Montgomery

[Emperor of Europe]

Originally posted by Sire Enaique

3:1 armor advantage on the front, 4.3:1 taking immediately available reserves into account (ie, lose your tank today, get a new one tomorrow).

And 3:1 superiority at the Army level IS massive.

Okay, as I said: we may just have a different understanding of the term 'massive'.

And the problem with Monty's conduct of the battle isn't that he waited too long before attacking, it's how he managed the breakout and especially the pursuit of the DAK. His overall superiority was 10-15:1 by then, so he COULD afford a modicum of risk...

Yes, with hindsight he could have pursued the Afrika Armee with far more zeal, but should he? And is it the sign of a bad general, that he didn't. I don't necessarily think so.

The 8th army had time and again overextended itself and suffered remarkable setbacks, when it tried to pursue the Germans. Their morale had just been rebuilt and a new defeat was about the last thing they needed.

Montgomery showed an extremely methodical approach to the desert war: defeat the Axis, follow them, built up for a new attack, smash them with artillery and planes, assault, repeat process. Given the nature of his enemy and his own forces it's not necessarily a bad approach.

I'm not a big fan of Montgomery, there are no posters of him in my bedroom. And his methods definitely lacked the dash and flash of more "interesting" generals, but he soundly defeated his enemy by using his strengths against their weaknesses, and by time and again refusing the enemy any advantage, and IMHO that makes him a capable general.

Regards,

EoE

 

[unmerged(5120)]

Originally posted by Emperor of Europe
I'm not a big fan of Montgomery, there are no posters of him in my bedroom. And his methods definitely lacked the dash and flash of more "interesting" generals, but he soundly defeated his enemy by using his strengths against their weaknesses, and by time and again refusing the enemy any advantage, and IMHO that makes him a capable general.EoE

He certainly used his strengths, but wether it was against his ennemies' weaknesses is debatable. It's the whole point of the debate, really.

 

[Agelastus]

Originally posted by Belrick
If your looking for a great allied general, IMHO it begins and ends with cunningham, good thing for the jerries the first thing rommel did in NA was capture him lol.

I suspect you really meant to write O'Connor here, since Cunningham (brother of the capable Admiral who launched the Taranto raid) was removed from the North Africa command for his failure to defeat Rommel.

Sire Enaique
3:1 superiority isn't massive, not in terms of a set-piece battle. I believe another reason the pursuit was so slow was because, despite the proverbial "desert", it was actually quite wet for once in the weeks following Alamein (no, I can't remember where I read that!)

 

[unmerged(598)]

Montgomery was at his very best in the desert. I don't see anything wrong with a lack of flair, or glory when it is done to minimize your own casualties. Montgomery was suited to the war there, was suited to the British army, and achieved success, just as Patton was suited to the US army, and exploited his strengths in a very different way.

When Montgomery diverted from his conservative, almost plodding, but effective best, it turned into a disaster.

Expecting Montgomery to be Patton is wrong, and as so many allied Generals who were awful, his successes do stand out more than his failures.

 

[Emperor of Europe]

Originally posted by Sire Enaique


He certainly used his strengths, but wether it was against his ennemies' weaknesses is debatable. It's the whole point of the debate, really.

Sure. So here's my line of thinking: The major Allied strength was their numerical superiority, their major weakness was the tactical handling in mobile operations and morale. The main Axis strength was their experience and proficiency in fighting fluid and confused battles. Their main weakness was their lack of men, arms and supplies.

Montgomery prefered to fight pitched battles on a "tidy battlefield", using his own strength (numbers) in a battle of attrition while denying the enemy use of their strength (proficiency in mobile operations).

From that point of view it makes perfect sense NOT to pursue the Germans by all means available, but let them build another line of defense and wear them down once again. Not flashy - I know - but it worked (and works).

Regards,

EoE

 

[unmerged(5120)]

Massive stands somewhere between definite and overwhelming.
Again, the significance of force ratios depends on the scale considered. A 3:1 superiority in a tactical situation isn't massive, it's just adequate.

When a force of 10+ divisions has that same kind of superiority over the ennemy, then it's bound to win if the job isn't completely botched , so I call it massive.

That Monty won that battle doesn't prove he was a good general, just that he wasn't a terrible one.

That the Germans were far superior to the British in fluid situations in late 1942 is quite clear.
Not pursuing the retreating Germans at Halam Halfa was therefore OK. They were retreating in good order towards prepared positions and it's all too likely the British would have been licked once again.

The situation after 2nd Alamein is different, though. The DAK's prepared positions and good order were gone by then and the British enjoyed a much greater superiority. Here was an opportunity to wipe the DAK out, before it could reorganize.

The Germans were short of supplies and thus had little opportunity for fancy maneuvering.

By November 3rd, the Germans were down to 12 runners. By November 5th, they didn't have a single 88 left. All this at a time when 8th Army still had @ 550 runners.

Monty WAS prepared to accept huge exchange ratios if it meant breaking the ennemy:
Gen Freyberg of 2nd NZ div, to which 9th Arm Brig had been attached for an attack on Kidney Ridge on 2 Nov in which the armor were to lead the attack, answering the brigade commander who observed his losses might well be 50%: "It may well be more than that. The army commander [that is, Monty] has said that he is prepared to accept 100%".

Why then did he stop 10th Arm XX on the 8th when it's commander wanted to push forward?

Worse: the DAK was retreating along the coast were it could receive a trickle of supplies throught coastal shipping.
Monty made absolutely no effort to send a blocking force through central cyrenaica to repeat O'Connor's Beda Fomm gamble. Except that for Monty it wouldn't have been a risky gamble: he had troops and transport assets to spare to do it without lessening the direct pursuit, and he knew through Enigma the supply quandary the DAK faced as well as it's position!

We're not talking hindsight any more!

Monty had:

- overwhelming superiority over the ennemy
- knowledge of the ennemy's whereabouts and situation
- a precedent showing how this knowledge and superiority might be used to destroy the ennemy utterly with little risk involved

That he failed to act upon it is inexcusable.
For me, it clearly shows that he certainly was not a good general.
In his boots, O'Connor would have annihilated Rommel. I'm pretty sure even Mark Clark would have done it!!

 

[Emperor of Europe]

Reply to Sire Enaique

When a force of 10+ divisions has that same kind of superiority over the ennemy, then it's bound to win if the job isn't completely botched , so I call it massive.

Wrong. If you doubt that a 3:1 numerical superiority does not ensure success, military history is full of examples. A few recent ones would include all Israeli wars and Desert Storm. A WAPA attack into the European Theatre would also have been a near-run thing despite their numerical advantage.

That Monty won that battle doesn't prove he was a good general, just that he wasn't a terrible one.

(...)

For me, it clearly shows that he certainly was not a good general.

So he is not good and not terrible? Just your average kind of general? Funny that such an average man succeeded were better(?) men had failed.

The DAK's prepared positions and good order were gone by then and the British enjoyed a much greater superiority. Here was an opportunity to wipe the DAK out, before it could reorganize.

I was not aware that Panzerarmee Afrika and especially the DAK was in any sort of disarray – at least not greater than usual I’m also don’t know much about the defences establish in the rear, so any information you have would be very much appreciated.

Worse: the DAK was retreating along the coast were it could receive a trickle of supplies throught coastal shipping.
Monty made absolutely no effort to send a blocking force through central cyrenaica to repeat O'Connor's Beda Fomm gamble. Except that for Monty it wouldn't have been a risky gamble: he had troops and transport assets to spare to do it without lessening the direct pursuit, and he knew through Enigma the supply quandary the DAK faced as well as it's position!

We're not talking hindsight any more!

Of course Panzerarmee Afrika retreated along the only possible highway along the coast. Incidently that’s where the supply columns ran as well, so they retreated along their line of communication and supply.

A British blocking force would have to cross the desert, where resupply and communication gets extremely difficult. Any rush across Cyrenaica would have been a gamble, and contrary to O’Connor, Montgomery was in a situation were he had no need to gamble. By its very nature a gamble can go both ways, and there was no reason why Montgomery should give Rommel a straw to grasp at.

I am unaware of the extent of knowledge Montgomery had about the German situations. I have also been unable to find any archives on the internet describing the sort of information the British Intelligence had at the time about the state of Panzerarmee Afrika, so again: input is appreciated.

Monty had:

- a precedent showing how this knowledge and superiority might be used to destroy the ennemy utterly with little risk involved

What precedent is that?

Regards,

EoE

 

[unmerged(3586)]

To be honest - I find the performance of most of the allied generals (including Monty) simply competent none of them struck me as been brilliant. Especially if you consider the fact that the allies had broken the German codes early in the war and knew a great deal about German plans and troop movements. I think it was just neccessary for us Brits at the time to have some kind of military hero for propoganda purposes in the mold of Wellington and Marlborough and Monty was the least tarnished of our well known generals. I suspect the same claim can almost be made about Patton from an American perspective. As awful as the Nazis were, sadly they did appear to have the sharper military brains on their side - for instance Manstein was unquestionably gifted. But it is essential in war time to provide heroes for your population and the national media tend to be helpful in these times of crisis. I'm just suprised that WWII propoganda has survived so long as some people still view Monty as something of a "genius" (again the same is possibly true for the Americans and even the Russians).

 

[Agelastus]

Originally posted by Emperor of Europe
I am unaware of the extent of knowledge Montgomery had about the German situations. I have also been unable to find any archives on the internet describing the sort of information the British Intelligence had at the time about the state of Panzerarmee Afrika, so again: input is appreciated.

Fairly extensive, it's clear that the staff at Bletchley Park were literally tearing out their hair with frustration at the slow progress of the Alamein engagement. However, an aggressive pursuit of Rommel was simply not in Montgomery's style, particularly at a point where Britain still needed to conserve manpower. This was not 1944 with the war almost won in the west.

As for wearing the Germans down at a defensive line-Montgomery's performance when trying to break past the Mareth line on Tunisia's border is the other major blot on his career in my opinion.

 

[unmerged(5120)]

Originally posted by Emperor of Europe
Wrong. If you doubt that a 3:1 numerical superiority does not ensure success, military history is full of examples. A few recent ones would include all Israeli wars and Desert Storm. A WAPA attack into the European Theatre would also have been a near-run thing despite their numerical advantage.

OK, I'll stand by what I've written with the (important) correction that troop and equipment quality differences must be included in the ratio computation.

I maintain that between roughly equivalent armies, 3:1 at the operational level is pretty much a sure win.

In the specific case of operation Supercharge, my WAG is that generally better British equipment counterbalances superior German combat effectiveness, so it's still roughly 3:1.

Originally posted by Emperor of Europe So he is not good and not terrible? Just your average kind of general? Funny that such an average man succeeded were better(?) men had failed.[/B]

Not average, a bit below average.
And I wouldn't call his predecessors better men, though in all fairness they never enjoyed the kind of numerical, qualitative and logistical superiority Monty had at 2nd Alamein.
We also now know that the British 2-pounder AT gun couldn't penetrate German armor at normal combat ranges (see http://www.wargamer.org/GvA/background/ammotypes4.html . Most of Monty's tanks didn't suffer from this problem. It always helps).

Originally posted by Emperor of Europe
I was not aware that Panzerarmee Afrika and especially the DAK was in any sort of disarray – at least not greater than usual I’m also don’t know much about the defences establish in the rear, so any information you have would be very much appreciated.

Even if it was not a rout, any army that suffers that kind of losses and has to retreat in precarious conditions so far from its bases loses cohesion.

As to prepared positions between El Alamein and the Mareth line, I'm not aware there were any. I'm not saying there weren't any, just that I've never heard any mentioned.

Originally posted by Emperor of Europe
A British blocking force would have to cross the desert, where resupply and communication gets extremely difficult. Any rush across Cyrenaica would have been a gamble, and contrary to O’Connor, Montgomery was in a situation were he had no need to gamble. By its very nature a gamble can go both ways, and there was no reason why Montgomery should give Rommel a straw to grasp at.

I am unaware of the extent of knowledge Montgomery had about the German situations. I have also been unable to find any archives on the internet describing the sort of information the British Intelligence had at the time about the state of Panzerarmee Afrika, so again: input is appreciated.

What precedent is that?

No need to gamble? tell that to the tommies who died assaulting the Mareth line!

Monty had knowledge about Rommel through Ultra. Specifically, he was advised on 16 and 17 November that the DAK was stranded in Benghazi awaiting the delivery of fuel.

He did issue orders for X Corps to cross Cyrenaica on 18 November, but having made absolutely no preparations for this eventuality, X Corps wasn't able to react fast enough (several days delay were necessary) so the order was never executed: sub-par staff work.

The precedent was precisely O'Connor trapping the Italians at Beda Fomm in 1941.

Montgommery had enough forces at his disposal to earmark some for such an operation. And it was much less of a gamble than what O'Connor did: the British in late 1942 had much more reliable and better tanks than in early 1941, and a lot more transport assets, so the supply situation of the blocking force wouldn't have been as precarious.

And he could afford the loss of said blocking force, whereas O'Connor couldn't.


Alan: I quite agree with you. Exceptions would be at least O'Connor, Patton and Juin, though.

O'Connor because what he achieved in 1940-41 against the Italians can only be described as brilliant.

Patton, if only because he did his homework. He was very much worried about a possible German attack in the Ardennes in early December 1944, and had prepared (against Einsehower's orders) a contingency plan for a III Corps counterattack northward in case his fears materialized. That's why units from this corps could start moving on the afternoon of the 16th, much earlier than any other reinforcements, and how US 4th Armored could relieve Bastogne in time. Few Allied generals managed to have that kind of forethought.

Juin, for his planning the 4th battle of Cassino.

 

[joak]

Originally posted by alan
. . . especially if you consider the fact that the allies had broken the German codes early in the war and knew a great deal about German plans and troop movements.

My feeling from various sources is that the extent of information that the allies got, in Europe, through cryptographic means is usually over-rated. Codes were broken and changed repeatedly on both sides, and neither side had a consistent advantage (even if the allies seemed to be better at the process, on the whole).

For example, in Africa, pre-Montgomery, Rommel apparently benefited enormously from the fact that the Italians had broken the code the US observer was using to send detailed information to Washington; the leak was plugged about the same time Montgomery took over, IIRC. The same goes for other theatres.

My main source for this is Kahn's "The Codebreakers." I've seen the overall assessment repeated elsewhere, including Keegan.

 

[unmerged(598)]

Sir Enaique, I too believe Patton to be superior, not just to Montgomery, but to all the allied leaders. Though much of my reasoning is as much subjective as objective.

O'Connor may be the most underrated man in British military history, partly because of the awful (and unfair) reputation the Italian army had during the war, and because he was captured. What might have been had he been able to continue?

 

[unmerged(5120)]

Originally posted by joak


My feeling from various sources is that the extent of information that the allies got, in Europe, through cryptographic means is usually over-rated. Codes were broken and changed repeatedly on both sides, and neither side had a consistent advantage (even if the allies seemed to be better at the process, on the whole).

For example, in Africa, pre-Montgomery, Rommel apparently benefited enormously from the fact that the Italians had broken the code the US observer was using to send detailed information to Washington; the leak was plugged about the same time Montgomery took over, IIRC. The same goes for other theatres.

My main source for this is Kahn's "The Codebreakers." I've seen the overall assessment repeated elsewhere, including Keegan.

By its very nature, ULTRA gave only partial information, that of the highest military level. But it could provide the kind of info I mentionned in my last post. And it also gave warning of the Mortain counteroffensive.

Originally posted by sean9898
Sir Enaique, I too believe Patton to be superior, not just to Montgomery, but to all the allied leaders. Though much of my reasoning is as much subjective as objective.

O'Connor may be the most underrated man in British military history, partly because of the awful (and unfair) reputation the Italian army had during the war, and because he was captured. What might have been had he been able to continue?

IMHO, Patton is often a bit overrated: I wouldn't call him brilliant; he never pulled the kind of stunts Manstein, Rommel or O'Connor did. But he was certainly damn good! the best Allied leader? I'd say the second best after O'Connor, but that's a bit subjective too...

I'm convinced that had O'Connor stayed in command of British field forces in North Africa, the war would have been very different.

With so few British units facing the DAK in early 1941, he wouldn't have been able to prevent Rommel from besieging Tobruk, but he certainly would have managed not to botch Battleaxe and Crusader!
care to go on in the what-if thread?

 

[unmerged(598)]

Originally posted by Sire Enaique

IMHO, Patton is often a bit overrated: I wouldn't call him brilliant; he never pulled the kind of stunts Manstein, Rommel or O'Connor did. But he was certainly damn good! the best Allied leader? I'd say the second best after O'Connor, but that's a bit subjective too...

I'm convinced that had O'Connor stayed in command of British field forces in North Africa, the war would have been very different.

With so few British units facing the DAK in early 1941, he wouldn't have been able to prevent Rommel from besieging Tobruk, but he certainly would have managed not to botch Battleaxe and Crusader!
care to go on in the what-if thread?

We had one! Along the lines of either O'Connor not being delayed by Wavell swapping divisions on him at the last minute, or Greece being delayed until the capture of Tripoli.

Conclusions were something along the lines that it may have all worked out better for the Axis. They have more troops in 1941 and 1942 in Russia, as well as Rommel, and Britain has no where to fight in Europe. Also the possibility of a disasterous 1943 D-Day was considered.

What are your thoughts?

 

[Agelastus]

Originally posted by sean9898
....and Britain has no where to fight in Europe.

But I believe the general thrust of that consequence also included possible benefits to Britain in the war against Japan, in the Malaya and Burma theatres. Although we did get a little fixated on Montgomery!

No-one suggested sending O'Connor east.............

 

[unmerged(598)]

Agelastus you're right. We did send Monty east, either to surrender or fight in Singapore or do something in Burma.

Did some light reading about Burma, wondered what opinions of Slim are as a General.

 

[Agelastus]

Originally posted by sean9898
Did some light reading about Burma, wondered what opinions of Slim are as a General.

XIV Army, eh? The so-called "Forgotten War" in Britain. My opinion of Slim is......competent. He's also a "forgotten general", I'm afraid........

Although his reading of Japanese intentions/reactions during the 1945 Burma campaign was extremely insightful.

 

[unmerged(5120)]

About O'connor staying in command in North Africa:

I'd say it's an even chance he'd have trapped Rommel in late 1941 the same way he trapped the Italians in February.

Here's my reasonning:

The supply situation of the DAK in 1941 was always extremely precarious.

On the other hand, the British had for all practical purposes lost the elite pre-war 7th armored, and were quite green.

Now I believe O'Connor would have read the situation correctly. Battleaxe would have occurred (Churchill wouldn't have let 8th Army sit tight), but would have been a draw, with more axis losses and fewer British.

Therefore, Crusader, with a better superiority margin and better planning could well have been decisive.

In any case, the best Rommel could have hoped for in early 1942 would have been to hold off a British offensive around El Agheila.

The next question is therefore, with the axis in dire straits in North Africa in mid-1942, would Torch have occured?

I think yes, but for different reasons:

In this kind of situation, Germany would have used whatever means necessary to secure the use of Tunis, so with German troops in French North Africa, the Torch landings would have been both just as necessary, and probably easier to boot because there would probably have been less resistance from local French troops.

So I guess the end result would have been an axis eviction from North Africa in late 1942 instead of spring 1943.

What would have happened after that becomes a WAG at best

 

[Agelastus]

Originally posted by Sire Enaique
In this kind of situation, Germany would have used whatever means necessary to secure the use of Tunis, so with German troops in French North Africa, the Torch landings would have been both just as necessary, and probably easier to boot because there would probably have been less resistance from local French troops.

Depends how many troops have actually been committed in this scenario-if it's sufficient to deploy some westwards in the Orania region, for example, the landings could be considerably more bloody.

A fine point that-just how successful can O'Connor be without prodding Hitler into one of his truly massive overreactions. If it occurs before Torch, that could lead to a very sticky situation indeed.

But what would that do to the Ostheer? Hmmm.............

 

[unmerged(5120)]

The real key issue in this scenario is, do the Germans break the 1940 armistice?

Historically, it was after Germany did just this by invading Vichy France that French troops started fighting the Axis again: to the legal-minded French officers, armistice clauses being unilaterally broken by Germany, a state of war between France and Germany existed again.

If the armistice had clearly been broken by Germany, then in all likeliness French units in North Africa would have resisted. There were enough troops and equipment available to at least hold until British and American reinforcements could arrive.
Operations by those same units in the Tunisian campaign in 1942-43 bear ample proof of this assessment.

If the political backround hadn't been that clear, precedents point to an almost total lack of French resistance, and the Axis would probably have occupied French North Africa with little difficulty.

This last scenario is a real Pandora's box.
With Germany in possession of airbases barely 200 Km from Gibraltar, LOTS of things could have happened.

The impact all this could have on the war in Russia is another good question.

On the ground units side my guess is, not much: withdrawing 3-5 divs from the eastern front would have been a drop taken from the ocean, add in 3-5 divs taken from occupation forces all over Europe, a few Italian divs as well and you have assembled a sizeable force by North African standards.

On the Luftwaffe side, it's quite different because Allied air forces in North Africa WERE strongly engaged, and the level of Luftwaffe reaction necessary to effectively counter this wouldn't have been marginal at all.

The only real way to find out what would have happened would be playing Grand Europa, I guess... (is that a leitmotiv or what? )