Make maginot line great again

[jockedahl]

I don't want this to become a World War 1 simulator.

Save that for Victoria 3 Podcat!

 

[Bridger15]

That is true!

However in my experience it was never worth to put resources into building the line, better spent it on IC and equipment.

Except that your equipment is built by military factories and forts are built by civilian factories. Yes, civilian factories could also spend their time building military factories, (and they will do that a lot in the early game), but eventually you are going to run out of room for your factories or you're going to run into a situation where you can't wait for the investment in the mil factories to pay off and you need defensive power on a front *right now*. Forts are great for these situations.

 

[lekim]

Except that your equipment is built by military factories and forts are built by civilian factories. Yes, civilian factories could also spend their time building military factories, (and they will do that a lot in the early game), but eventually you are going to run out of room for your factories or you're going to run into a situation where you can't wait for the investment in the mil factories to pay off and you need defensive power on a front *right now*. Forts are great for these situations.

I do not expect that you will have a lot of free IC to build the forts - watch some WWW video, civilian IC is used to repair everything all the time. Infrastructure is very important in the game -> I will expect that when the game is balanced say Germany will have to improve USSR infrastructure to be able to expand beyond Ukraine, same for Japan in China.

I believe I proposed an interesting concept for forts (a dynamic defense bonus, troops speed move bonus and tactical attack delay) which can make them a go to defense tool especially if you need to cover a huge coastline and lacking divisions.

Actually it is probably a DLC material cause most likely it will kill existing AI strategies

 

[amalric de g.]

The ignorance people show towards what the Maginot Line was for is astounding. It succeeded in all of it's goals. Every one. The Maginot Line didn't fail, or cause the fall of France. Gamelin and the French High Command did.

Sorry, i´m not ignorant about the importance of the Maginot Line, but all Fortresses sooner or later fall, if the attacker do it right. Thats the point and the french government had better extended the line straight to the channel, regardless what the Belgians think about it.

The funny side is, the fanboys allways try to proof that only they are right and all other opinions didn´t matter. You think, that my avatar means i´m a german fanboy and try to down play the Maginot and France as a whole, that´s a prejudice.

No one said it was impenetrable. But if you are going to use Wiki to disparage the Maginot Line, the least I can do is use Wiki to show how useful it was. What was written directly underneath the part you quoted.

And even more interesting:
So, just to be clear to everyone in this thread:

The Maginot Line held out longer than Maurice Gamelin, Marshal Petain, and the entire French Republic. Even when attacked from the rear, fortresses were difficult to seize. Even when surrounded and the government surrendered, fortresses continued to hold out.

You can make fun of the French for surrendering (I don't, but other people do), but I wouldn't make fun of the Maginot Line's battlefield record. It did better than the rest of the French and British armies in 1940.

I didn´t made fun out of it, but the simple truth is, all fortresses/lines Maginot, Metaxas, Siegfried and the Chzech Line are not impenetrable, it only depends on time and effort to go through, thats all.

Why do you think, i quoted this wiki source? It clearly says, the maginot was broken on three weak points and in one case with support from the rear. The rest of the Line still hold out, but a chain is only so strong as the weakest point of it.

 

[keynes2.0]

but all Fortresses sooner or later fall, if the attacker do it right.

That is a ridiculous conditional. I could just as well say "all fortresses hold forever, if the defenders do it right." You are creating a loophole where any attack that fails is classified "attackers did it wrong".

 

[keynes2.0]

TThere was no specific failure in ... or strategy

There was a very specific and very massive failure of strategy. Gamelin deployed the 7th army to belgium instead of keeping it in reserve and deploying a different army to belgium like the entire french military strategy was designed around. That is what created the opportunity for Germany to make a massive encirclement, the mobile army that was perfect to counter the German attack was not in position to do so.

 

[Secret Master]

I didn´t made fun out of it, but the simple truth is, all fortresses/lines Maginot, Metaxas, Siegfried and the Chzech Line are not impenetrable, it only depends on time and effort to go through, thats all.

Why do you think, i quoted this wiki source? It clearly says, the maginot was broken on three weak points and in one case with support from the rear. The rest of the Line still hold out, but a chain is only so strong as the weakest point of it.

You are assuming that a fortress's job is to remain an impregnable and absolute defense. That is not necessarily true.

Fortresses also perform the following functions:

1) Amplify the defender's fighting ability: When facing an enemy with superior numbers or firepower, fortifications can be used to amplify the defender's ability to fight. If you can hold a fortified position for three days with 1/3 as many men as it would take without fortifications, you just bought three days and extra men to do something on another part of the front.

2) Channel the attacker: Sometimes, the goal of fortifications is to discourage the movement of attackers in certain directions. Even at the squad and fire team level, using fox holes and concertina wire to channel attackers into fire lanes where crew served weapons can hit them better is a pretty standard tactic. At the strategic level, covering a line of advance with massive fortifications might encourage the attacker to maneuver somewhere else. Incidentally, the Maginot Line did this beautifully. Gamelin should have had the Germans channeled into a fight on his terms in Belgium and northern France since most German forces went through Belgium. But the French screwed that up, not the Maginot Line.

3) Conserve manpower: The disparity between France and Germany in terms of manpower was striking in the 20s and 30s. In demographic terms, creating the Maginot Line in 1930, especially in light of luke warm commitments from Britain to force Germany to abide by Versailles, makes sense. If you expect Germany to be able to attack you with almost twice as many soldiers, creating a system of fortifications to help neutralize that advantage makes sense, especially in light of WWI. I should also point out that France does not create the Maginot Line until after her troops leave the Rhineland. With her ability to just immediately occupy the Rhineland if Germany screws around removed, France had far less security. Building a string of fortifications that cover the French heartland makes sense if you want to defend that area with fewer troops so you can meet the Germans in Belgium per the terms of your alliance with Belgium.

4) Buy time: Fortresses have always been used delay enemy attacks. If the enemy spends two weeks wearing down a fortress to overcome it, that's two weeks it's not marching on the heartland of the defender. The Czech fortresses are like this; Czechoslovakia knows it cannot defeat Germany by itself. But with an alliance with France, she doesn't have to. If it takes Germany six weeks to overcome the border forts, surely her allies will have come in from the other front and taken the pressure off by then (the fact that Munich gave Czech forts to Germany is one of the key things that doomed Czechoslovakia in the end). The same is true for other fortifications. French military doctrine at the time assumed that another war with Germany would be a long war. The fortresses on the Maginot Line were designed to buy France time to mobilize fully for the anticipated war. They also buy time for economic problems to hamper German military strength. If Britain joins a war against Germany, a blockade will take time to have an effect on Germany (as it did during the last war). But if Germany wastes her initial strength against fortresses like those on the Maginot Line, then even her numerical superiority won't matter a year down the road as her economy faces serious problems. (The M-R Pact is one way Germany tries to get around this problem.) It's also worth pointing out that buying time for Britain to fully mobilize and send help to fight is a worthwhile goal itself if France feels she can rely on Britain. Of course, it doesn't matter if the British get routed and evacuate at Dunkirk, but that's the Maginot Line's fault, either.

It's worth pointing out that German planning reflected this reality; various planners knew what was awaiting Germany if she did not achieve a satisfactory outcome before the economic effects were felt or the Allies fully mobilized for war.

5) Fortifications that are properly manned can avoid the problem of surprise attack: While it's not generally a big deal in this particular war, fortifications can be used to negate advantages of surprise attacks.

I should also point out that the wiki page you quote says nothing about the Maginot Line being intended be an absolute defense that was impregnable.

The Maginot Line was built to fulfill several purposes:

• To avoid a surprise attack and to give the alarm
• To cover the mobilisation of the French Army (which took between two and three weeks)
• To save manpower (France counted 39 million inhabitants, Germany 70 million)
• To protect Alsace and Lorraine (returned to France in 1918) and their industrial basin
• To be used as a basis for a counter-offensive
• To push the enemy to circumvent it while passing by Switzerland or Belgium
• To hold the enemy while the main army could be brought up to reinforce the line
• To show non-aggressive posture, and compel the British to help France if Germany invaded Belgium
• To push Belgium into the war, by leaving it open to an attack from Germany

Based on the above criteria, do you think the Maginot Line did it's job? It did all of those things, including the basis of a counter-offensive (see the Saar Offensive).

Now, you might argue that it was too expensive, or that the Maginot Line was not properly utilized (wasted opportunities like the Saar Offensive), or that France should have traded the Maginot Line for five times as many heavy artillery pieces, but saying that the Maginot Line was intended to be some absolute end all and be all of warfare for France is simply not true. The strategies behind the design and creation of the Maginot Line were rational responses to France's position in the 30s.

I personally think that France put too many divisions on the Maginot Line during 1940. More trust in the Maginot Line's defensive capabilities would have allowed France to have a larger strategic reserve by freeing up divisions that were historically tied down there. Even ten divisions taken off the Maginot Line and prepped to plug holes up north might have made a significant difference in the outcome of the war.

 

[amalric de g.]

That is a ridiculous conditional. I could just as well say "all fortresses hold forever, if the defenders do it right." You are creating a loophole where any attack that fails is classified "attackers did it wrong".

Why is it a loophole? Every coin has two sides, or not? It´s pointless, if i say the attacker wins or the defender lost, or the defender wins and the attacker lost.

It´s common sense, that the defender of the fortress plays his role in this case as well. In the example of the Maginot Line it´s the french armoured corps that should prevent the attacker to circle around the Maginot and attack unhindered from the rear.
Or in the case of a breakthrough the french Reserve Divisions should hinder the attacker to gain ground and ideally throw them back.

You are assuming that a fortress's job is to remain an impregnable and absolute defense. That is not necessarily true.

Fortresses also perform the following functions:

1) Amplify the defender's fighting ability: When facing an enemy with superior numbers or firepower, fortifications can be used to amplify the defender's ability to fight. If you can hold a fortified position for three days with 1/3 as many men as it would take without fortifications, you just bought three days and extra men to do something on another part of the front.

2) Channel the attacker: Sometimes, the goal of fortifications is to discourage the movement of attackers in certain directions. Even at the squad and fire team level, using fox holes and concertina wire to channel attackers into fire lanes where crew served weapons can hit them better is a pretty standard tactic. At the strategic level, covering a line of advance with massive fortifications might encourage the attacker to maneuver somewhere else. Incidentally, the Maginot Line did this beautifully. Gamelin should have had the Germans channeled into a fight on his terms in Belgium and northern France since most German forces went through Belgium. But the French screwed that up, not the Maginot Line.

3) Conserve manpower: The disparity between France and Germany in terms of manpower was striking in the 20s and 30s. In demographic terms, creating the Maginot Line in 1930, especially in light of luke warm commitments from Britain to force Germany to abide by Versailles, makes sense. If you expect Germany to be able to attack you with almost twice as many soldiers, creating a system of fortifications to help neutralize that advantage makes sense, especially in light of WWI. I should also point out that France does not create the Maginot Line until after her troops leave the Rhineland. With her ability to just immediately occupy the Rhineland if Germany screws around removed, France had far less security. Building a string of fortifications that cover the French heartland makes sense if you want to defend that area with fewer troops so you can meet the Germans in Belgium per the terms of your alliance with Belgium.

4) Buy time: Fortresses have always been used delay enemy attacks. If the enemy spends two weeks wearing down a fortress to overcome it, that's two weeks it's not marching on the heartland of the defender. The Czech fortresses are like this; Czechoslovakia knows it cannot defeat Germany by itself. But with an alliance with France, she doesn't have to. If it takes Germany six weeks to overcome the border forts, surely her allies will have come in from the other front and taken the pressure off by then (the fact that Munich gave Czech forts to Germany is one of the key things that doomed Czechoslovakia in the end). The same is true for other fortifications. French military doctrine at the time assumed that another war with Germany would be a long war. The fortresses on the Maginot Line were designed to buy France time to mobilize fully for the anticipated war. They also buy time for economic problems to hamper German military strength. If Britain joins a war against Germany, a blockade will take time to have an effect on Germany (as it did during the last war). But if Germany wastes her initial strength against fortresses like those on the Maginot Line, then even her numerical superiority won't matter a year down the road as her economy faces serious problems. (The M-R Pact is one way Germany tries to get around this problem.) It's also worth pointing out that buying time for Britain to fully mobilize and send help to fight is a worthwhile goal itself if France feels she can rely on Britain. Of course, it doesn't matter if the British get routed and evacuate at Dunkirk, but that's the Maginot Line's fault, either.

It's worth pointing out that German planning reflected this reality; various planners knew what was awaiting Germany if she did not achieve a satisfactory outcome before the economic effects were felt or the Allies fully mobilized for war.

5) Fortifications that are properly manned can avoid the problem of surprise attack: While it's not generally a big deal in this particular war, fortifications can be used to negate advantages of surprise attacks.

I should also point out that the wiki page you quote says nothing about the Maginot Line being intended be an absolute defense that was impregnable.


Based on the above criteria, do you think the Maginot Line did it's job? It did all of those things, including the basis of a counter-offensive (see the Saar Offensive).

Now, you might argue that it was too expensive, or that the Maginot Line was not properly utilized (wasted opportunities like the Saar Offensive), or that France should have traded the Maginot Line for five times as many heavy artillery pieces, but saying that the Maginot Line was intended to be some absolute end all and be all of warfare for France is simply not true. The strategies behind the design and creation of the Maginot Line were rational responses to France's position in the 30s.

Where did I wrote, that the Maginot Line did not it´s job? My statement, that the Line is not unbreakable, was only for the fanboys who think that the Line was not broken.

I assume not that a Fortress is unbreakable, thats nonsense.

France made several big mistakes:

1. The Line was not completed, there are some holes in the Line.
2. The Line was not build to the channel coast.
3. The Line was not strong enough on the Rhine border.
4. France needed several Infantrie Divisions to close the holes.
5. France needed field artillery to protect the weak points.
6. Ardennes are impenetrable for tanks.

If you are dependent on one condition only, what do you think would Sun Tzu say to you?

I personally think that France put too many divisions on the Maginot Line during 1940. More trust in the Maginot Line's defensive capabilities would have allowed France to have a larger strategic reserve by freeing up divisions that were historically tied down there. Even ten divisions taken off the Maginot Line and prepped to plug holes up north might have made a significant difference in the outcome of the war.

Thats only partially true, the french had enough reserves in the vicinity of Sedan, but they got peacemeal destroyed. The french high command feared rightfully a breakthrough of the Maginot, thats why they send only 3 Divisions on the 15.May to the area of Sedan. But it was allready to late.

And most Divisions in the Maginot Line are Fortress Divisons without heavy equipment and the rest was category B Divisions. And the Maginot Line along the Rhine was not so strong as most guys think, thats why the french needed the Infantry Divisions and the artillery as Reserves.

Here is a map of the Maginot, the big black line is with Artillery and the smaller black line had only MG cover, so the infantry Divisions are needed to protect the Maginot.

The Allies possessed at the start of the German attack sufficient reserves. In addition to the 7th Army (Giraud) the strong cavalry corps Prioux and four armored divisions could be made ready for retaliation. the 7th Army set northward march - as it was believed to have recognized the heavyweight divisions in the north, initially was the cavalry corps ordered to stay and a little later send also north - despite protests from General Georges.

The fate of the other reserves:
The 1st Armored Division (General Bruneau) was charged with 167 modern tanks, including 65 Char B, surprised the morning of May 15 at Flavion by the 7th and 5th Panzer Divisions during refueling and smashed to the ground by the Panzer Regiment 31 of the 5th Panzer Division although they had only 30 tanks of types III and IV.

The 2nd Armored Division (Bruche) received five different operational orders between 11 and 15 May. Since the tanks were transported by railway and the baggage train on the street, it came to the fragmentation and ultimately to paralysis of the Division. Quoting from the report of the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry:
"On May 16, there is no 2nd Panzer Division anymore, but only scattered units, whose leaders are trying by all means to keep order, to comply with amendment instructions to avoid air raids and German armored spearheads, while command posts of all kinds fight over them and the confusion multiply. "

The 3rd Armored Division (Brocard) failed at Sedan, the time window for a counter strike and frittered subsequently in the fighting at Stonne.

The 4th Armored Division (de Gaulle) prepared the German command the greatest concern. She reached the morning of May 17 of the Aisne ago northward direction and overran German motorcades. Only on the outskirts of Montcornet succeeded anti-tank guns and 88mm guns to stop them. After air raids and a counterattack by the 10th Panzer Division, the division had to retreat after heavy losses. Two days later they made again a attack at Crecy-sur-Serre. There the battle was decided mainly by the use of the german Air Force. De Gaulle was accused later of having not requested air support.