Montgomery

[Agelastus]

Originally posted by Sire Enaique
The only real way to find out what would have happened would be playing Grand Europa, I guess... (is that a leitmotiv or what? )

It appears that that discussion's gone dormant.

Besides, this sounds very like one of the "strange events" you profess to object to in WiF!

I suspect that Germany would have had to remove more than the three to five divisions you postulate. Ignoring the poor performance of the Italians in much of the Desert War, the German High Command would never voluntarily leave anything significant that could be affected by an Italian (or sattelite) presence-which shows just how badly they misjudged the situation at Stalingrad.

I would just like to point out that in WiF........Gibraltar is regarded as the single most important hex in the game, on which much hinges.

 

[unmerged(5120)]

Originally posted by Agelastus


It appears that that discussion's gone dormant.

Besides, this sounds very like one of the "strange events" you profess to object to in WiF!

I suspect that Germany would have had to remove more than the three to five divisions you postulate. Ignoring the poor performance of the Italians in much of the Desert War, the German High Command would never voluntarily leave anything significant that could be affected by an Italian (or sattelite) presence-which shows just how badly they misjudged the situation at Stalingrad.

I would just like to point out that in WiF........Gibraltar is regarded as the single most important hex in the game, on which much hinges.

Gibraltar IS the most important hex on the map in any strategic WWII game worth its salt.

Wether the dozen or so divs I stipulated would have been enough to affect the campaign decisively is debatable at best, but I can't see how the Axis could have supplied more anyway.

In this regard, the early fleet actions in the med may have been the most decisive factor in the historical outcome:

Having fared so badly against the RN, the Italian navy held a very low priority ever after, and wasn't allocated enough fuel to engage in major operations after mid-1941.

It thus wasn't able to contest control of the eastern med from the British. Since supplying a drive to Alexandria required shipping significant supplies at least to Tobruk if not further east, not being able to do so spelled doom for the DAK: if you can't win, you're bound to lose in a total war.

Going back to the current discussion, supply was THE major factor limiting German intervention in North Africa. They simply weren't able to supply a force large enough to force them to make a choice between North Africa and Russia.

(Of course, controlling Gibraltar would considerably alter the picture...)

What I object to in WiF is, it lets you do way too many things that were at best remotely possible historically way too easily.

This is true in 3R/A3R too, but to a lesser extent - that's quite subjective, though, I must admit !

Anyway, how kicking more German ass sooner would have been counterproductive for the Allies is beyond me. Yeah, I know, ripples, ripples. Still, war is about kicking ass, so as a rule of thumb it's better to be on the kicking than on the receiving end of it!

 

[Agelastus]

Originally posted by Sire Enaique
Going back to the current discussion, supply was THE major factor limiting German intervention in North Africa. They simply weren't able to supply a force large enough to force them to make a choice between North Africa and Russia.

(Of course, controlling Gibraltar would considerably alter the picture...)

Indeed, we need to simplify Germany's position a bit-the assault on Malta is a critical aspect of this change of events, as it were. If Germany committed enough troops after all, perhaps they could have reversed the Desert War (yes Sean9898, I do remember the capacity problems of the Libyan ports!) Certainly if they neutralised the British base at Gibraltar and turned back the Torch landings.

As for a dozen divisions being a drop in the ocean........only if they're not drawn from the Ostheer but from the occupied territories/Germany. Those dozen divisions are effectively Germany's theatre reserve on the Eastern Front, no matter what their composition.

I'd still love some examples of your WiF complaints-they'd make fascinating "What Ifs"!

 

[Emperor of Europe]

Originally posted by Agelastus

Fairly extensive, it's clear that the staff at Bletchley Park were literally tearing out their hair with frustration at the slow progress of the Alamein engagement. However, an aggressive pursuit of Rommel was simply not in Montgomery's style, particularly at a point where Britain still needed to conserve manpower. This was not 1944 with the war almost won in the west.

Uhm... so the codebreakers at Bletchley Park were able to follow the battle and the later pursuit almost in realtime? A feat we are only beginning to master now? What's your source on that?

As for wearing the Germans down at a defensive line-Montgomery's performance when trying to break past the Mareth line on Tunisia's border is the other major blot on his career in my opinion.

Why? Just curious.

Regards,

EoE

 

[Emperor of Europe]

Reply to Sire Enaique

OK, I'll stand by what I've written with the (important) correction that troop and equipment quality differences must be included in the ratio computation.

I maintain that between roughly equivalent armies, 3:1 at the operational level is pretty much a sure win.

In the specific case of operation Supercharge, my WAG is that generally better British equipment counterbalances superior German combat effectiveness, so it's still roughly 3:1.

I still have to disagree. Even if we stray from your original point: that a 3:1 numerical advantage on the operational scale ensures victory, and allow qualitative factors to be part of the equation, I will still maintain, that the history of war has sufficient counter-examples to falsify your hypothesis. A case in point could be Alexander the Greats battles against the Persians. Technology was roughly the same, and though present day Greeks might like to believe in some Macedonian superman myth, the men were pretty much the same. What made the difference was tactics and leadership in the face of overwhelming enemy numbers.

Not average, a bit below average.
And I wouldn't call his predecessors better men, though in all fairness they never enjoyed the kind of numerical, qualitative and logistical superiority Monty had at 2nd Alamein.
We also now know that the British 2-pounder AT gun couldn't penetrate German armor at normal combat ranges (see http://www.wargamer.org/GvA/background/ammotypes4.html . Most of Monty's tanks didn't suffer from this problem. It always helps).

You mean just like the standard issue German 37mm AT gun couldn’t penetrate most British tanks, and the British Mathilda proved quite unstoppable in the early days of the desert war?

I am not saying that technology and numbers did not give Montgomery better odds. I am just saying that he used those odds wisely, by forcing the Germans to fight exactly the kind of battle, they could not afford to fight: the battle of attrition. As I have said repeatedly: in my book a good general is one, who makes the most of his strengths, while denying the enemy use of their strength. Montgomery did just that.

Even if it was not a rout, any army that suffers that kind of losses and has to retreat in precarious conditions so far from its bases loses cohesion.

But didn’t you say, that Panzerarmee Afrika was in greater disarray than during previous delays? It’s the "greater" I am interested in here.

No need to gamble? tell that to the tommies who died assaulting the Mareth line!

Monty had knowledge about Rommel through Ultra. Specifically, he was advised on 16 and 17 November that the DAK was stranded in Benghazi awaiting the delivery of fuel.

He did issue orders for X Corps to cross Cyrenaica on 18 November, but having made absolutely no preparations for this eventuality, X Corps wasn't able to react fast enough (several days delay were necessary) so the order was never executed: sub-par staff work.

Even more Tommies could have died if X Corps had been cut off, surrounded and annihilated in the sort of mobile battle Rommel excelled in and the Brits did not.

The sub-par staff work of X Corps is precisely the reason, why it was wise of Montgomery to avoid fluid battle situations. Neither the units, the formations or the staffs were up to that sort of battle, so the set-piece battle was the best option. Allowing for the nature, capabilities and limitations of ones army is – as I have said with other words before – the hallmark of a good general.

The precedent was precisely O'Connor trapping the Italians at Beda Fomm in 1941.

You know very well that there was a tremendous difference between the Italians at Beda Fomm and the later Panzerarmee Afrika. The slow-moving, badly led, badly equipped and immoralised Italian infantry was no match for anyone.

Montgommery had enough forces at his disposal to earmark some for such an operation. And it was much less of a gamble than what O'Connor did: the British in late 1942 had much more reliable and better tanks than in early 1941, and a lot more transport assets, so the supply situation of the blocking force wouldn't have been as precarious.

And he could afford the loss of said blocking force, whereas O'Connor couldn't.

Ok, let’s repeat each other Montgomery had no reason to gamble. He was winning so there was absolutely no reason to risk any loss – even if he could afford it.


Regards,

EoE

 

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Evaluating Monty

If you read the memoirs of lord Alanbroke, Turn of the tide, you have a perspective of desert war from an inside perspective.
Monthy own memoirs gives his view of the dessert war.
The book "Churcills generals" evalutates the Imperial commanders during WWII.

From my perspective Monty did the only possible campaign after El Alamein, mostly due to inferior equipment and the moral condition the army was in when he and Alexander came down to Egypt in 1942.

 

[Ebusitanus]

I'm afraid I have to agree with Sire Enaique here.

 

[Sir James]

My opinion of Slim is......competent.

I would consider Slim one of the best infantry commanders of the C20th. His extraction of British/Indian forces from Burma, then his defeat and destruction of the Japanese, was impressive.

During the war, he rose from a very insignificant brigade command to c-in-c of Allied forces in SE Asia, indicating that the high command had some considerable faith in him.

He gave a lot of the credit for his victory to his superiors at various stages such as Giffard (who even fewer people will have heard of), Alexander, Wavell and Auchinlek, but a lot of their assistance was based on letting him get on with things.

For the record, both my grandfathers rated Auchinlek as the best strategist of the war, and Slim as the best leader of men. They were, however, somewhat biased.

 

[unmerged(5120)]

Originally posted by Agelastus


Indeed, we need to simplify Germany's position a bit-the assault on Malta is a critical aspect of this change of events, as it were. If Germany committed enough troops after all, perhaps they could have reversed the Desert War (yes Sean9898, I do remember the capacity problems of the Libyan ports!) Certainly if they neutralised the British base at Gibraltar and turned back the Torch landings.

As for a dozen divisions being a drop in the ocean........only if they're not drawn from the Ostheer but from the occupied territories/Germany. Those dozen divisions are effectively Germany's theatre reserve on the Eastern Front, no matter what their composition.

I'd still love some examples of your WiF complaints-they'd make fascinating "What Ifs"!

Indeed with the Tunisian ports open to Axis shipping, Malta would have become an important issue. Within the framework of the historical campaign, it wasn't that important: the main limiting factor was Axis land transport assets: witness how stockpiles regularly grew in Tripoli.

The dozen divs I mentioned were to be taken thus:
- 3-5 from Russia
- 3-5 from occupation duty
- the balance from the Italian army

Maybe not an ideal force mix, but certainly one that could be assembled relatively painlessly.

One complaint about WiF I remeber is, It's way too easy for the Japanese to attack in China.

Others to follow...

 

[Agelastus]

Originally posted by Emperor of Europe
Uhm... so the codebreakers at Bletchley Park were able to follow the battle and the later pursuit almost in realtime? A feat we are only beginning to master now? What's your source on that?

Why? Just curious.

Regards,

EoE

Personal recollections of staff members from a recent series on the Codebreakers at Bletchley Park-Hannibal Barca can probably give you more exact details. Bletchley park were effectively decoding Rommel's transmissions to OKW at that time in what we'd call "Real-time".......and they felt Montgomery was ignoring the information he was getting.

As for the Mareth line, it was broken by a flanking move by the New Zealand units of Eighth Army-this had been the first plan suggested, but Montgomery rejected it, preferring a frontal assault which failed. If I'm remembering the timing correctly, it's this bodge-job that eased the pressure enough to let Rommel launch his Kasserine offensive.

Sire Enaique
I suppose China can fall too easily-although anyone pushing an offensive into the Chinese mountains in WiF had better be prepared for a frightening rate of attrition. That problem may have been solved in the computer game, since the whole world's done to the same scale as Europe, but Japan and China don't get any more units. A continuous front looks impossible to achieve........so there we have open flanks, partisans............get the picture, Sire Enaique?

 

[unmerged(5120)]

Originally posted by Agelastus
I suppose China can fall too easily-although anyone pushing an offensive into the Chinese mountains in WiF had better be prepared for a frightening rate of attrition. That problem may have been solved in the computer game, since the whole world's done to the same scale as Europe, but Japan and China don't get any more units. A continuous front looks impossible to achieve........so there we have open flanks, partisans............get the picture, Sire Enaique?

mumble grumble mumble grumble yeah but anyway mumble japs couldn't supply grumble significant force so far inland mumble anyway grumble.
Won't let mumble that grumble limey mumble get the last grumble word on me, ha!

 

[Emperor of Europe]

Originally posted by Agelastus


Personal recollections of staff members from a recent series on the Codebreakers at Bletchley Park-Hannibal Barca can probably give you more exact details. Bletchley park were effectively decoding Rommel's transmissions to OKW at that time in what we'd call "Real-time".......and they felt Montgomery was ignoring the information he was getting.

I had absolutely no idea, that codebreaking happened so fast, that it could have tactical impact on the battle field, and will definitely look into this intriguing field.

While the mathematicians at Bletchley Park may have been disappointed by the progress of Montgomery, they were exactly that: scientists - not soldiers. Worse: they only had one side of the story: the Germans, while Montgomery had both, including his own army. To me the professional judgement of a trained military man based on all information available seems preferable to the judgement of a bunch of codebreakers thousand of miles from the field of battle.

As for the Mareth line, it was broken by a flanking move by the New Zealand units of Eighth Army-this had been the first plan suggested, but Montgomery rejected it, preferring a frontal assault which failed. If I'm remembering the timing correctly, it's this bodge-job that eased the pressure enough to let Rommel launch his Kasserine offensive.

This is also new to me. As I understand it, the Mareth line was supposed to be broken by a frontal assault to pin the enemy followed by a left hook by the New Zealanders. That's what happened, and it broke the Germans lines. Most people seem to judge this as a British victory by Montgomery, and not as the terrible blunder you call it.

Regards,

EoE

 

[Agelastus]

Originally posted by Sire Enaique
mumble grumble mumble grumble yeah but anyway mumble japs couldn't supply grumble significant force so far inland mumble anyway grumble.
Won't let mumble that grumble limey mumble get the last grumble word on me, ha!

Really, Sire Enaique, really.............

A few more "Rice offensives" in order, I think.

Emperor of Europe
The Cryptographers at Bletchley Park probably had a pretty good idea what Montgomery had-but more to the point they knew that Rommel was desperate to withdraw, and that Hitler wouldn't let him (yes, it was that "real-time".)

As for the Mareth line........Monty was good at saying that was the idea all along. The first Eighth army attempt to crack the Mareth line was a frontal assault ignoring the potential of the flank move by the New Zealanders. Whether this delay was culpable or not, it's the one really bad move that stands out to me in Monty's north African campaign.