Land based Naval Air Useless?

[Axe99]

I was thinking much the same thing. In the actual conflict, land based air was quite effective even far out to sea, so I'm having a hard time grasping the rationale for reduced efficiency based on distance from the coast. I suppose you could make the argument that a greater number of sorties would be possible close to the coast, but even that does little to negate the historical success of Allied aircraft against U-boats in the Atlantic.

What I'm trying to say is: Allied pilots knew where the convoys lanes were, so they didn't need more eyes, (i.e. more sorties), to find the enemy, because they already knew approximately where the enemy would congregate. So in some respects it was actually easier to find U-boats far out to sea than it was near the coast. 'Cause in the coastal sector you had to get lucky and catch them in transit to and from their bases. Which was tricky since you didn't know when they'd be arriving, plus, when close to base, U-boats tended to travel at night making them much harder to spot. Whereas, at sea, you could simply shadow convoys and patrol the lanes knowing the Germans would be drawn there at certain times, (based on the proximity of convoys), like moths to a flame.

Land-based air was relatively more effective closer to the coasts, primarily because aircraft could stay 'on station' for longer the closer they were to base (so out in the mid-Atlantic, the amount of time they could stay on station was relatively less, even in 42/43). Time on station was important, as the most important role of aircraft was spotting subs near convoys and routing escorts to deal with them and keeping them submerged (thus slowing them down and keeping them away from convoys) - although they were also from the second half of '42 very effective sub-killers in their own right.

 

[Gwydion5]

I think you also miss the point on having airfields on Pacific islands. The main point to a field on Wake is not the defense of Wake itself. By itself it has nearly zero strategic importance. One does not even expect planes from Wake to stop any main battle fleet heading further east.

I get what you are saying on the first part. But it still doesn't change the fact that I have no ability to have a CAS Patrol around the island/coastline that is effective/efficient. Historically, I have to assume there was in fact perimeter air patrols around islands/coastlines that had adequate coverage and effectiveness for the sole purpose of reliable defense, recon and also threat to enemy navy.

Am I wrong on this? Were islands and coastal seas given the same considerations/importance as the deep blue seas of nothing over vast areas? If not, then why not redraw the sea / air zones with that in mind?

 

[C-Breeze]

Does that make it more clear as to my point / rationale for my suggestion?

Yeah, I think I see what you're saying. If I read you right, you're talking about the dilution of mission efficiency based on the overall scale of the sea zone. So given a limited number of aircraft, their 'efficiency' would be considerably watered down when spread out, but enhanced when concentrated in a limited perimeter.

Certainly not opposed to this concept, it's just it would seem to require a hefty redesign of the naval/air system to realize it. Whether that's something the devs are willing to undertake is beyond me.

Time on station was important, as the most important role of aircraft was spotting subs near convoys and routing escorts to deal with them and keeping them submerged (thus slowing them down and keeping them away from convoys) - although they were also from the second half of '42 very effective sub-killers in their own right.

Yes time on station was important, however the Allies were able to mitigate this factor by staggering patrols in such a way to reduce breaks in coverage. It doesn't make sense to place all your eggs in one basket and you certainly don't benefit from having your entire air fleet go bingo fuel at the same time.

 

[Axe99]

Yes time on station was important, however the Allies were able to mitigate this factor by staggering patrols in such a way to reduce breaks in coverage. It doesn't make sense to place all your eggs in one basket and you certainly don't benefit from having your entire air fleet go bingo fuel at the same time.

Absolutely, but they also didn't have an unlimited supply of long-range aircraft. It was only in late 42/43 when the started getting adequate numbers of aircraft just to intermittently cover out to the mid-Atlantic. Prior to mid-42, there was a severe shortage of long-range aircraft for anti-submarine patrols, because Bomber Harris wouldn't give them up, and was doing a better job persuading Churchill of their merits in strategic bombing Germany than Dudley Pound and co were in arguing for ASW. Coastal zones both allow shorter-range aircraft (of which there were quite a few on ASW duty) to have reasonable efficiency closer to the shore (which they did), but for zones further out to rely on the provision of longer-range machines, which need to be balanced between ASW and strategic bombing. Just my angle on things, all these things are contestable .

 

[C-Breeze]

Prior to mid-42, there was a severe shortage of long-range aircraft for anti-submarine patrols, because Bomber Harris wouldn't give them up, and was doing a better job persuading Churchill of their merits in strategic bombing Germany than Dudley Pound and co were in arguing for ASW.

Undoubtedly the British were quite enamored with the concept of strategic bombing, arguably erroneously so - at least in terms of breaking civilian morale - but I would also refer to the oft quoted Churchillian remark that the only thing he ever really feared in the war was the U-Boat threat. As a result, I would contend that Churchill himself was acutely aware of the economic threat to his island nation in terms of the slow strangulation of essential war materials.

That being said, I do readily acknowledge that the so-called German Happy Times were largely the result of the Allied air effort straining to catch up with and/or fill the Mid-Atlantic gap. But getting back on topic here, once they did so, land based air proved brutally efficient even in the middle of the Atlantic ocean. So I guess I remain unconvinced as to the basis of suggesting their efficiency should be considerably downgraded due to distance from shore.

 

[Axe99]

Undoubtedly the British were quite enamored with the concept of strategic bombing, arguably erroneously so - at least in terms of breaking civilian morale - but I would also refer to the oft quoted Churchillian remark that the only thing he ever really feared in the war was the U-Boat threat. As a result, I would contend that Churchill himself was acutely aware of the economic threat to his island nation in terms of the slow strangulation of essential war materials.

That being said, I do readily acknowledge that the so-called German Happy Times were largely the result of the Allied air effort straining to catch up with and/or fill the Mid-Atlantic gap. But getting back on topic here, once they did so, land based air proved brutally efficient even in the middle of the Atlantic ocean. So I guess I remain unconvinced as to the basis of suggesting their efficiency should be considerably downgraded due to distance from shore.

He was definitely aware . He was also, however, aggressive-minded to a fault, and saw convoy defence as a 'passive' activity, so was easily swayed by Harris' calls for resources for his more 'aggressive' strategic bombing. My impression is from Dimbleby's Battle of the Atlantic which, while it has its issues, and focuses a bit more on the political, covers the fighting between the Admiralty and the RAF pretty well. So, sadly, while Churchill talked up his fear of convoy losses, his actions didn't always help the situation (including encouragement for the silly and resource-wasting use of ships independently hunting subs early in the war, that saw the loss of the Courageous). The RAF's winning the fight for resources over the Admiralty resources was a big thing, and one of Churchill's more important misjudgements.

Also, in terms of the 'efficiency downgrade' - it would only be a drop for aircraft without the range to go out further from shore (and it's actually not really much of an issue on the British coast, which has plentiful small sea zones in most cases) - so larger, long-range aircraft wouldn't take an efficiency hit under HoI4's current air model (noting that this may be changing a bit with Oak, but no news on that I'd guess until at least next Wednesday, and I'm not sure how much it'll change).

Also, in the very middle of the Atlantic Ocean Escort Carriers were still more important (again, because range was less of an issue because the planes could take their airfield with them).

 

[C-Breeze]

My impression is from Dimbleby's Battle of the Atlantic which, while it has its issues, and focuses a bit more on the political, covers the fighting between the Admiralty and the RAF pretty well.

I've always thought it interesting that the former Lord of the Admiralty would be inclined to sway from his own branch. Perhaps that speaks well of him in that he was able to move beyond his own history. Or as you suggest, perhaps sheer aggressiveness overtook good judgment. In any event, I'm quite sure the political posturing between the branches made an interesting campaign unto itself, filled with it's own thrills, chills and spills.

Also, in terms of the 'efficiency downgrade' - it would only be a drop for aircraft without the range to go out further from shore (and it's actually not really much of an issue on the British coast, which has plentiful small sea zones in most cases) - so larger, long-range aircraft wouldn't take an efficiency hit under HoI4's current air model...

Well, if we're talking short range as opposed to long range, that does change the discussion considerably. (Can't recall that being mentioned before - unless I missed it - but it certainly is a game changer). So if you're only targeting short range aircraft, how do you envision that being implemented in the current design? Are you suggesting they should be penalized based on the size of the sea zone? Whereas long range craft would escape such a penalty?

Also, in the very middle of the Atlantic Ocean Escort Carriers were still more important (again, because range was less of an issue because the planes could take their airfield with them).

True, but historically that didn't negate the fact that land based planes were still effective even at the outer reach of their range. If a long range craft has ordinance on board, and spots a sub, they're potentially just as deadly whether they make contact at the end of the pier or in the Mid-Atlantic. (Slight exaggeration, but the point being, the physics are largely the same, - i.e. an exposed sub caught on the surface is just as likely to suffer a hit mid-ocean as it is within sight of shore). The waves may be a little higher at sea, but ASW technology is more than capable of offsetting that.

 

[Axe99]

Well, if we're talking short range as opposed to long range, that does change the discussion considerably. (Can't recall that being mentioned before - unless I missed it - but it certainly is a game changer). So if you're only targeting short range aircraft, how do you envision that being implemented in the current design? Are you suggesting they should be penalized based on the size of the sea zone? Whereas long range craft would escape such a penalty?

Coastal zones both allow shorter-range aircraft (of which there were quite a few on ASW duty) to have reasonable efficiency closer to the shore (which they did), but for zones further out to rely on the provision of longer-range machines, which need to be balanced between ASW and strategic bombing. Just my angle on things, all these things are contestable .

Promise I mentioned it . Because the coastal zones are close to the short-range aircraft bases (well, assuming they're based adjacent to that coastal zone), the distance that is required to be covered is a lot less, so shorter-range aircraft will have a higher efficiency. On the other hand, the zones out at sea will require long-range aircraft to have a decent efficiency level. If they're just large zones, then the shorter-range aircraft will have low efficiency, but will be able to hit submarines far further out from the coasts than they should (just not that frequently).

True, but historically that didn't negate the fact that land based planes were still effective even at the outer reach of their range. If a long range craft has ordinance on board, and spots a sub, they're potentially just as deadly whether they make contact at the end of the pier or in the Mid-Atlantic. (Slight exaggeration, but the point being, the physics are largely the same, - i.e. an exposed sub caught on the surface is just as likely to suffer a hit mid-ocean as it is within sight of shore). The waves may be a little higher at sea, but ASW technology is more than capable of offsetting that.

They were, but with only 18 to hand even in early 1943, there was only so much they could do . Sorry it's just a wiki reference, I don't have an easy reference to hand for the figure beyond that.

 

[Gamer_1745]

Some of you might like this wartime movie:

 

[Gwydion5]

Yeah, I think I see what you're saying. If I read you right, you're talking about the dilution of mission efficiency based on the overall scale of the sea zone. So given a limited number of aircraft, their 'efficiency' would be considerably watered down when spread out, but enhanced when concentrated in a limited perimeter.

Kind of. That would be an indirect result based on how air missions work currently in that air missions only operate in one zone at a time, and what I'm proposing is redrawing sea zones so every place that can have an air base, has the capability (more capability) to protect itself which some locations like Wake and Phoenix island really don't.

I still feel the point is being missed and I am going to take one more stab at this.

Eastern Micronesia : Wake Island Airbase : Stock 1936 Nav Bomber has 13.9% coverage, 1940 Nav Bomber has 13.9% coverage, 1944 Nav Bomber has 21.5% coverage (-78.5% to mission efficiency), 1944 +5 Range Nav Bomber 40.5% coverage (-59.5% to Mission efficiency).

The only change that I'm advocating for is creating a new sea/air zone around land based airbases so that there is a practical area for coverage that would be more historically accurate for close air patrols / perimeter missions. So for Wake Island I've drawn a red border around it as an example of a new air/sea zone where I can have 100% coverage, and still have the horrible coverage in Eastern Micronesia. If I have 100 Nav Bombers on Wake, I can assign 75 to the proposed air/sea zone change for 100% coverage / mission efficiency. I can then assign 25 Nav Bombers to eastern micronesia for limited and less effective interdiction.

Here is a zoomed in screenshot showing the surrounding areas. So you can still have the low mission efficiency areas outside the coastal air zone where naval units are more likely to be and where air power won't dominate as much since mission efficiency is much lower.

Hawaii Ridge : Hawaii Airbase : Stock 1936 Nav Bomber has 35.3% coverage, 1940 Nav Bomber has 38.2% coverage, 1944 Nav Bomber has 42.6% coverage (-57.4% to mission efficiency), 1944 +5 Range Nav Bomber 76.5% coverage (-23.5% to Mission efficiency).

So again, strong air power interdiction inside the red lined area, weaker air power interdiction outside the red line area. Air power out of Hawaii would be split between 2 air/sea zones instead of one.

And just a reminder that I'm not advocating that the current system is ideal or the better solution. If PDS ultimately does not like the way zones and air bases work, and they are eventually planning to redo the whole thing, that is a different topic. If that is not the case and PDS plans to keep the current system, then I think we need to look at the Air and Sea Zones and try to create a better representation for the capabilities of being able to build an air base on Wake Island for example. Or various areas where coastal sea zones are so big that they can't be used for air power. I'm not saying ever deep blue sea zone of nothingness should have 100% coverage for aircraft. But that the current implementation has some areas where it's just to prohibitive to even try. Like Eastern Micronesia.

And just to be sure I'm getting my point across I'm going to give one more example of my complaint.

Imagine that North East Pacific and Western Seaboard zones were combined. Would PDS's current system accurately reflect the US's capability to use air power to protect the south west coast? No. As demonstrated with Wake Island and Hawaii such a large zone with air bases on the edge of it give very low coverage. So Japanese fleets could operate in this region and air power would be very ineffective. If you look at the coastal zones around the USA, you can see they are all small areas which gives the US the ability to leverage its air power in those areas effectively. This is by design and this gives players the option to do something in those areas with air power. Wake and Phoenix Island on the other hand don't and thus need be redesigned.

So essentially from my perspective, my argument is we need to add the Western Seaboard zone as that makes leveraging air power for the south west coast of the USA viable (except I'm talking about islands and other coastal zones where it's too large). Yet somehow there seems to be resistance to this idea.

 

[sterrius]

@Gwydion5

For pacific you need to use TAC´s. Tac´s participate in naval combats as long they have the ground support button enabled.
Of course they need 2 ships fighting each other to join.

There is a reason in history why both USA and JAP used more heavy fighters and bombers in those regions instead of using the more light ones.

A 1940 TAC if i remember right have a range of 1700 to 2500km Well above the range of a NAV 1944. (can´t acess the game right now, the wiki is very wrong on ranges of air units unfortunally).

Also some regions are just not fit to have a good amount of air superiority, at least unless you heavily invest in heavy fighters and tac´s.

 

[Gwydion5]

There is a reason in history why both USA and JAP used more heavy fighters and bombers in those regions instead of using the more light ones.

I understand that to effectively use air power in the deep blue sea zones you will need long range aircraft and that the pacific theater will have a higher disposition of long range aircraft for that purpose. But that is not my point. I don't see how it's still be missed to be honest. I thought for sure my last example would seal the deal on my point. But I guess not. I don't get the opposition to this at all.

 

[kettyo]

@Gwydion5Tac´s participate in naval combats as long they have the ground support button enabled. Of course they need 2 ships fighting each other to join.

Back to topic...do they on ground attack order exhibit the same one shot bug with naval battles like the naval strike order of other planes? I think CAS has both ground attack and naval strike orders too.

 

[Dalwin]

I understand that to effectively use air power in the deep blue sea zones you will need long range aircraft and that the pacific theater will have a higher disposition of long range aircraft for that purpose. But that is not my point. I don't see how it's still be missed to be honest. I thought for sure my last example would seal the deal on my point. But I guess not. I don't get the opposition to this at all.

One of the reasons for opposition (and I see a few others as well) is pointed to by you yourself. Air missions are only assigned to one air zone at a time. So with your plan, say I have decent long range aircraft stationed at Wake. Now they would be forced to either guard in close and waste their range or fly further out and be excluded from any close in action.

Further, air attacks on ships in this game (except for carriers) are more of a gradual attrition than dramatic strikes. Why would I only want my CAS in an area where they had say 75% efficiency? Why would I not want to be covering a much wider area even if they had 25% efficiency? With the wider coverage I would get many more attacks over time and most likely more overall damage over time as well.

My planes on those little islands are not primarily concerned with the island itself. That is what the marine contingent is for. They are concerned with projecting force over as much of the surrounding sea as possible.

 

[Gwydion5]

Air missions are only assigned to one air zone at a time.

I don't see that as being a horrible thing. Perhaps the HOI3 system would be better. But we are working with what we have. I suppose excess range from completing the coastal zone could be used to cover another zone. But with the current sizes of some zones that seems unlikely.

Why would I not want to be covering a much wider area even if they had 25% efficiency?

Because mission efficiency = combat effectiveness is my understanding.

My planes on those little islands are not primarily concerned with the island itself. That is what the marine contingent is for.

I understand that. But in order to invade the island, ships must go into the sea zone, and if you can provide 100% mission efficiency to that seazone then perhaps your marines can have some decent air support too? Perhaps a few ships are sunk in addition to the damage against org and strength for the invading forces? Perhaps you can intercept strategic / tactical bombers effectively. It just seems to open up options, where as right now with the high negatives due to coverage, we are limited.

Just my opinion though. I understand your point and can see what your saying. I just feel that perhaps part of the reason why the pacific sucks is because it's not really that engaging or strategic with the islands and their uses. Perhaps my suggestion would be totally counter productive to that end too.

 

[AegonTheUnready]

How big should these sea zones be? The range of a 1940 NAV? A 1940 TAC? I.e., what should we target as the average efficiency, assuming the no variants adding range?

 

[Dalwin]

I don't see that as being a horrible thing. Perhaps the HOI3 system would be better. But we are working with what we have. I suppose excess range from completing the coastal zone could be used to cover another zone. But with the current sizes of some zones that seems unlikely.



Because mission efficiency = combat effectiveness is my understanding.



I understand that. But in order to invade the island, ships must go into the sea zone, and if you can provide 100% mission efficiency to that seazone then perhaps your marines can have some decent air support too? Perhaps a few ships are sunk in addition to the damage against org and strength for the invading forces? Perhaps you can intercept strategic / tactical bombers effectively. It just seems to open up options, where as right now with the high negatives due to coverage, we are limited.

Just my opinion though. I understand your point and can see what your saying. I just feel that perhaps part of the reason why the pacific sucks is because it's not really that engaging or strategic with the islands and their uses. Perhaps my suggestion would be totally counter productive to that end too.

Clearly you are not seeing the Pacific islands the way I do. Protecting the island from invasion is a minor consideration. The islands by themselves are worth absolutely nothing. They have value in two ways only. One is to extend your naval range and you don't need many of them for that. One forward island is enough.

Their main value is in their ability to project power into the large sea zone. Close in air defense of the islands has almost zero value. It is unimportant.

 

[Baron Jukaga]

Is it worth sending out fighters to escort the NAVs on naval strike missions? I haven't really noticed them helping out when the NAVs bomb a carrier group.

 

[melkor88]

I have to agree with OP, as recently I have not been bothering with the extra research and production, and just been using CAS in places like the Channel when I need them there, and are not using them elsewhere.

 

[C-Breeze]

Promise I mentioned it .

My bad. It was late, I was tired and I guess I skimmed right over that.

They were, but with only 18 to hand even in early 1943, there was only so much they could do . Sorry it's just a wiki reference, I don't have an easy reference to hand for the figure beyond that.

I hope I'm not misunderstanding you, but we seem to be talking at cross purposes. I'm speaking of tactical capabilities whereas you seem to be talking historical logistics. Which is all well and good, save for the fact, I'm unclear as to why historical numbers should impact the in-game efficiency of individual planes given that the player can choose to prioritize their production and overturn any historical deficits.

My concern here is that the efficiency of long range aircraft shouldn't be nerfed because the Allies had relatively few before 1943, but rather what were the actual capabilities of the model? If for example, we're discussing how early Nav bomber tiers lacked airborne sonar, then fine, their capabilities wouldn't be as great as later models. But I really don't see how 'having only 18 to hand' factors into game mechanics.

Furthermore, reading through the link you posted, one encounters excerpts like this:

"The paltry nine Liberator GR.Is operating over the Atlantic,[4] members of 120 Squadron based in Iceland, were nevertheless a worry to Admiral Dönitz, BdU.[14]"

Which indicate that even with a staggering shortage of historical craft they were still quite dangerous, (hence efficient) against U-boats. So by this very source, the individual per plane capability appears to be significant. Therefore, on what basis should we nerf them?