Chapter VII: A-Go Sakusen
Part II: January 23 – February 23
Once Okamura had gained Chunchon, he decided against pressing on haphazardly but instead tarried to consolidate his gains. Primarily, this consisted of reforming his disorganized divisions and awaiting Imamura’s arrival, who arrived but a day later. He was also hesitant to advance as he did not know in which direction to advance, intelligence on the Chinese was spotty and all he knew was that on each of the three axes available to him—Seoul, Daegu and Busan—there were at least three divisions facing him. Subsequently, he awaited until the 4th before requesting that Ishiwara conduct a probing attack toward Seoul from Pyongyang, to judge the strength of the enemy in that region.
Ishiwara thus quickly formed his two divisions up and attacked lightly. As all military commanders know, the fog of war is never thinner than on the actual battlefield. Ishiwara’s after action report indicated that there were four divisions defending Seoul, under the direction of General Yang Aiyuan, an aggressive but inflexible martinet who prided himself on the discipline he instilled in his troops. This report convinced Okamura that the best path open to him was the middle one, to Daegu. He and Imamura attacked in full strength on the 5th, exactly twenty-four hours after Ishiwara’s probing actions, and ran into four divisions under the command of the ex-warlord Ma Hongkui. However, the battle was not destined to last long.
Mere hours later, the Chinese attacked from the north, as well as from Seoul, toward Wonsan. Their aim was obviously to split us in two again, and no doubt this time to finish their work and crush us. Okamura immediately broke off the attack as Ishiwara threw his two divisions northward to hit two Chinese divisions at Sinuiju, one of which was motorized, in the flank. After a day and a half of combat, General Li Fuying was forced to withdraw his two divisions back across the Yalu River toward Andong as he was unable to fend off Ishiwara’s quick attack. This reduced the pressure on Hata slightly; however, nineteen divisions in Seoul, Hyesan and Hamhung were still dedicated to completing their task and the defense of Hata’s eight divisions, of which my two infantry divisions were a part, was quickly crumbling.
Hata ordered Okamura to turn his attention to reducing the pressure from Seoul, but Okamura could not do this, not yet, as his divisions could not yet be moved from their positions opposite Daegu. It would be some hours before he could move, long hours. Yamashita had been tasked to supporting the defense of Wonsan and he was pushing his troops to their limits, forcing them to march at triple their normal speed, to reach the town. At dawn on the 6th, I saw an opportunity to relieve some pressure off of our defenses and launched a minor counterattack to regain certain key positions. Tanaka Shizuichi saw this movement and threw his three divisions forward as well—soon, with Hata joining in this, our entire defensive line was pushing outward. It certainly took the Chinese by surprise and they hesitated for some hours, unable to but watch as our divisions ravaged theirs in a desperate attempt to expand and hold the lines around Wonsan.
At 1600 on the same day, Okamura finally attacked toward Seoul, his infantry and Imamura’s marines slammed into Yang Aiyuan’s eastern flanks. By this time, Yamashita had joined us at Wonsan but his two divisions were but a drop, if still a welcome drop, against the masses of Chinese facing us. Within but seven hours, Yang Aiyuan had been forced to call off his attack to deal with the danger on his flank. However, his troops were still caught up forward of his defensive positions around Seoul, and were indeed closer to Wonsan than they were to Seoul, and he could do naught but withdraw them from their advance positions. Under pressure from the direction of Chunchon, however, this limited retrograde motion quickly turned into a route as his four divisions broke and fled southward toward Gwangju. On the 12th, Seoul fell to Imamura’s troops and a two-division counterattack mounted by Pan Wenhui out of Gwangju faltered.
Amazingly, with the defeat of the four division thrust toward Wonsan from Seoul, the entire Chinese attack faltered and at dawn on the 7th, twenty-four hours after our counterattack, the Chinese withdrew back to their own positions. The Chinese would continue to launch minor raids over the next five days but they were all beaten off. On the 12th, however, with Seoul captured and secured at last, Hata ordered a general withdrawal southward. If nothing else, he reasoned, it would deny the Chinese the advantage of one axis of advance as they would have but two potential camps to advance southward from, rather than three.
Thus, we began our withdrawal southward. Certain historians have claimed this as the official beginning of A-Go Sakusen. They are, however, incorrect. A-Go Sakusen would begin with a message from Tokyo later in the month, though in truth this very plan espoused by Tsuchihasi and, no doubt reluctantly, by Tojo, had been on our own minds for some time. Regardless, officially this withdrawal was not a part of A-Go Sakusen but rather simply a precursor withdrawal. The fact that I personally consider this to be a part of A-Go Sakusen is simply a reflection of what was on all our minds at the time.
Nevertheless, the withdrawal went smoothly for five days. On the fifth day, the 17th, the majority of our forces had reached either Chunchon or Seoul, in fact I was the single general still remaining in Wonsan. I suppose this is the price of being recognized not only as a defensive mastermind, but also the most technically skillful general of the entire army on top of that—which is to say, I was the rearguard, again. On the 17th my two divisions were assaulted from three axes by some fifteen or so divisions, I could do naught but withdraw. Unfortunately, at this point the men under my command panicked and, rather than withdrawing toward safety, which lay in the south, they routed toward Pyongyang, which was at that very moment not only undefended but in danger of being occupied by the Chinese! Yamashita, however, quickly recognized this and dashed northward from Seoul with his two mountain divisions.
Yamashita, pushing his men hard, arrived at Pyongyang just before dawn on the 22nd and immediately deployed them to repulse the Chinese advance. Succeeding in this, he awaited my arrival not even twenty-four hours later. As one can imagine, I was very relieved to see Pyongyang in friendly hands and quite happy to see my old mentor in particular. We immediately began marching southward toward Seoul.
Our positions in Korea had taken a definite shift southward.
