Moar WW2 Stuff (sorry): Could the Allies have saved Poland?

[Klausewitz]

There was no parity in equipment though and I am not sure if there was parity in training.
And while 3 to 1 odds might be doable on the tactical level, they aren't on the strategic level.
Lets say that you have 30 divisions and I have 45 divisions. I can counter your divisions all along the front and, theoretically, assemble a 16 to 1 superiority in one sector.
Even with reserves my ability to hold the line and still overload your defenses already start with a few divisions I have over you and at 3 to 2 the odds are already pretty bad.

 

[bz249]

There was no parity in equipment though and I am not sure if there was parity in training.
And while 3 to 1 odds might be doable on the tactical level, they aren't on the strategic level.
Lets say that you have 30 divisions and I have 45 divisions. I can counter your divisions all along the front and, theoretically, assemble a 16 to 1 superiority in one sector.
Even with reserves my ability to hold the line and still overload your defenses already start with a few divisions I have over you and at 3 to 2 the odds are already pretty bad.

Basically 3:2 means that unless something goes totally wrong the frontline will be broken at multiple locations. And since Poland is flatland with scattered cities they just cannot neglect anything. Though the fact that organized resistance collapse within a week was a surprise (for an alternative just take a look at the Battle of Berlin, Wenck and his army managed to execute a complex maneuver at this stage of the war)

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

There was no parity in equipment though and I am not sure if there was parity in training.
And while 3 to 1 odds might be doable on the tactical level, they aren't on the strategic level.
Lets say that you have 30 divisions and I have 45 divisions. I can counter your divisions all along the front and, theoretically, assemble a 16 to 1 superiority in one sector.
Even with reserves my ability to hold the line and still overload your defenses already start with a few divisions I have over you and at 3 to 2 the odds are already pretty bad.

Thats a bit simple isnt it ?
If on the defensive I dont need a division to hold against one of yours. If half a division is enough to hold against one I have a reserve of 15 divisions and the advantage of interior lines.
Which means at that ratio I have enough to hold against your concentrated attack and go on the offensive elswhere and roll up your flanks.

If 2/3 of a division is needed we fight an even battle.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

Thats a bit simple isnt it ?
If on the defensive I dont need a division to hold against one of yours. If half a division is enough to hold against one I have a reserve of 15 divisions and the advantage of interior lines.
Which means at that ratio I have enough to hold against your concentrated attack and go on the offensive elswhere and roll up your flanks.

If 2/3 of a division is needed we fight an even battle.

You are specifically describing the German tactical response to Russian wave attacks late in the war which were ordered to occur in the same place repeatedly. They would cycle a unit in, take the hit, withdraw, and the next men up would take their place. It proved catastrophic to Russian attacks.

Unfortunately for Germany, Russia simply had too many men, too many weapons, and too much time. Meanwhile, Germany was handcuffed by Hitler's dementia. Game over.

 

[Klausewitz]

Thats a bit simple isnt it ?
If on the defensive I dont need a division to hold against one of yours. If half a division is enough to hold against one I have a reserve of 15 divisions and the advantage of interior lines.

Sure, but I also only need one division or even one half division to hold against you.
Then maybe the same number of division as a reserve as you (which i can also use as an attack force) and that still leaves me enough troops to construct a situation of initial superiority (until your reserves arrive) in two or three places of my choice, i.e. places that favor my troops over your troops.

Which means at that ratio I have enough to hold against your concentrated attack and go on the offensive elswhere and roll up your flanks.

Yes. But I do to. The point is I can do all you can do, but more since even with reserves and division holding the line I have more divisions to play around with.

I can construct a double bind for you:
Either you hold still and keep your position.
In that case I can attack at a point of my choice, or several points of my choice, draw your reserves in, and when I have drawn them all, for which I need only enough troops to dislodge your initial deployment and force you to plug the position up with forces almost equal to mine*, I start one or two more offensive actions. Only now all your forces are in the line, while mine are not.
Either you juggle divisions from other sectors, risking a breach there, or you get a breach in the newly attacked sectors. Either way, sooner or later, I get a breach somewhere. And a big one, since once it breaks there is nothing behind it to stop my troops.
And that is without my offensive troops being able to move faster into the depth of your positions than your reserves are able to move lateral behind the front, movement which, unlikey in WW1, can be interdicted by fighters and bombers.



*Here another trade-off comes in: the thinner your initial line of defense, the higher the chance any determined offensive effort can dislodge your troops from their defensive positions, which means to contain the breach you must send more troops than you would have needed to hold in place (since the reinforcements do not or at least cannot expect to benefit from the defensive positions).

 

[keynes2.0]

Sure, but I also only need one division or even one half division to hold against you.

Cool, so now the defender only needs a quarter of a division. Keep this up and the entire frontline will being guarded by distant pickets while everyone else is back home enjoying Christmas with their families. Hopefully next year we can find a way to bring the pickets home for Christmas as well.

 

[Klausewitz]

Cool, so now the defender only needs a quarter of a division. Keep this up and the entire frontline will being guarded by distant pickets while everyone else is back home enjoying Christmas with their families. Hopefully next year we can find a way to bring the pickets home for Christmas as well.

If you don't have anything smart to say, maybe just say nothing, next time.

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

Keynes has a point, your original premise was that you need one to pin down one of mine.

 

[Klausewitz]

Which you correctly pointed as too simple.
The only thing, I think, either side cannot do without is a thin veil of troops in front of the other sides thin veil of troops. The illusion of presence and the threat of a fight if either advances beyond a certain point.
How many troops or division we feel we need will depend on terrain, on how crucial we think the sector, how highly we value the specific division, etc.
But at that point we have already fallen off the other side of the problem and are lost in details.


What is needed from either side is a troop concentration, which the enemy will not be able to assess with absolute accuracy, capable of withstanding probing attacks and substantial enough to delay until the reserves arrive.

Think 'Fleet in Being'.
The mere presence of my forces forces you to keep enough of your own directly in front of them to delay and enough in reserve to repulse them.
If you simply withdraw them or weaken them too much my forces might very well be able to produce a breakthrough by accident (more likely if individual commanders have a high degree of independence and aggression as the Germans did) which would then cost you more forces than if you had simply put enough in front of them to prevent that.
It is a poker game where you are not sure about the pot, don't know how many cards the rules allow and where you are not sure what the hole cards are.

I am actually not sure where exactly I am losing you. I would be grateful for pointers.

 

[keynes2.0]

If you don't have anything smart to say, maybe just say nothing, next time.

It's nice that you are stating your personal goals in public.

But dont worry, there is nothing bad about the fact that you stated a model that has problems. We all make mistakes from time to time.

 

[Klausewitz]

It's nice that you are stating your personal goals in public.

But dont worry, there is nothing bad about the fact that you stated a model that has problems. We all make mistakes from time to time.

So why don't you, instead of being snotty and evasive and sarcastic, state the problems you perceive?
Instead you utter some sarcastic remark that says nothing.
So, what are the problems with my model?

 

[keynes2.0]

You didn't quite convince me that I want to give you what you want. Have you considered tossing in a few more personal insults? That would probably convince me.

 

[Klausewitz]

Then the call goes out to everyone.
Whoever thinks he or she has a counterpoint worth making is cordially invited.

 

[Fire_Unionist]

Well then, what course of action would you have recommended to the UK and France?

 

[Klausewitz]

Pretty much what they did.
Belgium and the Netherlands remained quiet attached to their neutrality, so no offensive across the Northern Plains.
No invasion through France because that opens up a meatgrinder the Germans might very well come out of on top.
No Invasion through the North Sea since the Kriegsmarine would have been capable of inflicting severe casualties on both the Royal Navy and any landed troops so close to their own air support and their own ports.
No supplies through Danzig or Gdynia since 1) the corridor were was among the first Polish terrain to fall and 2) getting their would have meant running the gauntlet through German-controlled seas.
Which would have left air strikes on German cities, something which was shelfed for fear of retribution, and sending troops to the Polish through Rumania which would have meant a symbol gesture sure to strand those troops since Rumania would not have allowed through a lot of troops and those would have been hard to supply once there.
The guarantues the Western Allies had given to Poland could never be fulfilled once Germany had rearmed.

 

[Fire_Unionist]

Pretty much what they did.
Belgium and the Netherlands remained quiet attached to their neutrality, so no offensive across the Northern Plains.
No invasion through France because that opens up a meatgrinder the Germans might very well come out of on top.
No Invasion through the North Sea since the Kriegsmarine would have been capable of inflicting severe casualties on both the Royal Navy and any landed troops so close to their own air support and their own ports.
No supplies through Danzig or Gdynia since 1) the corridor were was among the first Polish terrain to fall and 2) getting their would have meant running the gauntlet through German-controlled seas.
Which would have left air strikes on German cities, something which was shelfed for fear of retribution, and sending troops to the Polish through Rumania which would have meant a symbol gesture sure to strand those troops since Rumania would not have allowed through a lot of troops and those would have been hard to supply once there.
The guarantues the Western Allies had given to Poland could never be fulfilled once Germany had rearmed.

So you are arguing that, once war was declared, the Allies did as well as they realistically could have.

 

[Klausewitz]

No, I am arguing they could have done more but it would not have done much good.
They could have force Belgium into the war, they could have tried to go through the woods but given their military capabilities it would not have had a noticable impact in the desired timeframe.
The war started in September and they would have had to achieve remarkable results before the winter, so in two, three months tops.

 

[Easy-Kill]

So you are arguing that, once war was declared, the Allies did as well as they realistically could have.

The problem is mainly one of mobilisation of industry for offensive warfare. As an example, the main reason Germany wished to avoid war with the western allies is that they knew after the declaration of war, the German industry would be stunted due to the allied blockade, but that the allies would continue to expand until they were vastly out producing Germany. Prior to Poland and the battle for France, huge increases in German munitions production were experienced. In the latter, 24% of German GDP was dedicated to armaments, an insane amount for any nation.

France and the UK may have had the men in 1939, but they didn't have the munitions necessary to undertake a sustained offensive operation. They had also not yet realised that the German military would recklessly gamble at the operational level to overcome strategic limitations.

 

[Easy-Kill]

If you don't have anything smart to say, maybe just say nothing, next time.

Just because what you said was slightly longer, doesn't make it any more smart.

 

[keynes2.0]

No Invasion through the North Sea since the Kriegsmarine would have been capable of inflicting severe casualties on both the Royal Navy and any landed troops so close to their own air support and their own ports.

The Germans were grossly outnumbered by just the home fleet alone. Their only advantage over the British was in speed. For instance the largest gun the British could have broug to the fight in 1939 was a 16 incher while the largest German piece equiped was a 11 inch gun, small even by the standards of Jutland. There is a reason they turned to cruiser warfare historically. The Germans had no pilots trained in naval warfare while the British were operating numerous aircraft carriers and soon demonstrated the effectiveness of their naval aircraft.

Naval invasions done in a hurry are a bad idea but the British were hardly afraid of getting in a naval showdown with the Kriegsmarine in 1939. If anything they would welcome such a fight.