submit.”
The Ching government planned to fight the Russians in indirect ways. Experience has shown that a direct military confrontation was usually not in favor of the Manchus. Therefore, the Qing Emperor developed a "different plan — - to take the Russians by starvation: “In view of the fact that the Russians have long occupied our border territories, accept our deserters and sow discord, we should immediately exterminate them. But Your Majesty, moved to all living feelings of love, allows them to die a natural death. " In “Pindin Locha Fanlyue” it was stated: “You, Your Majesty, having made sure that their customs are like moral animals, understood that without simultaneous use of methods of beneficence and power, that is, extermination and attraction to their side, Russians will never submit.”
When planning military operations, the Qing military command paid special attention to reconnaissance. Repeatedly, cavalry groups, loyal tribes of nomads, who conducted thorough reconnaissance of Russian positions and fortresses, were sent to the area of alleged hostilities.
“The pacification of the Russians”, according to the plan of the Qing Courtyard, was to be carried out both by force and by diplomatic and psychological methods. For these purposes, an appropriate postulate was developed: "It is better to humble them with virtue than to punish with the help of military force." The instructions of the Qing Courtyard said: “First, we will try to persuade the Russians to go over to our side, and if they do not agree, we will lead the army and destroy them. If the Russians know in advance about our approach and retreat, then the army sent let it take advantage of a convenient moment and the population of various Hezhen places will appease, and also try to attract to our side all those who have not joined us yet. ”
The Qin emperor taught his subjects: “The use of military force, smashing weapons are all dangerous means. The ancients did not like to use them. We control the Middle Kingdom with the help of humanity and initially disapprove of the killings. You commanders, strictly order the officers and soldiers not to violate our highest will. Due to the fact that we use selected and strong troops, our weapons and equipment are in excellent condition, the Russians will not be able to resist us and will be forced to give us the land and appear with an expression of submission. You do not kill any of them and give them the opportunity to return to their former lands so that they glorify our boundless generosity. At present, all these orders must be carried out, and we are in extreme happiness. "
A special policy was pursued by the Qing authorities regarding prisoners. The captured Cossacks were kept alive, “presented with gifts” (coats, hats, clothes), fed and watered, assigned officer ranks with one goal only: “When our army launches the offensive, these prisoners must be released — in order to demonstrate our generosity ".
On the whole, the experience of interaction between Tsin China and Russia in the Amur region, which formed the basis of the “Strategic plans for the pacification of Russians”, cannot be viewed in an isolated cultural and historical context. The foundations and principles of relations with Russia in Beijing were built in line with the general Qing foreign policy strategy, taking into account certain features of the geographic location and the experience of historical interaction.
CHAPTER 2.
FIRST CONFRONTATION
Russia's Movement to the East: First Contacts with China
The first contacts between Russia and China date back to the XIII century. Information about Russia, the Slavic lands and the peoples of Eastern Europe as a whole reached the Chinese lands along the main trans-Asian trading route - the Great Silk Road. The prolonged domination of the Mongols in the vast expanses of Asia and their aggressive campaigns against the West, into the lands of the Slavs, contributed to the establishment of the first contacts between Russia and China.
When sending a campaign to the west of Subede Bagatura, Genghis Khan, among the countries that were to be conquered, indicated the country Orosat (Russia), and as the point to which the Mongolian army was to reach, it called walled ”- Kiev.
The strategic invasion and numerous tactical Mongol raids on Slavic lands were accompanied by the capture of tens of thousands of Russian soldiers. The Mongols from the conquered tribes and peoples they selected young strong men and formed special detachments for the Khan Guard.
In 1330, a special “Russian detachment” was formed as part of the Beijing Guard of the ascended Khan Tutemur. To the north of Beijing on the lands bought by the government from the peasants for the Russian captives, who became Khan's soldiers, a special settlement was organized. Russian captives lived compactly, were engaged in cultivating the land and, if necessary, were involved in military service.
After the collapse of the empire, the Mongols between Russia and China maintained episodic ties through Central Asia, in the markets of which Russian merchants met with merchants who came from India and Minsk China.
Russian contacts with China, in contrast to the “discovery” of China by the West, were initially built on other foundations and principles. Russian movement went on land, on the vast and unexplored expanses of Siberia. Without overcoming these spaces it was impossible to get in touch with distant China. In contrast to the European colonial powers, Russia followed its civilizing desire, rather than its desire to seize new lands and markets in China.
The unique geostrategic position of Russia on the Eurasian continent objectively created the prerequisites and conditions for its inevitable turn to the east, towards Siberia. The peoples living there were at a lower stage of development, tactically had no contact with Europe, which in those specific historical conditions meant that they had to be “opened”.
Russia began its advancement in search of the wealth of the East in the direction of Central Asia and India since the XV century. She came into contact with the countries of Central Asia: Khiva, Bukhara, Kokand khanate, skillfully performing political maneuvers in this region, bringing new lands and peoples under the jurisdiction of Russia.
The revival of interest in China in Russia occurred in the XVI century and was connected with the history of the long search for the northern route (sea or land) from Europe to China. In the international relations of the Russian state, primarily with England, from the middle of the XVI century, the question of the ways to China and India begins to play a significant role. Moscow turned out to be a gateway for Western European traders to Central and Northeast Asia and the Far East. But neither the representatives of the Western powers, nor the Russians themselves had an accurate idea of the vast territories that lay between the eastern borders of the Russian state and the Minsk Empire.
The first attempt of the Russian government to independently explore the ways to Mongolia and China was the departure in 1608 by order of Tsar Vasily Shuysky group of Tomsk Cossacks headed by I. Belogolov in search of Altyn-Tsar and the Chinese state. This expedition ended in vain, but the Cossacks brought information about China they received from the Yenisei Kyrgyz.
In the years 1615-1617 Tobolsk voevoda I.S. Kurakin sent two embassies - T. Petrov to the Kalmyks and V. Tyumenets to Western Mongolia. The information brought by them showed that the limits of China are quite achievable for Cossack expeditions.
At this time, the British government made active attempts to influence Moscow in order to obtain permission to organize an English expedition to search for the road to China through Siberia. But the Russian government decisively rejected these harassment as incompatible with the interests of Russian trade in the East and instructed the Tobolsk voevoda to send a trade-intelligence mission, aimed at finding out the way from Siberian cities to China and finding out how rich and great the Chinese state is.
Thus, the first Russian expedition to China was sent, not least because of the desire of the Russian government to prevent transit trade of foreigners with the countries of the East, and in particular with China, through the territory of the Russian state. The immediate reason for accelerating the organization of such a trip was the pressure of British diplomacy on the tsarist government. The successful development of Russian-Mongolian ties provided a real opportunity for Russians to travel through Western Mongolia to the borders of the Minsk Empire.
On May 9, 1618, the first Russian embassy to China was sent from Tomsk. It consisted of a group of Cossacks headed by Ivan Petlin. On September 1 of the same year, the embassy reached Beijing, where it stayed for four days. The Chinese government perceived the arrival of the Russian expedition as the first embassy from the Russian state, but the embassy was not from an equal state, but from the one who had sent tribute to the Peking court. However, since there was no “tribute” to the Cossacks with them, they did not get an audience with Emperor Zhu Yizun, but received a letter drawn up on his behalf, allowing Russians to come with embassies and trade in China.
The letter (message of the Chinese emperor) brought by I. Petlin to Moscow remained unread due to ignorance of the language, and Mikhail Fedorovich’s government showed some caution in developing ties with distant China during the period when the Russian state, devastated by long years of internal crisis and Polish Swedish intervention, has not yet gained enough strength and resources to expand trade with the East. Therefore, the mission to Beijing I. Petlina, which crowned with brilliant geographical discoveries, a long period of searching the northern route from Europe to China, completed the first stage in the formation of early Russian-Chinese relations, which did not become regular, because at that time they were stimulated by external factors rather than internal necessity. .
It was not until the beginning of the second half of the seventeenth century that the necessary political and economic prerequisites were created for the establishment of official and regular relations between Moscow and Beijing.The main role in this was played by the growth of power, as well as the expansion of the limits of the Russian state in Eastern Siberia and the accession to China of significant territories in Manchuria, which were the patrimonial possessions of the new Qing dynasty that subjugated China.
In the 17th century, Russian exploration began in Eastern Siberia. In 1619, Yeniseisk was founded, in 1628 - Krasnoyarsk. In 1632, the centurion P. Beketov on the Lena River founded the Yakutsk burg, which became the center of new lands, the administrative center of a vast territory in Eastern Siberia.
It was from there that batches of Russian explorers went north, east and south in search of new lands, bringing local peoples and tribes into Russian citizenship. On the rivers - the main transport arteries of Siberia and the Far East - new Russian spears and settlements appeared.
Moving to the Far East, organizing expeditions from Yakutsk to distant lands, Russian explorers sought to find ways to China. One of the first to find out about the proximity of the Chinese state was the Yenisei serving man Maxim Perfilyev. Returning to Yakutsk and Vitim in the summer of 1640, he said that at the mouth of the Shilka River there lived certain “Kilonians”, “bread people” who also had “plenty of cattle”. ” And the same people, ”the explorer added,“ come together with the Chinese people and trade among themselves ”.
Attempts to explore the route to China continued throughout the forties of the seventeenth century repeatedly. In 1641–1642 detachments of Cossacks headed by M. Vasilyev, S. Skorokhodov, and K. Ivanov are sent from Yakutsk to find out “to the Chinese state with a river and how many ships to go or dry to the Chinese state of cities”.
Parties of Russian explorers from Yakutsk were heading not only to the south, but also to the east, to the shores of the distant sea. In 1638, an expedition headed east by the Cossack Pentecostal I.Yu. Moskvitinom. The long and difficult wanderings of a small party of Cossacks led to the fact that the Russian people in 1639 for the first time reached the shores of the Pacific Ocean. In the summer of 1641, Moskvitin returned to Yakutsk and reported on his geographical discoveries and the wealth of the Primorsky Territory. The Russians learned about the existence of the Amur, Zeya, and Songhua rivers, in the basin of which the Daurov and Ducher tribes lived, engaged in arable farming and cattle breeding. Their lands were reputed to be rich in silver, copper, lead, as well as cloth and fur. According to G.I. Nevelskoy, "this news was enough to move our freemen to those unknown and distant countries."
In June 1643 the Yakut voivode P.P. Golovin equipped a detachment of 130 Cossacks under the direction of V.D. Poyarkov. The main task of the expedition was, in addition to collecting information about the new lands, to bring new peoples into Russian citizenship, to collect from them the appropriate tribute.
From the very beginning of the expedition it became clear that the preliminary information about the new lands in many respects corresponds to reality. The lands encountered by the Cossacks were fertile, the numerous settlements of the local peoples were really rich. However, the relationship of the Cossacks with the local population from the very beginning did not exist, and above all through the fault of the Russian explorers themselves. The actions of the Cossacks differed rudeness, treachery, accompanied by violence and robbery.
In his Essay on the Offensive Movement of Russians to the East, to the shores of the Great Ocean, the Russian staff captain Christiani described it as follows in 1901: “Those who were met very hospitably by the inhabitants soon managed to embitter them with their violence; began serious difficulties in the food detachment, which led, finally, to the terrible famine, from which 40 people died and were eaten by their surviving comrades. Only 50 people survived. The famine stopped when the other Cossacks, who had left for the winter hut, came to the rescue and brought with them provisions. ”
Nevertheless, in the spring of 1644 Poyarkov reached the banks of the Amur. Downstream of the great river, his detachment descended to the Sea of Okhotsk, feeding on the way almost with fish alone.The Cossacks spent the winter of 1644/1645 in the lower reaches of the Amur in the village of Gilyaks (Nivkhs). Subordinating them to Russia and collecting from them a yasak in the amount of 12 forties (480 skins) of sable and 16 sable furs, Poyarkov, with the opening of navigation, set off along the Sea of Okhotsk to the north. The Cossacks spent the next wintering at the mouth of the Hives in the winter quarters, built by Moskvitin. In the spring of 1646, 60 Cossacks who survived the three-year wanderings set off on a long journey home. July 12 of the same year Poyarkov with the remnants of his squad arrived in Yakutsk.
The long and long journey of Poyarkov and his comrades was difficult and dangerous. By their actions, they embittered the local population of the Amur region, “they threw unkind glory about the Russians on this river”.
V.D. Poyarkov reported in detail to the Yakut governor about the wealth of the new region, which he called Dauria. The main conclusion from his report was that the local peoples were independent and should have been finally brought into Russian citizenship. For this, it was necessary to establish and consolidate Russian influence in the Amur region, primarily military influence.
Poyarkov, based on his experience, believed that the new region could be subordinated to Russian sovereignty, with only 300 well-armed troops. He proposed to leave half of these forces in three or four key guards, and use the remaining 150 people as mobile units to "pacify those of foreigners who will be disobedient and will not pay tribute". According to Poyarkov, serious resistance to Russian power in the Amur region should hardly have been expected.
However, the real situation was somewhat different. G.I. In connection with this, Nevelskoy writes: “Such an opinion about the ease of acquiring Amur was quite natural, because Poyarkov, still unfamiliar with the region, lost sight of the most important fact: that the local population could expect the help of military forces from adjacent to this land of Manchuria, especially since at that time, instead of the Mongolian dynasty, the Manchu dynasty came to the throne of China ”.
Poyarkov, based on his experience, believed that the new region could be subordinated to Russian sovereignty, with only 300 well-armed troops. He proposed to leave half of these forces in three or four key guards, and use the remaining 150 people as mobile units to "pacify those of foreigners who will be disobedient and will not pay tribute". According to Poyarkov, serious resistance to Russian power in the Amur region should hardly have been expected.
However, the real situation was somewhat different. G.I. In connection with this, Nevelskoy writes: “Such an opinion about the ease of acquiring Amur was quite natural, because Poyarkov, still unfamiliar with the region, lost sight of the most important fact: that the local population could expect the help of military forces from adjacent to this land of Manchuria, especially since at that time, instead of the Mongolian dynasty, the Manchu dynasty came to the throne of China ”.
In the first half of the 17th century, when Russian explorers were looking for ways to the Amur basin, the Manchu influence here was very significant. Throughout the XVI century, there was a consolidation of the Manchu tribes, constantly disturbing the borders of the Minsk Empire. By 1616, most of the territory of present-day Northeast China was seized by the Manchus. The founder of the Qing Dynasty, Nurhaci, created the Jin State here and proclaimed himself Khan. In 1626, Nurhaci moved the capital to Mukden. His son, Khan Abahai, in 1636 assumed the title of emperor, giving his state a new name - Qing. In 1636— 1643 he waged continuous wars with the Minsk Empire.
By the time of the Russian invasion in the 17th century, independent tribes of the Daur, Ducher, Evenk, and Nivkh, who were at the stage of the disintegration of the tribal system, lived there in the Amur region. Their total number was small and was, according to estimates of the domestic scientist B.C. Myasnikov, a total of 40.7 thousand people (in the Amur region - 32.3, in Primorye - 4.0 and on Sakhalin Island - 4.4 thousand). Before the arrival of the Russians, the local tribes were not subject to either the Qing empire or any other states. There were no Manchu or Chinese authorities in those areas of the Amur Region and Primorye, where Russian settlers and authorities came, there was no Chinese, not even a Manchurian population. There was also no permanent economic ties between the local population and China.
Moreover, the main purpose of the episodic campaigns of the Manchu troops in Northern and Northeastern Manchuria was the capture of manpower — recruitment units for the Manchurian army, rather than the occupation and development of occupied land. The captured territories were not included in the composition of the Manchu empire, local tribes and peoples were not brought into Manchu citizenship. They, as a rule, paid off episodic raids of Manchu tribute, and then only on the right bank of the Amur, since the river served as a natural insurmountable obstacle for the Manchurian detachments. In fact, by the time the Russian detachments penetrated into the Amur region, the power of the Manchus extended only to the central and southern parts of Manchuria.
By the middle of the 17th century, the northern limits of the Qing empire were limited to the line of fortifications built only in 1678 by order of the emperor Kangxi, called the “Willow palisade”. This 900-kilometer line ran approximately 600–800 km south of the Amur River and far west of Ussuri. ” Willow Palisade was a continuous system driven into the ground in two rows of willow stakes with deep ditches in front of them. Along the line were built gates and sentries. Travel in both directions was carried out with a pass.
The main attention and the main military-political efforts of the Qing state were turned to the south, to China. In 1636–1643 there were continuous wars with the Minsk Empire. In 1644, Beijing fell, and the Manchus moved their capital there. In the march to the southern provinces of Minsk China, all the Manchu Eight-Famous Forces, almost all men capable of carrying weapons, were withdrawn, which caused a sharp decline in economic life in Manchuria.That is why at the time of the appearance of V. Poyarkov’s squad on the banks of the Amur, the Amur tribes actually had no political or economic ties with the Qing Empire.
So, the XVII century became in the history of Russia a period of expansion to the East to the shores of the Pacific Ocean and the borders of the Qing Empire. The “offensive movement” of Russia to the East was mostly spontaneous, and the main role in this was played by the Cossacks.
The Russian development of Siberia objectively had a progressive, civilizing character. N. Steinfeld, a full member of the Imperial Society of Oriental Studies and the Society of Russian Orientalists, arguing on this topic in 1910, wrote: “Moral motivations were led in former times mainly by geographers and adventurers like Christopher Columbus. Here we must also include our Siberian Cossacks, without any apparent need at their own peril and risk breaking through the wilds of Siberia right up to the shores of the Pacific Ocean ...
The boldness of the Cossacks always captivated the minds of the Russians, and she needed to come up with some kind of excuse. We decided, finally, to declare this desire to the east of Russia's cultural and historical mission, as a reaction against the invasions of Asians in the past to Europe. Such a solution of the question seems to be all the more successful because, sensibly reasoning, Russia had absolutely no other reason to look for new lands and, moreover, as unfriendly and cold as its own. ”
The "open" Russian peoples, who were at a much lower level of socio-economic development, were brought into Russian citizenship with the preservation of their inherent way of life and the system of local self-government. This was the fundamental difference between the development of Russian open spaces of Siberia and the Far East from the colonial policies of the Western powers in Asia, Africa and America. At the same time, this “Russian style” of the colonization of new lands did not exclude the use of brute (military) force from the Cossack detachments in relation to the local population.
The gradual development of Siberia and the Far East by the Russians led to the creation in these vast spaces of ostrokes, settlements and cities, which successively became outposts of Russian penetration further east and south.
The vast and sparsely populated spaces of the Amur Region were a kind of “vacuum”, which throughout the 17th century was gradually “filled” by the Russian and Manchurian military contingents. The state of "vacuum" lasted long enough for both Russia and China, although for various reasons.
Russia traditionally concentrated its military-political efforts in the Western direction. Siberia, the Far East and the more so “semi-mythical” China were not considered in Russia as directions or sources of possible danger. These lands were reputed endless, deserted, but extremely rich. In the 17th century, Russia had neither the strength, nor the means, nor even the political will and determination to deal with the East. Therefore, the development and colonization of Siberia and the Far East were extremely slow and largely ineffective.
For China, the 17th century was characterized by the strengthening of the Manchurian state and the conquest of the Qing dynasty of China itself. Ancient empire was shaken by wars and rebellions. Qing's military-political efforts were turned to the south, to the final and complete conquest of China. For a long time, the unknown Russia was not perceived by Tsins as a real military threat.
The result of this was a rather long and to a certain extent “passive” movement of Russia and Qing China towards each other in the Amur region. Moreover, neither in Russia nor in China had any real information about each other, and the cash information was largely distorted. Russia actively tried to find ways to the “Chinese kingdom”, while China, following its policy of self-isolation, sought to prevent any contacts with Russia. This was fully manifested in 1618, when the first Russian mission of I. Petlin reached Beijing. Despite the obvious importance of this event, it did not lead to the establishment of any relations between the two states.
Expedition V.D.Poyarkova (1643–1646) completed the initial stage of Russian penetration and assertion in the Amur region. This stage was characterized by active efforts of Russia to gather information about new lands and organize expeditions deep into this region. At this stage, there were no contacts with the Qing Empire, the Russian military units, consisting mainly of Cossacks, did not enter into direct contact with the Manchurian troops. In fact, at this stage, only the conditions for the formation of military-political relations between the two parties were maturing.
The first military clashes between Russia and Qing China
From the mid 40s of the XVII century, especially after the return of the expedition of V.D. Poyarkova, interest in this region in Russia has increased dramatically. By the end of this decade, the actual accession of the Amur region to the Russian possessions was completed. This process is associated with the name of Yerofey Pavlovich Khabarov.
The Yakut voivode D. A. Frantsbekov (a native of Livonia named Farenbsbakh) helped the wealthy industrialist E.P. Khabarov equip an expedition to Dauriya to bring its inhabitants into Russian citizenship. The first squad of E. Khabarov included 70 people.
Khabarov’s detachment set out on a journey in 1649 and already at the beginning of 1650 reached the Amur. The Dahur settlements, to which the Cossacks approached, turned out to be completely empty: the inhabitants fled after learning of the approach of the Russian detachment. From local residents, the Cossacks learned that the entire yasak Daura had already been given to the “prince Bogdoy”. Fearing a clash with the military units of "Prince Bogdoy", to which the Russian expedition was not ready, Khabarov decided to return to Yakutsk for reinforcement.
For his new expedition, E.P. Khabarov scored 117 volunteers. Voevoda Frantsbekov sent more than 20 servicemen with him, and also armed the detachment with three guns. In the winter of 1651, E. Khabarov was again on the Amur.
While still in Yakutsk and preparing for a long march, Khabarov received an instruction from the Yakut governor to bring "Prince Bogdoy" into Russian citizenship. Naturally, at that time in Yakutsk they still did not identify the “prince Bogdoy” with the Tsinsky emperor.
On July 9, 1650, the Yakutsk iznatsky izba was issued by EP Khabarov is quite tough instructions - “a fictitious memory” - about bringing the Amur region to Russian citizenship. In the “memory” it was stated: “To Yerofey and to Prince Bogda, send envoys. And tell them to say that Prince Bogday with his family and tribe and with all ulus people was under the sovereign of our tsar and grand duke Alexei Mikhailovich of all Russia with a high hand in servitude, because our sovereign is terrible and great, and many states have a sovereign and owner and no one could stand from his state battle. ”
Further, in the same document, E. Khabarov was given the authority to use force if Prince Bogdoy refuses to voluntarily go into Russian citizenship. In Moscow at that time, they did not yet know to whom this letter was addressed, and the prince Bogda seemed only the leader of one of the Dahuri tribes. The very style of “punitive memory” was sustained in a tough, almost ultimatum style: “But you, Bogday, will not be under his sovereignly high hand in eternal servility, and we will write to you to the great sovereign, your king and grand duke Alexei Mikhailovich All Russia to Moscow, so that he, the sovereign, would order many of his people to be his sovereign and many of you, Bogdaya, for your disobedience, the sovereign ordered the ruin to ruin , so that, looking at you, Prince Bogdaya, and at your own surrender abandonment, and other Daursky land princes who do not live under your prince, seeing the sovereign of our tsar and grand duke Alexei Mikhailovich of All Russia, the death penalty and ruin, would be submissive and obedient without a fight ... ".
The same requirements and in the same ultimatum style were included by the Yakut voivod D. Frantsbekov in a message addressed to Prince Bogdoy, which he was to convey to the last E. Khabarov. In the message, the prince Bogda warned that in case of refusal to obey, he would be attacked by Russian troops of 6,000 men with cannons.
The message to prince Bogd was not delivered due to the appearance of new data on the eastern lands and their rulers.
Released on a long hike E. Khabarov with his detachment actually conducted reconnaissance activities, trying to collect at least some objective data about this region. As we study the situation in the Amur Region, E. Khabarov became convinced that Prince Bogdoy does not exist, but there is the land of Bogdoyysk, ruled by King Alaka Baturkhan. King Shamshakan was proclaimed viceroy of this king in the Amur region. E. Khabarov informed about this in Yakutsk, referring to the fact that the error was due to a lack of information: “... only one Dahuri woman was seized during the pogrom on the great Amur River and didn’t really know how to tell about this.”
Thus, “one Dahuri woman” became for the Russian side one of the first sources of information about China. However, at that historical stage neither this nor other sources of information differed and could not differ with certainty. The reasons for this were: the geographical distance of Russia and China; formidable language barrier; the absence of any ties and contacts between the two states in the past; the fullest informational vacuum about each other: the absence of a clearly expressed desire to establish bilateral relations.
As they advanced along the Amur region, Khabarov’s detachment was repeatedly attacked by local peoples and tribes. One of the first serious and organized resistance of the Daura was in the spring of 1651 to the Cossacks near the town of Albazin. In a stubborn battle, which lasted from noon until late evening, the Dauri suffered heavy losses, while the Cossacks lost only 20 people wounded. However, all attempts of the Cossacks to take a fortified point by storm were repulsed. Only when E. Khabarov pulled the cannons towards Albazin, did the Dauri leave him. Collecting the remnants of their troops and taking with them the property and supplies that it was possible to take, the Dahuri princes fled down the Amur.
Entering Albazin, the Cossacks began to build fortifications, turning the village into a powerful ostrog. Large stocks of weapons, property and provisions were concentrated here. Khabarov informed the Yakut voivod about the wealth of the region, that bread and other foodstuffs in Albazin were stored for several years. All that was needed was help from people — both service workers, Cossacks, and farmers for the development and colonization of the region.
Already in 1651, the first emperor of the Manchu dynasty, Shunzhi, sent troops to Albazin numbering up to a thousand people. The operation of the Chinese troops did not pursue decisive goals, but rather was a demonstration of force. ” Having dispersed the restless neighbors, the Chinese army some of them took prisoners of war to Beijing; but she did not destroy the fortress of Albazin, as she stood on neutral ground. After the removal of the Chinese army, the Albazinians again occupied their former settlements and entrenched themselves in them ”.
In the summer of 1651, when E. Khabarov and his detachment were already on the Amur River, a new party led by TE was equipped in Yakutsk. Chichegin. A detachment of Chichegin consisting of 137 people with weapons and ammunition was sent to E. Khabarov, and he already had to send an embassy further to the king Sham-shakan. In the instructions to Khabarov and Chichegin there is no mention anywhere about bringing Tsar Shamshakan into Russian citizenship, if necessary, by force. However, in the message of the Yakut command house to Prince Shamshakan himself on July 27, 1651, there were again threats addressed to him: “... for your disobedience, the sovereign orders the monarch to pacify his sovereign with mortal combat”.
Moving deep into the Amur lands, the Khabarov detachment met fierce resistance from local tribes. However, seeing their helplessness in the struggle against the Russians, the Dauri turned for help to the Manchu authorities located in the city of Ninguta. During the skirmish of the Cossacks of the Khabarov detachment with the Dauri in the summer of 1651, the Manchurians (“Bogdoy people”) who were constantly living in the prince of Guygudar’s prince were in the Dahuri camp in the Daurian camp, but they did not take part in the battle; and watched him from the side, leaving for the time of the battle in an open field. According to Chinese sources, in the battle under the Guygudarov town they took part along with the Dauri and Manchus. More than a thousand Dauri and 50 Manchu "heroically died defending their homeland and national dignity" {43}.
The next day after the victory of the Russians, the Manchus sent their representative to them for negotiations, who spoke "the language of Chinese." Ignorance of each other’s languages did not allow the parties to reach an understanding.
In Khabarov’s “unsubscribe” to the Yakut governor Frantsbekov in the summer of 1652, it is described as follows: “We don’t know that language, we don’t have those interpreters, but those Daurian women say that our king Shamshakan didn’t fight with us, our king Shamshakan told us to meet with the Cossacks honestly ... And Yaz, Yarofeyko (this is about E.P.Khabarovsk), to that Bogdoy peasant, gave honor, and gave the sovereign the gifts, and let him go, the Bogdoy-muzhik, honestly to his Bogdoy's land ".
Thus, this meeting testified to mutual vigilance and attempts by the parties to establish first contacts. The lack of information about each other did not allow either the Russian or the Chinese-Manchurian side to choose the right policy towards each other. In general, the first meeting between the Russians and the Manchus showed the parties' intentions to develop relations peacefully.
In September 1651, Khabarov with a battle took possession of one of the townships of the Olchi and founded the Achansky ostrog on that place. There, a detachment of E. Khabarova and wintering. The local princes attempted to dislodge the Russians from the fortress, but after a series of defeats they were forced to submit.
Early in the morning of March 26, 1652, the Manchurian army, concentrating unofficially near the Achansk small town, unexpectedly for the Russian garrison, began to storm. The Cossacks, led by Khabarov, were taken by surprise, but they were able to quickly recover from the enemy’s sudden strike. The battle lasted until late evening. The fierce battle demanded from the Russian garrison of only 206 people extreme stress of physical and moral forces.
The enemy forces included: a Manchu detachment of 600 warriors with six cannons, 30 piscals and 12 pi-narts (clay mines filled with gunpowder); three groups of daurov and ducherov with a total number of 1,500 people. He led the campaign Manchu military leader Xi Foo.
In the midst of the battle, the interpreters reported to E. Khabarov that the Manchurian commander Isine (Si Foo) ordered: “Do not burn or cut the Cossacks, grab them, Cossacks, alive!” And the Cossacks led by Yerofey Khabarov swore: “We will die brothers Cossacks, baptized for their faith, and we will stand with the Savior and Prechistya and Nikola the miracle-worker, and we, the Cossacks, will sovereign the Tsar and Grand Prince Alexei Mikhailovich of All Russia, and we, the Cossacks, will die for the same person against the sovereign of the enemy, Cossacks, in the hands of them, the people of God, do not give up! ".
Inspired by the appeal of their governor, the Cossacks stood to death, fought, not sparing their lives, showed miracles of heroism.
At the critical moment of the battle, when the enemy destroyed a part of the wooden wall that surrounded the Achansky town, and rushed into the breaches made in this way, the Cossacks pulled up a “big copper cannon”. The Russian defenders of the fortress beat off the Manchu assault, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy.
To consolidate the military success of the 156 Cossacks made a sortie, pursuing a departing enemy. In the osrtog only 50 people remained. The bold Russian maneuver caught the Manchu off guard, and decisive melee fights with the Cossacks finally broke the enemy. The enemy suffered serious losses, abandoned his weapons and retreated in disarray.
Russian trophies of war amounted to: 830 horses, large stocks of food, 17 rapid-fire pishchal, 2 guns, 8 battle banners. The total losses of the consolidated Manchu troops amounted to 676 killed. The captured Manchus - "tongues" - were "firmly questioned." One of the prisoners named Kabysheyka gave the most complete testimony. The interrogations of prisoners were intended to obtain information of a general military-political nature about the enemy. The Russian side was primarily interested in the data on the state-political structure of the Manchus and the Chinese - on the land of Nikan, the land of Bogdoy, the king of Shamshakan. Khabarov interrogated prisoners and about the riches of the eastern countries - about deposits and reserves of gold, silver, pearls.
As a result of the siege of Achansky fortress, the garrison of the fortress suffered minor losses. 10 Russian soldiers were killed: 2 - servicemen and 8 - free Cossacks. 78 Cossacks were injured of varying severity during the battle {46}.
E. Khabarov inflicted a brutal defeat on the united Manchu-Daurian detachment. Hai Sai (Haise), the commander of the garrison in Ninguth, was executed, and Si Foo, the commander of the detachment sent against the Russians, was dismissed.
In modern Chinese sources, the first major military clash between the Russians and the Manchus near Achansky is described as follows: “On October 19, the Hezhe people in the village of Uchzhala in the lower reaches of the Amur River after being defeated by Khabarova turned to the Qing army for help. On the morning of April 4, 1652, the Ningutan Chzhangin Heise received an order from the Qing government to provide assistance to the heje. At the head of a detachment of 600 people of the Qing troops and several hundreds of local residents, he unexpectedly struck the Russian fortifications in the Achansk region. The Russians suffered losses: 10 killed and 76 wounded.
Catching the Russians by surprise, the Qing troops broke into the fortress and believed that victory was already secured for them. However, Haise thoughtlessly did not correctly evaluate the situation and ordered to stop the offensive, calling for "to stop the fires, not to kill the Cossacks, but to take them alive as a prisoner." As a result, the Russians took advantage of the favorable situation and counterattacked. Having suffered huge losses, the Qing troops were forced to withdraw. Subsequently, Haise was executed for his mistakes in command of the troops on the orders of the Qing Dvor. Fearing new attacks from the Chinese troops, Khabarov in a hurry with his army fled from these places up the river. ”
Thus, one of the first major military clashes between Russia and China (the Manchu Empire) ended with a complete military victory of the Russian side. However, E. Khabarov, fearing a new campaign of the Qing troops, was forced to leave Achansky ostrog.
Khabarov's detachment moved up the Amur, where a detachment of T. Chechigin of 140 Cossacks joined him.The combined Russian detachment continued on its way, but soon among the Cossacks "disagreements and discord began" and more than 100 people "fled to the robbery." With the remaining people, E. Khabarov reached the mouth of the right tributary of the Amur - the Kumara River, where he founded the Kumar burg in 1652. From there, Khabarov sent drug dealers to Yakutsk, demanding reinforcement with a strength of 600 people to counteract the blow they expected from the Manchus.
Moscow already had information about the Daursk lands transferred from Yakutsk as a result of the Poyarkov expedition and then Khabarov, and decided to assist the efforts of Ye.P. Khabarova. In 1652, a nobleman D.I. was sent from the capital to the far Amur region. Zinoviev led a detachment of 150 soldiers, who were tasked with delivering salaries and awards to the Cossacks, supplying them with ammunition and necessary property, and also preparing the conditions for sending Russian troops of 3,000 men to the Amur basin. It was assumed that this army will be headed by Prince I.I. Lobanov-Rostovsky. At the same time, orders were issued to the governors of the Verkhotursky and Tobolsk otoggs to build 80 vessels for the transport of troops on the River Tura. It was supposed to conduct preparatory work during the years 1652-1653.
D. Zinoviev arrived at Amur in August 1653 and met with E. Khabarov at the mouth of the Zeya River. According to GI. Nevelsky, “his stay was not pleased by the Cossacks, because he mainly came to restore order in the freemen and, if possible, to turn them to agriculture. The latter was especially necessary in order to procure food for the troops that were supposed to be sent here. The Cossacks were not accustomed to such work, until then they walked around the Amur only for the purpose of profit. ”
DI. Zinoviev stayed on the Amur for long. Returning to Moscow, he took with him E.P. Khabarova, and Onufry Stepanov was left as the senior commander over the Cossacks.
In the fall of 1654, E. Khabarov was awarded the boyars rank for successfully bringing the peoples of the Amur region to Russian citizenship. To the distant Amur Yerofey Pavlovich never returned.
The Russian government is impressed by the stories of E.P. Khabarova decided to create a voivodship in Dauria. In this regard, the first Daurian governor A.F. Pashkov was ordered to find out "how far from the land of Bogdoyysky to the Nikansky kingdom."
But the new commander did not have time to reach his destination, as the struggle in Dauria broke out with a new force.
The Russian forces that remained at the disposal of O. Stepanov totaled only 500 Cossacks. With such forces it was impossible not only to resist the Qing troops, but also simply to control the vast territory of the Russian Amur Region. The Cossacks lacked gunpowder and lead. But the most important thing was that the bread ran out and the Cossacks began to starve. Farming flourished in the Amur basin, quickly dying. There were several reasons for this. First, the Manchu authorities banned local people from growing bread. Secondly, the local able-bodied population of the Amur region was taken away by the Manchus, forcibly mobilized into the army, as a result there was no one to work the land. Thirdly, the Cossacks, with their raids and robberies, forced the local population to hide the existing stocks of grain. The Cossacks themselves did not intend to turn to agriculture.
In the spring of 1654, Stepanov, in search of food, was forced to go up the Sungari River. After a three-day voyage, the Cossacks clashed with the large sea and land forces of the Manchus. In the course of a fierce battle, the Russians broke through the Manchurian line of defense from riverboats, but were exposed to strong fire impact from the fortifications built in advance. Cossacks were forced to return to Cupid.
The farther, the position of the detachment O. Stepanov became more and more threatening. Repeatedly, he appealed for help to the Yakut governor, requesting help with people, weapons and food, reporting that "on the great Amur River there are strong fights with Bogdoyian military people."The most serious Russian-Manchurian military confrontation was the defense of the Kumar burg, which lasted from March 13 to April 4, 1655.
The Qing troops numbered 10 thousand people with 15 guns. The report of Stepanov said: “They had shields on the carts, and those cars were on wheels, and wooden boards, leather skewers, and felt were, and on those cars there were stairs, and at the end of the stairs there were wheels, and iron and sticks, and on those arbans there were tied firewood, and smolie, and straw for lighting, and they had the same spear jail; yes, they, the Bogdoy people, had every shield with iron and all wisdom wisdom. ”
In the midst of the battle, the interpreters reported to E. Khabarov that the Manchurian commander Isine (Si Foo) ordered: “Do not burn or cut the Cossacks, grab them, Cossacks, alive!” And the Cossacks led by Yerofey Khabarov swore: “We will die brothers Cossacks, baptized for their faith, and we will stand with the Savior and Prechistya and Nikola the miracle-worker, and we, the Cossacks, will sovereign the Tsar and Grand Prince Alexei Mikhailovich of All Russia, and we, the Cossacks, will die for the same person against the sovereign of the enemy, Cossacks, in the hands of them, the people of God, do not give up! ".
Inspired by the appeal of their governor, the Cossacks stood to death, fought, not sparing their lives, showed miracles of heroism.
At the critical moment of the battle, when the enemy destroyed a part of the wooden wall that surrounded the Achansky town, and rushed into the breaches made in this way, the Cossacks pulled up a “big copper cannon”. The Russian defenders of the fortress beat off the Manchu assault, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy.
To consolidate the military success of the 156 Cossacks made a sortie, pursuing a departing enemy. In the osrtog only 50 people remained. The bold Russian maneuver caught the Manchu off guard, and decisive melee fights with the Cossacks finally broke the enemy. The enemy suffered serious losses, abandoned his weapons and retreated in disarray.
Russian trophies of war amounted to: 830 horses, large stocks of food, 17 rapid-fire pishchal, 2 guns, 8 battle banners. The total losses of the consolidated Manchu troops amounted to 676 killed. The captured Manchus - "tongues" - were "firmly questioned." One of the prisoners named Kabysheyka gave the most complete testimony. The interrogations of prisoners were intended to obtain information of a general military-political nature about the enemy. The Russian side was primarily interested in the data on the state-political structure of the Manchus and the Chinese - on the land of Nikan, the land of Bogdoy, the king of Shamshakan. Khabarov interrogated prisoners and about the riches of the eastern countries - about deposits and reserves of gold, silver, pearls.
As a result of the siege of Achansky fortress, the garrison of the fortress suffered minor losses. 10 Russian soldiers were killed: 2 - servicemen and 8 - free Cossacks. 78 Cossacks were injured of varying severity during the battle {46}.
E. Khabarov inflicted a brutal defeat on the united Manchu-Daurian detachment. Hai Sai (Haise), the commander of the garrison in Ninguth, was executed, and Si Foo, the commander of the detachment sent against the Russians, was dismissed.
In modern Chinese sources, the first major military clash between the Russians and the Manchus near Achansky is described as follows: “On October 19, the Hezhe people in the village of Uchzhala in the lower reaches of the Amur River after being defeated by Khabarova turned to the Qing army for help. On the morning of April 4, 1652, the Ningutan Chzhangin Heise received an order from the Qing government to provide assistance to the heje. At the head of a detachment of 600 people of the Qing troops and several hundreds of local residents, he unexpectedly struck the Russian fortifications in the Achansk region. The Russians suffered losses: 10 killed and 76 wounded.
Catching the Russians by surprise, the Qing troops broke into the fortress and believed that victory was already secured for them. However, Haise thoughtlessly did not correctly evaluate the situation and ordered to stop the offensive, calling for "to stop the fires, not to kill the Cossacks, but to take them alive as a prisoner." As a result, the Russians took advantage of the favorable situation and counterattacked. Having suffered huge losses, the Qing troops were forced to withdraw. Subsequently, Haise was executed for his mistakes in command of the troops on the orders of the Qing Dvor. Fearing new attacks from the Chinese troops, Khabarov in a hurry with his army fled from these places up the river. ”
Thus, one of the first major military clashes between Russia and China (the Manchu Empire) ended with a complete military victory of the Russian side. However, E. Khabarov, fearing a new campaign of the Qing troops, was forced to leave Achansky ostrog.
Khabarov's detachment moved up the Amur, where a detachment of T. Chechigin of 140 Cossacks joined him.The combined Russian detachment continued on its way, but soon among the Cossacks "disagreements and discord began" and more than 100 people "fled to the robbery." With the remaining people, E. Khabarov reached the mouth of the right tributary of the Amur - the Kumara River, where he founded the Kumar burg in 1652. From there, Khabarov sent drug dealers to Yakutsk, demanding reinforcement with a strength of 600 people to counteract the blow they expected from the Manchus.
Moscow already had information about the Daursk lands transferred from Yakutsk as a result of the Poyarkov expedition and then Khabarov, and decided to assist the efforts of Ye.P. Khabarova. In 1652, a nobleman D.I. was sent from the capital to the far Amur region. Zinoviev led a detachment of 150 soldiers, who were tasked with delivering salaries and awards to the Cossacks, supplying them with ammunition and necessary property, and also preparing the conditions for sending Russian troops of 3,000 men to the Amur basin. It was assumed that this army will be headed by Prince I.I. Lobanov-Rostovsky. At the same time, orders were issued to the governors of the Verkhotursky and Tobolsk otoggs to build 80 vessels for the transport of troops on the River Tura. It was supposed to conduct preparatory work during the years 1652-1653.
D. Zinoviev arrived at Amur in August 1653 and met with E. Khabarov at the mouth of the Zeya River. According to GI. Nevelsky, “his stay was not pleased by the Cossacks, because he mainly came to restore order in the freemen and, if possible, to turn them to agriculture. The latter was especially necessary in order to procure food for the troops that were supposed to be sent here. The Cossacks were not accustomed to such work, until then they walked around the Amur only for the purpose of profit. ”
DI. Zinoviev stayed on the Amur for long. Returning to Moscow, he took with him E.P. Khabarova, and Onufry Stepanov was left as the senior commander over the Cossacks.
In the fall of 1654, E. Khabarov was awarded the boyars rank for successfully bringing the peoples of the Amur region to Russian citizenship. To the distant Amur Yerofey Pavlovich never returned.
The Russian government is impressed by the stories of E.P. Khabarova decided to create a voivodship in Dauria. In this regard, the first Daurian governor A.F. Pashkov was ordered to find out "how far from the land of Bogdoyysky to the Nikansky kingdom."
But the new commander did not have time to reach his destination, as the struggle in Dauria broke out with a new force.
The Russian forces that remained at the disposal of O. Stepanov totaled only 500 Cossacks. With such forces it was impossible not only to resist the Qing troops, but also simply to control the vast territory of the Russian Amur Region. The Cossacks lacked gunpowder and lead. But the most important thing was that the bread ran out and the Cossacks began to starve. Farming flourished in the Amur basin, quickly dying. There were several reasons for this. First, the Manchu authorities banned local people from growing bread. Secondly, the local able-bodied population of the Amur region was taken away by the Manchus, forcibly mobilized into the army, as a result there was no one to work the land. Thirdly, the Cossacks, with their raids and robberies, forced the local population to hide the existing stocks of grain. The Cossacks themselves did not intend to turn to agriculture.
In the spring of 1654, Stepanov, in search of food, was forced to go up the Sungari River. After a three-day voyage, the Cossacks clashed with the large sea and land forces of the Manchus. In the course of a fierce battle, the Russians broke through the Manchurian line of defense from riverboats, but were exposed to strong fire impact from the fortifications built in advance. Cossacks were forced to return to Cupid.
The farther, the position of the detachment O. Stepanov became more and more threatening. Repeatedly, he appealed for help to the Yakut governor, requesting help with people, weapons and food, reporting that "on the great Amur River there are strong fights with Bogdoyian military people."The most serious Russian-Manchurian military confrontation was the defense of the Kumar burg, which lasted from March 13 to April 4, 1655.
The Qing troops numbered 10 thousand people with 15 guns. The report of Stepanov said: “They had shields on the carts, and those cars were on wheels, and wooden boards, leather skewers, and felt were, and on those cars there were stairs, and at the end of the stairs there were wheels, and iron and sticks, and on those arbans there were tied firewood, and smolie, and straw for lighting, and they had the same spear jail; yes, they, the Bogdoy people, had every shield with iron and all wisdom wisdom. ”
A prolonged siege, constant shelling of the prison, and even attempts to take it in a bout did not give anything to the Manchus. After suffering heavy losses, the enemy fled. The Russians took 2 cannons, 800 nuclei and more than 30 pounds of gunpowder as trophies.
However, despite the victory at the Kumar prison, the position of the Cossacks became more and more critical: “Not everyone in the army was starved and seduced, we feed on grass and root and we expect the sovereign to decree. And we don’t dare to leave the Great River without a sovereign by decree. And the Bogdoyian military people stand close to us, and we, against them, the Bogdoy people, have nothing to stand for, and there is nothing for the fight, there is no powder or lead at all. ”
Trying to isolate and weaken the Russian troops as much as possible, the Manchus completely ravaged the villages of the local peoples: “Shukhaly (Sungari) did not declare the Ducher people above the Malzinsky Ulus and higher, and the Sevs anywhere, and the yurt. Ulus are all burned out and ravaged, and there was no one to take the sovereign Jasak. And now there are no grain stocks on the Shingaly mouth on the great Amur River, the servicemen and the Amur hunting Cossacks became all hungry and cold, and they were offended, the grain stocks were not in the army, and there was no lead and no powder, they all kept it. ”
The year 1657 turned out to be difficult for the Cossacks in the Amur region. Collecting tribute, Stepanov went up the Amur, but the banks of the great river were deserted: the local population was resettled by Manchus to the south, and all their villages were burned out and ravaged. G. Nevelskoy gave his assessment of the events of those years: “At the call of the Chinese Bogdo-khan, all residents from the Amur moved to Manchuria; Cossacks, in order not to die of hunger, had to work themselves. Stepanov was in the greatest difficulty: the Cossacks, who were not accustomed to discipline or to work, began to raid Manchus and rob them. The orders from Moscow - to live peacefully with the natives and the Manchus and not to make raids and robberies at all - the Cossacks and freemen did not listen: Amur had complete anarchy. ”
In the summer of the next 1658, O. Stepanov, with a large detachment of Cossacks of about 500 people, decided to go deep into the Manchu lands from the Amur up the Sungari primarily to get food. However, at the very mouth of the Sungari, he met with large Manchu forces. The brutal and unequal battle of the Russian detachment on several river vessels with the Manchus ended tragically: “Bogdoy people in 47 bus (river vessels) with a fighting fight, with cannons and with food, and Onofreiko with service people from ships hit the shore, and others the courts have beaten. And in that battle, Evo, Onofreika, was killed, and 220 people were beaten by service people. ”
According to the description of G. Nevelsky, 270 Cossacks, along with Stepanov, were killed, the rest fled under the blows of the Qing troops. Some of the survivors reached Yakutsk, and already in 1661, 17 people came to Nerchinsk with the news to Governor Pashkov.
With the defeat of the detachment O. Stepanov, the Russian influence in the Amur region, based on military might, weakened. However, the campaigns of small detachments of the Cossacks into the basin of the great river, mainly for collecting tribute, continued. Construction continued on the forts and villages on the banks of numerous rivers, and land was developed. Gradually went settling edge. By the 80th. In the 17th century, Russia's possessions in the Far East included the entire Amur region, the Ussuri river basin and part of the Sungari river basin. The Russian military and political presence in the region was provided by 8 guards and several villages and settlements inhabited by Russians.
Thus, since the 50s. The relations between China and Russia in the 17th century, although not yet diplomatically executed, are becoming increasingly confrontational. In fact, it was during this period that the emergence of military-political relations between Russia and Qing China occurred. The parties entered into direct contact in the Amur River basin as their political and military influence spread to this region.There was an inevitable clash of interests between the two powers, which at that time took the form of small skirmishes and battles between the Cossacks and the Manchu troops.
The plans for the development of the Amur region did not occupy a central place in the system of priorities in Russia's foreign and military policy in the middle of the 17th century. At the same time, Moscow understood the state importance of plans for the development of new lands in Siberia and the Far East. Not having sufficient material and military forces for active operations in the region, Moscow supported any initiative actions of the Cossack detachments.
The role of the Cossacks in the development and annexation of the Amur region to Russia looks ambivalent and contradictory. By their actions, they often angered the local population against themselves, forcing the latter to seek help from the Qing. The headquarters captain Christiani in his "Outline of the Russian Offensive Movement to the East ..." wrote bitterly about the tragic fate of O. Stepanov: "But can you blame Stepanov for this failure? Does not more blame fall on his happy predecessor Khabarov, who for all the time of his aimless wandering along the Amur, has done nothing to consolidate Russian power on this river? What led Khabarov in his actions? Only the spirit of tribute and robbery, and not a single thought about the benefits of the state. Up to 1,500 people, cut off from the already weak voivodships, the devastation of a rich river, the anger of the inhabitants, the multiplication of Chinese citizens are the only results of its activities. And if Khabarov should be given the glory of the first conquest of Amur, then it must also be blamed for all our subsequent failures, the first victim of which was the unfortunate Stepanov. ”
From the very beginning of Russia's penetration into the Amur Region, the Qing government began an armed struggle to oust the Russians from this region. For the Qing monarchy, this area was of particular importance. Manchuria was the historical homeland of the ruling Qing dynasty in Beijing. Therefore, the question of mastering the Amur became fundamentally important for the Peking government. The Qing authorities gradually took the course of "squeezing" the Russians out of the Amur Region, and above all towards the destruction of the Russian military settlements.
The defeat of the detachment of O. Stepanov in the summer of 1658 marked the end of the first stage in the emerging military-political relations between Russia and Qing China. The desire of Russia to extend its military-political influence on the Amur region and to consolidate its strength in this region at that stage was unrealized. The desire of the Tsins to consolidate in the Amur region and prevent the Russians from entering there turned out to be unfulfilled.
The ripening conflict in relations between Moscow and Beijing was "mothballed." In the military-political relations of the two powers, there was a kind of pause that lasted, however, only a few years.
The first incidents in the military relations between Russia and Qing China in the Amur region revealed some features that became characteristic of subsequent clashes between the two sides.
Military clashes between Russia and Manchu China in the Amur region were initiated by the latter, although they were provoked, according to the Manchus, by the Cossacks. Russian penetration into this land and its colonization were met with active opposition from Qing China. This opposition was in the nature of military campaigns against Russian fortified points in the Amur region. From a military point of view, the Manchus took offensive actions, the Russians defended themselves.
The military clashes of the parties in the Amur region were limited, tactical in purpose, scale, grouping of forces and means. This was not a military clash between the two states, especially since there were no diplomatic relations between the states. Neither Russia nor China conducted military operations against each other in the form of war. In fact, there was a struggle for the conquest of new “no-man” geographic spaces, a kind of “vacuum filling”.
The Manchurian military operations against the Russian fortifications were carefully planned and comprehensively prepared by the Qing leadership. On the part of Russia, retaliatory military actions were often carried out spontaneously, without due state support, at the level of the initiative of local commanders of the Russian garrisons.
The Manchurian side always had numerical superiority in forces and means, but in terms of the quality of personnel (morale, professional military training, stamina), the Russian garrisons were superior to their adversary. This factor has often played a decisive role in the clashes and battles.
The Qing Empire paid great attention to working with the local population of the Amur region. This work was carried out in a coordinated manner by civilian and military bodies of the Qing and was carried out in several directions: anti-Russian propaganda and subversive work with the leaders (princes) and the population of local tribes; recruiting spies and military contingents from the local population; economic and other sanctions against those tribes that submitted to the Russian authorities, etc.
Finally, the level of knowledge of the parties about each other was extremely low and primitive. Sources of information were mainly local people. For both sides, but first of all for the Russian, a large, often insurmountable obstacle was the language barrier.
CHAPTER 3.
ALBAZINO EPIC
The first clash of Russia and China for Albazin
A special role in the history of Russian-Chinese military-political relations at the initial stage of their formation and development was played by Albazin, an advanced Russian fortress on the Amur River, which became the main political center of the Russian Amur Region.
This town, founded by the Dauri in 1645, was named after Prince Albaza, the son-in-law of the Daur prince Ilginay. Albazin was located on the left bank of the Amur opposite the confluence of the Albaziha River. The Chinese called this point of the Yaksa.
Engaged by E.P. Khabarova in 1651, Albazin, who occupied an extremely advantageous strategic position in the Far East, was used by the Russians as a forward bridgehead for subsequent expansion in the region. This, of course, caused a cautious attitude on the part of China, who saw in the promotion of the Russians a threat to their interests in this region.
In 1661, Pentecostal Nikifor of Chernigov, with a detachment of Cossacks, came out of Ilimsk fortress (Kirensk), reached Albazin. By 1665, the town was rebuilt and significantly fortified.
N. Chernigov's campaign to Amur was not an action carried out within the framework of the state policy of Russia in the Far East. Moreover, this action was actually purely criminal coloring. N. Chernigov, being the caretaker of the Ustkutsk plant, together with his comrades, killed the Ilimsky commander L. Obukhov for his extortion and outrages and was forced to flee. The fugitives numbered about a hundred Cossacks and peasants who made up the garrison of the Russian fortress.
Trying to turn the “thieves jail” into a regular military jail of state importance, on the initiative of the Siberian authorities on March 17, 1672, the tsarist government pardoned all those involved in the murder of Obukhov. For active actions on Amur in the interests of the state, Chernigovsky and his comrades received forgiveness for their crime, were awarded 2,000 rubles and received a silver seal with a double-headed eagle and the inscription "Seal of the Great Sovereign of Siberian Land of Albazinsky Ostrog"
In 1672–1673 peasant families were sent to the Russian fortress on the Amur from Nerchinsk, who founded "proper farming". The main task of Albazin was to ensure the military presence of Russia in the Amur region and to collect yasak from the local population. In the summer, military expeditions were sent down from the Amur River from Albazin to develop new areas and bring their people under Russian domination.
In turn, recalcitrant local peoples repeatedly raided Albazin. Thus, in June 1669, a Cossack detachment of 60 people left the prison to collect tribute, only a small detachment of Russian soldiers led by Chernigovsky remained in Albazin itself. The local Tungus took advantage of this. They organized a raid on the fortress and, after killing three people, captured large trophies, horses and cattle. However, Albazin remained in the hands of the Russians.
Meanwhile, the strengthening of the position of Russia in the Far East caused increasing concern at the Qing Court. Since 1669, the emperor Kansi began a gradual strengthening of the northern border of Manchuria with fortresses, attracting for these purposes the local population, fierce with looting and extortion by the Cossacks. From interrogations and inquiries of prisoners and local residents, the Russian authorities knew that the Manchus were bracing large military forces, stocking up material resources and preparing for a big war with the Russians. Both sides, using the faithful tribes and nationalities, conducted active intelligence. Skirmishes between the Manchu troops and the Cossacks took place, turning into major battles.
However, Russia, realizing its weakness in the Far East, tried to solve the problems of relations with China through trade and diplomatic embassies, the main of which was N.G. Spafariy (Milescu), who led the negotiations in Beijing from May to September 1676.In his actions, Spafariy was obliged to be guided by the “memory of punishment” issued to him in February 1675: he had to find out the most convenient ways to the Qing empire, find out with whom it borders, what Russian goods are in demand in China and what can be exported from there, and whether the Qing government intends to adhere to peaceful relations with the Russian state.
Having begun negotiations with the Manchus, the Russian side sought to avoid any complications in the zone of contact between the two powers and to keep the "Cossack freemen" from thoughtless and provocative acts. So, in 1675, the Dauri from the Gan River sent their representatives to Albazin with a request to accept them into Russian citizenship and protect them from the Manchus. N. Chernigovsky, by his own decision, headed 300 servicemen and Cossacks entered the Manchu uluses. Despite the fact that the punitive expedition against the Manchus did not take place, the participants of the march were interrogated with passion by the Yenisei commander M.V. Priklonsky.
However, despite the best efforts of the Russian side, Spafari's mission ended in failure. The Qing party not only did not wish to establish diplomatic correspondence, but also refused to receive ambassadors, messengers and merchants from Russia, until the latter fulfilled the three preliminary conditions: “1st, so that Gantimura will send syudy with his ambassador; 2, that the ambassador was the most reasonable and that he did everything that we ordered according to our custom, and in no way opposed; 3rd, so that all foreign places, where foreign people live peacefully to your great sovereign, always live peacefully. ”
One of the main preconditions of the Manchus was the extradition of the "fugitive" Gantimur by Russia. This condition, despite its insignificance as compared with other problems of interstate relations between Russia and China at that time, was crucial for Qing. There were two major reasons for this.
First of all, Gantymur created a precedent that is dangerous for Qing. He was an Evenk (Tungus) prince who took Russian citizenship as early as 1651. In 1654-1655 together with his people, he was forcibly relocated by Tsin from his native Amur region deep into Manchuria. The Manchu authorities tried to bribe Gantimur, generously giving him bureaucratic titles, salaries and awards. However, the Tungus prince, in an attempt to involve the Tsins in his military operations against Russia, fled in 1667 with his whole family to Russian territory.
Secondly, as Jesuit Verbist said to N. Spafari, the Tsinsky courtyard intended to begin military actions to expel the Russians from the Amur region, and to use the “Gantimura case” as a reason for them.
Thus, during the official Russian mission of N. Spafari to Beijing, no specific issues of bilateral relations were resolved. The relationship between the two powers was still “frozen”. The Manchurian empire focused on the "squeezing" of Russians from the Amur region, the active seizure of territories in the Amur basin, and bringing local peoples into their citizenship.
Jilin became the main base and center of military preparations for military operations with Russia. In 1674, this town received city status. There was formed a river crew of 250 sailors and 45 artisans, who built 30 warships and 80 ships to transport provisions. Jilin occupied a favorable strategic military position in northern Manchuria: along the Ussuri River, one could easily reach the Amur River. The garrison of Kirin was purposefully preparing for the forthcoming hostilities with the Russians.
The Qing troops stationed in Manchuria were not limited to combat training. They committed military campaigns on the Russian settlements and the fort in the Amur region.
In March 1681, a detachment of Qing troops arrived at the walls of Albazin, who demanded an explanation from the Cossacks regarding the construction of a Russian fortress on the Zeya River, which prevented Qing officials from traveling to collect yasak. Albazinians sent a delegation led by a Cossack foreman Yu. Laba to the talks, who told the Qing representatives that the local population on the Zeya river had recognized Russian citizenship and was paying tribute to Russia. In response, the Manchus declared Zeya district their "original" land and demanded that the Russian people be withdrawn from there, threatening with war.
At the same time - in March 1681 - the Albazin authorities learned from the daur that the Qing troops were going to make a military campaign against the Russian burg along the Amur on ships and by land along the banks of the great river. These rumors, although they were close to the truth, were not confirmed that year.
In parallel with the preparation of a military operation against Albazin, the Manchus carried out private operations against Russian settlements on the Amur below Albazin. In 1682, the Chinese burned down Dolonsky and Selemdzhinsky ostrogs, in 1683 they ravaged Zeisk and Tugarsky jails, capturing 29 Russian subjects.
In preparation for the campaign against Albazin, the Manchus took a number of political and diplomatic measures, psychological actions and specific military steps.
The emperor Kansi, in his decree in September 1682, noted: “The Russians are subjects of the state of Olosa. The Russian state is at a distance, in the extreme north-west, and since ancient times has not had relations with China. Russians are mostly all rude, greedy and uncultured. Those who settled on the borders not far from Heilongjiang were called Daura and Solon. They were outraged, killed and robbed, took defectors from our side, (constantly) causing evil on the borders ...
The emperor, developing plans (further actions), addressed (to the advisers) with the following words: “If you do not punish (them) with the help of military force, then will (they) understand what punishment and fear are? (They) will continue to raid. " And in this regard, he decided to march and eradicate them. "
Following the imperial Chinese tradition, Beijing decided to create a pretext for military intervention. To this end, the Manchu emperor was declared a kind of peacemaker, who, caring for the peoples of the Amur region, decided to “pacify” the “cruel” Russian aliens-locha. ” A version of the supposedly vassal dependence of the “protected” peoples on their Peking high sovereign was put into action.
At the same time, the Manchus undertook several reconnaissance expeditions against the Albazins to investigate the terrain and find out the composition of the forces and means in the Russian fortress.
In September 1682, under the personal order of the emperor Kangxi, the Manchu fudutun Lantan and first-degree gunns Penchun were sent “to the places of the dauri and solon under the guise of deer hunting, for inspection and note of the state of the loch”.Kansi issued the following instructions to the reconnaissance expedition: “You, arriving at the Solon and Dauram, send a warrior to the city of Nerchinsk, announcing that you came here to hunt deer. And at the same time, while carefully observing the distance, go, hunting, on land along the bank of the Amur, the shortest way to the city of Albazin. Scrutinize its location and setting. I think that the Russians will in no case decide to attack you. If the Russians want to donate products to you, you accept them and thank them accordingly. If more than the aspirations of the Russian attack you, in no case with them do not get involved in the battle and take your people back. For I have a special plan. ”
The “special plan” about which Kansi spoke was formed six months later, when the emperor received a report from his spies. Lantany informed, in particular: “Before, when the Russians built a wooden city in Uchzhala and lived in it, the Ninghut fudutun Haise attacked them, but failed. Subsequently, the Russians still erected a city at the mouth of the Khumara River (Kumara) and Dutun Minyanandi attacked it, but did not take it. From now on, the Russians attach great importance to the construction of wooden cities and believe that they can sit in them without fear ... We believe that it is impossible to destroy Yaksa (Albazin) without overseas cannons ”.
In Beijing, they realized that a military expedition against the Russians who had established themselves on the Amur River is impossible without additional training: “According to the report of Lantanya and his comrades, it is extremely easy to capture the Russians, for this it is enough to send three thousand soldiers. We believe that this is correct, but sending troops is not a good deed. The hike should be postponed until time. It is necessary to move the troops from Jilin and Ninguty, in the number of 1,500 soldiers, to begin the construction of military ships, to send cannons, as well as instructors. In two places - near Heilongjiang and Humara - to build wooden cities that will resist the Russians. And at a certain moment, start acting. ”
For the campaign against the Russian fortifications on the Amur in 1682, the Tsins allocated about 3 thousand soldiers, and then another 1.5 thousand people to build ships on the Sungari River and fortified Chinese points on the Amur itself. On the right bank of the Amur River, against the mouth of the Zeya, the Aigun fortress was built by the Manchus. After that the fortified towns of Esuli and Humara were built. The Qing armies stored food, preparing for a long siege of the Russian fortress. In the area of the future clash, the Qing began to brace the cannons cast in China by Catholic missionaries.
The food and material support of the troops was a major problem for the Manchu leadership. The geographical remoteness of the region, the lack of reliable information about the terrain, climatic and weather conditions, ways of communication caused the difficulty of preparing the upcoming military campaign.
The Manchu command paid special attention to questions of strategic and operational camouflage. The instructions of the emperor to their generals contain requirements to send spies to the Amur region under the guise of deer hunters in order to mislead the Russians. At the same time, the Manchus conducted active reconnaissance activities.
In December 1682, the Nerchinsky voivode F.D. Voeikov received a message from Albazin that a Manchurian equestrian detachment numbering 1,000 men had arrived there. The Manchus "went quietly and the Russian people did not beat anyone and did not rob." The purpose of their visit, the aliens announced a request for the Russians to give them a few fugitives from the “Naun-villages”. When the Albazin clerk I. Semenov refused to do so, the Manchus left down the Amur.
The purpose of the arrival of the Manchurian detachment was absolutely clear to the Albazinians: “And it is a remarkable thing that they came to the Albazin ostrog not for runaway men, to inspect the Albazinsky ostrog and what fortresses there are and how many Russian Albazinsky are.” In one of the reports to the emperor, dated June 1684, it was reported: “We, your subjects, repeatedly came to the solons and carefully examined the position of the Russians. All people agree that in two cities — Albazin and Nerchinsk — there are 500-600 Russians each. For many years they managed to stay here only because there are more than ten settlements located from the mouth of the Argun to Albazin ... ”.
Gradually, the Manchu command developed a plan for the upcoming military campaign against Albazin. It was decided to start the operation not in the summer, as was supposed earlier, but in the winter. Command of the operation was assigned to Sabs and Waliha. The generals received strict instructions to proceed with caution, in accordance with the situation. The plan consisted in a secretive concentration of superior Manchu forces and fire weapons (guns) near the Russian fortress with the aim of its assault from several directions. It was supposed to carry out the operation immediately, as the Manchu command was afraid of the arrival of Russian reinforcements in Albazin.
Faced with Chinese troops in the Amur Region and realizing the seriousness of the intentions of the Qing Empire in this region, Russia took a number of measures to strengthen its martial law. By the beginning of the 80s of the XVII century. in Albazin, a voivodship was established, to which the entire Amur region was subordinated. The city received its coat of arms - the image of an eagle with outspread wings, a bow in the left and an arrow in the right paw.
In 1684, the first voivode A.L. arrived in Albazin with a Cossack regiment. Tolbuzin. In fact, Albazin was becoming the main stronghold of defense against the Chinese invasion of the Amur region, although the Russian forces in this region continued to remain extremely limited. According to Tolbuzin himself, at that time there were only 350 service and industrial people in Albazin and 97 arable peasants around the city.
Having completed military preparations, the Manchus sent several messages to Albazin, demanding that the Russians leave the prison and go to Yakutsk. Such messages were transmitted, as a rule, through prisoners or local residents. So, in June 1683 a detachment of Albazin Cossacks under the command of G.S. Mylnikova, who was sailing along the Amur at Bureya, met near the mouth of the Zeya with the Qing flotilla. Most of the Russian detachment was captured. The Russian prisoners were transferred to Beijing, and two of them, M. Yashin and I. Yeniseits, decided to use the Manchus as parliamentarians for delivering the ultimatum to the Russians.
The text of the ultimatum (diploma) read: “Previously, Mengade and others (persons) were sent to Nerchinsk, and it was agreed that neither side would (further) accept the defectors, and Gantymur who had escaped in previous years will be returned to us. You violate the previous agreement, invade our lands, disturb the daur and solon, burn and rob (villages) of fayak and cylinder.
Therefore, it is now ordered to the military commander to come forward with the troops and permanently settle in the garrison in Esuli. If you leave our borders, return to your former lands, return our deserters, then the question will be settled by itself. Otherwise, we will also accept defectors on your part. And also, by all means, we will miss and execute your people who will come to us. ”
On the report received (the emperor imposed a resolution):
"Execute".
When the message was read out to the Albazins, they unanimously declared that they would rather die, but the prisoner would not leave.
At the same time, Yashin and Yenisei told about the military preparations carried out by the Tsin, which they witnessed. Albazins learned about the creation of the Chinese fortress Aygun, which was two weeks away from the Russian fortress. Russian prisoners saw in that fortress a multitude of soldiers and river vessels. Offering peace, the Manchus prepared for war, and this was reflected in their ultimatums. However, the Manchus did not receive a response from the Albazians on any of their messages.
One of the directions of the comprehensive preparation of Chinas China for conducting military operations with Russia in the Amur region was to attract Russian prisoners and defectors to the Chinese side. In his decrees, the Qin emperor demanded a good attitude towards prisoners, to recruit them to serve in the Manchu army. The prisoners were generously awarded and presented, they created a privileged position. Thus, on December 25, 1683, by decree of the Manchu emperor, an entire group of Russian prisoners who had gone over to the side of the Manchu were given officer ranks. The relevant decree by Kansi stated:
“Jiangjun Sabsu reported:“ Zilar Siluguenu and others from the Burey river killed more than ten Russians and, seizing their wives and children, went over to our side. Zhuerjiangge and others from the Elechun tribe reported that five Russians had been killed on the Zee River and had their guns captured. I also learned that the fayak people attacked and killed many Russians. We should take advantage of these circumstances and assign to the Russians who have recently come over to our side to Grigory, Athanasius, Maxim and others, the corresponding officer ranks, as well as the officer ranks who had previously passed to us Ivan, Agathon and Stepan for their zeal for the service. ”
The emperor pointed out: “Recently, the rank of Xiao-Tsisiao to Agathon, Stepan, as well as the newly conquered Gregory, Athanasius and Maxim has already been granted to everyone - to give the rank of the seventh grade. And Athanasius and Philip, who had recently come over to us, immediately sent to Sabs and, accordingly, used them to attract to our side (other Russians). Since it is cold now, please give them a fur dress and hats ”.
By the summer of 1684, the Qing troops were actually ready for active hostilities with the Russians. The Tsinsky court clearly overestimated the strength of the Russians, both in the Amur region in general and in Albazin in particular, so it was decided to strike at the most sensitive place of the Russians - their food base.
In June 1684, the emperor Kansi ordered Jiang Jun Sabs, who commanded the Manchu troops on the Amur River, to approach Albazin and mow down all the bread in the Russian fields, preventing them from harvesting. The cut bread was supposed either to be taken away on ships, or, if it was impossible to take away, to be thrown into the river.
The Manchu emperor, in a relevant decree, Jiangjun Sabsu, noted: “According to Mala and his comrades, if you grab bread in the fields from the Russians, they will soon find themselves in a difficult situation. The report by Shivei Kuan-bao says that Jiangjun Sabsu also considers it right to seize bread from the Russians, especially as Russians who settled in Albazin and Nerchinsk are engaged only in agriculture. If we capture their bread, they will not be able to hold out for a long time.
I order Sabs to discuss the plan of our further actions accordingly. Going dry or by land and water at the same time, our army will mow down all the bread on the Russian fields, preventing them from harvesting. When advancing by land, skewed bread should be thrown into the river, so that it can be carried away downstream. In the event that we advance both by land and by water, then the captured bread should be loaded and taken away on ships.
Before sending, our soldiers should send a man to the Russians, who will announce them: “You, Russians, have captured our Albazin and Nerchinsk and have owned them for many years.We have repeatedly ordered you to leave these places and come back, but you not only delayed your departure and did not leave the places you occupied, but also received defectors from our side, and also disturbed our frontier population. Nowadays our troops came out by water and by land in order to exterminate all of you. Go away to save your lives. ”
On February 15, 1685, the emperor Kansi issued a sharp decree, in which again, but this time in the most ultimatum form, demanded the complete destruction of Russian influence in the Amur region. The borders of Russia were determined by him to Yakutsk, that is, a significant part of Eastern Siberia, according to this document, was to go to China. The decree noted:
“War is an evil deed, and one should resort to it only when it is forced to.
In the past, the Russians invaded our lands without any reason, they accepted defectors. Later, they crossed the border, disturbing the lands of the Solon, Hezhe, Feyaka, Tsilar tribes, who were deprived of the opportunity to live in peace. (Russian) captured local residents, their villages, took sables of fur, committed many atrocities. On this occasion, our envoys repeatedly handed them decrees, and also presented diplomas through their envoys.
However, the Russians did not listen to us. On the contrary, they plunged into the lands of hezhe and fayak, disturbed our borders even more. Then our army was sent to Aihun to prevent their movement. However, the Russian continued to seize our lands, did not betray our defectors, so they should be immediately destroyed.
Now, in accordance with the desire of Heaven, the great army is ready to move to Albazin, but through our messenger the Russians should once again pass the decree:
“Earlier, we repeatedly sent you letters demanding that you withdraw your people and return the defectors to us. However, for several years, you have not received an answer. On the contrary, you went deep into our inner lands, seized children from the population, constantly created unrest. Then we sent an army to stop your invasion, and attracted the population of all the places of Amguni to our side. You still remain in Albazin and now we have specially sent a strong army on the march. Is it difficult to destroy you with such military force? However, we invariably protect the population of our lands, we want it to live in peace. Therefore, we did not immediately use force and did not destroy you, and our repeated warnings were imbued with the desire that both parties live peacefully and peacefully.
You, Russians, should quickly return to Yakutsk, which should serve as a border. Catch sables there and collect tribute and do not invade our inner lands any more, return us defectors. For our part, we will also return to you Russians who come to our side.
Under these conditions, we will be able to trade on the border, and yours and our border population will be able to live in peace: there will be no military clashes. In the event that you persist in your errors and are not aware of them, our army will certainly attack Albazin, destroy your people. ”
If after the announcement of this decree, the Russians obey him and return to Yakutsk, making his land a border, we will immediately deploy troops in Aykhun, and in Albazin we will place guards so that complete calm will reign at the border. If the Russians continue to persist, then our army should consider its subsequent actions, whether to advance or retreat. If you do not act in accordance with the decree announced, it may turn out that today we will capture Albazin; under our offensive, the Russians will withdraw their forces. When we retreat, they will move forward again. In this case, the hostilities will last forever, the border population will not live in peace. "
In February of the same year of 1685, the Manchurian troops stationed in the Amur Basin, undertook a large-scale reconnaissance operation, which had the task of identifying the real forces of the Russians in Albazin. To this end, the Qing authorities “ordered the deputy chief of the Daurian, named Beilear, at the head of more than 30 people, to go to the areas north of Albazin in order to take the language without fail, and also to familiarize themselves with the details and report back to the area”.
A month later, the Manchus received detailed information about the Russian fortifications in Albazin and received Cossacks from the daur of seven prisoners. One of the prisoners named Gavrila told the Manchus that the garrison of the fort was 1 thousand people, and the fortifications themselves were repaired and strengthened over the past year. One of the captured seven prisoners soon escaped, and the six remaining were transferred by the Manchus to Beijing.
The emperor Kansi issued a decree on this operation: “Beylear and others reached Albazin, reconnoitered the situation and captured Russian prisoners. Their achievement deserves praise, and their superiors should reward them according to the law. Six prisoners brought to each give a set of clothes in accordance with the season and refer them to Jiangjun Sabsu. When our army launches an offensive, these prisoners must be released - in order to demonstrate our generosity. ”
In March 1685, the Manchu troops appeared just below Albazin. A cavalry detachment numbering up to one hundred men, three versts from the fortress, occupied the mill of F. Burdukovsky, a merchant man, captured its owner, partially interrupted and partially captured the Cossacks and workers who were there, and immediately departed. A.L. The next day Tolbuzin sent a Cossack detachment to the mill and began to expect a siege. However, the Qing retreated.
By June 1685, the Qing troops, concentrated in Aigun, were ready to attack Albazin. In total, for this military campaign, the Manchus gathered 15 thousand soldiers, 100 cannons and 50 heavy siege weapons. Catholic missionaries served as advisers to the troops.
On June 10, the Qing army already captured several Russian villages and haunts along the banks of the Amur below Albazin and was preparing to attack the burg. Through the Russian prisoners F. Teln and G. Sitnikov, the defenders of the Russian fortress were given two letters of ultimatum from Emperor Kangxi to the Russian Tsar and from Penchun to Tolbuzin. Modern Chinese historians interpret this step as the desire of the Qing empire to act according to the principle “first observe the norms of respect, and then take up arms”.
The general meaning of the letters, in the interpretation of modern Chinese sources, was as follows: "Russian troops illegally invaded our territory," seized the land, kill women and children, there is no end to ugliness. The Chinese side can no longer tolerate this, and there is nothing left for it but to move troops for self-defense. Now Chinese troops are standing on the walls of the city. If the Russian troops agree to leave Yaksa (Albazin), if the Russians are ready to “collect tribute, confining themselves to Yaku (i.e.Yakutsk), not to invade our borders, to return our fugitives, then we will return your people who have surrendered to us. ” Then both states will be able “in conditions when the border will forever become calm and inviolable, mutually trade and exchange envoys, live in peace and harmony”. However, the Russian troops "continued to persist, not intending to retreat," "they spoke boldly and impudently."
At the same time, the same ultimatum letters with other prisoners were sent to Yakutsk, through Northern Mongolia to Selenginsk and through Dzungaria to Tobolsk.
Earlier, on November 15, 1685, letters were sent to Moscow sent through Northern Mongolia with the Cossacks I. Ivanov and G. Fomin. Only by the end of October 1685, three other Russian captives — L. Kulikov, M. Safyanchikov, and I. Kiselev — reached Krasnoyarsk with the “sheets” He secretly measured the height and width of the Great Wall of China (15 and 21 arshin respectively) from the accompanying guards.
In these letters, the Chinese emperor, calling to live "on the council," "without a fight and without war," "bidding and send ambassadors to each other," agreed to withdraw his troops from Albazin under the condition of leaving the Amur and setting the border at the turn near Yakutsk or in the "other place" and to Yeniseisk {81}. However, the threats of the Manchu side were in vain.
On June 12, 1685, the Manchu troops approached the walls of Albazin. Originally A.L. It seemed to Tolbuzin that the Manchu army, which had approached on 100 beads, numbered over 10 thousand people with 200 cannons, 50 of them were heavy siege. The captured Chinese clarified these data: there were 4,200 people in the Manchuri army, including 1,200 "workers", 30 large and 15 small cannons. In addition, the coast came 1000 cavalrymen. The overwhelming majority of the enemy soldiers were armed with bows and only 100 people with flagella captured in the Russian guards.
At this time, in the ostrog itself there were only 450 Cossacks with three guns and 300 guns. The Manchus once again demanded complete surrender from the Russian garrison: “The philanthropy of our emperor is limitless, and he cannot reconcile with further bloodshed. You are ordered to return to your original lands. " On the requirement of Lantanya about the surrender of the fortress of voivod A.L. Tolbuzin responded with a categorical refusal, telling the enemy that he would defend Albazin to the last drop of blood.
On June 14, the Manchus captured 40 Russian subjects who were swimming along the river to Albazin. In connection with their refusal to surrender to the mercy of the enemy, all the men were killed, and the women and children were taken to bondage.
Manchurian troops surrounded the Russian fortress and closed the siege ring. At dawn on June 15, 1685, the storming of Albazin began, which continued until late in the evening. According to the commander A. Tolbuzin, during the assault the Russians were killed “a man with 100 or more, and the towers and the fort were razbili, and servicemen, trade, and industrial people, and the arable peasants were beaten off from in many places in the Olbaza prison, the church, and the bell tower, and the shops, and the bread barns, were lit with fire arrows. ” Despite this, the defenders of Albazin continued to resist.
Realizing the impossibility of taking Albazin by assault, the Chinese resorted to the "fire attack" - the use of incendiary means.
Having exhausted all available opportunities for defense, voivode A. Tolbuzin agreed to capitulate, having achieved, however, the right of free passage of residents and a garrison with weapons and property to Nerchinsk.
About 300 defenders of Albazin without property and provisions left the prison under the leadership of A. Tolbuzin. The Manchus violated the agreement and took away their property, weapons and food. After this, the Manchus' Russian defenders of Albazin tried to persuade them to transfer to Chinese citizenship, describing the hopelessness of their position. Some defenders of Albazin - according to various sources from 25 to 45 people - surrendered to the Manchus.
There is a legend that the Chinese have captured 151 defenders of Albazin in total. Lantan suggested that they either go to the service of the Chinese emperor, or return to their homeland, 101 people wanted to return home, and 50 Russian subjects expressed their readiness to serve the emperor Kangxi. And then the Chinese general took the first to Beijing with him, and the second he resettled all over Manchuria as farmers. His logic was deep:
“Since those who have expressed a desire to return to their homeland have thus proved their loyalty to the natural king, so there is no doubt that they should not be loyal to my sovereign either. And those who served the foreign sovereign preferred to serve their natural king, cannot be faithful to either lord, why should they remain in slavery and under the supervision of local authorities in certain places ”.
Chinese sources note that "the assistant chief (Albazinsky garrison) Vasily (Zakharov) and with him another 40 people refused to return, and therefore we left them."
The arduous campaign of the Albazins to Nerchinsk lasted more than a week.At the mouth of the river, Urushi Tolbuzin released 120 people from his unit to Yakutsk, hoping that it would be easier for them to reach Russian settlements. The Manchurian detachments accompanied the Russians for a long time and then turned back.
On the way, the Albazinians met the late reinforcements sent to them on June 23 by voevod I.Ye. Vlasov from Nerchinsk. The reinforcements under the command of Antsifor Kondratyev consisted of 100 Cossacks on 11 strugues with two cannons and three cannons.
In principle, this detachment could hardly have radically changed the situation at Albazin. If he had managed to make a jail on time, the siege of Albazin would have lasted longer, would have been more costly for the Chinese side and would have led to great casualties on both sides. However, the balance of forces and means would still be in favor of the Chinese. The Russian authorities could no longer help the defenders of Albazin, while the Chinese side could pull in any necessary number of troops.
The situation in Albazin and around it could be changed by a Cossack regiment of 600 men under the command of A.I. Baytona, sent from Yeniseisk. This was the only real chance for the Cossacks. However, even with his arrival, the Russian forces would have reached only one thousand people, and the superiority of the Chinese in forces and means would still be absolute. Unfortunately, the detachment of Bayton did not reach Dauria. The Cossacks were carried away by the pursuit of the Mongol detachments who stole their horses, as a result, Beyton could not bring the "freedom-loving" Cossacks to the goal in an organized manner.
On the night of July 3, Cossack G. Fomin brought I.Ye. Vlasov news of the fall of Albazin and the retreat of A.L. Tolbuzina. A week later, AL himself arrived at Nerchinsk. Tolbuzin, with whom the surviving Albazin population arrived - 324 men and 312 women and children.
Part of the detachment A.L. Tolbuzina, who moved to Yakutsk, got there in more than a month. The report on these events reached Yeniseisk by August 28 and was received in Moscow only on March 13, 1686. At the same time, a Chinese prisoner, Woytsy, was taken to Moscow.
This ended the first part of the Albazin epic - the heroic defense of the Russian lands from the Qing conquerors in the Amur region.
A special page in the history of the first clash between Russia and China for Albazin. - the fate of Russian prisoners. At the end of 1685, the captives arrived in Beijing and "were received by affectionately complacent Bogdykhan, who was flattered by such desperate brave men." Albazinians were settled in the north-eastern outskirts of the Chinese capital, near the city wall.
Russian captives were ranked among the hereditary military class, which occupied a prominent position in the bureaucratic hierarchy of the Chinese Empire. Organizationally, they became part of the Manchu Guard (the Manchurian flag of the Eight-Famous Forces, yellow with a red border) in the so-called “Russian” company of Gudei, formed back in 1649. Russian were granted state apartments, cash, rice rations and plots of arable land. At the same time, the Chinese authorities took a number of measures to assimilate the Russians, giving them Chinese women as their wife. However, the Chinese did not invade the spiritual world of Russian prisoners: the Albazins remained true to their Orthodox Christian values. Together with the Albazins, their fate in the Chinese capital was shared by priest Mikhail Leontyev, who founded the first Russian spiritual mission in China in Beijing.
Thus, from the mid-80s of the 17th century, the Russian ostrog Albazin became the center of the Russian-Manchurian confrontation in the Amur region.
Albazin occupied an exceptionally advantageous military-strategic position in the region and was used by the Russians as an advanced bridgehead for subsequent expansion in the Amur Basin.
The Qing government, naturally, was wary of Russian activity in the region and saw in the advancement of Russian troops (the penetration of Cossack detachments and their consolidation along the banks of the Amur rivers) a threat to their interests in this region. Trying to "squeeze out" the Russians from the Amur Region, the Tsins concentrated their main military efforts on the destruction of the Russian fortress Albazin.
The military and political preparations of the Qings for military operations in the Amur region were carefully designed and planned, sanctioned at the highest level (emperor Kangxi) and well organized. The training took a total of several years and was multifaceted: there was an increase in military forces and equipment, deep reconnaissance of the Russians was carried out, and measures were taken to ensure the logistics of the troops.
Qing paid particular attention to political and psychological forms and methods of dealing with Russians in the Amur region. Numerous ultimatums and threats on behalf of the emperor Kangxi should have intimidated the Russians. The “humane” treatment of prisoners, including granting them officer ranks, as well as allowing them to return to their troops (usually as parliamentarians for delivering Chinese ultimatums), aimed to break the morale and will of the Russians to resist. Emperor Kangxi instructed his generals: "When our army launches an offensive, the prisoners must be released - in order to demonstrate our generosity."
As part of the confrontation in the Amur region, both Russia and Qing China tried to win over local peoples and tribes and use them either as political trumps in the political struggle (the Gantimur case) or as military force.
The Russians in the Amur Region had neither the strength nor the sufficient means to counter the Chin troops. However, the morale and fighting qualities of the Cossacks gave the Russians a huge advantage, which the Qing could not neutralize with their absolute superiority in forces and means. In many ways, the success of the development of the Amur region and the strengthening of Russian influence there was provided by the initiative and daring of the Cossacks, and not by the efforts of Russia at the state-political level.
The siege of Albazin by the Manchu army, which had a 35–40-fold superiority in men and an absolute in the guns, ended without result for the besiegers. Russian prison, despite all the difficulties and deprivation of his defenders, survived and did not surrender to the enemy. Only when resistance was no longer possible, did the Russian garrison leave the fortress, not recognizing, however, its defeat.
The heroic defense of Albazin in the summer of 1685 was the first act of a decisive military confrontation between Russia and China for supremacy in the Amur region. Formally, the Manchus won the victory, having achieved the departure of the Cossacks from Albazin. However, the military failure did not mean Russia's abandonment of plans to further spread its influence on this region by all means available to it.
The heroic defense of Albazin
The arrival in mid-July 1685 of the surviving defenders of Albazin to Nerchinsk marked the beginning of a new stage in the development of military-political relations between China and Russia. The defeat of the Russians by the Manchus in no way shook the determination of the Russian authorities to defend the national interests of the Russian Empire in this region. Nerchinsky voivode I.E. Vlasov took the most decisive position in this regard. It was on his initiative that concrete measures began to be taken to return to the Manchu-occupied Albazin.
Already in the middle of July 1685 voevoda I.E. Vlasov sent in reconnaissance search down the Shilka on five strugues 70 Cossacks headed by foreman J. Telitsyn. He was ordered "with great caution" to find out the situation in the Albazin area and to get the "language" without fail. As he moved forward, J. Telitsin learned about the withdrawal of the Manchu troops down the Amur. For a day and a half to Albazin, the Cossacks landed on the shore and continued their march over land. However, when the Telitsyn detachment reached Albazin, the Cossacks saw only a ruined fortress abandoned by the Manchus.
On the ashes of Albazin, the Cossacks captured the "language" - the Chinese Wancis (Wang Zisha). From his interrogation, the Cossacks learned that the boy’s father was a helmsman on a Manchurian ship, but was executed by the Qing authorities for putting him on stones. Fearing for his life, Wancis deserted from the Manchu army and hid in the ruins of Albazin, finding shelter and food there.
The Chinese prisoner told Telitsin that the Manchu troops had left Albazin urgently in connection with the uprising in China and the need to pacify him. According to Wantsia, the only garrison left by Tsinami was stationed in Aigun and consisted of 500 people.
On August 7, J. Telitsin returned to Nerchinsk and reported on everything he had seen and heard to I. Vlasov, after convincing him of the reality of plans for the return of Albazin.
Despite the intention to destroy all the crops around Albazin, the Manchus did not have time to do this during their hasty departure. This inspired optimism and strengthened the confidence of the Russian military authorities in the success of the upcoming actions. According to the plan I.E. Vlasov, Tolbuzin originally had to build a "small fortress" and stock up as much grain as possible to support the troops in the upcoming inevitable clashes with Qing.
For these purposes, an equestrian detachment of 198 men, headed by A. Beiton, was sent from Nerchinsk, and after him “ran” down the Amur River A.L. Tolbuzin with a detachment consisting of 123 Albazians and 193 Nerchinsk Cossacks. The detachment was armed with six cannons, one "zatchinaya pishchal", 160 cores, 100 pishchal hand, 50 berdysh, banner and drum. In total, according to Vlasov, “military men with him, Alexey, 514 people, and 155 industrial people and plowed peasants, and two men of Moscow gunners” were sent to Albazin.
August 27 A.L. Tolbuzin and his people reached Albazin.
By the beginning of 1686, there were already 725 people in Albazin, and in Nerchinsk and its outposts — 340 servicemen and 100 industrial people. In total, thus, by 1686, over a thousand military men had been drawn up for the defense of the Amur Region, the number of which, if necessary, could be increased by industrial people and peasants.
By the end of 1685, the Russians managed to remove the bulk of the crop from more than a thousand acres. At the same time, there was logging for the construction of a new Russian fortress, which, by order of the governor I.Ye. Vlasov was supposed to be located below the old Russian fortress. However, the Cossack circle collected by A.L. Tolbuzin to discuss this issue, called for the restoration of Albazin in the old place.
Work began immediately. The earthen walls were set in 4 sagins wide; before the frosts, the Albazinians managed to bring the walls 1.5 sag high. Wooden "sample" (model) of the fortress A.L. Tolbuzin sent to Moscow.
The fortress was built in the form of a rectangle stretched along the Amur.The fortress walls were erected from logs in two rows, between which the earth was poured, as a result of which the width of fortifications reached 8 - 8.5 meters. The height of the walls of the fortress reached 3 meters - the Cossacks did not have time to raise the walls due to the onset of cold weather. The wall along the Amur coast was reinforced by a tower to prevent enemy ships from approaching the fortress itself.
The Manchu authorities in Aigun soon learned about the occupation of Albazin by Russian troops and the return of the population there. However, when it was reported to the emperor Kangxi, he did not believe his commander Sabsu: “After reading the report of Sabsu, the emperor decided that the report was based on rumors and Sabsu did not send people to investigate the situation in Albazin and receive reliable information. Therefore, we cannot send troops without good reason. It was commanded by Sabsu, Lanzhongu Lifanyuanya Manpi and others to get accurate information through intelligence and report. ”
Already in the autumn of 1685, A.L. Tolbuzin reported I.E. Vlasov about the activity of the enemy’s intelligence - the Manchurian cavalry detachments repeatedly approached the city itself, attacking Russian subjects. A.L. Tolbuzin took appropriate countermeasures by organizing a patrol of the Albazin neighborhoods by mounted “outpost guards” under the command of A. Bayton.
On October 2, the Russian "retaliatory guard" entered into battle with a large detachment of the enemy. A Cossack detachment of 100 people, who came to the rescue, could not catch up with the Manchus and came back. Two weeks later, on October 14, the Manchekurs crossed the Amur River, attacked Pokrovskaya Sloboda on the Lapkaevsky Meadow, killed and captured part of the population, and burned grain stocks. A detachment that came up from Albazin a few days later was unable to pursue the enemy who had departed for the Amur because of the ice drift that had begun. In early November, A. Beyton, with 200 Cossacks, overtook the Manchus at the Monastery Loot, defeated them and captured a herd of horses. On November 26, the Manchus again approached the Shingalovskaya Zaimka, captured the prisoners and left, although A. Beyton with 150 Cossacks pursued them for two days. In December 1685, the Manchu command was set to seize Albazin again in the summer of 1686 from the Cossacks seized by the Cossacks.
On February 1, 1686, a large Manchurian detachment of 500 men approached Albazin and plundered the Great Border within ten miles of it. Again, the Russian cavalry units rushed in pursuit, but the Manchus disappeared.
On February 24, Tolbuzin sent Bayton at the head of a detachment of 300 Cossacks to the area of the Kumara River. There, they were faced with a Ching troops watch of 40 people. As a result of a fierce battle, 30 Qing soldiers and 7 Cossacks died. A prisoner captured during the raid confirmed information about the preparation of a new campaign by the Manchus from Aiguni to Albazin.
By the spring of 1686, the Qing Courtyard had finally made sure that the Russians had returned to Albazin. The Manchus were convinced of this during the interrogations of the Russian peasant Aksenka Fedorov, who was captured by the Solonists in early 1686 from the Pokrovskaya Zaimka and later handed over to the Manchus. A. Fedorov said that 1500 more people with five guns had been added to the former defenders of Albazin. In addition, according to the Russian prisoner, eight more guns were expected to arrive. Fedorov described the fortifications of Albazin and spoke about the huge food reserves in the city, which "will be enough for two years."
On February 13, 1686, when Emperor Kangxi learned about the real situation in Albazin (Yaks), he immediately developed a plan for military operations. It noted: “Nowadays the lot (the term for Russian) has returned to Yaks, fortified the fortress. If you do not carry out a punitive expedition, you will inevitably have to accumulate large stocks of food, and this is not easy to do. He ordered the Jabujun Sabs to stop the relocation of families, as requested earlier, to build a court, leading a detachment of officers and soldiers from Ula and Ninguty, rush to Heilongjiang, and before that solve the issue of leaving the fortified garrisons from among the select troops, then lead the detachment from 2000 soldiers on Yaksa. ”
On April 17, 1686, the emperor Kangxi ordered Lantan to lead a new march on Albazin with the aim of "exterminating" the Russians. At the audience, he ordered: “You must proceed with caution during the current campaign. It is necessary, as in their previous surrender, to explain to them our decree that they, the Russians, being people of another state, risking their lives for the sake of self-interest, disturb our borders. Now a large army has again arrived (under their city, and they) must quickly submit, for if they do not submit, they will all be destroyed. If you take the city of Albazin, then immediately go to the city of Nerchinsk, and when you finish the job, return to Albazin and, having placed troops here, spend the winter. Do not destroy their cities and do not damage their fields, because when the bread is ripe, they can be (collected) and used for our needs. ”
In early July 1686, the Manchurian army approached Albazin, stopping 5 versts from the Russian fortress.
The Russian "outpost guards" advanced from Albazin down the Amur River faced the advance units of the Manchurian army and in time reported the approach of the enemy. The population managed to hide in the fortress. The works on its strengthening by this moment were almost finished. The artillery of the fortress consisted of a mortar ("riding cannon"), firing poods, 8 copper cannons and 3 zatinnyh tweezers; more than 112 pounds of gunpowder and 60 pounds of lead were stored in the powder keg. Flour from the harvest of 1685 should have been enough for almost two years - until the summer of 1687. A herd of horses of 500 heads was driven by the Albazinians into the taiga.
Altogether, 826 servicemen, industrial people and plowed peasants gathered in Albazin, who made up the garrison of defenders of the fortress.
The siege army of the Manchus approached the Russian fortress along the Amur coast and "by water" on 150 beads. It numbered up to 5 thousand people with 40 guns. To ensure further advance, the Manchus drove up to three thousand horses to Albazin.
Before the siege of Lantany, he again sent a letter to Albazin with the released prisoner A. Fedorov demanding to leave the Amur and surrender the city of Albazin to the “Bogdoy governors”. In the "lovely letters" addressed to the Russian garrison, the Manchus demanded: "And you are not angry with big forces, but rather be born ... And it will not be like that, you don’t take it, you will become a fighter and opposer, and at that time we won’t disperse."
However, all attempts of the Manchus to shake the resistance of the defenders were in vain. The garrison decided to defend to the end: "One for one, head to head, and back de without a decree neidem" {98}.
At the time of the approach of the Manchu army to A.L. Albazin. Tolbuzin tried to prevent the landing of the enemy from ships near the fortress itself and made a sudden sortie. The Russian detachment led by A. Bayton, supported from the fortress by rifle and cannon fire, according to a Chinese source, acted so vigorously that Lantan was personally forced to restore order in his troops. As during the first siege, the Manchus immediately tried to cut off Albazin from Nerchinsk and placed their vessels above the fortress to impede the approach of reinforcements.
On July 7, 1686, a lengthy and grueling siege of Russian Albazin by the Manchus began. A week after the start of the siege, Langtan began an assault. The Manchus went on the attack from the riverine and north sides. A.L. Tolbuzin responded with a sortie, and the Manchus themselves admitted that “we didn’t repair the attack all that night until dawn, but we couldn’t break cities behind the fortress” {99}.
The failure to take Albazin on the move forced the Manchu command to proceed with a long siege of the Russian fortress. To this end, they erected about 400 meters from Albazin and on the opposite bank of the Amur, their own earthen defensive walls, placed their guns on them and began to systematically bombard the fortress. The army of the besiegers was placed in yurts in three hastily built fortified towns.
On the fifth day of the battles of voivod A.L. Tolbuzin was seriously wounded in the leg by the nucleus and died four days later. The command of the fortress took Athanasius Beyton.
Persistent fighting continued day and night.During the three successful raids by the Russian defenders of the fortress, one and a half hundred enemy soldiers were killed, and another 200 Manchurian soldiers were killed by Russian artillery fire.
During the third outing, three “languages” were taken, but “no one is truly able to ask those de languages, because no one knows how to use the Nikansky language in Albazin, and those languages do not understand Chinese and Mungale languages”.
The loss of the Russian garrison by this time amounted to 101 people. 21 people died in raids, 40 people died from the fire of Manchu artillery and 40 people died from scurvy.
Lantany was forced to recognize the resilience of the Russian defense and the failure of the assault. About this "fast messengers", he notified Kangxi and received an order to lead a siege and die out defenders of hunger, thirst and cold.
On August 13, the Chinese emperor, in his decree, was forced to note: "Our army laid siege to Albazin, but the Russians, although they were in an extremely difficult situation, continue to stand to death."
August 19 Nerchinsky voivod I.E. Vlasov, who did not have complete information about the situation near Albazin, sent the Struts from Nerchinsk near Albazin to the reconnaissance of the boyar’s son, Grigory Lonshakov, with 70 Cossacks "for conducting news and taking the language." The detachment was able to secretly approach Albazin, where he was joined by 20 Cossacks and peasants who did not have time to hide in the prison until the approach of the Manchus.
The mission of G. Lonshakov was unsuccessful. The siege of Albazin was so complete that the Cossacks could not penetrate the city. Could not they take the "language". The only thing that G. Lonshakov was able to report on his return to Nerchinsk on September 26 was Governor I.Ye. Vlasov, this is what the Russian garrison stubbornly and in an organized manner defended and needed reinforcement in the face of the absolute superiority of the enemy in forces and means.
No more information about Albazin in Nerchinsk was received until the beginning of November.
After the failure of the first assault, the Manchus intensified work on the construction of defense. For this purpose, trenches, moats, earthen ramparts were built, positions for guns were torn off. Near Albazin, there were already four fortified towns, where the main forces of the Manchurian forces were located in yurts and dugouts. Above the fortress beyond the Amur camp was built, fortified shaft.
On September 1, the Manchus made a new decisive assault on the fortress, which, however, again ended in failure for them. They attempted to blow up the ramparts, starting to build a tunnel for this purpose, which was discovered and destroyed by the Cossacks during the attack.
In October, by the beginning of the ice drift, the Manchus had increased their vessels to the backwaters, which A. Beyton had used. During the ice drift, on the night of October 12, three brave souls - Cossacks I. Buzunov, V. Baksheev and Y. Martynov - managed to get out of Albazin and sail by boat. Maneuvering between the ice floes, they swam four miles. Then the boat was crushed with ice, and they got to the island. A week later, Cupid finally became covered with ice shell, and the Cossacks moved on. By November 10, they reached Nerchinsk and reported on the state of the fortress and its defenders.
Until October, the Albazin garrison made sorties five times, destroyed up to 150 enemy soldiers and lost 65 people. There was enough food in the fortress, but there was a shortage of water, fuel, and anti-scaling media: 50 people had already died of scurvy by that time.
In October 1686, the last fierce assault on Albazin began. The entire army of Lantania was thrown at the attack, the number of which had increased by that time to 10 thousand people. The Manchus built two "wood" ramparts from "Smolya" and raw wood, which they wanted to bring right under the walls of the fortress, and then light it. During the raids, the Cossacks burned one of them, and under the second they brought undermining and blew up. At the same time, the Manchus tried to “sweep up” the fortress with “chopped firewood”, that is, to fill up the shaft of planes from the catapults. Firewood was very useful for the besieged, severely affected by the lack of fuel.
Due to the onset of winter in the last battle, the Manchus wanted to break the resistance of Alba-zin by all means, and the besieged, in turn, sought to break the siege.According to the Cossack M. Chaplin, who arrived in Nerchinsk in December 1686, the Albazins “beat” up to 1,500 people in this battle.
By December 1686, Albazin continued to defend himself stubbornly, although much of his garrison died in October — November. More than a hundred people were killed on the raids and during the bombing, more than 500 people died from scurvy. 150 people survived {105}.
The siege of Albazin, which lasted for almost half a year, was unsuccessful for the Manchurian troops. The Russian garrison, in spite of the difficulties and deprivation of the siege, fiercely defended. As a result, the Manchus were forced to abandon the use of force and negotiate. The difficulties faced by the Manchu government in its actions in the Amur region, forced him to establish diplomatic contacts with the Russian government.
Russia has also taken certain steps to resolve the crisis in the Amur Region politically. On December 28, 1685, a decree was signed on the appointment of the steward F. Golovin is a great and plenipotentiary ambassador for negotiating with Manchu representatives at the border congress.
On January 26, the Russian ambassador left Moscow and on September 6, 1686, arrived in Yeniseisk. F. Golovin was charged with the duty to defend the Russian frontiers in Eastern Siberia not only by diplomatic means, but also by “military craft”. To organize the defense, he was given power over the vast territory of the Irkutsk, Nerchinsk, and Albazin districts.
On January 26, the Russian ambassador left Moscow and on September 6, 1686, arrived in Yeniseisk. F. Golovin was charged with the duty to defend the Russian frontiers in Eastern Siberia not only by diplomatic means, but also by “military craft”. To organize the defense, he was given power over the vast territory of the Irkutsk, Nerchinsky and Albazinsky counties.
According to the decree of December 10, 1685, messengers were sent from Moscow to Beijing - clerks of the Ambassadorial Order Nikifor Venyukov and Ivan Favorov, who visited China with N. Spafari. In the tsarist charter, Bogdykhan pointed out the unexpectedness of the commenced military actions, the existing possibility of their prevention by diplomatic means “without spilling blood and devastating states." The Russian government informed the Chinese emperor of its agreement to begin peace talks in Albazin and about the departure of ambassadors from Moscow, subject to the establishment of a truce and the retreat of the Manchurian army from Russian territory. N. Veniukov and I. Favorov were instructed to find out further intentions of the Manchu court and to specify the conditions of peace.
N. Venyukov and I. Favorov left Moscow on December 20, 1685. The long and difficult journey continued until the end of October 1686. On October 31, Venyukov and Favorov arrived in Beijing and presented the message of the Russian government to the “khan people”.
During the meetings with representatives of Moscow, Manchurian officials tried to impose the same point of view on the development of the situation in the Amur region, which they expounded to the embassy of N. Spafari. The Tsinsky court refused to consider itself in a state of war with Russia and declared that military actions were caused primarily by the self-will of the Cossacks who occupied the banks of the Amur, and also by the refusal of the Nerchin authorities to extradite the “defector” Gantymur. Nevertheless, they claimed the readiness of the Bogdikhan to maintain "peace and friendship" and immediately lift the siege of Albazin. The Manchus proposed to exchange Gantimura for Russian prisoners, and their territorial claims were already limited only by the Amur Region.
Venyukov and Favorov's “unsubscription” said: “And when hearing about that peaceful decree, their khan, they, too, were khan's closest people, so that the bloodshed on both sides would cease, rejoicing that the khan did not sometimes, even now, he did not want a life with friendship and love, and, wishing those people who are sitting in Alba-zin not to die of hunger, he indicated that his troops would retreat from Albazi-on ”.
“Khanova Neighboring People” suggested that the Russian messengers immediately send two people to Albazin with a notice of the upcoming arrival of the Russian ambassador and the need to preserve the “status quo” near Albazin. The Manchus committed themselves to cease hostilities, “no arrogance with the Albazin Cossacks can be repaired.” At the same time, the Ching authorities demanded that the Russian garrison demanded “Nikak's enthusiasm, for the time being, the Albazinian Cossacks did not repair the perfect world of the Uinitsa, and they didn’t beat the yasak people, and didn’t take yasak from them. they will cease, and therefore the perfect world of the host. "
Venyukov and Favorov refused to comply with the requirements of the Qing Courtyard, citing the lack of authority, stating that the Cossacks "sit in the city by decree of royal majesty, and not with self-will." In response, the “Khan's near people” threatened that if the messengers were not sent to Albazin, then the fate of the Russian defenders would be deplorable: the Manchurian army would intensify the siege and the Cossacks would “die a death by starvation”. This forced the Russian representatives in Beijing to accept the demands of the Qing authorities. Ivan Sharapov and Pavel Bushkov, “Selenga Cossacks”, were sent to Albazin with a letter addressed to A. Tolbuzin. By that time, the voivode Tolbuzin had already died, the Manchus themselves told Venyukov and Favorov, but the Russian representatives did not believe this information.
Sharapov and Bushkov, accompanied by the Manchu detachment, left for Albazin from Beijing via Manchuria.
November 5, 1686. On the eve of departure, Sharapov received an order "traveling by the road and being in the Chinese army ... about everything to look tightly."Upon arrival in the Albazin area on November 30, Sharapov and Bushkov were passed by the Manchus inside the Russian fortress, where they delivered a message from Venyukov and Favorov to the garrison commander A. Beyton. Cossacks Mikhail Chaplin and Jacob Boltevsky were singled out from the Russian garrison to negotiate with the Qing command near Albazin. The Manchus, fulfilling the will of their emperor, somewhat weakened the siege regime of the Russian fortress, promised that “they would not start Albazin,” and even allowed small groups of Cossacks to leave the city for water to the river. However, these indulgences did not extend to those Russians who dared to go out of town for fishing, hunting, or gathering brushwood and pine needles (a decoction of pine needles was used to treat scurvy) in the surrounding forests. The siege continued, and the Manchus continued to strive to take the Russian fortress into thin air.
At the same time, during the contacts with the Russian garrison, the Manchu command promised: "But only what is in the siege will be scanty, and they would be, siege residents, they (the Manchu) commanders would be told, and they will help you in helping them."
The besieged Russian garrison achieved Manchus and some other "indulgences". Thus, the enemy promised to let small groups of 20-30 people with provisions and livestock from Albazin to Nerchinsk and back, “but they didn’t want to let the large people and camels on camels”. Excluded also the movement of the Cossacks alone.
After negotiations with representatives of the Manchu command A. Beyton found out that the enemy army could withdraw only after the opening of the Amur, and until spring the enemy intended to continue the siege.
In accordance with the agreements with the Manchus, A. Beyton sent a group of his envoys to Nerchinsk, which included Cossacks Chaplin, Sharapov and Bushkov. The Manchus missed this group without hindrance, even supplied the Cossacks with supplies and provisions all the way.
Upon arrival in Nerchinsk, M. Chaplin reported to commander I.Ye. Vlasov about the loss of Albazinians and the state of defense of the fortress: “In the siege de time, a man with 100 died on the outcrops and on the city, and from wounds died. And with him there are servicemen and all sorts of people in Albazinskaya ... peretsynzhali, and others injured, and on guard de only a man with 30 and older people with 15. And horse riding and regimental guns are all in one piece, and gunpowder de pud from 20, the lead also. And de bread in Albazin will be the siege of July before the first numbers. ”
Having received news of the situation in Albazin and around it, on December 26, Vlasov sent to the fortress "Dahurian boyar boy" Ignatius Milovanov with 26 servicemen who were to provide distillery for 20 besieged cows. Vlasov could not render any more help: “And for medical treatment ... from myta and from the tsingi and from the wounds by the Alba’s siege of siege, it’s not good for me to send it, but it’s dangerous to send gunpowder and lead”
The Manchus seized the Milovanov detachment on the outskirts of Albazin and put all the Cossacks in custody one by one. After that, the interrogation of the Russian envoys began - the Manchus tried to find out as much information as possible about the plans of the Russian side. The Manchus missed only 10 people and cattle inside the besieged fortress. With Milovanov, they sent Ivan Artemyev and Afanasy Baigashin as accompanying “former traitors”.
Milovanov was allowed to be in Albazin for only a quarter of an hour. He only managed to meet with A. Bayton, seriously ill by that time. The garrison of the fortress was on the verge of physical exhaustion, the majority of service people and peasants were injured or sick. For the entire time he was inside the fortress, Milovanov saw only three healthy Cossacks. Accompanying the "traitors" are not allowed to newcomers to enter into any conversations with either the Bayton himself or with other defenders of the fortress. At the same time, as Milovanov subsequently reported to Vlasov, "former traitors" "go to Albazin bargaining, sell hot wine and fish." By sending Russian captives to the side of the Manchu of Russian prisoners, the enemy studied the mood inside the Russian fortress.However, despite all the difficulties and hardships, the Russian garrison was not morally broken. None of the Albazians even thought of surrender to the enemy.
Two Cossacks from the Milovanov detachment — G. Fomin and I. Tarkhanov — disappeared on their way back to Nerchinsk. Milovanov himself concluded that they most likely went over to the side of the Manchurian army, since no one else had seen them in Albazin either. The fate of Fomin and Tarkhanov was long unknown to the Russian command. Repeatedly, Beyton and Vlasov demanded that the Manchus extradite them, however, they constantly maintained that "such people did not go to Tabara for them." Only in August 1687, when the Manchus had already moved away from Albazin, Fomin and Tarkhanov were extradited to Albazin by the Russians and “given for bail” until the final decision of their fate.
During the meetings of the Russian and Manchu representatives at Albazin, the question of the fate of prisoners was always quite acute. Already from the end of 1686 began an organized exchange of prisoners. Thus, the Cossack Mikhail Akhreyanin, who was in captivity, was exchanged on December 5 for the "taken language of the Nikan breed."
Akhreyanin spoke about the circumstances of his capture. On July 7, 1686, he was sent with other Cossacks to alert the peasants near Albazin about the approach of the enemy troops. In carrying out this task, along with ten other Cossacks, he was captured by a Manchurian detachment of 500 men. All but the Akhreyanin, the Manchus immediately “were executed by death”, and “they were told to hold him behind guard before rozmeny”. Speaking about his stay in captivity, Akhreyanin noted that “in the Chinese regiments he was full of hunger and all anguish, because for many times at night they undressed his donog and tied his arms and legs to stakes”. Subsequently, in August 1687, by order of F. Golovin, M. Akhreyanin was given 4 rubles for “for granted patience”.
From Akhreyanin, the Russian command found out about the difficult situation in the Manchu army, which had laid siege to Alba-zin. Thus, being in captivity, Akhreyanin heard from "traitors to the former Albazin Cossacks," that is, Cossacks who had gone over to the Manchus, who had been captured during the first siege of Albazin, that ".
The Manchus suffered huge losses not only from military operations, but also from hunger and disease. From the "bread poverty" began the pestilence. The total losses of the Manchus reached over 2500 people.
On February 10, 1687, after many months of the siege, the Manchu emperor issued a decree: “We learned that after the lifting of the siege of Albazin there are many sick among the soldiers. This is the best Manchu troops, we are extremely sorry. Nowadays, two doctors and medicines are specially sent for their treatment. ”
Further, in his decree, the bogdykhan farsightedly noted: “If there are now sick Russians in the city, these doctors can also help them so that, returning to their country, the Russians would spread fame about our generosity.”
The command of the Manchu army acted strictly in accordance with the instructions of its emperor. In early February, the “former traitor” I. Artemyev was sent to the Russian fortress. Bayton was required to submit a statement of all the sick and wounded who needed medical care. A. Bey-ton “refused to give them that, and said that in Albazin the service people, by the mercy of the great god, are all healthy, and there are no weak people”.
The generous gesture of the Manchu army towards the defenders of Albazin in fact pursued far from noble goals. The Manchus knew very well that practically the entire garrison of the Russian fortress needed medical assistance. And by that time, the garrison itself numbered only "all kinds of human officials, 115 people, women and 55 people." The Manchus needed more complete information about the forces of the Russians and their capabilities, about the ability of the Russians to withstand the tough Manchu siege.
Beiton's proud refusal of help from the Manchus had a justification. Shortly before that, by agreement with the Manchurian side, 12 Cossacks were sent to the forests to collect pine branches and bark, however, the “Chinese guards” seized them, tied them up and dragged them along the fields for a long time. The Cossacks were sent back "slightly alive", and by the evening of the same day six of them died from their wounds. After this, there was no longer any trust in the "generosity" of the enemy on the part of the Albazins.
Despite the critical situation, the garrison of the Russian fortress continued to serve, maintained order and discipline. A. Beyton did his best to not show the Manchus his plight. On March 27, on the occasion of the Easter holidays, the Russians sent the Manchus "a wheat pie weighing a pud, and the Chinese de voivods accepted the pie with honor."
With the arrival of spring of 1687 and the opening of navigation on the rivers, the Nerchinsky voevoda I.Ye. Vlasov began demanding the withdrawal of the Manchu troops from Albazin, as promised by the Qin side in the fall. However, the enemy was not going to fulfill his promise.
On April 20, 1687, a Cossack Andrei Vologda from Nerchinsk arrived in the Manchurian camp on the Amur, who handed the Qing commanders Vlasov's demand to leave Albazin.
On May 6, the Manchurian army retreated down the Amur by 3-4 versts and stopped in the area of the Russian village of Ozernaya. Before the retreat, the Manchus destroyed all their defenses and equipment near Albazin, and at a new place immediately began to build defensive fortifications.
The behavior of the Qing troops near Albazin was initially incomprehensible to the Russian command. However, it soon realized the true plans of the Manchu side. From the "traitors", in particular from A.Baygashin, the Albazinians learned that "the Chinese regimental governors began from the city in the nearest places, in order not to give the Albazin inhabitants nikakov bread to sow, and how the grain sowing time passes, and they will go to the Chinese state with all the troops at that time" .
With the departure of the Qing troops, the Russian command received new data on the situation in their camp. From Baygashin and two defectors - mungaletin named Ochirko and the Chinese - it became known that “fighting men of a thousand and a half and a half were killed near Albazin, and a lot of people were beaten by working Nikansky men”. The main reason for the loss is the lack of provisions in the Manchu army. Both defector A. Beyton after interrogations sent back to the Chinese camp, so as not to provoke the enemy to retaliatory tough actions.
On August 30, 1687, the Manchurian army left its fortified camp and headed for the mouth of the Zeya River. The enemy has departed from the Russian fortress.
Military-political relations between the two countries entered the stage of diplomatic negotiations.
The heroic five-month defense cost the lives of the overwhelming majority of the defenders of Albazin. In one petition of 1689, the Albazin Cossacks indicated that the Pentecostal Antsifor Kondratiev had survived the siege of the “old Albazins” and 19 privates, and of those who came to Albazin with A. Bayton - Pentecostal Vasily Smirennikov and 29 privates. Total - 50 people. A. Beyton himself in 1689 compiled a list of 7 "old" Albazin Cossacks and 90 Cossacks who came to Albazin with him.
As in 1685, the Albazinites again lost all livestock and horses. After the withdrawal of the Manchu army, A. Beyton began to restore the fortifications and structures inside the burg, to prepare for sowing. I.E. Vlasov sent a small reinforcement from Nerchinsk.
Further, the fate of Albazin was decided by the embassy of F.A. Golovin and Ching representatives, who held several rounds of negotiations. The outcome of these negotiations, during which the Russian side made many concessions, was the conclusion of the Treaty of Nerchinsk.
On August 31, 1689, F. Golovin sent A. Beiton to Albazin a decree - “to destroy the built city of Albazin without a trace, and henceforth from both sides there should not have a fortress or dwelling of Nikakov”. At the same time, a decree was sent to the Argun burg to transfer the fortress to the other side of the river.
On October 8, voivod A. Beyton reported on the destruction of Albazin and the exodus of Russian military force.
Thus, the second defense of the Russian fortress Alba-zin lasted for five months and was distinguished by high intensity of military operations.
The Qing had absolute superiority in manpower and equipment, and were able to carry out comprehensive and effective preparation for military operations in advance. However, their attempts to seize the Russian fortress on the move proved ineffectual.
Russian garrison distinguished the highest morale, courage and loyalty to his duty. All enemy attempts by force or cunning to break the Russians were in vain. Ostrog remained impregnable for the enemy. The Russian detachment, organized by order, left its position, destroying all the fortifications and structures upon withdrawal.
In Beijing, the siege of Albazin and its subsequent destruction were perceived as a great victory over Russia. The Tsinsky court concluded: “The Russian state never had ties with the Middle State. Russians are extremely fierce in nature and difficult to subdue. However, at present they are submissive and sincerely willing to turn to culture. Lands that lie several thousand liars on the Kingan (slopes) facing the Middle State, starting from the far north, and deserted, will entirely belong to the Middle State. ”
The heroic defense of Albazin became a bright page in the history of Russian-Chinese relations and became a symbol of the inflexibility of the Russian spirit and Russian military force. The lessons of Albazin, the main one of which was the impossibility of defeating the Russians by military means, was remembered forever in Beijing.The military-political relations of China and Russia, regardless of the political changes that took place over the next more than three centuries, have since been based on the lessons and experience of military operations near Albazin in the second half of the 17th century.
“Yaksa retaliatory strikes”: the Chinese version of the siege of Albazin
Events associated with the Russo-Chinese clashes for Albazin are evaluated in a completely different light in modern China. Traditionally, in the Chinese historiography of that period anti-Russian approaches prevail. The development of Russia Amur region is considered in Beijing as an invasion, aggression in the "native" Chinese lands. Therefore, Albazin, in Chinese - Yaks, was considered in China to be a material symbol of the expansionist policies of Tsarist Russia against the Qing Empire.
In this sense, the system of argumentation of Chinese historians and the facts cited by them are of interest. The following is an abridged translation of the head of the 6th "Hostilities in the Yaks area against the aggression of Tsarist Russia", which was included in the book "Military History of China" issued by the Academy of Military Sciences of the PRC in 1992:
"one. The invasion of tsarist Russia in the Amur region and the war of resistance of the army and the people of the Northeast
The basin of the Heilongjiang and Ussuri rivers from ancient times was a place of labor activity, a source of existence and development of the ancestors of the Chinese nation. The ancestors of the Manchus were one of the tribes living here. And already in the XI century BC, they recognized themselves as vassals of the Zhou dynasty. After the Qin and Han dynasties, the ties with China proper were always close, and in the Tang era, dutunism was created here. The leader of the tribe was dutun, who acted under the supervision of a representative of the central government.
In 1411, the Minsk government created in Tielin, near the mouth of the Lyaogunhe River, the highest government body to manage the territory of the Heilongjiang and Ussuri river basins, called Nergan du Jihui Shisy - “Slave Use Control”.
After the conquest of China by the Qing Dynasty, the Office of the Eight-Famous Forces was established and the titles "head of the clan (tribe)" and "head of the county" appeared instead of the Minsk control system, which provided for "military districts" and "military departments (posts)".
In 1636, the Qing Emperor Tai Chi appointed Ubahaya Fudutun Ninguty, and from that time Ninguga became the political center of the Heilongjiang and Ussuri River Basin under the direction of the Qing Dynasty. In 1644, the Qing moved the capital to Beijing, and the entire territory of the Northeast to the south of the Outer Khingan (the Stanovoy Range) fell under the control of Shenjing.
In 1653, the Qing government created a separate administrative department of the district, including the territories of the Songhua, Heilongjiang, and Ussuri river basins, including Fr. Sakhalin and Nerchinsk with the subordination of Ningute according to the “sign of control” (later the manager became known as “Ningutaskyjiangjun”).
In 1683, the Qing government divided the area formerly under the administration of Jiangjun Ninguty into two parts: the area west of the Hadaulahe river, the Bichan river, and the eastern bank of the Sungari river passed into the administration of Jiangjun Heilongjiang; the area to the east of the above rivers, including about. Kuedao (Sakhalin), still subordinate to Jiangjun Ninguty.
Some obedient hacks in Tsarist Russia said nonsense that the Heilongjiang district had never belonged to China, that the Russian people had found abandoned land here. This is a shameless lie! In fact, in the Tang era in the Heilongjiang - Ussuri region, the administrative and managerial apparatus was created. And only 700 years later, Russia began to take shape as a single state. Feudal-feudal class interests led to the fact that the foreign policy of tsarist Russia was inevitably directed "towards the subordination of other nations, the seizure of the territories of neighboring states" ("Collected Works of Marx-Engels". So 16. p. 181. - Chinese edition). That is why the aggressive forces of Tsarist Russia immediately after heading into Eastern Siberia rushed headlong into the basin of the Heilongjiang River.
On July 26, 1643 the Irkutsk voivode Golovin sent the written head of Vasily Poyarkov at the head of a detachment of 132 people to march on Amur to search for food opportunities and silver there. Poyarkov walked up the Lena, then crossed Outer Khingan (the Stanovoi Range) and reached the Chinese Jingqili River (now the Zeya River), a right tributary of the Bryanta River, on November 7, then went to the Umulekan River, where he created a post in which he spent winter
Subsequently, Poyarkov sent 70 people headed by Yuri Petrov to the Dahuri villages at the mouth of the Silinmudi River, where he tricked the head of the Daur tribe out of the village and then demanded food from the residents for themselves, cattle and sable skins. Realizing that they were cruelly deceived, the Dauri saw the true appearance of these robbers.When the people of Petrov decided to break into the Daurov village, the latter repulsed them, kept them under siege for three days and three nights, killed 10 people, wounded 50 of the detachment, and forced the rest to flee. Having no food, Petrovians showed their bestial essence, killing and eating 50 ducher. For this, the locals called these bandits monsters-cannibals. In 1644, a detachment of Petrov passed along the Amuru, Sunhuajiang and Ussuri rivers, constantly being attacked by local residents, and as a result about 50 people were left alive.
In this sense, the system of argumentation of Chinese historians and the facts cited by them are of interest. The following is an abridged translation of the head of the 6th "Hostilities in the Yaks area against the aggression of Tsarist Russia", which was included in the book "Military History of China" issued by the Academy of Military Sciences of the PRC in 1992:
"one. The invasion of tsarist Russia in the Amur region and the war of resistance of the army and the people of the Northeast
The basin of the Heilongjiang and Ussuri rivers from ancient times was a place of labor activity, a source of existence and development of the ancestors of the Chinese nation. The ancestors of the Manchus were one of the tribes living here. And already in the XI century BC, they recognized themselves as vassals of the Zhou dynasty. After the Qin and Han dynasties, the ties with China proper were always close, and in the Tang era, dutunism was created here. The leader of the tribe was dutun, who acted under the supervision of a representative of the central government.
In 1411, the Minsk government created in Tielin, near the mouth of the Lyaogunhe River, the highest government body to manage the territory of the Heilongjiang and Ussuri river basins, called Nergan du Jihui Shisy - “Slave Use Control”.
After the conquest of China by the Qing Dynasty, the Office of the Eight-Famous Forces was established and the titles "head of the clan (tribe)" and "head of the county" appeared instead of the Minsk control system, which provided for "military districts" and "military departments (posts)".
In 1636, the Qing Emperor Tai Chi appointed Ubahaya Fudutun Ninguty, and from that time Ninguga became the political center of the Heilongjiang and Ussuri River Basin under the direction of the Qing Dynasty. In 1644, the Qing moved the capital to Beijing, and the entire territory of the Northeast to the south of the Outer Khingan (the Stanovoy Range) fell under the control of Shenjing.
In 1653, the Qing government created a separate administrative department of the district, including the territories of the Songhua, Heilongjiang, and Ussuri river basins, including Fr. Sakhalin and Nerchinsk with the subordination of Ningute according to the “sign of control” (later the manager became known as “Ningutaskyjiangjun”).
In 1683, the Qing government divided the area formerly under the administration of Jiangjun Ninguty into two parts: the area west of the Hadaulahe river, the Bichan river, and the eastern bank of the Sungari river passed into the administration of Jiangjun Heilongjiang; the area to the east of the above rivers, including about. Kuedao (Sakhalin), still subordinate to Jiangjun Ninguty.
Some obedient hacks in Tsarist Russia said nonsense that the Heilongjiang district had never belonged to China, that the Russian people had found abandoned land here. This is a shameless lie! In fact, in the Tang era in the Heilongjiang - Ussuri region, the administrative and managerial apparatus was created. And only 700 years later, Russia began to take shape as a single state. Feudal-feudal class interests led to the fact that the foreign policy of tsarist Russia was inevitably directed "towards the subordination of other nations, the seizure of the territories of neighboring states" ("Collected Works of Marx-Engels". So 16. p. 181. - Chinese edition). That is why the aggressive forces of Tsarist Russia immediately after heading into Eastern Siberia rushed headlong into the basin of the Heilongjiang River.
On July 26, 1643 the Irkutsk voivode Golovin sent the written head of Vasily Poyarkov at the head of a detachment of 132 people to march on Amur to search for food opportunities and silver there. Poyarkov walked up the Lena, then crossed Outer Khingan (the Stanovoi Range) and reached the Chinese Jingqili River (now the Zeya River), a right tributary of the Bryanta River, on November 7, then went to the Umulekan River, where he created a post in which he spent winter
Subsequently, Poyarkov sent 70 people headed by Yuri Petrov to the Dahuri villages at the mouth of the Silinmudi River, where he tricked the head of the Daur tribe out of the village and then demanded food from the residents for themselves, cattle and sable skins. Realizing that they were cruelly deceived, the Dauri saw the true appearance of these robbers.When the people of Petrov decided to break into the Daurov village, the latter repulsed them, kept them under siege for three days and three nights, killed 10 people, wounded 50 of the detachment, and forced the rest to flee. Having no food, Petrovians showed their bestial essence, killing and eating 50 ducher. For this, the locals called these bandits monsters-cannibals. In 1644, a detachment of Petrov passed along the Amuru, Sunhuajiang and Ussuri rivers, constantly being attacked by local residents, and as a result about 50 people were left alive.
In the spring of 1645, Poyarkov, fearing to go back along the same path, was forced to flee from the mouth of the Amur along the sea to the north. And only in July 1646, he arrived in Yakutsk.
In March 1649, the Yakut voivode Frantsbekov sent Khabarov’s “long march” at the head of 70 people. The detachment climbed up the Lena, Olekme, crossed the Stanovoy Range and reached the Amur, where he reached the fortified points of Lafukai and Yaks, burning and plundering everything in its path. Faced with the resistance of the düçers and convinced of the lack of his strength, Khabarov returned to Yakutsk, recruited an additional 138 people and took a letter from the Russian Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich to the Chinese emperor.
The letter was shamelessly stated that the Russian tsar has no equal and is invincible, and the Chinese emperor must truly honor him and forever obey him. Otherwise, the Russian Tsar will send an army and destroy all the Chinese.
At the end of September 1650, Khabarov returned to Amur again and seized Yaks by force, renaming it Albazin, strengthening his defenses, making him the main stronghold of the aggression of tsarist Russia on Amur. June 13, 1651 Khabarov begins its movement down the Amur, but encounters stubborn resistance of the local population. In the village of chief Guigudara, more than 1,000 Duchers and 50 Manchus die heroically, defending their homeland and national dignity.
On October 19, the Hezhe people in the village of Uchzhala in the lower reaches of the Amur River, after being defeated by Khabarov, appealed for help to the Qing army. On the morning of April 4, 1652, the Ningutan Zhang Yin Heise received an order from the Qing government to give aid to hezhe. At the head of a detachment of 600 people of the Qing troops and several hundreds of local residents, he unexpectedly struck the Russian fortifications in the Achansk region. The Russians suffered losses: 10 killed and 76 wounded.
Catching the Russians by surprise, the Qing troops broke into the fortress and believed that victory was already secured for them. However, Haise thoughtlessly did not correctly evaluate the situation and ordered to stop the offensive, calling for "to stop the fires, not to kill the Cossacks, but to take them alive as a prisoner." As a result, the Russians took advantage of the favorable situation and counterattacked. Having suffered huge losses, the Qing troops were forced to withdraw. Subsequently, Haise was executed for his mistakes in command of the troops on the orders of the Qing Dvor. Fearing new attacks from the Chinese troops, Khabarov in a hurry with his army fled from these places up the river.
2. The first retaliatory strike at the Yaksa
The tsarist government, on the one hand, did not pay attention to the decisive resistance of the Chinese people and continued to pursue a policy of expanding aggression, invaded new sections of Chinese territory, and, on the other hand, sent its diplomatic parties one by one to Beijing to hide their aggression policy , misleading and putting pressure on the Qing Courtyard. So, following Baikov and Milovanov in 1676, the diplomatic mission of Nicholas (Spafaria) arrived in Beijing. The Qing government stated that if the tsarist government ceases aggression on Chinese territory, returns Gantimura, then only then can we begin to consider the demands put forward by the government of tsarist Russia. Otherwise, none of the requirements can be accepted.
Nikolai made many promises, but immediately upon returning to his homeland, he reported to the tsarist government the information he had gathered along the route and took the initiative: “As soon as tsarist Russia creates a fortress on the Argun or Hailar rivers, the entire local population living between Nerchinsk and the Nongjiang River immediately submit to the Russian Tsar. " In addition, Nicholas said: “Although the Chinese have guns, guns and other weapons, but they act thoughtlessly, not observing the requirements of military art. Therefore, even a small detachment of the European army can subdue them. " Truly, only one phrase revealed the true intentions of the diplomatic missions of Tsarist Russia.The reality shows that after Nicholas returned to Russia, Tsarist Russia not only did not stop, but even more aggravated aggression against China, expanding it from the upper reaches of the Amur to the areas of the lower and middle reaches of the Amur and the eastern bank of the Argun River. Therefore, the Qing government very closely followed developments, taking appropriate defensive measures. This applies particularly to the period after the pacification of unrest inside China in October 1861 and after the unification of Taiwan in August 1863, when China had the opportunity to give a fitting rebuff to the ever-increasing aggression of tsarist Russia.
The Qing government, having long fought against the aggressive forces of tsarist Russia, learned lessons from wise principles: “I’m advancing - the enemy is defending, I’m retreating - the enemy comes, if you don’t use the army, there’s no peace on the border”. Therefore, it is necessary to create strong strongholds on the advanced border lines, to solve long-term issues of supplying troops, and only then it will be possible to destroy the strongholds of the enemy’s aggressive actions and effectively prevent the expansion of aggression on the part of Tsarist Russia. And therefore it is necessary, on the one hand, to send troops to create strongholds and land development, on the other hand, to stock up military supplies, build postal stations, repair ships and armaments, conduct reconnaissance of the enemy, penetrating the front line, against Tsarist Russia "The policy of the carrot and stick, punitive operations to pacify the enemy."
In January 1685, Heilongjiang Jiangjun Sabsu in a draft combat action plan for capturing Yaks composed by him over orders stipulated: four months later “to take the land and the river, approaching the city to call him to submission, if it is rejected, to attack the city; in case the difficulties are insurmountable, then first of all destroy all the crops of the enemy ”. The Qing government generally accepted the draft plan prepared by Sabs, but she remembered that Sabsu himself had missed a favorable case in the past, so he was removed from management, and the plan was assigned to Dutun Penchun.
According to the prisoners, in the Yaks there were about 1 thousand people. However, as soon as it became known that the Qing troops were going to take the city, the fortress walls were fortified, reinforcements of 1 thousand people were formed, and the forward detachment had already left, and another detachment was ready to come out.
Having understood the enemy's defense and the deployment of his forces in Yaksu, the Qing troops decided to act in accordance with the previously adopted plan. On April 28, 3,000 people sent from various places of China from the Eight Famous Forces and the Luin troops under the leadership of Penchun and Sabsu made separate routes from Aigun. On May 22, they reached Yaks and placed their headquarters on a small island opposite the city (now Gucheng Island).
Acting on the principle of “first respecting the norms of respect, and then taking up arms”, Penchun sent a Russian prisoner with two letters to the enemy: the first from the emperor Kangxi to the Russian tsar, the second from the Penchun to the commander of the Russians Tolbuzin in Yaksa. The letters were written in three languages: Manchu, Mongolian and Russian. The general meaning of the letters was as follows: Russian troops illegally invaded our territory, "seized the land, kill women and children, there is no end to ugliness." The Chinese side can no longer tolerate this, and there is nothing left for it but to move the troops for self-defense. Now Chinese troops are standing on the walls of the city. If the Russian troops agree to leave Yaks, if the Russians are ready "to collect tribute, confining themselves to Yaka (ie, Yakutsk), not to invade our limits, to return our fugitives, then we will return your people who have surrendered to us." Then both states will be able “in conditions when the border will forever become calm and inviolable, mutually trade and exchange envoys, live in peace and harmony”. However, the Russian troops "continued to persist, not intending to retreat," "they spoke boldly and impudently."
The Tsin troops involuntarily were forced to prepare the troops and positions for battle by May 23. On May 24, Jinjun Sheng Wei fire weapons came to the walls of the city and prepared for battle. By that time, although the Russians inside the city had only 450 people, 3 guns, 300 guns, they created strong defenses and reinforcements descended down the wooden ships on the river, ready to attack the positions of the Qing troops. Therefore, the arrogance of the Russians was great. Penchun, assessing the situation, immediately ordered the commander of the guard squad, Yaletsin, to lead the squadron and rise on the ships up the river, forcing the suitable enemy to capitulate.
Russian troops refused to capitulate and in response began shooting. Then Yaleletsin sent forward daredevils and, at the head of a detachment of warriors and officers, took the Russian wooden ships to board the ship, tied hand-to-hand combat with the enemy. As a result of a fierce battle, the enemy lost more than 30 people killed and the rest were taken prisoner.
The same evening, the troops under the leadership of Fudutun Yatsin erected barriers and earthen ramparts from the south of the city and resorted to tricks, pretending that their forces were running out. From the north, troops under the command of fudutun Wendai and Liu Zhaoqi began hurricane fire from their large guns. The troops under the leadership of the commander of the guard detachment Bo-lyu used the guns of jiangjun Sheng Wei and launched an attack from two sides - from the east and the west. Fudutun Yacinay, at the head of the squadron on ships, blocked the city from the side of the river.
At dawn, the 25th of the day “decisively attacked, sowing panic and confusion in the city.” The Qing troops laid the walls of the city with wood and brushwood, intending to use a fire attack and sow terror inside the city. The Russian troops, without waiting for help, realizing that the city could not be kept, and their morale was shaken, they sent a priest, Hermo (Chinese transcription of a Russian name) to Tolbuzin, in order to persuade the latter to stop the resistance. Tolbuzin, seeing that his army had lost morale, was forced to capitulate to the Qing troops.
After Penchun announced to the surrender of the Russian garrison the seriousness and humanity of the position of the Qing government, the Russian soldiers were extremely happy and assured that they would never dare to invade again. From 600 to 700 Russian soldiers and their families, including women and children, returned to Nerchinsk. The Qing troops not only did not forbid them to take with them their possessions and even weapons (except for guns), but also supplied them with horses and food, sent escorts to the mouth of Argun. Bashnyli (Chinese transcription of the Russian name) and with him 45 people did not want to return to their homeland and were settled in Shenyang. 160 Chinese subjects, captured by Russian troops as hostages and slaves, were returned to their homes.
On June 14, the emperor Kangxi issued a decree: "Although Yaks is subdued, her defense should not be destroyed." However, Penchun and his people turned out to be short-sighted, frivolously underestimated the enemy, and after destroying the defenses in Yaks, they did not even leave the garrison, did not destroy the crops around the city, returned to Aygun and Mergen. As a result, after two months, the Yaks again found itself in the hands of Russian troops.
3. The second retaliatory strike at the Yaks
In the 24th year of the reign of Emperor Kansi, on June 9, 1685, Tolbuzin, at the head of the surviving defenders of Albazin, arrived in Nerchinsk. The city governor Vlasov could not accept defeat and, taking advantage of the arrival to the aid of a detachment led by Bayton, again invaded Yaks. On June 14, he sent a detachment of 70 Cossacks led by Telitsin to Yaks for reconnaissance. On July 8, Telitsin came back and reported that he had not met a single Chinese on the entire route, that Yaksa and all other localities had been burned, but all the crops in the fields remained intact. Hearing this, Vlasov was delighted and immediately sent a detachment of 300 men headed by Bayton for harvesting towards Yaks. Following this, he appointed Tolbuzin a voivod at Yaksa, sending 516 Cossacks and 155 peasants with him to the settlement. Russian troops first reaped the entire harvest, after which they rebuilt and fortified the fortifications of the city even more. Around the city, an earthen bank was created with a width of 4 Russian fathoms (8.5 meters) and a height of 3 Russian fathoms (over 6 meters). Four prominent forward positions for guns were arranged on four sides, and ditches were dug outside the wall by a circle around the city. From the side of the river they erected a protective hedge that rested right on the shore. Inside the city itself were built barracks, arsenal, food warehouse. In total there were placed 11 guns with 175 shots, 60 pounds of lead bullets and 112 pounds of gunpowder.
However, Heilongjiang Jiangjun Sabsu sent a reconnaissance led by the head of his valiant cavalry, Sho Gese, to Yaks. Due to the small size of the group and due to the fact that the horses were tired on the road, reconnaissance returned from halfway back. On the way, Chinese intelligence heard from the locals that the Russian troops had returned to Yaksa and fortified the fortress. Sabsu immediately reported this to the Qing court and informed about the readiness after the opening of the rivers of ice to "repair the ships, personally lead the troops and punish the enemy in accordance with the situation." Kansi considered that intelligence data obtained on the way cannot be completely believed and ordered to send a new reconnaissance party. Then the deputy leader of the Solonov Umuerdai, who was sent to Sabs directly to Yaks, captured one Russian named Ekesuomugo (Chinese transcription of a Russian name). From the captive, the Chinese learned that the Russian troops that had returned to Yaksa not only strengthened the fortifications, but also collected a lot of grain, which is enough for them for two years.
On February 13, 1686, when Emperor Kangxi learned about the real situation in Yaks, he immediately developed a plan for military operations. It noted: “Today the lot (meaning the Russian troops) returned to Yaks, strengthened the fortress. If you do not carry out a punitive expedition, you will inevitably have to accumulate large stocks of food, and this is not easy to do. He ordered Jiang-Jun Sabs to stop the relocation of families, as requested earlier, to build a court, leading a detachment of officers and soldiers from Ula and Ninguty, rush to Heilongjiang, and before that solve the issue of leaving the fortified garrisons from among the select troops, then lead detachment of 2,000 soldiers on the Yaks. " In addition, he ordered the hou (prince) Lin Xingzhu, led by 400 warriors with liana shields from the province of Fuzqian, to perform a military operation, and to release the tribes of Solon and Daur from tribute, so that they would support the military operation with manpower.
On February 24, Tolbuzin sent Bayton at the head of a detachment of 300 Cossacks to the area of the Kumara River. There, they were faced with a Ching troops watch of 40 people. As a result of a fierce battle, 30 Qing soldiers and 7 Cossacks died. Russian troops, taking advantage of this incident, burned down two villages, took away all the food and property, and took all the local population with them. This shows that Russian troops not only treacherously re-captured the Yaks, but also were the first to start a war.
In early May, the Qing army led by Sabs launched two routes from Aigun to Yaks - along the river and on land. On May 28, both groups met in the Chakezhou area, on the outskirts of Yaks.Sabsu sent a message to Tolbuzin, in which he accused the latter of violating this promise, of a new invasion of the Chinese lands and demanded that he return to his land with the Russian troops, promising that he would otherwise be destroyed. Tolbuzin did not heed the warning and, on the contrary, sent his detachment out of the city with the task of attacking Qing troops. Since June 4, the Qing troops began to storm the city fiercely. A Chinese detachment operating from the north under the command of Lantan bombarded the city with its guns. Detachments under the command of Yatsin and Banedalish attacked the city from the south. Russian troops left the city in order to take the fight, and were defeated. The Fudutuns Wendai and Baike, led by detachments of Fujian warriors with liana shields, captured a small height south of the city. The Russian troops, who again came out of the city to attack in order to lift the blockade, were crushed in hand-to-hand fighting and suffered serious losses. In order to block the Russian garrison for a long time, Sabsu ordered to dig out moats from three sides and build defensive fortifications and various barriers.
In order to block the paths of departure or reinforcement for Russians, “one detachment was located opposite the river from the west side of the city”, and 6–7 li from the city up the river in the bay “another detachment was located on the ships”. Defense was created along both the western and eastern banks of the river. Sabsu reported: "I, vassal, at the head of 2,100 people lead the defense, but the forces are clearly not enough." The emperor Kangxi immediately ordered Fudutun Bodin at the head of a detachment of 200 officers and soldiers to come forward to the rescue, and to send the tired horses from the front line to Sabs to send to pastures to Heilongjiang and to Mergen.
Since July 14, both sides held five fierce battles. Tolbuzin died after he was seriously injured by a splinter in his leg, and Beyton took the place of the commander. After Vlasov had learned about the difficult situation in Yaks, he sent a detachment of 70 people under the command of Lonshakov to help. Lonshakov on riverboats reached the mouth of the Erdokunhe River, however, he was there in an ambush set up by the Qing troops. In search of a way out that could be used to get into Yaks, he saw that the Qing troops from land and from the river took the garrison of the city into a tight ring and it was impossible to carry out sudden sorties. In a depressed state, he was forced to retreat towards Nerchinsk. Due to the fact that there was no help, food supplies melted away, and there was a harsh winter ahead, Russian troops were thirsty and cold, their morale fell, they suffered from scurvy. The population of the city fell from 150 to 150, and in the end only 66 remained alive. The corpses lay in mountains, they were not possible to betray the earth.
Since the war for the Yaks was fair, it received deep support in the hearts of the population and the army. In addition, the Qing government applied a strategic course, “first a ritual, then military force,” which stipulated: “to accumulate enough military supplies, always guard the borders on Heilongjiang, to press constantly, creating difficulties for the enemy”. As a result, Tsarist Russia twice found itself on the verge of hopelessness with respect to Yaks. However, the government of tsarist Russia at that time, due to its policy of territorial expansion and the oppression of peoples, found itself in a very difficult situation at home and abroad. The army and material resources of Siberia were extremely scarce; they could not render any effective assistance to the Russian garrison in Yaks. Therefore, in September of the 25th year of Kansi's reign (1686), the Russian Tsar sent Venyukov’s mission to Beijing. On the one hand, throwing dust in the eyes, a large detachment of troops was sent to help the Yaks garrison, on the other hand, Venyukov was to persuade the Qing government to suspend the Yaks blockade and declare that the Russian Tsar sent Ambassador Golovin to Beijing to conduct border delimitation negotiations.In fact, the Qing government’s consistent position was to “separate the border through negotiations, so that each side did not go beyond its borders, so that the local population of both border territories could settle there and not lose their intention to live in eternal friendship.” And, despite yet another treachery of the tsarist government, Yaksa was again returned to the hands of the Qing troops. As soon as the Russian government showed a desire to negotiate, the Qing government immediately welcomed this step. Kansi immediately openly announced: “The Russian Tsar accepted the requirements of the ritual, asked to lift the blockade of the Yaks. We are generous and do not intend to organize a massacre in the city. In accordance with this order, Sabs must withdraw the soldiers from the Yaks, gather all in one place, bring together warships. In addition, it is announced that all the locals should leave the city, should not defensively recklessly and should act on the instructions of the Russian envoy. ” In addition, a cavalry detachment of palace guards was sent to Yaks to transfer the order of the emperor. Sabsu, having received the imperial order in winter, immediately began to carry it out, offering food to the Russian garrison and expressing its intention to send its doctors to treat the sick. Then, on his own initiative, he withdrew his troops 20 li from the city, allowing the Russian troops to freely leave the city and establish contact with the Russian troops from Nerchinsk.
On July 12 of the 26th year of Kangxi reign (1687), the Mongolian tushet Khan reported to Qing Court that the Russian envoy sent to negotiate had already reached the lands subject to him. Kangxi immediately ordered: “Sabsu should be led by a detachment of warriors and, taking advantage of the fact that the cold has not come, move to the Heilongjiang-Mergen area, repair and put in order the weapons, rest the horses and wait for the arrival of winter. Regarding important points, continue to conduct thorough exploration. In addition, the intention of the Russian envoy to ask for peace and the withdrawal of troops.
