Monty in WWII: Genius or Idiot?

[unmerged(19546)]

You do know the oft used 90% success comment by Monty was used by him on the topic of number of bridges taken?, 8 out of 9, and is often misrepresented to mean a widder view than his comment was actually addressing....

HB

As a matter of fact, i don't. I do remember reading the infamous "90%"-statement myself, without any restricting reference as "tactical" or "according to the number of bridges taken" in the german edition of Montgomerys own memoirs, though.

Anyways, though he could somewhat rightfully claim, that Market Garden has been an 90% tactical success, he, to the best of my knowledge, never publicly admitted, that in its outcome, it was an almost complete strategical failure, has he?

But, i fully agree with the rest of Your statements made above, regarding Montgomory and/at Market Garden.

 

[unmerged(2833)]

Sorry, I think you're mixing a few things up here. Montgomery was, for a short time, given command of assets of Bradley's 12th Army Group. That happened months later during the Battle of the Bulge, when Eisenhower's disastrous strategy had allowed the Germans to regroup and attempt their counter-offensive.

After the battle Montgomery's 21st Army Group remained in command of the 9th US Army, but that's beside the point here.

cheers/EoE

I poorly remembered that issue and thus made a mistake. Monty was not assigned 1st army, but he persuaded Eisenhower to support "northern approach". Also, 21st Army Group was given priority in supply, and within 12th Army Group, 1st army was given similar priority.

That hapenned in late August.


On a side note, what do you mean by

when Eisenhower's disastrous strategy had allowed the Germans to regroup and attempt their counter-offensive.

 

[unmerged(2833)]

I'm not sure I follow you here, but I guess you're looking for examples? Well, there's the Moselle battle and the 5th Infantry's assault on Metz. That good enough for you?

Hmmm, you mean just before Market Garden or october one?
I am not really all that knowledgeable about this.

Actually not.

(centuries argument)
I would argue that you compare uncomparable things

P (european armies slugged there through centuries) implies Q (there is enough mobility for that), Q (there is enough mobility there) implies R ( It is suffiecent terrain for armour warfare).

I would argue practically against every connection you make, and that your first use of Q is replaced with use of similairly sounding Q but in fact different thing.

That doesn't mean i will disagree with the outcome, i think it does offer enough mobility

 

[unmerged(2833)]

I'm very sorry, but I'm not sure I understand where you are going with this. Are you advocating a southern approach? And what's this about Troyes?

My main point is that a concentrated northern hook would have taken place over better terrain than a southern strategy or the compromise broad front strategy, and that it would have been closer to the heartland of Germany.

cheers/EoE

Probably nowhere. I would argue against both southern approach and northern approach AS a way to end the war (ie: go into Germany). It requires assumption that allies would face similairly weak opposition in Germany that they faced after fall of 7th Army. Which was not true.

I would argue for northern strategy AS a way to secure Antwerpen port (and some other positive externalities).

Though, IF Ike would make decision to try to end the war before 1945, i would argue for southern strategy. The Troyes thing is that while 21st Army group was busy around lower Seine, 3rd Army already was FAR close to Germany.

25 August, it was in Troyes, while Brits were on the western side of Seine, still (IIRC). 6 days later, Patton was in Verdun, while Monty advance was still very slow (his right flank got to Amiens, but mostly because 1st American army got there, his main front barely crossed Seine)

 

[unmerged(2833)]

With the bonus of seccuring the deep water port of Antwerp, poss intact.

HB

Then there is a thing with Skaalde (sp?) river. Antwerpen is useless without southern Zeeland beign cleared. Monty Market-Garden adventure meant that Germans had time to fortify there.

 

[unmerged(2833)]

What EoE posits earlier, and Monty wanted to do later was to by pass the Rhine and Siegried lines of defense by getting beyond them on the coastal flank, this Market Garden achieved in part, in that they wer now 60 miles beyond the Siegfried lines outer flank, and secured the 8 major bridges leading upto the Rhine while failing to secure a Rhine lodgment.

When that lodgement a broad front continued rather than maintainace of the strategic aim as advocated by Monty.

HB

As you say it in following post, it was impossible to prosecute, due to logistical situation.

 

[unmerged(2833)]

Patton was the most vulgar man I ever thought was a good general.

Well, thats true. Whats interesting, his official reports were full of not-so-official language, too

 

[unmerged(2833)]

Sorry, Cpt Anson and RCH, but i have to disagree about Monty saving 1st Army during Bulge. His counterattacked (funnily, the way is criticized here in broader scope-i mean, he used frontal assault at the point of the wedge) on 2nd January, using AMERICAN troops (corps), while Patton counterattacked on 22nd December, also using force of one corps.

About Patton in Italy, if he would be given command at Anzio, Italian campaign would be definitly VERY different.

 

[Jove]

Then there is a thing with Skaalde (sp?) river. Antwerpen is useless without southern Zeeland beign cleared. Monty Market-Garden adventure meant that Germans had time to fortify there.

That is the number one reason why I have always thought Market Garden was a bad idea. With the supply line streached as it was, the big left hook would have made the logistic situation worse until the Germans could have pinched off the spear point by holding on to the shoulders (like in USSR).

 

[unmerged(13241)]

About Rommel capabilities as army commander, sure he did mistakes, but as others have pointed out, so did all the others as well. Should he have streched himself to Al Alamain and there lost to Monthy? No.
But the offensive itself, which was started without great preparations, cought the British in mid of they preparation for they own offensive. Indeed, it was possible that this offensive (the british had ammased some 500 tanks) could have ended the Afrikan campaign much sooner.
Also, his record as army commander includes other operations, and again he perfomed quite well.
As the last point, Al Alamain didn't crush the Afrika corps, it was Tunis, the losses very moderate, and they had to retreat, but this was a proven muster in the years and campaign before.

 

[unmerged(26045)]

with montgomery in command - we would still be trying to cross the rhine. As far saving the American army at the Bulge, I think him doing nothing to stop the german advance - didn't save the USA army. Patton on the other hand - turned and attacked and rescued the forces at Bastogne.[/QUOTE]


Um montgomery was in command :rofl:

 

[unmerged(272)]

yes sorry but he did rescue the situation for the americans at the battle of the bulge. Not only the troops but the american command were in a total state of panic. Montgomery came in with a steady head and dealt with the situation.

And once again Rommel was a great at squad level tactics but totally failed in the strategic sense, which lets face it wins the wars overall.

I already stated that this thread has been answered but some of you want to rumble on with your nitpicking!

Personally I feel that General Slim was the best general of world war II, any comments? :

 

[unmerged(13241)]

yes sorry but he did rescue the situation for the americans at the battle of the bulge. Not only the troops but the american command were in a total state of panic. Montgomery came in with a steady head and dealt with the situation.

And once again Rommel was a great at squad level tactics but totally failed in the strategic sense, which lets face it wins the wars overall.

I already stated that this thread has been answered but some of you want to rumble on with your nitpicking!

Personally I feel that General Slim was the best general of world war II, any comments? :

So the war in the desert that lasted what 3 years, with Rommel participating for 2 was a complete strategic failure for all those 2 years?
In hindsight, which strategy should the Axis have used to win the war, if that was possible?

 

[unmerged(457)]

How come Monty is considered over cautios when is most bold plan of Market Garden was failure?

Isnt that taking too much of risk and not too little?

 

[w_mullender]

As a matter of fact, i don't. I do remember reading the infamous "90%"-statement myself, without any restricting reference as "tactical" or "according to the number of bridges taken" in the german edition of Montgomerys own memoirs, though.

Anyways, though he could somewhat rightfully claim, that Market Garden has been an 90% tactical success, he, to the best of my knowledge, never publicly admitted, that in its outcome, it was an almost complete strategical failure, has he?

But, i fully agree with the rest of Your statements made above, regarding Montgomory and/at Market Garden.

Two things:
-If it would have been 100% succesful we would have been spared the hungerwinter as the other german troops in Holland would have been isolated and also the route to the Ruhr and Berlin would have been "easy"-
-Even without the succes, it caused a deflection so that german troops also had to defend the dutch border.

 

[unmerged(25744)]

with montgomery in command - we would still be trying to cross the rhine. As far saving the American army at the Bulge, I think him doing nothing to stop the german advance - didn't save the USA army. Patton on the other hand - turned and attacked and rescued the forces at Bastogne.

Um montgomery was in command :rofl:

monty in command of what?

:wacko:

 

[Emperor of Europe]

Darthmaur: Work has caught up with me, so this is going to be short.

My main points were that the Allies could have shortened the war, had they given priority to a left flank hook in early autumn instead of the broad front push. The terrain in the north was more favourable, and they were closer to the industrial heartland of Britain. As Hannibal pointed out it might not have been feasible from a logistical point of view though.

I'm not really sure that you disagree with that, so is there any reason to continue the debate? Or should I get back to work?

cheers/EoE

 

[unmerged(2539)]

As a matter of fact, i don't. I do remember reading the infamous "90%"-statement myself, without any restricting reference as "tactical" or "according to the number of bridges taken" in the german edition of Montgomerys own memoirs, though.

Anyways, though he could somewhat rightfully claim, that Market Garden has been an 90% tactical success, he, to the best of my knowledge, never publicly admitted, that in its outcome, it was an almost complete strategical failure, has he?

But, i fully agree with the rest of Your statements made above, regarding Montgomory and/at Market Garden.

Its a common thing, but if you re read the quote he says Arhem was a 90% successful, in the context of taliking soelly about the taking of the bridges that would give a lodgement past the Rhine and beyond the inner flank of the siegfried line.

Its an easy matter to use that phrase to say he ment the whole operation was 90% successfull, but that was not what Monty said, after all the primary mission was not achievied, somewhat invalidating the concept as a whole, you would be hard pressed to claim a 90% success in such a case.

HB

 

[unmerged(2539)]

I poorly remembered that issue and thus made a mistake. Monty was not assigned 1st army, but he persuaded Eisenhower to support "northern approach". Also, 21st Army Group was given priority in supply, and within 12th Army Group, 1st army was given similar priority.

That hapenned in late August.

Well past Market Garden, which was undertaken on on hand supply without any increase in priority of logistics from Ike.

From Col Cole, a Official US historian for NWE.
Sep 8

"We must push upto the Rhine as soon as possible all along the front to cut off the retreating enemy and prepare and concentrate for the final thrust" Eisnhower.

Ikes reasons for the broad approach were two fold at this time, first was 30 odd US divisions awaiting deployment in theatre, for them he needed space to deploy them in, second he rienforced success by allowing Bradly and Patton to continue operations that returned that ground. This allocation restricted Montgomery Ruhr thrust, only 3 Uk divisions out of 9 were able to be used because of logistical considerations, at any one time. Second to that had Patton been held on the Meuse rather than sent to Moselle and his supply used by Hodges and Dempsey then Achaen would in all probability fallen, while allowing a broader frontage for 2 Army to utilize its assets, and extending 21 AG flank protection.

HB

 

[unmerged(2539)]

Then there is a thing with Skaalde (sp?) river. Antwerpen is useless without southern Zeeland beign cleared. Monty Market-Garden adventure meant that Germans had time to fortify there.

Its the Scheldt eustary, after Normandy the LC used went to the Pacific and Med, therfore the ability to leap frog up Europe coast was no longer available, Antwerp fell on 4 Sept intact with a 40,000 tonn a day capacity, the German bttys at Mexham was still inside range of the docks,further out on the eustary at Wallecharian Island (between Zeebrugge and Breskens), and werew some of the more devolped Atlantic wall defences. It was here that5 Model left the 64ID, 14,000 strong of Russian front experienced men, amply supplied but isolated in the "Breskins pocket" which the Canadians eventually took out.

However this would not have been the case if suffiecent LC had been on hand earlier, SHEAF made the choice to remove all the amphib assets and undertake no further coastal ops, when the 2 ID gaurding the Sheldt moved away in August there was no garrision, so then an opurtunity presented itself for just such an operation that SHEAF thought would not present itself, but had no assets to do the job.

Instead it had to be reduced from the lanwards side, to do that you have to get the Beveland Penninsular (taken in Market Garden 12-28 Sept), 51 Highland div could have done this earlier but was unable to because its organic transport was being used to move supply to assist Patton and was held at La Havre, when the transport returned 51st took the lanwards side that prepd the ground for the Canadians to reduce the area in Oct. That op was planned to take 4 days but took a month, and saw the SBS using Buffaloes under cover from Warspite to take Westkapple from the sea, and then roll up the flanlk of the defenses east to west.

Thats the long answer, the short one is what your argueing against with EoE, by not pulling in Patton, Ike did not allocate resources suffiecent for Monty to undertake the reduction of the Sheldt Eustary to improve the supply net, but chose instead to gain the Mosselle.


There was not enough supplys to do everything at the same time, there was enough to put 20 divs into the Ruhr or there was enough to do what was was done. The petrol supply from Chebourg ran by pipe to Chartes by Sep 12, and was being laid at 25 miles a day, rail lines open to Liege by the 18th and Einhoven on the 28th, dictated the extent of movement by rail, and opertional limits from supply source, such as Dieppe 6000 tons a day capacity from Sept 28th.
HB