Italian Army Seems Underpowered

[tom_jones]

Sure, when Germany intervened their position was untenable, but no one is saying that the German army performed poorly in WWII

Germany failed to achieve bulk of the objectives they set for themselves from ~1940 onwards. They lost the war they started, as the result. Using the yard stick applied to Italians in this very thread, they did perform poorly.

 

[Denkt]

The division templates each country start with add some flavor. If you wan't to change Italy's template it should not be to hard as you start in a war.

 

[Gort11]

The system they've gone with is actually better for Italy than what it might have been. By starting Italy with binary divisions the player has the opportunity to swap out of them early.

If instead binary divisions were forced on Italy on the historically-accurate date, you might well not be able to swap out of them as quickly.

All this presumes, of course, that binary divisions are meaningfully worse than triangular ones. That might not be the case in all situations, if at all.

 

[Praetonia]

No, you don't get it. The rest of the front was almost empty, even though a German attack was a possibility.

Fine, but they would have lost to the Germans even if the Italians had not been involved in the war; it's irrelevant. That Italy - arguably a great power - could not defeat Greece - which was, at best, a small regional power - is relevant.

 

[tommylotto]

From what I've read, the Spring Offensive in 41 was a complete failure. I suppose that if the war dragged on long enough, Italy would eventually bleed Greece dry, but I'm not sure how long that would have taken without German intervention.

How much longer do you think it would have taken for Italy to finally defeat the Greeks, given performance in March of 1941?

Here are some quotes on the condition of the Greek Epirus army on April 14 -- as the Germans approached but before they had arrived:

"Shortly afterwards, generals Pitsikas and Bakos entered, visibly shaken, to meet with Papagos, the commander of the Epiros Army Department, warned of 'a danger of a complete collapse' of the army's morale. Papagos at first was inclined to dismiss the fears. It was taking him a long time to tear himself away from the attack mode that had proven so successful a few months before. But there were 200,000 men in uniform languishing in Albania, not knowing what their fate would be. The commanders were as confused as the men". John Carr, (Pen and Sword, 2013) The Defence and Fall of Greece 1940–1941, p. 218

"More seriously, outbreaks of mutiny occurred in the 5th (Cretan) and 6th Divisions. A few dozen deserters were caught at the Mertzani Bridge on the border and promptly executed, but that didn't stop the rot. Amid these signs of an army's disintegration, on 14 April Major General Katsimitros of the much-bloodied 8th Division appealed to Pitsikas to consider an armistice with the Germans merely to keep some of the army intact.". John Carr, (Pen and Sword, 2013) The Defence and Fall of Greece 1940–1941, p. 219

Here is another:

The Greek commanders were aware that, given the continued Italian pressure, the lack of Greek motor transport and pack animals, the physical exhaustion of the Greek army and the poor transport network of Epirus, any retreat was likely to end up in disintegration. They had pressed in vain for a retreat already before the start of the German attack but now they petitioned Pitsikas to surrender.

I'm of the opinion that in April of 1941, the Greeks had already "blown their wad" against the Italians and were ready to cuddle. However, and as usual during the early part of the war, Hitler's timing was masterful. With the German intervention sealing the deal, history has kinda neglected the Italian effort to turn their early reverses around. Between January and May of 1941 the Italians sent 380,000 more troops to Albania (as compared to only 86,000 sent to North Africa). The sea lane to Albania was manned by 975 merchant ships, whereas only 317 serviced the line to Africa. Resources were literally pouring in.

The only wildcard was Churchill putting commonwealth forces into Greece to bolster the Greek defense. That might have slowed down the Italian efforts, as their only answer to the Matildas was to wait for them to break down.

 

[Mannstien]

Decent Article on Quora about the Italians.

https://www.quora.com/Why-did-the-Italian-military-do-so-poorly-in-WWII?redirected_qid=897198

 

[WeissRaben]

Fine, but they would have lost to the Germans even if the Italians had not been involved in the war; it's irrelevant. That Italy - arguably a great power - could not defeat Greece - which was, at best, a small regional power - is relevant.

I'll point to Tommylotto's excellent post immediately after yours: Italy not conquering Greece came from two things.
1) The horrible organization of the early invasion, that allowed a counterattack to dig in Albania and needing to be dislodged;
2) Hitler timing the intervention to the moment of maximum political effect, but minimal effort.
Greece - I'll repeat for the nth time, and maybe Tommylotto's quotes will drive that in - was going down. They had thrown everything but barely armed recruits and reservists at Italy, and it still was starting to be worn down. Was the general organization of the invasion a horrible mess? Yes, indeed, undeniable. Was Greece in any position to actually win? No. If Hitler had kept on its own, Greece would have fallen in 1941, still. A completely useless meatgrinder, which ended up weakening Italy more than it strengthened it, but a win. Germany stopped that cold.

 

[Loke]

I am curious as to what metric you are using to define winning and losing.

In this case; a reaction on Praetonias statement "Italy lost to Greece historically. If the Germans had not intervened, Greece was set to defeat Italy."

The Italian invasion of Greece did not succeed and the Greek invasion of Albania did not succeed either, a stalemate more or less.

So when reading up on the Greco-Italian war it actually ended with the surrender of Greece to the Axis and the British evacuated. So to me its more of an Axis win than a Greek win.

 

[Secret Master]

Here are some quotes on the condition of the Greek Epirus army on April 14 -- as the Germans approached but before they had arrived:




Here is another:


I'm of the opinion that in April of 1941, the Greeks had already "blown their wad" against the Italians and were ready to cuddle. However, and as usual during the early part of the war, Hitler's timing was masterful. With the German intervention sealing the deal, history has kinda neglected the Italian effort to turn their early reverses around. Between January and May of 1941 the Italians sent 380,000 more troops to Albania (as compared to only 86,000 sent to North Africa). The sea lane to Albania was manned by 975 merchant ships, whereas only 317 serviced the line to Africa. Resources were literally pouring in.

The only wildcard was Churchill putting commonwealth forces into Greece to bolster the Greek defense. That might have slowed down the Italian efforts, as their only answer to the Matildas was to wait for them to break down.

That makes for rather grim reading. I guess they were pretty much bled white by this point.

 

[amalric de g.]

Thats the light tank Mk VI, the 1st light tank Brigade had 168 of this tanks for greece. Sorry no Matildas.

 

[WeissRaben]

That makes for rather grim reading. I guess they were pretty much bled white by this point.

They were. And, while it is absolutely undeniable that the whole operation had been a failure of cosmic proportions, saying that Greece won against Italy (which is what they went for, keep going until anything but Italy put them out of their misery), or even worse that Greece would have won without German intervention (which removes even the fig leaf of the technicality) is ridiculous. Mussolini tried to start a war completely out of spite, in possibly the worse country-by-terrain he could have chosen, given that he was bound in another theater already (and against actually dangerous enemies), without an effective plan or having an effective way to achieve superiority, and that was his grand failure - not the possible conclusion of the invasion itself. That much was a foregone conclusion - even though it took a lot of wasted blood that would have been better spent somewhere else.

 

[Praetonia]

I'll point to Tommylotto's excellent post immediately after yours: Italy not conquering Greece came from two things.
1) The horrible organization of the early invasion, that allowed a counterattack to dig in Albania and needing to be dislodged;
2) Hitler timing the intervention to the moment of maximum political effect, but minimal effort.
Greece - I'll repeat for the nth time, and maybe Tommylotto's quotes will drive that in - was going down. They had thrown everything but barely armed recruits and reservists at Italy, and it still was starting to be worn down. Was the general organization of the invasion a horrible mess? Yes, indeed, undeniable. Was Greece in any position to actually win? No. If Hitler had kept on its own, Greece would have fallen in 1941, still. A completely useless meatgrinder, which ended up weakening Italy more than it strengthened it, but a win. Germany stopped that cold.

We can endlessly prophesise what might have happened. The fact is that Italy did not succeed in defeating Greece, and was pushed back by Greece, and was not able to remove Greece from its territory, despite trying. I don't have anything more to say on that matter.

 

[Praetonia]

tommylotto's post is discussing Greek reaction to the obvious impending German invasion that was going to either trap their army in Albania or force it into a shambolic withdrawal. None of those quotes are discussing what Italy might have accomplished alone.

 

[WeissRaben]

We can endlessly prophesise what might have happened. The fact is that Italy did not succeed in defeating Greece, and was pushed back by Greece, and was not able to remove Greece from its territory, despite trying. I don't have anything more to say on that matter.

If you are trying to talk about historical facts, it is fine. If you are trying to gauge strengths, it is not. Greece was in a downward spiral, which means that Italy did have the strength to beat Greece. Invalidating the argument "couldn't beat Greece -> weaker than Greece".

 

[Ultimate_Hobo]

Italy should be given all the resources it had at its disposal at the start of the war, everyone should. Nerfing Italy by reducing these divisions is simply unfair when other nations wont face the same bias. If they must be binary for the sake of some army experience then there should be more of them.

However, it is also fair to illustrate Italy's incompetent leadership. The national spirits have already been used to do this in France where the French, correct me if I'm wrong, have a penalty to doctrine research. I see no reason why Italy couldn't have a similar penalty to planning, doctrine development or even to organisation to represent the Italian leadership. Currently, all they have are (based on the 27th DD)

• Vittoria Mutilata, which increases their fascist political leanings, and make them less likely to fall for democracy or communism.
• King Victor Emanuel III, the King provides a small national unity increase each month.

neither of which have anything to do with the military. Representing poor leadership by taking away resources when a far better alternative is easily available seems nonsensical.

It saddens me that, based on much of the media they have released, Paradox has a serious bias both towards and against some countries. I fully appreciate that HoI is, first and foremost, a game. However, equally, it is a historical game and a number of their fans gain satisfaction in creating their own alternate history within the confines of reality. Paradox's dismissive attitude towards countries such as Italy and Czechoslovakia which were of significant importance in the war is not good, in my opinion, for the direction of the game.

 

[1337Hospitaller]

Look, I know it sounds insane to say that Italy's army is actually underpowered, and that it was stronger in real-life, but stay with me. Contrary to the Italy dev diary, where it was stated that Italy would start off with binary divisions, historically, the Italian army only drew up the binary reorganization plans in 1938, only put them into effect in 1940, and some triangular divisions continued on until the end of the war. The Italian army also had 41 divisions at the start of the Second Italo-Abyssinian War, in 1935, not 39, again stated in the dev diary. Finally, Italy had four battleships, though two were being upgraded at the start of 1936, so I have no idea if you're intending on reflecting that in the game.

I just wanted to know if there were any gameplay reasons for these inaccuracies, not a big deal or anything.

I don't think there was a single time during the war when the Italians did anything right in a strategic or in a tactical sense. Maybe I'm wrong, but the underpoweredness is deserved.

 

[Loke]

I don't think there was a single time during the war when the Italians did anything right in a strategic or in a tactical sense. Maybe I'm wrong, but the underpoweredness is deserved.

I guess you missed post #38 in this thread...

 

[tommylotto]

Thats the light tank Mk VI, the 1st light tank Brigade had 168 of this tanks for greece. Sorry no Matildas.

I could swear that I faced a Matilda in a Greek Scenario

It's right there on the box!

Maybe I'm wrong

Well, that's right!

 

[Admiral Piett]

Every nation has missing things I'm sure. Japan has no tanks in the 1936 start, which is absurd, but understandable for the game.

 

[Constans]

No, you don't get it. The rest of the front was almost empty, even though a German attack was a possibility. The Greeks were asked to defend something more than the yard immediately in front of the Italian army by the British generals, and refused. They knew full well a German attack would pulverize everything they had out of Albania, and even though they did have a chance to bog down the German army in the mountains, they threw it away because they had to avoid losing to Italy. That was literally it: Italy started an attack with 87,000 men, Greece countered with 105,000 men. The disorganized attack, thrown through ridiculously defensive terrain, was easily repelled, and the Greek army used the confusion to advance in Albania. The counterattack was later stopped cold, but dislodging from the mountains an army just under your size often proves difficult, even with great leadership (which Italy doesn't have). Keeping the Italians there required the whole Greek army to be concentrated on the Albanian front (Yugoslav attempts to close the deal before the German came were swatted away easily), to the point of disintegrating any chance to actually, you know, defend the country.

It sounds like you are saying the Italians won the war because the Greeks had to use all of their army to defeat them. Which is an interesting way of defining victory.

No doubt, if given time, the Italians on their own would have defeated a Greece on her own. The issue there is, that was not even close to happening in 190-41, and then the Brits began lending serious aid to the Greeks in early 1941. There was a real prospect that Anglo-Hellenic forces might eventually mount attacks that would've pushed Italy entirely out of Albania.

Of course the Greeks didn't leave half their force at the Yugoslav border to defend against a hypothetical German attack form there: at the time Yugoslavia was a neutral nation and not a border that was a threat, and besides, I'm sure the Greeks themselves knew the game was up if the Germans attacked anyways.