Modern Germany

[Archangel85]

BTW four squadrons are flying the Phantom; two of which are JG 71 'Richthofen' and JG 74 'Molders' .

As for innovation, hmm, MBB (the M is for Messerschmitt IIRC) played a part in Eurofighter.

Moelders isn't Moelders anymore, its just JG 74. The guy they named it after took part in the legion condor mission, wich brought a TV magazine to start a smear campaign against it (basiclly blaming Moelders for everything up and including the bombing of guernica, and depicting that the personal in that unit as die hard nazi worshippers...). So now its just JG 74. Oh well.

the Eurofighter is annother incident in big technical screwups in the Bundeswehr, it is how long in development? 25 years or sumthing? And as it is of now, its not even allowed to fire its cannon because of safety regulations.

The main "problem" with the modern german army is that its not really recognized in society - the conscription is seen as something that happens to you and spoils other plans, not something acceptable. Something like "support the troops" is basicly unheard of. Yet german soldiers in Afghanistan have to run their vehicles with the same regulations that would apply in germany.

To finish my little rant here, a joke that depicts the view of the Bundeswehr on itself and of the population on it:

"Function of the Bundeswehr: Hold the borders until a real army arrives."

 

[The Witch-King]

I'm not so sure about the part regarding a professional army automatically being better than conscription troops.

I recall hearing something recently about the Swedish Coastal Rangers (conscripts) outclassing US Marines (professionals) in some international combat operations test.

Of course, in a conscription army you may both get better motivated soldiers, as well as soldiers recruited from more diverse walks of civilian life (meaning a more "clever" army as a collective). This may explain an added efficiency on their part, to compensate for less years average in training.

 

[Archangel85]

Can't agree here... (with the EGA Officer you mention). A large element of the organisation of the Warsaw Pact forces facing NATO at the end of the Cold War in Germany was based on echelons. One of the facts about such a system is that everything down to regimental level was echeloned (in simple terms) in an east to west sequence. Effectively the first echelon is what starts out at the Inner German Border on day 1. Since there were only Soviet Armies in the first echelon, the EGA couldn't possibly come into play unless it moved through or displaced the entire army in front of it (a logistic nightmare). Anyway, the Sovs would never have started the war with a satelite army leading.

Hm, a sattelite army that can read the enemies roadsigns is a clear advantage, don't you think?

As for the Nazi-officer thing, that was a major disadvantage for EGA - they recruited parts of their higher officer corps from WWII-enlisted ranks, who had obviously no idea about operational or strategical warfare - kinda like Hitler, they would have tried to micromanage from way behind the front, leading to catastrophic results.

 

[Archangel85]

Should there be another 'Case White' I'm positive that the Polish legions would march through Berlin in 7 days. Or less.

So what? let them have Berlin, mass in the north and south, strike their supply lines and encircle them. Then start talking about a peace offer.

 

[Archangel85]

you understood it wrong. initiative doesn't mean that orders don't have to be followed. initiative is there to ensure that in a chaotic situation (like...say, uh...the opening hours of a large war that starts with an enemy suprise attack), units won't sit around waiting for orders, but low level officers being trained to think on their feet, improvise and solve any problem that occurs without having to ask for orders first.

 

[Archangel85]

I think modern historical interpretation would at least go someway to refute this. Certainly true of 1941/42 but by 1944/45 the Soviet "officer class" was much more developed and experienced and had been encouraged to develop tactical initiative and had (comparative to the position in 41/42) relative freedom from political officers, ironically at the same time the initiative which devolved to German field officers in the early years of the war had become stilted and the class of officers had been thinned by losses. This is not to say that the 1944 German army was not still officered very well, but that the significant advantages it had in the early war years, speaking across the whole of the Wehrmacht, had been badly eroded.

Plus, in 1944, despite having seen the results already in 1941 (on the sovjet side), Hitler started to issue the stand-and-die orders, wich cut down on the germans options dramaticaly...