Cunneda said:
The consider the performance of the British and Empire Armies in the following campaigns:
Northern France (May-June 1940) - utter defeat
British Empire forces in Malaya (Dec 41- Feb 42) - utter defeat due to incompetence, too many bloody Indians, and only 2 Brigades of Australian Infantry
Greece (April 1941) - defeat of Australians and New Zealanders outnumbered 7 to 1
Crete (May 1941) - defeat due to cowardly NZ leadership, the absence of the will to fight
Rommels first offensive in North Africa (April - May 1941) - defeat/strategic running away.
These results are completely consistent to my mind. That is the Empires Armies were pretty bad, but at least they inflicted casualties on their enemies and took casualties themselves.
So how do you propose we ensure that, that happens? A 30-40% efficiency penalty to the British & Commonwealth for the first two-three years of war to ensure that they go the historical way and lose their initial campaigns?
Cunneda said:
Here are some facts:
38 000 Italians surrendered at Sidi Barrani after the attack 9 Dec 40
6 Infantry battalions ie less than 5000 men assualted Bardia 3 Jan 41
Result:
40 000 captured Italians
Assualting infantry: 130 dead (includes died of wounds)
Tobruk attacked 21 Jan 41
Result:
25 000 captured Italians
Assualting infantry: 49 dead (includes died of wounds)[/
Quote from
"Iron Hulls, Iron Hearts" (A new book specialised on the Italian armoured divisions, strongly recommended.) by Ian W. Walker, page 61-62:
"The sole advantage that the forward Italian forces in Egypt had was their superior numbers, with six divisions and a small armoured group. However, they managed to discard this ace by dispersing their forces amongst a number of defensive camps that were unable to support each other. [...] They had experienced numerous scares in the form of British raids and naval bombardments, but nothing more threatening; they had become accustomed to such activity and had ceased their own patrols. [...]"
"The initial assault would fall on Nibeiwa Camp, where the only available Italian armoured unit was based and it achieved complete surprise. The Raggruppamento Maletti [...] was an ad hoc formation consisting of 2,500 Libyan soldiers and 2nd Armoured Battalion, with thirty-five M11/39 medium tanks and thirty-five L3/35 light tanks. It was earmarked for early destruction in the assault, which commenced at 05:00hr with what appeared to be no more than another raid on the eastern side of the camp. At 07:00, however forty-eight Matilda tanks suddenly appeared from the opposite side of the camp. They struck twenty-three unmanned M11/39 tanks [...] The Italians were caught completely off guard and many did not even reach their tanks, including General Maletti, who was killed emerging from his dugout. They were slaughtered and their vehicles destroyed by the British in less than ten minutes. The Italian artillery fought on valiantly, firing on the Matildas and recording many hits, some at point-blank range - but none penetrated their 70mm of armour. The remaining Italian tanks were captured intact, and the Libyan infantry, left practically defenceless, quickly surrendered. The British had captured Nibeiwa and destroyed the only front-line Italian armoured unit in less than five hours."
"The swift destruction of the Italian armour condemned the rest of the Italian forces in Egypt. They consisted entirely of immobile infantry formations that were isolated and destroyed piecemeal by the mobile British forces before they had a chance to organize their defences."
A quote from the
Comando Supremo website:
NEBEIWA: Italian artillery men encounter the British Matilda's for the first time and fought against them with great bravery, but with little success. An English combatant at the scene described the battle:
"The Italian and Libyan dead were everywhere. The guns were piled around with empty cases where men had fired to the very last. The Italians...fought like hell in Nebiewa."
20 000 Italians surrendered at the road block at Beda Fromm early Feb 41
The way this fact is presented would seem to imply that the Italians immediately threw up their arms the moment they saw the British roadblock, which is in fact very far from the truth: Leading up to this battle the first Italian armoured unit with all arms support (The
Brigata Corazzata Speciale or Special Armoured Brigade, commanded by General Babini it was also called Babini's Brigade) had seen action against the 4th British Armoured Brigade on the 24th of January near Mechili. It destroyed at least two British cruiser tanks and six light tanks while losing nine of its own fifty-seven M13/40 medium tanks, and thus delayed the British long enough to allow the 60th
Sabratha infantry division to retreat from Derna.
The following piece on the battle of Beda Fomm is also a quote from
"Iron Hulls, Iron Hearts", page 64-66:
"On the 5 February a British combined force, including tanks, artillery, infantry and anti-tank guns, crossed the desert and reached Beda Fomm ahead of the Italians retreating along the coast road. They quickly set up an ambush to cut off the Italian forces retreating south towards them from Benghasi. The Italian 10th Bersaglieri Regiment were first to encounter this roadblock, whose presence was a complete surprise. They were badly shot up, but in spite of heavy casualties, attempted to break through the British force; but without the support of artillery or tanks, they failed. The Italian armour of Babini's Brigade were north of Benghasi providing a rearguard against 6th Australian Division.
As the day wore on, more and more Italian units arrived in front of the British roadblock and crowded together in complete chaos. A few units launched their own desperate but futile attacks against the British. The Italian commander, General Annibale Bergonzoli [...] hastily organized them into ad hoc assault groups, and threw them against the blockade. But in their haste to break through, the Italians neglected to reconnoitre the British positions, and on the basis of casualties suffered, had an exaggerated idea of their strength. [...] In late afternoon, 4th Armoured Brigade arrived on the Italian left flank and severely punished their close-packed forces."
"The arrival of 4th Armoured finally brought Babini's Brigade south with its sixty M13s. They were needed by Bergonzoli, who now planned a holding action on the road while outflanking the British through the desert to the east.
At 08:30hr on 6 February the attack commenced without prior reconnaisance or co-ordinated artillery support; the Italians were therefore unaware that the British had reinforced their positions with twenty-two cruiser and forty-five light tanks, well concealed in hull-down positions. The Italian tanks also advanced in single companies at intervals, rather than in a single mass. Thus the leading company of ten M13s were completely surprised when they crested a small rise to find British cruisers waiting for them. They halted to return fire before attempting to withdraw behind the crest, but the British destroyed eight of them before they could do so. The British then engaged a second wave of Italian M13s, destroying another seven without reply. It was only at this point that Italian artillery finally came into action, shelling the area. The Italians now converged on the British roadblock under cover of their artillery. In reply, the British brought more cruiser tanks into action and increased thier own artillery fire.
In a well rehearsed drill the British cruisers struck the Italian in the flank, and a further eight M13s were knocked out. The Italians, who lacked the radios necessary for this kind of close control, were unable to respond effectively: they were left to react to British movements, and were unable to inflict any significant casualties in reply. They showed great determination, but were fighting at a clear disadvantage. In spite of this, they came very close to breaking the British blockade; only quick action by a combination of British tanks and artillery prevented this."
"In the afternoon Bergonzoli prepared a more co-ordinated attack involving a combination of tanks and artillery. This renewed assault on the extremely stretched British brought things to a crescendo at 15:00hr, and it was only the opportune arrival of British armoured reinforcements on the Italian desert flank that forced them to withdraw. At nightfall Bergonzoli abandoned his plans to outflank the British in favour of an attempt to infiltrate their main positions. The presence of British armour on the inland flank, the apparent weakness of British artillery fire in the centre, and the pressure of time, all encouraged this decision."
"At dawn on 7 February, thirty Italian M13s were launched against the British blockading force, now standing at fifteen cruisers and fifty-one light tanks. This final attack, in contrast to earlier ones, was supported by infantry and every available Italian artillery piece. The M13s advanced in the spreading light of dawn, concentrating on the British tanks and anti-tanks guns. They pressed home their attacks with desperate courage, driving close to the British positions and firing point blank at their anti-tank guns. They suffered severe losses, but knocked out all but one of the British guns. The surviving M13s drove on into the British positions.
The British infantry kept their heads down as the Italian tanks passed, but rose up to fire on the following Italian infantry. The British artillery fired on their own forward posts to prevent Italian infantry from breaking through. This combination of infantry and artillery prevented the Italian infantry from securing the penetration made by their tanks. The last few M13s were destroyed outside the British command post, one within 20 yards.
The failure of this last effort, that had so nearly succeded, and the arrival of the 6th Australian Division in the Italian rear, brought the struggle to an end. The entire Italian force, including General Bergonzoli and Babini, surrendered to a British force that was much smaller than they had realized."
"Rommel's North Africa Campaign" by Jack Greene and Alessandro Massignani, page 31 about the battle of Beda Fomm:
"The Australian Official History would say: 'After the fighting had ended the desert looked like a film producer's conception of a battlefield. For ten miles the stony floor was littered with Lancia and Fiat trucks, many overturned and splintered by shell fire, and with dozens of dark green tanks with crews dead inside them. There were lines of abandoned field guns with ammunition boxes scattered round.'"
The actions of Babini's Brigade (The only well equipped Italian armoured formation the British would encounter before the Germans arrived.) at Mechili and Beda Fomm, and the performance of the Italian armoured and motorized units alongside the Germans in 1941-43 hints at what might have been achieved in 1940 had properly equipped armoured and motorized divisions been deployed in North Africa at that time.
My suggestion is to make regular foot infantry and militia fight at a severly decreased effeciency in desert terrain, thus allowing even a few motorized/armoured divisions to defeat a larger force of foot soldiers. A few quotes, beyond the above, to back my proposal:
"Mussolini - A New Life" by Nicholas Farrell, page 345:
"Graziani had pursued a strategy of building defensive redoubts in the desert - a similar concept to that which lay behind the Maginot Line in France. But success in the era of the tank, especially in the desert, depended on mobility."
"Iron Hulls, Iron Hearts" by Ian W. Walker, page 66:
"In view of the small armoured forces at their disposal, the Italian defeat in 1940 appears almost inevitable, the deployment of a largely immobile infantry army against mobile opponents inviting disaster. The conditions in the desert were more suited to mobile forces than to positional warfare, with open spaces and few impediments; these offered few readily defensible positions, and few possibilities for secure flanks."
"How Hitler Could Have Won World War II" by Bevin Alexander, page 72:
"Rommel had already grasped the essence of the war in Libya and Egypt: everything depended upon mobility.
'In the North African desert,' he wrote, 'nonmotorized troops are of practically no value against a motorized enemy, since the enemy has the chance, in almost every position, of making the action fluid by a turning movement around the south.' This was why the Italian had been beaten almost without a fight - they had moved largely on foot; the British were in vehicles. Nonmotorized forces could be used only in defensive positions, Rommel saw. Yet such positions were of little consequence, because enemy motorized units could surround them and force their surrender, or bypass them."
