(B. RESTRICTION AND UNRESTRICTION, AND SURFACE WARFARE)
TheBromgrev, that's useful to know. I'll bear it in mind. And yes, I'm extremely concerned about US involvement.
Baltasar, I declared war on the Benelux nations to give the land army the historical option for attacking France. Needless to say, with France actually advancing on the France/Germany front, I'm very concerned about the war in the west.
Laurwin, I'll deal with the issue of unrestricted submarine warfare in depth in this post.
As for who provides the convoys, it sounds like you know much more than I do about the details. If any convoy ships I sink are not Allied per se, though, they come from pools on which the Allies are drawing. Historically, the United States bent its neutrality severely out of shape to provide naval assistance to Britain before formally joining the war, not merely shipping war supplies to the British Isles and providing merchant ships (notably tankers), but actually escorting UK-bound convoys to the mid-Atlantic (where responsibility was handed off to Canadian or British escorts). This was particularly problematic for U-boats because Hitler, not wishing to provoke the USA into the war, ordered that U-boats not fire on these escorts.
Your summary of Tooze is also what Dönitz believed. I haven't seen hits to national unity or anything else yet, but it's early days and maybe that stuff will start kicking in after several million more tons of shipping hit the bottom.
The tech difference is a mysterious one for me at this point. With my most productive U-taskforce made up of obsolete boats, clearly tech is not the be-all and end-all of commerce raiding. At the same time, there is absolutely no getting around the range requirements for certain deployments. (I am not sure HoI3 Type IXs are technically capable of Operation Drumbeat from Brest. Should I capture Brest I will find out.) I had hoped to wage a close war and avoid the need for too much engine research, but it's not to be. I don't rule out the possibility entirely, though, and maybe with better air support a "Coastlion" near-shore blockade would be feasible. I must confess I've left most of the aircraft with the land forces because I'm afraid they'll need the support against the French. (Also, my policy has been to build interceptors in strong preference to ground-based anti-air capabilities of any kind, which makes my AA locationally flexible but also locks many interceptors into reactive roles rather than clearing the skies over the Channel.)
Cybvep, it's not gambling, it's incompetence. I needed to influence the USA from the start to (at worst) delay its entry, and I didn't despite identifying its neutrality as a critical war goal. Similarly, I didn't mean for things to turn out this way but I think I can count on an attack from the Soviet Union in a few years and need to wrap the land war with the Allies up in time to deal with that. We'll have to see if Normal difficulty can save me.
TheRealKestrel, I plan to deal with the issue of task forces and capital ships in this post. The short version is that I don't expect my submarines to take on surface navies directly, instead hopefully weakening them by creating fuel shortages that hinder operation and materials shortages that hinder construction.
dublish, while you may be right about visibility, the unfortunate thing about moving my U-boats out to sea is that the more distance I put between my pickets and European ports, the more area I'll need to cover to get all the routes, and the thinner that coverage will be. With 60 to 90 boats in the Channel, I may well have been sinking everything that sailed in (except British taskforces, sadly). Ten submarines in Rockall or Porcupine or King's Trough or Finisterre may not be so effective, allowing some ships to slip through. In analyzing convoy sinkings I found, expectedly, that shipping is extremely concentrated around a select few European ports, which take in goods from all over the world. With better range I might be able to seal off foreign ports or (against the Americans, where direct blockade is probably too risky) set up a faraway picket tailored to catching ships leaving Boston and Halifax rather than striking while they're arriving at Portsmouth or Dover.
scholar, thanks for your support. Good luck to you as well.
Now then! Unrestricted submarine warfare in HoI3 is abstracted to the point of extreme simplicity: it's a technology.
On paper, there are no drawbacks.
Of course, it's not that the German navy didn't know about unrestricted submarine warfare or how to conduct it, given that it was a major if sporadic feature of naval operations in WWI. As I've said before, I believe that this technology represents the political and doctrinal effort of getting USW accepted and put into practice.
In order to understand unrestricted submarine warfare, it's necessary to understand restricted submarine warfare. Under standing naval conventions, a warship couldn't just sink a merchant on sight, even one flying an enemy flag. Instead, they were supposed to fire a warning shot, wait for the merchant to halt, board and inspect the cargo, and determine whether the ship was carrying war supplies. If it was, the warship had two options. They could send part of their own crew onto the merchant (called a prize crew) and have them take the ship to a friendly port as spoils of war, or they could fully evacuate the enemy crew, take them prisoner, and sink the ship.
The basic ideas behind these rules were informed by the realities of oceangoing warfare in the age of sail. They made no special provisions for submarines, which must rely on surprise to be effective and (particularly in WWII) did not have the necessary living space to carry prize crews or POW crews. Prize rules worked very well for merchant raiders, the conventional cousins of submarines (light warships disguised as enemy or neutral merchants), but a submarine firing a warning shot was usually faced with a fleeing merchant broadcasting SSS, the distress signal indicating submarine attack.
Sid Meier's Pirates!, a game where prize rules come more naturally.
As far as these issues were concerned, this was a frustrating time for U-boat skippers. The British made propaganda of German attacks on (for example) a mercy ship carrying refugee children, but that ship wasn't marked in any special way and behaved like any other freighter, leaving the U-boats no way to know it was protected by the code of the sea. Similarly, hospital ships sailed without red crosses, and neutrals sailed blacked out at night rather than lit up.
Radio communication and air cover changed the equation as much as submarines did. To the submariners, broadcasting SSS on the radio was the hostile use of a weapon, and made merchants fair game if they did it. A U-boat radioing the position of a sinking and asking ships in range to pick up the crew made itself a target for retaliatory air patrols and redirected warships. Even providing assistance to the crew of the stricken vessel was dangerous, eating up valuable escape time and not really having any counter-propaganda effect with the Allies.
There was also the matter of convoying. An effective convoy (which is not to say the war's early convoys were effective) should be largely impervious to lone submarine attack under these rules, since surface ships can reply to a warning shot with their vastly superior deck guns. Convoying was another proven technique from WWI and all sides had every reason to expect it.
Why wouldn't the navy be happy to make a change that made their operations more effective and was already a tested, proven procedure from the last war? There are three reasons.
The first is that unrestricted submarine warfare in WWI was the focus of a great deal of concern about the horrors of war. Anti-German propaganda in that war made a great deal of it, calling the Germans savages for sinking ships without warning and making the very phrase "unrestricted submarine warfare" an epithet. It was as reviled, in many ways, as gas weapons (a favorite topic for anti-war poets, they were avoided entirely in WWII, although there were a handful of frightening false alarms).
The second is that as unrestricted submarine warfare removes much of the safeguard against sinking friendly, neutral, or protected ships, it makes it easier for mistakes to happen. Submariners cleared to attack any ship in the water could easily misidentify a blacked-out ship or its flag at night and sink it though they shouldn't. There were several painful diplomatic and friendly fire incidents during the war. In addition, unrestricted submarine warfare was a direct violation of a high-profile clause in the interwar international naval treaties. Germany had already broken these treaties in many ways (historically, by rebuilding the navy; in my game, by building so many submarines), but the return to unrestricted submarine warfare would be ugly and unpopular and give the Allies a windfall of propaganda ammunition as well as casting further doubt on the value of any international agreements with Germany.
The third is that frankly, the naval officers were personally inclined to do what they saw as the honorable thing. It was typical for U-boat captains to order the provision of enemy lifeboats with such things as blankets, compasses, food and water, and directions to the nearest land. Dönitz, concerned that this was putting U-boats in danger, ordered them not to assist survivors anymore. Although the issue is far more complex than its abstraction in HoI3, this would have been a major turning point in the implementation of unrestricted submarine warfare as the game presents it. The first such order was issued in 1939, but the second in 1942 is probably a better indicator of when "the technology was researched." I am in 1939 now and will consider myself fortunate to be waging unrestricted submarine warfare in 1942 (if only because it will mean I have survived three years!).
Dönitz was tried at Nuremberg and the whole tangled mess of submarine warfare protocols examined in great detail. The Allies naturally wished to charge Dönitz with everything they could, but in the end they were only able to sentence him to ten years in prison (oddly enough, the same amount of time he was a U-boat commander). Sources differ on the relative weight of Dönitz's alleged crimes in the sentence, and two major complicating factors were that the Allies had their own comparable skeletons in the closet (particularly the quietly-conducted unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan), and that many witnesses for the defense came forward with information on German rescue operations and Allied countermeasures that made it more difficult, if not impossible, for the German navy to follow the rules of war.
Although it seems to me that his role in the treaty-breaking reconstruction of the German navy would have more than justified execution or life in prison, the whole business of unrestricted submarine warfare as a war crime is the result of a curious double standard, and that either this perception ought to be abandoned or many, many other things which aren't generally seen as specifically being atrocities ought to be recognized as such. Expectations are different on the sea, but imagine the fighter pilot accused of shooting down an enemy transport plane without rescuing the crew, or the infantry unit put on trial for attacking an enemy truck convoy without first searching it, or the artillery operators sentenced for sustaining indirect fire on an enemy position which included an unmarked hospital tent. At some point you must either consider war a circumstance which is by nature not fully restricted, or condemn war itself.
The other major topic I want to deal with in this post is submarine suitability to strikes on capital ships and surface fleets in general. It is becoming increasingly clear to me that HoI3 comes down on the side that they are ineffective. I don't think this is quite fair to the humble submarine, which seems to me to be perhaps the premier way to attack a capital ship.
Consider the torpedo. Torpedoes as submarines know them were developed for the forerunners of destroyers, torpedo boats. The idea was to give a small, expendable vessel the mine-like firepower to sink or seriously damage capital ships. Submarines and naval (torpedo) bombers appropriated the torpedo for their own use.
We can see the effectiveness of the torpedo for torpedo boats and destroyers in the Battle of Vella Gulf, when six American destroyers jumped four Japanese destroyers and won a decisive victory through use of surprise and torpedoes. Approaching under cover of darkness, their silhouettes hidden by land, they used radar to establish bearings and ranges and fired more than 30 torpedoes over the course of roughly a minute. Stealth was the key, with the Americans having the advantage because of their ability to detect and avoid detection, and their use of torpedoes, which do not give away position the way deck guns do.
The Battle of Vella Gulf was an exceptional incident. Most of the time, destroyers cannot expect to manage their own detectability this way. It was owing to a fortunate combination of conditions and terrain that they could launch their torpedoes without being seen. But for submarines, these factors are typical. They can submerge to completely conceal themselves from gunfire and radar and visual identification (although in clear water it may be possible to see a shallowly submerged submarine, especially from the air), they can establish bearings and tentative identifications with their hydrophones and take range measurements (at the risk of detection) with active sonar, they can (while surfaced) use radar for range and bearing measurements, and they can, as everyone knows, maintain direct visual contact with a tiny periscope barely poking out of the water. Submarines may or may not launch fewer torpedoes than a similar number of destroyers (if a group of 5 submarines has 3 forward tubes and fires full forward salvos, it's 15 torpedoes; 4 forward tubes and it's 20; 6 forward tubes and it's 30), but they are certainly far more likely to do so under favorable conditions, and far more capable of departing undetected. (The Thorn Dance attack discussed above could, if done perfectly, use Type VII boats to throw a pattern of no less than 120 torpedoes through a convoy or task force, with an additional 30 stern torpedoes available to fire during the escape phase, not counting reloads.)
Even surfaced, submarines have a distinct visibility advantage over surface ships, being generally smaller and lower in profile.
The typical torpedo of the period had a 600-pound warhead with an enhanced TNT explosive (Torpex for the Allies, Hexanite for the Germans). (These were not the biggest explosives in the ocean. The Japanese torpedoes were in some respects more advanced, with 1,000-pound warheads. The typical mine warhead was around 1,200 pounds.) Electric torpedoes without visible wakes (at the cost of slower speeds) were developed, as were (eventually) slow homing torpedoes and torpedoes that could be programmed to run in search patterns to maximize the chance of striking a ship in a convoy. Three systems existed to deliver torpedoes to targets: the surface warship, the submarine, and the torpedo bomber.
Let's consider 1939 Sea Attack values in HoI3. Naval bombers rate 6.75 and carrier air groups rate 4.25. Bear in mind that aircraft were more detectable in the attack than submarines due to their engine noise and, well, position in the air rather than under the water, and that they could be targeted with anti-aircraft guns. Destroyers rate 4.20, light cruisers 7.00, heavy cruisers 12.00, and it goes up from there. Only one class that even has a Sea Attack score rates lower than destroyers, and that's submarines, clocking in at a pathetic 1.80. Now let's assume that there are five submarines in a flotilla and 30 planes in a torpedo bomber squadron. Torpedo bombers carry one torpedo each, and the typical sub of this time period (the Type VII, we shall assume) has four forward torpedo tubes and one stern tube. So a 30-torpedo attack from aircraft, likely to be inferior in terms of conditions for launch and which may even be carrying a lighter variant of the torpedo, is considered to have 0.22 Sea Attack per torpedo (or for CAGs, 0.14), while 5 Type VIIs collectively launching 20 initial torpedoes and having the option of 5 more through the stern tubes, with greater stalking and aiming opportunities, exert only 0.09 to 0.07 Sea Attack per torpedo. Why are submarine torpedoes less than half as effective as naval bomber torpedoes? Are airplanes magical? (The presence of gun batteries on destroyers makes the destroyer rating more resistant to analysis.) Now granted, there is supposedly a special surprise attack chance, but even without surprise, we're talking about a very divergent treatment of comparable ordinance. (It could be argued that the difference means naval bombers are using thousand-pound bombs rather than torpedoes. I say thee nay!, for several reasons. Although it is true that the bombs have more explosive and could in some cases even be carried two at a time, they are more dangerous to launch than torpedoes, harder to strike with, and are less likely to strike the keel or the hull below the waterline.)
Fortunately the game does recognize the difficulties of targetting submarines with surface ships or aircraft, using a separate Sub Attack stat to represent ASW capability. In most cases, ASW detection and weapons systems were entirely separate from surface warfare capabilities, as a submerged submarine simply can't be attacked with guns or spotted by a deck watch. So Sub Attack represents systems such as depth charges (bombs rolled off the deck) and depth charge catapults (self-explanatory), and Sub Detection represents systems such as hydrophones and sonar. In the case of naval bombers, for ASW they would use radar to catch subs on the surface (standard operating procedure was to remain on the surface unless expecting contact with an enemy patrol or target), hydrophone sensors dangled into the ocean to detect submerged subs, and bombs rather than torpedoes. (Scientific review convinced the British to switch from large, single bombs bursting at 250 feet to more effective strings of small, shallow-exploding bombs.) The Sub Attack and Sub Detection values look reasonable to me in context, with the primary part of that context being submarine Visibility (3.00, with the next lowest being destroyers at 50.00). Submarines may languish (appropriately) at the bottom of the Speed and Range lists, but they have their advantages too. (Similarly, the submarine flotilla is equal to a battleship and not quite the equivalent of a battlecruiser or superheavy battleship at pure commerce raiding, but this makes sense because of the superior speed and relative imperviousness of such capital ships to merchants and escorts.)
This would be incomplete without a discussion of historical results. Submarines, and torpedoes in general, did sink capital ships. Over the course of the war the United States operated about 260 submarines against the Japanese, losing around 60. What follows is a partial list of major Japanese warships destroyed in whole or in part by torpedoes.
*Light Cruisers
- Isuzu, torpedoed by submarine
- Kashii, aerial torpedo assist
- Kuma, torpedoed by (British) submarine
- Nagara, torpedoed by submarine
- Naka, aerial torpedo assist
- Natori, torpedoed by submarine
- Noshiro, aerial torpedo assist
- Oi, torpedoed by submarine
- Okinoshima (minelayer-cruiser), torpedoed by submarine
- Tama, torpedoed by aircraft and submarine
- Tatsuta, torpedoed by submarine
- Tenryu, torpedoed by submarine
- Yahagi, aerial torpedo assist
- Yubari, torpedoed by submarine
*Heavy Cruisers
- Ashigara, torpedoed by submarine
- Atago, torpedoed by submarine
- Kako, torpedoed by submarine
- Kumano, repeated attacks including submarine and aerial torpedoes
- Maya, torpedoed by submarine
- Nachi, aerial torpedo assist
- Suzuya, aerial torpedo assist
*Carriers
- Chitose, aerial and destroyer torpedo assist
- Hiyo, aerial torpedo assist
- Ryujo, aerial torpedo assist
- Shinano, torepedoed by submarine
- Shinyo, torpedoed by submarine
- Shoho, aerial torpedo assist
- Shokaku, torpedoed by submarine
- Taiho, torpedoed by submarine
- Taiyo, torpedoed by submarine
- Unryu, torpedoed by submarine
- Unyo, torpedoed by submarine
*Battleships
- Fuso, destroyer torpedo assist
- Hiei, aerial torpedo assist
- Kongo, torpedoed by submarine
- Musashi, aerial torpedo assist
- Yamashiro, destroyer torpedo assist
- Yamato, aerial torpedo assist
American Avenger torpedo bomber, payload one torpedo.
So there is just one area where I feel submarines are not getting their due, but it is an absolutely critical one. Submarine torpedoes are underrated in HoI3. However, I am willing to accommodate the game as it is, declaring that in my game, things must have gone disastrously wrong in early mass operations (which I always recognized as a possibility; radio silence and tight coordination don't mesh well) and forced Dönitz to shift to more historical deployments with no interest in confronting enemy task forces. Ingame research continues on all aspects of submarine development, with range essential to operate further into the Atlantic, torpedoes essential for core effectiveness, unrestricted submarine warfare essential for same, and hull design essential for lower profiles and deeper diving depths. If there's one area I'd consider less of a priority now, it's anti-aircraft capability, as deterring aircraft is not preferable at this point to evading them.
Steam has autopatched HoI3 even though I told it not to update. Fingers crossed that it didn't break anything.