Montgomery

[joak]

I recently read Keegan's The Second World War. I should mention that most of my reading on military history was done a decade or more ago, but I was still a little surprised by what he thought of Montgomery.

My general impression before reading the book was that Montgomery was generally considered as much a PR creation as anything else; a journeyman commander who became the hero a beleagured nation needed. I knew he handled Rommel, but that was helped by a severe security leak being plugged at the same time he took over; beyond that, I knew he championed the ill-fated Market Garden.

But he comes off quite highly in Keegan. Insightful, competent, good strategic sense, and an excellent judge of what his forces were capable of; even his stalled advances seemed to help elsewhere in the front. So my questions for those who know more than I: Is this the consensus view? Has his reputation improved recently, or was my memory just wrong? Or is this just a British/American split in interpretation?

 

[Emperor of Europe]

On a wargame board I used to visit before everything turned to hell and US vs. Europe bashing we had quite a few debates on Montgomery.

It seems there's quite a split between the British and the US views. The Brits obviously think he's a great commander, that repeatedly lead them from victory to victory while some Americans believe he was the main cause behind some notable missed opportunities, notably an early breakout from Normandy, a proper closing of the Falais Gap and an early involvement in the Battle of the Bulge. Most of this animosity might stem from the conflict between Montgomery and Patton. I guess it's only natural that Brits and Americans take the views of their favourites.

From an outsider perspective I think that the truth is somewhere in between. The main German strength was their tactical and operational versatility and mobility and that same thing was the weakness of the Commonwealth forces. It makes sense to deny the Germans the use of their strength while exploiting ones own strength (numerical superiority) to the utmost. The setpiece battle with an organized battlefield and even the battle of attrition can therefore be sound military tactical choices. By avoiding a fluid battle and grinding the Germans down, success was almost assured.

The downside of this approach is of course, that your troops and your command style might seem somewhat lethargic. But if you look at Montgomery's spectacular defeat at Market Garden, you actually have an operation that was as daring as anything the Germans have ever done. It might have succeeded - and if it did, it might have shortened the war by months, not only saving lives, but also pushing the later iron curtain east.

IMHO the main drawback of Montgomery was the reputation he got in the US camp. Hostility towards him - and a natural wish to be the ones who defeated Hitler - lead to the adaption of the broad front strategy in 1944 instead of the narrow front advocated by Montgomery. Had he had his way, the 21st British Army Group could have penetrated into the German heartland before the Germans had time to reorganize their defence after their withdrawal to the Siegfried Line, and the war might have ended before christmas. Instead the Allies pushed along the entire front, giving us the bloody battles of Arnhem, Hurtgen Forest, the Vosges etc. all while the Soviets pushed west with incredible speed.

So in summary: I think Montgomery was the kind of commander needed at the time. Unfortunately he lacked the necessary political skills to get his way in a coalition army, and he might have stuck to much to the methods that gave him an initial success.

Regards,

EoE

 

[unmerged(598)]

I used to be extremely harsh on Montgomery. Falaise, Caen, and Arnhem as examples of inept leadership. On further reading though I agree with Emperor of Europe, he is somewhere between hopeless and wonderful.

Montgomery's outlook was shaped both by his own experience during WW1 and the experience of the British army. His cautious, almost timid pursuit of Rommel across Africa could be viewed as an example of his weakness, but I consider it a strength. Montgomery cared about keeping casualties low. Whether this is a short sighted vision or not is debateable, but the results he achieved in Africa were proof that this method would work.

I do think that his rashness at Arnhem was an aberation, and one which has stained his whole career. What I find more distasteful than the defeat though, is the claim that the operation was 90% successfull.

Finally, Montgomery was side by side with Patton, a General who adopted a completely different view of offensive war, combined with a brashness, and self promotion which would dwarf any other wartime commander. Let me ask this, would Montgomery be judged differently if the 3rd Army had been commanded by Mark Clark?

 

[Sir James]

Monty was ultimately a competent general. He did what he had to do to win, with the minimum of casualties. He was not into spectacular successes, and saw no reason to take risks if by avoiding that risk, victory was still assured. Market Garden was just too tempting.

You could liken him to the manager of a football team who sees a choice between a 100% chance of a 1-0 victory, or, if he takes a risk, an 80% chance of a 4-0 win, but a 20% chance of a defeat.

Patton might take to second option, Monty, unless in Market Garden mode, the first.

His most important contribution was turning morale, and the British army's whole attitude, around when he took command in North Africa.

He was, I think, just as guilty of self-promotion as Patton, just less convinced of his own genius. Slim made a pointed comment about self serving generals with too many cap badges, which I assume referred to him.

 

[Gjakoll]

As an American, I have to admit that Monty isn't the puffed up overblown windbag that many of my countrymen think he is. He was an excellent strategist, and probably his biggest contribution to the Western allied war effort gets overlooked - that being Overlord.

When Ike was appointed to be the Supreme Commander, he chose British land, air, and sea subordinates - Monty, Ramsay, and Tedder. In Jan. '44, Monty took over the planning for Overlord that had already been done by COSSAC, which called for a three division invasion of Normandy supported by one airborne division. Monty demanded that Overlord be increased to the historical size. This enlargement of the assault was, imo, crucial to Ovrlord's eventual success.

Monty's flaw, as is recognized by Keegan and others, is his inability to admit his plans were not being successful. Again, his performance after June 6 is instructive in this regard. Monty planned to seize Caen on D-Day, and then pin panzer forces will the americans captured Cherbourg. When the assault divisions failed, Monty, instead of admitting their failure, acted like everything was going according to plan. This infuriated subordinates who were scapegoated by him.

So, the statement that Monty lies somewhere between hopeless and genius probably is an accurate statement of his performance.

 

[Agelastus]

As for the Falaise Gap "debacle", most books I've read place most of the blame on the American forces trying to close the gap from the south that were more interested in pushing south and east.

As for Monty, I've always seen him as a good commander, but not a great one. Which is equally my view of his rival Patton. One was a good publicist, one was a bad one, but both were good at their job even if their preferred style was different.

 

[joak]

thanks all

Originally posted by dave3l
He was an excellent strategist, and probably his biggest contribution to the Western allied war effort gets overlooked - that being Overlord.

Possibly the single fact that most surprised me was the level of Montgomery's involvement with the planning. I think there is a definite American bias in descriptions of D-Day, anyway--I've never read an American account that didn't emphasize the American involvement, and I've also never read one that gave Montgomery any credit for what seems an amazingly planned, and mind-bogglingly large, operation. (Again, with the caveat that I haven't read tons).

Originally posted by sean9898
His cautious, almost timid pursuit of Rommel across Africa could be viewed as an example of his weakness, but I consider it a strength.

Certainly Keegan agrees with this--he explicitly praised Montgomery for not succumbing to the temptation for rapid but ephemeral advances that had characterized the desert war to that point.

Regarding the comments about Montgomery's dubious claims of "success," was this merely bragging, or did it involve throwing men's lives away because he stuck to an unsuccesful plan far too long? Obviously, the former is an unpleasant habit, the latter has led generals to disaster.

 

[grumbler]

Monty!

I have always thought that Montgomery was probably the best WWI general who fought in WWII. He wasn't at his best in fluid situations, but he was never at a loss (which counts for a lot).

His best feature was that he genuinely cared about the lot of his troops and took all the necessary care to ensure that their situation was as good as it possibly could be.

His worst feature was failing to realize that troops might need to be lost today in order to save lives in the furture. he was probably too conservative to rank as a Great General.

His ego did get in his way, at time, but not on the order of Patton. MacArthur or Mark Clarke. He apparetly hated to hear jokes about himself, unless he was the one who told them.

His reputation suffered somewhat from the fact that he knew how slim the British manpower reserves were, and this made him more cautious. prehaps, in 1944 than he would have been naturally.

In the end, he proved to be exactly the sort of winner Britain needed. The press made more of him than he deserved, perhaps, but to blame all of this on his own (considerable) egotism is going too far.

As a planner, he was a master. He could, and did, keep track of an enormous number of details in his head.

If one were to compare him to an American general, two spring to mind: George MacClennan in the ACW, and Omar Bradley in WWII. Mac was less lucky, and Omar more lucky, when facing their own "fox" but. like Monty, their troops never forgot them. Patton and Mark Clarke have done less well as the personal memoirs have been published, methinks.

 

[grumbler]

BTW, I would feel a whole lot more comfortable with Keegan if he had never published "The Price of Admiralty." Anyone agree?

 

[unmerged(4386)]

I don't see Monty as being unwilling to take casualties. He was ready to take 100% casualties in many regiments if that's what it took to win at El Alamein. He also stuck the British 1st Airborne Division in the most vulnerable position in the Market Garden operation, instead of sacrificing Americans as he could have. The British Guards armored division took a fair pounding in that operation also.

I think it would be interesting to compare Monty with other British generals such as O'Connor, Wavell, Alexander, Slim, etc., rather than try to compare him with Americans. Was Monty the best that his country had to offer to allied leadership? (Understanding that O'Connor was captured, and therefor not available for much of the war)

Perhaps he could be compared with other Commonwealth generals as well.

 

[Emperor of Europe]

Originally posted by grumbler
BTW, I would feel a whole lot more comfortable with Keegan if he had never published "The Price of Admiralty." Anyone agree?

Why? I thought about buying it, but maybe I shouldn't?

Regards,

EoE

 

[unmerged(5120)]

Well, you can have my copy if you want, I never managed to read past the first dozen pages or so.

Could the real reason behind this book be that everyone must pay taxes sooner or later?

Monty:

I think of him as the British Grant: both stepped in after a number of inept commanders had managed to consistently fail for years despite a marked material superiority. Both were the first ones to actually use that material superiority. Neither was imaginative nor bold, but they knew they were stronger so they just kept pushing until something broke. An Asterix fan would say both were masters of psychological warfare *: if you're stronger, just keep bashing your ennemy on his head until he calls it quits. It's not subtle, but it works.

He certainly was a meticulous planner, but a good one?
Overlord was his brainchild, and a remarkable success planning-wise. Given the magnitude of the endeavor, the foul-ups, if numerous, didn't have any major impact on the whole operation.

Yet

Yet, by June, 1944 the USMC and US army had extensive experience of large-scale amphibious operations in the PTO, and no effort was made to draw on this experience and the tactics and tools that had been developped there, as a really good planner would have done.

And nobody will probably ever know what Monty's plan for breakout really was. The scale and ambitious objectives of the British offensives in Normandy seem to bely the pretense that they really were only fixing attacks to draw German armor away from the American sector, especially when put in perspective with Monty's image of a commander preoccupied with sparing the lives of his soldiers.

Grumbler, I like what you say about Monty being the best WWI general of WWII. witness Market-Garden: It's typical of an allied WWI offensive, an extremely complex operation dependant upon an exacting timetable with absolutely no built-in margin that shatters utterly upon contact with the ennemy.

So my verdict is, he wasn't good. He wasn't terrible as many allied generals were during the first half of the war and that certainly was something, but he wasn't good.


* as understood by a single-neuron-driven mountain of muscle of a Roman legionnaire wielding a huge wicked-looking club (a kind of war on brains?)

 

[Agelastus]

Originally posted by Sire Enaique
* as understood by a single-neuron-driven mountain of muscle of a Roman legionnaire wielding a huge wicked-looking club (a kind of war on brains?)

Ah, yes, "Asterix and the Roman Agent"-my all time favourite, with the second biggest fight ever depicted in an Asterix book in it!

As for American experience at Amphibious operations in the Pacific etc. If Monty did ignore it during the planning phase, that's not very impressive. On the other hand, the Americans were the ones who refused to use the "funnies", whose value was proven during the D-Day operations.....that's not very bright either.

 

[unmerged(4745)]

Viscount Montgomery of Alamein

There is a book in my bookshelf called "Churchill's generals", with a short biography of the most important Brittish and Commonwealth generals in WWII.

In the "Turn of the tide", FM lord Alanbroke writes about his subordinates and their capabilities.

 

[unmerged(3115)]

Montgomery never fought a battle and won where he didnt hold a massive numbers advantage.
If your looking for a great allied general, IMHO it begins and ends with cunningham, good thing for the jerries the first thing rommel did in NA was capture him lol.

Oh and General freyburg of course he rocked

 

[unmerged(5120)]

Originally posted by Belrick
Montgomery never fought a battle and won where he didnt hold a massive numbers advantage.
If your looking for a great allied general, IMHO it begins and ends with cunningham, good thing for the jerries the first thing rommel did in NA was capture him lol.

Oh and General freyburg of course he rocked

Freyberg was a very good divisionnal commander, but as a corps commander he was below par.

 

[Emperor of Europe]

Originally posted by Belrick
Montgomery never fought a battle and won where he didnt hold a massive numbers advantage.

Well, 'massive' is a relative term. IMHO the advantage at El Alamein was not massive, but just the sound 1:2 or 1:3 advantage advocated as the tactical advantage necessary for succesful attacks on a tactical scale.

Never fighting a battle without success being almost assured, is IMHO not the mark of a bad general. Fighting battles and losing is.

Regards,

EoE

 

[unmerged(5120)]

Originally posted by Emperor of Europe


Well, 'massive' is a relative term. IMHO the advantage at El Alamein was not massive, but just the sound 1:2 or 1:3 advantage advocated as the tactical advantage necessary for succesful attacks on a tactical scale.

Never fighting a battle without success being almost assured, is IMHO not the mark of a bad general. Fighting battles and losing is.

Regards,

EoE

At the start of 2nd Alamein, The British had a 4.3:1 advantage in tanks.

In terms of artillery, the advantage was less clear, but very substantial nevertheless:
both sides fielded @900 pieces, but the British were all modern medium to heavy guns & howitzers, whereas 2/3 of the Axis artillery park was either light pieces or obsolete.

Furthermore, the Axis were at the end of a very long supply line, whereas the British were very close to their supply terminals in the Nile delta.The result was a 10:1 British advantage in shell supply.

In terms of air support, the RAF flew 11600 sorties during 2nd Alamein, against 3100 Axis, a 3.7:1 advantage.

I don't have the rifle strengths at hand, but from memory they're comparable.

And we're talking about an OPERATIONAL advantage. The prescribed 3:1 ratio applies to tactical situations. With the kind of overall superiority Monty enjoyed at 2nd Alamein, tactical attacks are likely to be at 10+:1 odds.

Monty's feat was that he was the first Allied general (after O'connor) who actually managed not to bungle it.

 

[Emperor of Europe]

Originally posted by Sire Enaique


At the start of 2nd Alamein, The British had a 4.3:1 advantage in tanks.

In terms of artillery, the advantage was less clear, but very substantial nevertheless:
both sides fielded @900 pieces, but the British were all modern medium to heavy guns & howitzers, whereas 2/3 of the Axis artillery park was either light pieces or obsolete.

Furthermore, the Axis were at the end of a very long supply line, whereas the British were very close to their supply terminals in the Nile delta.The result was a 10:1 British advantage in shell supply.

In terms of air support, the RAF flew 11600 sorties during 2nd Alamein, against 3100 Axis, a 3.7:1 advantage.

I don't have the rifle strengths at hand, but from memory they're comparable.

And we're talking about an OPERATIONAL advantage. The prescribed 3:1 ratio applies to tactical situations. With the kind of overall superiority Monty enjoyed at 2nd Alamein, tactical attacks are likely to be at 10+:1 odds.

Monty's feat was that he was the first Allied general (after O'connor) who actually managed not to bungle it.

IIRC rifle advantage was 2:1 or less. I also seem to remember a 3:1 armour advantage. All in all a 3:1 numerical superiority seems likely to me. Then there's the whole discussion of qualitative differences, morale etc.

But my point was, that a 3:1 superiority isn't 'massive' in my vocabulary. Of course the advantage was much greater at the point of attack, but that is hardly the way overall advantages are measured.

IMHO Montgomery did the reasonable thing. 8th Army needed a victory, and he waited until he could deliver it with close to 100% probability. By fighting a battle of attrition he denied his enemy the fluid battlefield conditions, where the Germans historically excelled and the British, well... sucked. I don't know whether that makes Montgomery a great general, but it certainly not makes him a bad one.

Regards,

EoE

 

[unmerged(5120)]

Originally posted by Emperor of Europe


IIRC rifle advantage was 2:1 or less. I also seem to remember a 3:1 armour advantage. All in all a 3:1 numerical superiority seems likely to me. Then there's the whole discussion of qualitative differences, morale etc.

But my point was, that a 3:1 superiority isn't 'massive' in my vocabulary. Of course the advantage was much greater at the point of attack, but that is hardly the way overall advantages are measured.

IMHO Montgomery did the reasonable thing. 8th Army needed a victory, and he waited until he could deliver it with close to 100% probability. By fighting a battle of attrition he denied his enemy the fluid battlefield conditions, where the Germans historically excelled and the British, well... sucked. I don't know whether that makes Montgomery a great general, but it certainly not makes him a bad one.

Regards,

EoE

3:1 armor advantage on the front, 4.3:1 taking immediately available reserves into account (ie, lose your tank today, get a new one tomorrow).

And 3:1 superiority at the Army level IS massive.

And the problem with Monty's conduct of the battle isn't that he waited too long before attacking, it's how he managed the breakout and especially the pursuit of the DAK. His overall superiority was 10-15:1 by then, so he COULD afford a modicum of risk...