I know I'm way off topic, but what looks harder to you? This armored car:
or this tank:
There is no question that the armor technologies advanced dramatically during the war years, but if we are going to give pre-war light armor units 30 softness, the armored cars deserve the same or thereabouts.
The examples you chose are somewhat misleading. That armoured car looks quite "hard", but I think you'll find the armour is no more than a few mm thick, while even that abysmal light tank example (hardly representative) would have armour thick enough to deflect/absorb shell fragments. Wheeled vehicles, by their nature, suffer when their armour is increased beyond a given point (their ground-pressure is much higher than a tracked vehicle) and in general any tank of any timeframe was much more heavily armoured than a concurrent armoured car. The few exceptions only help to prove the rule.
The subject was mechanized units of which the panzer divisions, as you said, typically had only one infantry battalion with APCs. The tactic I described was standard procedure in '43 and '44. This tactic was specifically described by Joachim Peiper of Malmedy infamy who was actually a Panzer Grenadier battalion commander during 1943 and 1944. He was promoted to command a panzer regiment just before the Battle of the Bulge. The Battle of the Bulge was his first experience with tanks which was why he ended up losing pretty much the entire tank regiment.
Think about it....how could this tactic have been used BEFORE 1943 when the infantry in a panzer division didn't have even one battalion in APC's. The Germans did not supinely retreat. Their operational doctrine called for immediate counter attacks if at all possible while their opponents were still disorganized after their attacks. And they still made full scale attacks into 1945.
Edit: Yes, this is per their ToE. Yes they were typically equipped below their ToE but that is also true of every unit in every army after even a short time in combat. Regardless of the numbers of APC's in a unit each still had 3 MG42's and they used the tactics they were taught regardless of their numbers.
a) I never suggested that it could be used before 1943...
b) The fact that one commander described it as a tactic (whether or not it was standard) is hardly indicative of its prevalence.
c) In later-1943 and 1944 the bulk of the Ostheer's panzer units were retreating exceedingly quickly through particularly the Ukraine and more generally the entire front. I agree their tactics called for aggressive counterattacks - I have seen little indication however, in my studies of the Eastern Front (my Master's specialization), that they had much opportunity to do so during the period in question.
d) Special circumstances weakened the Ostheer far beyond a typical army in combat. Hitler preferred to send new equipment to build new divisions rather than reinforce old ones, and as early as late 1943 most panzer/panzergrenadier units in the Ostheer were below 20% of their equipment TO&E (including MGs, which is clearly indicated by the unit supply records). Well below the status of any typical army in combat.