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yeah it shows how airplanes are underpowered in HoI, in RL Germans were just annihilated by Jabos.
Well, IRL aircrafts were pretty useless in the beginning of Ardennes Offensive due to extremely bad weather. But I assure you that I am being bombed to the stone age, I just don't show everything in screens. Many divisions lost substantial amount of strength. Furthermore, my 4 TACs were annihilated by allied fighters in the West because I stupidly think that I may use interdiction mission to soften up Allied defenses.
The real problem lies in the fact that what airplanes really disrupted is not, or at best, misrepresented in HOI. Airplanes, especially in WWII, are not that good at actually destroying equipment or manpower. They are great for reducing operational capacity because the troops scatter, look for cover, only move at night, and have their supply lines bombed. Airplanes are a tool to soften up your enemy so that he fights back at many levels below optimum. They are not (at least in this timeframe) a tool to actually kill your opponents troops.
Org regain in HOI is fraking quick, thus, the deorganizing effects of a continous bombing campaign (coupled with the ridiculous effect negation of "dug in 20") are very undervalued, while the destruction effects (loss of STR ingame) are overvalued. An understandable tradeof, but one that casts a long and wrong shadow.
See link
I don't know, the Allied airpower in the West in 1944/45 was pretty devastating. It was practically suicidal for German tanks to move during day in good weather. I of course entirely agree that the key effect was just what you described, but I don't think the actual destructive power of CAS, especially against vehicles, should be underestimated.
(It would be great if for example "Ground Support/Attack" missions were more effective against the types of divisions that are "vehicle-based" - ARM, MOT, MECH, etc.).
Again, those tanks were lost as operational losses, not as tactical ones. You should always, always question pilots reports about the damage they done.
For example: tank goes out, plane pelts it with 20mm ammo, that bounces right of the top armour, and penetrates, with a little luck, the engine block. The tank is now turned into a stationary gun, and can be considered knocked out.
Now, if we have an army that is either static, or on the offensive, then said tank will be towed back to base or the nearest adequate repair facility, and is repaired, and good to go. It is a short-lived loss, but not a permanent one.
If we have a retreating army with supply and logistics problems (germans in 1944), we will see that tank getting abandoned, and thus lost. This is an operational loss, since it was not brought by the plane actually killing the tank, but by the army the plane belonging to, advancing and enveloping the tank.
What HOI models, on the other hand, is tactical loss, meaning that the plane renders the tank not only inoperable, but completely destroys it. That did not happen often during WWII. Yes, the late-war planes had rockets, but you actually have to HIT things to destroy them, and this is where pre-guided munitions planes lack a lot.
(The same goes for the germans,of course, but they exploited this very fact, the disorganizing factor, in blitzkrieg)