For a country that only devoted some 25% of national outlays to the military (compared to 45-60% amongst the allies and comintern), the Japanese endured probably the most total mobilisation of their country. Wartime production is a lot more than resources. If the Japanese had held their supply lines open, they could have had all the oil they wanted from the Southern Area, but that wouldn't have been enough. An industrial economy requires a lot more than simple resources. It needs skilled labour, complex machine parts, efficient organisational methods and so on. The Japanese were focused on resources because that was something they could gain in the short run (and they critically underestimated the other things) but as things happened, they weren't nearly as important as the other things.
For example - Japan had a factory in Iwate prefecture that produced extremely complex variable pitch propellers for large aircraft. They brought in specialists from another firm to increase efficiency of production. The factory was totally destroyed in an earthquake (not a B-29 caused one) and work was wholly interrupted. A modern industrial machine requires complex parts that the Japanese were not particularly adept at making. The US superiority in cryptology and signals was not a lucky coincidence. Another example -in constructing their Type B Naval Cipher, which the US successfully broke into, the Japanese recruited one Teiji Takagi - a man who had no particular expertise in cryptology. When it came to their industry, especially their complex industry, the Japanese were amateurs. That was a lot more damaging than their resource scarcity.
Even for England, cut off from her Empire and besieged from the sea, production of aircraft wasn't nearly as much a problem as training and putting the pilots into the plane: and quite largely because of efficient organisation.