Leaving Stalingrad ?

[makif130289]

Hi,

What do you think about Germans trying to evacuate Stalingrad through a narrow corridor ( as suggested by some German commanders ) right after the city was encircled ? My questions :

1) Would it be possible to create a narrow passage to leave the city quickly ? Could Germans have stabilized the front after quick evacuation ?

2) Germans captured almost all of the city for an exremely heavy price, leaving it without a fight seems very demoralizing. Additionally, Germans managed to supply Demyansk pocket from air few months ago and Goering said Luftwaffe could supply Stalingrad as well. Hitler's plan was to hold the city against Soviet attacks and to prepare a battle group with fresh panzer divisions. The city was then expected be relieved within around 2 months. Was this plan implausible from the beginning ?

 

[Herbert West]

2) Germans captured almost all of the city for an exremely heavy price, leaving it without a fight seems very demoralizing. Additionally, Germans managed to supply Demyansk pocket from air few months ago and Goering said Luftwaffe could supply Stalingrad as well. Hitler's plan was to hold the city against Soviet attacks and to prepare a battle group with fresh panzer divisions. The city was then expected be relieved within around 2 months. Was this plan implausible from the beginning ?

Afaik, the air supply operations of the Demyansk and the concurrent Kholm pockets chewed up so much of not only the transport planes, but the retrained bomber pilots that no air supply operation afterwards could feasibly take place. In a way, Demyansk killed off the german twin-engine bomber corps due to the pilot losses.

 

[Amallric]

1) Would it be possible to create a narrow passage to leave the city quickly ? Could Germans have stabilized the front after quick evacuation ?

Well given that Wintergewitter failed(and by a large margin) to achieve even such a narrow passage, it would probably be totally impossible to do the same with the only forces of the 6th army. Then it would be a 300 km(at least) death march over frozen steppe, within enemy territory. Some people would get through, no encirclement ever was perfect...but the 6th army would effectively cease to exist as a fighting unit.

2) Germans captured almost all of the city for an exremely heavy price, leaving it without a fight seems very demoralizing. Additionally, Germans managed to supply Demyansk pocket from air few months ago and Goering said Luftwaffe could supply Stalingrad as well. Hitler's plan was to hold the city against Soviet attacks and to prepare a battle group with fresh panzer divisions. The city was then expected be relieved within around 2 months. Was this plan implausible from the beginning ?

Well, the amounts delivered in Stalingrad were never even close to what was required. So I think the capacity of the Luftwaffe to supply the pocket was vastly exaggerated. Another significant difference with Demiansk is that the frontline did not remain static after the encirclement of Stalingrad. Soviet forces were constantly pushing further and did not stop until reaching Eastern Ukraine.

 

[makif130289]

Well given that Wintergewitter failed(and by a large margin) to achieve even such a narrow passage, it would probably be totally impossible to do the same with the only forces of the 6th army. Then it would be a 300 km(at least) death march over frozen steppe, within enemy territory. Some people would get through, no encirclement ever was perfect...but the 6th army would effectively cease to exist as a fighting unit.



Well, the amounts delivered in Stalingrad were never even close to what was required. So I think the capacity of the Luftwaffe to supply the pocket was vastly exaggerated. Another significant difference with Demiansk is that the frontline did not remain static after the encirclement of Stalingrad. Soviet forces were constantly pushing further and did not stop until reaching Eastern Ukraine.

Didn't Manstein manage to get as close as 50 km by 20 December ? Maybe a breakout attempt by 6th Army at that point could have save considerable amount of the encircled troops ? My first question emphasizes about beginnig of evacuation right after the closing of the pocket. I mean Soviets closed the pocket but obviously it wouldn't be that tight until everything get stable. Also add to this, when pocket is closed, 6th Army was still very capable fighting unit but when Winter Storm commenced, it was near collapse due to lack of supplies.

Frontline constantly changing is a good point. No doubt that it severely slowed down Manstein and Hoth's advance.

 

[Amallric]

Didn't Manstein manage to get as close as 50 km by 20 December ? Maybe a breakout attempt by 6th Army at that point could have save considerable amount of the encircled troops ?

Well, he managed to get one division at 60 km for one day. Even assuming this division could have held the position(it was under constant attack; the Soviets threw the armored force they have gathered for their own offensive at them), it was still 60 km of open steppe, filled with Soviet troops. The 6th army would have to break through on their own, with frostbitten and hungry soldiers and almost no heavy equipment and vehicles(estimated speed: 15 km/day even assuming there is no enemy resistance, nor pursuit). As you can see, chances of survival were already very low. Besides, the Soviets had just made another breakthrough that outflanked the entire army group; had Wintergewitter not been cancelled(and the 4th Panzer army redeployed to stop the Soviet advance further west), there is a chance that a much bigger encirclement would have happened.

? My first question emphasizes about beginnig of evacuation right after the closing of the pocket. I mean Soviets closed the pocket but obviously it wouldn't be that tight until everything get stable. Also add to this, when pocket is closed, 6th Army was still very capable fighting unit but when Winter Storm commenced, it was near collapse due to lack of supplies.

Well it was already a very battered unit, exhausted by three months of apocalyptic urban warfare. I understand your point but as I said a breakthrough in late November would mean the 6th army is on it's own(there would be no support from the other side of the pocket, as the few available troops were desperately trying to stop the soviet advance) and the distance would be much greater. As I said, some would certainly get through, so in a way this is a better outcome than the surrender that historically happened, but still the 6th army would have been essentially destroyed. Look at what happened to German divisions overrun by the Soviets in Bagration for a comparison(and those retreated in heavily forested area and in summer).

 

[DoomBunny]

2) Germans captured almost all of the city for an exremely heavy price, leaving it without a fight seems very demoralizing. Additionally, Germans managed to supply Demyansk pocket from air few months ago and Goering said Luftwaffe could supply Stalingrad as well. Hitler's plan was to hold the city against Soviet attacks and to prepare a battle group with fresh panzer divisions. The city was then expected be relieved within around 2 months. Was this plan implausible from the beginning ?

The air resupply was a situation of impossibility. The ideal the Luftwaffe could manage (without fighter interference, weather, fatigue, general mishaps) was still below the bare minimum required by German forces.

Goering was, as usual, acting the arse.

 

[makif130289]

The air resupply was a situation of impossibility. The ideal the Luftwaffe could manage (without fighter interference, weather, fatigue, general mishaps) was still below the bare minimum required by German forces.

Goering was, as usual, acting the arse.

So, best strategy was then to leave the city as soon as it was encircled and to try to save as many troops as possible by slipping through Soviet lines ?

 

[Amallric]

In a world where the Luftwaffe is unable to supply the pocket yes. It would be very difficult to break through towards West, but towards South-West it could work. The south pincer of the Soviet encirclement was quite weak. Interestingly Khrushchev who served in the area as a political commissar believed there was no way to prevent the Germans from breaking away should they try to do that. Most of the heavy equipment would have been lost, however.

 

[CruelDwarf]

So, best strategy was then to leave the city as soon as it was encircled and to try to save as many troops as possible by slipping through Soviet lines ?

OK. Germans abandon Stalingrad in november. Let's assume that they even evacuate the 6th Army in good shape and it is still combat capable.
But how it helps the Germans? Red Army now have a huge amount of forces (and time) that they spent on encircling the 6th Army. Thus the Germans doomed the whole Army Group A in Caucasus by rescuing the 6th Army.

 

[DoomBunny]

So, best strategy was then to leave the city as soon as it was encircled and to try to save as many troops as possible by slipping through Soviet lines ?

Better, but far from a good situation.

OK. Germans abandon Stalingrad in november. Let's assume that they even evacuate the 6th Army in good shape and it is still combat capable.
But how it helps the Germans? Red Army now have a huge amount of forces (and time) that they spent on encircling the 6th Army. Thus the Germans doomed the whole Army Group A in Caucasus by rescuing the 6th Army.

The forces encircling Stalingrad were actually less than the forces contained within the pocket.

 

[Lord Tim]

In a world where the Luftwaffe is unable to supply the pocket yes. It would be very difficult to break through towards West, but towards South-West it could work. The south pincer of the Soviet encirclement was quite weak. Interestingly Khrushchev who served in the area as a political commissar believed there was no way to prevent the Germans from breaking away should they try to do that. Most of the heavy equipment would have been lost, however.

For logistical reasons the Germans had withdrawn most of their horses from the Stalingrad area - fodder for them was taking up too much space on the transport routes, especially the railways. So they'd be withdrawing without any of the horse-drawn vehicles or artillery tows that were normal, which means basically almost all the artillery would be left behind and a huge amount of other material that couldn't be carried by hand. Even if 6th Army had been withdrawn, it would efffectively have been so badly damaged by the effect that it wouldn't have been combat-worthy for a long while. And if it had been withdrawn, then the Soviet forces that were historically devoted to containing it and reducing the pocket would have been available for other operations. Little Saturn might actually have been Big Saturn, and a drive that reaches Rostov before the German forces to the South can be withdrawn (historically one of the armies involved, 17th iirc, withdrew to the Crimea) is rather worse than losing "just" the 6th Army.

 

[CruelDwarf]

The forces encircling Stalingrad were actually less than the forces contained within the pocket.

Wow. So soviets managed to encircle german troops and stave off Manstein counter-offensive with lesser amount of forces? This claim is rather bold.

 

[JodelDiplom]

Wow. So soviets managed to encircle german troops and stave off Manstein counter-offensive with lesser amount of forces? This claim is rather bold.

How is that a "claim"? The numbers ought to be in the history books, it's not like the battle of Stalingrad wasn't the most-published battle of all WW2 historiography.

 

[SDSkinner]

Wow. So soviets managed to encircle german troops and stave off Manstein counter-offensive with lesser amount of forces? This claim is rather bold.

He is only saying that the Russians had less troops encircling Stalingrad; I believe the ones fighting the counter offensive is a different group. It shouldn't be such a big surprise- I believe someone in the history forum pointed out that Soviet forces were outnumbered until 1944.

 

[makif130289]

He is only saying that the Russians had less troops encircling Stalingrad; I believe the ones fighting the counter offensive is a different group. It shouldn't be such a big surprise- I believe someone in the history forum pointed out that Soviet forces were outnumbered until 1944.

Even in 1942 Summer Offensive ( the peak of German victories ), Soviets seem to outnumber Germans 2:1 ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Case_Blue )

 

[CruelDwarf]

He is only saying that the Russians had less troops encircling Stalingrad; I believe the ones fighting the counter offensive is a different group. It shouldn't be such a big surprise- I believe someone in the history forum pointed out that Soviet forces were outnumbered until 1944.

It is just not true. Soviets were outnumbered (in terms of frontline combat strenght) only until november of 1941 or so. After this they usually have overall numerical superiority over germans.

So I will say again: early collapse of Stalingrad pocket (by any reason - either unusually fast soviet success or german retreat) will cause a collapse of entire southern flank of Eastern front and entire Army Group A will be encircled in the Causcasus.

Stalingrad was typical example of sacrificing part to save whole.

 

[SDSkinner]

Even in 1942 Summer Offensive ( the peak of German victories ), Soviets seem to outnumber Germans 2:1 ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Case_Blue )

Total front strength.

It is just not true. Soviets were outnumbered (in terms of frontline combat strenght) only until november of 1941 or so. After this they usually have overall numerical superiority over germans.

I believe the term used was "ration strength" and was the total Axis forces on the front, not just German; the post is somewhere buried in the history section.

 

[Cavalry]

It may be better to leave the city, but the damage already done. The 2 Roumania Armies already beaten and the German will pay a dear price for breaking through. And there is the Caucasus front to care! In the next events there are many Axis troop casuallties outside the encircle.

At the time of the encircle, the USSR has new troops, new weapons, and the factories moving to the East archive good production.

 

[KaiserBeer]

Didn't Manstein manage to get as close as 50 km by 20 December ? Maybe a breakout attempt by 6th Army at that point could have save considerable amount of the encircled troops ? My first question emphasizes about beginnig of evacuation right after the closing of the pocket. I mean Soviets closed the pocket but obviously it wouldn't be that tight until everything get stable. Also add to this, when pocket is closed, 6th Army was still very capable fighting unit but when Winter Storm commenced, it was near collapse due to lack of supplies.

Frontline constantly changing is a good point. No doubt that it severely slowed down Manstein and Hoth's advance.

In the case of a breakout the german armies would need to abandon any kind of heavy weaponry, supplies, ammo, etc. They would be sitting ducks to be roasted by any serious soviet offensive. Actually, Paulus' decision was sound. He pinned soviet troops, allowed the armies in the Caucasus to be evacuated and brought Germany time to reinforce the rearguard. So you have only these two options: To lose the 6th Army only or to lose the 6th Army AND the armies in the Caucasus.

 

[Henry IX]

The 6th army could have broken out if:

1. The Panzer divisions had recieved priority for fuel and had been disengaged from the fighting in Sarlingrad PRIOR to the launch of Uranus.
2. The remaining mobile division had been used to couterattack the weaker, southern spearhead rather than trying to form a new defensive line in the north along the Don.
3. The 6th armies horses had not been sent to the rear areas to make the logistics easier.
4. Paulus or Manstein had been prepared to disobey Hitler's orders to hold the line.
5. The experienced panzer crews had not been killed off by being used as infantry in Starlingrad.
6. The airlift had started with the sole intention of keeping the 6th army capable of breaking out, rather than win an indefinate siege.
7. Goering had been slightly less irresponsible with his claims of the ability to resupply an army.
8. Hitler had wanted to save his soldiers rather than create a legend of sacrifice.

Even if all of this had occured it is likely that the 6th army would have lost all of its heavy equipment and most of its armoured forces. Whether a breakout would have left the whole Army Group A exposed to the Saturn offensive is difficult to say. The sacrifice of the 6th army did make the withdrawal from the Caucasus much easier.

For what it is worth I think the destruction of the 6th army did far more damage to the German war effort than its sacrifice did good, however given the conditions needed to save the 6th army its destruction was assured from the moment Hitler changed its objectives.