italian ambitions over Austria

[Centerbe]

Austria...
Australia...
Australian Army...
Australian 6th Division in Greece Campaign...
Greece! It's an obvious connection.

now is really clear..... guilty was an "A"

 

[amalric de g.]

That is totally false, i don't know if Greece drafted some more soldier and they were 540.000 but British lost 1000 men and have had 13.000 prisoners. Most of Greeks dead was during Italo-Greek war of course. Germany loose 2.000 soldiers because they have not fought that much as i've said.

First you say the british had no tanks and in another sentence you say they had only light tanks? What did you think the germans had? Tigers?

The greeks and british/commonwealth lost from 06.April until 20.April 1941, against Germany, greece 17.500 soldiers (dead), british 3.700 dead (The number is from the BBC webpage), germany lost 2.500 dead, 3.600 missing and 5.000 wounded.

Greece drafted short before the german attack another 110.000 soldiers, thats why they had 540.000 in total.

And if you compare the numbers from 28.October until 26.March 1941, 13.000 dead, 1.300 missing greeks against 38.800 dead and 25.000 missing italians. You see of course that your sentence "Most of Greeks dead was during Italo-Greek war of course." Is total wrong.

Thats my last post about Greece, Italy and Germany, i have no intention to derail the thread any further.

 

[Centerbe]

Topic was about Austria and italian ambitions over that.
Looking now the complete italian focus tree, there is no trace of any stresa front option.
Italy its the only major havent any focus for joining allies or comitern, or aniway run out the historical path.

 

[mbarbaric]

true but looking the situation from when the game starts, there really is no other way for italy than to go the way it did with the leadership they had.

joining entante because of austria is too much given up territory just to opose german influence on austria. besides, by that point italy already has all the austrian provinces it desires. so to fight germany for no territorial gain is hard to imagine.

also, if they joined the democracies, how could italy fulfill mussolini's dream of rule over mediterrane? they couldn't fight english in africa, french in africa, greece (ally of england)...

they could go only against yugoslavia and that only if it chose to pursue axis allignment instead of entante getting on opposing side from italy.

in that case of all desired territories in africa and europe italy could get only (maybe) yugoslavian coast and very probably albania. i think mussolini himself would spit on such idea

in case england doesn't join the entante and remains neutral or even go to axis side they could attack greece and parts of english colonies in africa but that is too far into "what if" scenario.

 

[tommylotto]

First you say the british had no tanks and in another sentence you say they had only light tanks? What did you think the germans had? Tigers?

The greeks and british/commonwealth lost from 06.April until 20.April 1941, against Germany, greece 17.500 soldiers (dead), british 3.700 dead (The number is from the BBC webpage), germany lost 2.500 dead, 3.600 missing and 5.000 wounded.

Greece drafted short before the german attack another 110.000 soldiers, thats why they had 540.000 in total.

And if you compare the numbers from 28.October until 26.March 1941, 13.000 dead, 1.300 missing greeks against 38.800 dead and 25.000 missing italians. You see of course that your sentence "Most of Greeks dead was during Italo-Greek war of course." Is total wrong.

Thats my last post about Greece, Italy and Germany, i have no intention to derail the thread any further.

From wiki:

Note the casualties listed for Greece and Italy are for the entire Greco-Italian war and the Battle of Greece combined, and the German casualties are for the entire Balkan campaign.

On 13 February, General Papagos, the Commander-in-Chief of the Greek army, opened a new offensive, aiming to take Tepelenë and the port of Vlorë with British air support, but the Greek divisions encountered stiff resistance, stalling the offensive that practically destroyed the Cretan 5th Division. "General Papagos, Commander-in-Chief of the Greek army, opened an offensive against Tepelenë with the objective of driving on to seize the port of Vlorë ... However, the Greeks failed to capture Tepelenë, for the attack found the Italians determined to die rather than yield any further ground ... The Greek attack was repulsed, and their Cretan division, which traditionally possessed great fighting spirit, was literally mown down. Although the R.A.F. gave close ground support to the Greek formations in the attack, they had little success...." Owen Pearson, (I.B.Tauris, 2006) Albania in the Twentieth Century, A History: Volume II: Albania in Occupation and War, 1939–45, p. 122

From another wiki:

On 16 April, Pitsikas reported to Papagos that signs of disintegration had also begun to appear among the divisions of I Corps and begged him to "save the army from the Italians", i.e. to be allowed to capitulate to the Germans, before the military situation collapsed completely. On the next day, the Western Macedonia Army Section (Lt. General Georgios Tsolakoglou) was renamed to III Army Corps and placed under Pitsikas' command. The three corps commanders, along with the metropolitan bishop of Ioannina, Spyridon, pressured Pitsikas to unilaterally begin negotiations with the Germans.[9][11][12]

No one is saying the Germans were not the most professional force in Greece that spring. They were. However, the Greeks and Italians had been battering each other for 5 months and the Greeks were near the point of collapse when the Germans swept in from behind. Maybe it was not a cake walk, but it was pretty close. The Greeks refused to reposition their army to resist the Germans and were eager to surrender to the Germans to avoid the appearance of defeat at the hands of the Italians. It was a pride thing.

 

[amalric de g.]

From wiki:

Note the casualties listed for Greece and Italy are for the entire Greco-Italian war and the Battle of Greece combined, and the German casualties are for the entire Balkan campaign.

From another wiki:

No one is saying the Germans were not the most professional force in Greece that spring. They were. However, the Greeks and Italians had been battering each other for 5 months and the Greeks were near the point of collapse when the Germans swept in from behind. Maybe it was not a cake walk, but it was pretty close. The Greeks refused to reposition their army to resist the Germans and were eager to surrender to the Germans to avoid the appearance of defeat at the hands of the Italians. It was a pride thing.

Thats not the point, i tried to make. The germans where no supermen.
The italian generalship was completely useless thats the point. Attacking unprepared and on a narrow front, is a sign of complete ineptitude.
It´s not the fault of the average italian soldier, that they nearly lost Albania.

Example: All generals who fought in WWI are sacked by Mussolini, why? He feared that they are more loyal to the King, thats all. They received back water posts. Even as Italy was on the brinck of collapse in Albania and Greece, he had no balls and put them back in charge.

The second point is, if germany didn´t helped their Italian allies, the italian army would have been in real trouble, the Commonwealth Divisions and the greek ones had kicked them out of Albania, can you imagine what happens, if 500.000 italian soldiers got caught in Albania?

But it is a national pride thing for our italian friends to denie the truth.

And the Wiki numbers are total crap, example: the german casualties are from Hitlers speech to the Reichstag in May 1941 for the whole Balkan Campaign, the numbers are way to low. Hitler lied straight in the Face of the Members of the Reichstag.

In Greece and Jugoslavia the Wehrmacht lost exactly 2559 soldiers and 3169 missing. But nearly all soldiers died in Greece.

Jugoslavia was a cake walk, the Luftwaffe bombed all resistance in to the dust. After two days all jugoslavian communication was done and the jugoslavian airforce was obliterated. The army couldn´t move and the highcommand was unable to give orders. The Axis troops picked most jugoslavian Divisions piecemeal of and the rest dissintegrated and fled.

Also the numbers of the Allies and Italians are wrong. Depending on source the Commonwealth lost 983 - 3.700 soldiers in Greece. Please pick a number.
And the italian numbers i posted are from the Greece campaign only, 38.832 dead (until March 1941)

Never ever trust wiki alone. I allways search several sources for my posts.

sources:

• Heinz Richter: Griechenland im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939–1941. Contingenza Grecia – Operationen Barbarity, Lustre und Marita. 2. Auflage, Harrassowitz-Verlag, Wiesbaden 2010, ISBN 978-3-447-06410-1.
• Jozo Tomasevich: War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945. Occupation and Collaboration. Stanford University Press, 2001 ISBN 0-804-73615-4.
• Detlef Vogel: Das Eingreifen Deutschlands auf dem Balkan. In: ders., Gerhard Schreiber, Bernd Stegemann (Hrsg.): Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Bd. 3: Der Mittelmeerraum und Südosteuropa – Von der »non belligeranza« Italiens bis zum Kriegseintritt der Vereinigten Staaten. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1984, ISBN 3-421-06097-5, S. 417–511.
• Detlef Vogel: Deutschland und Südosteuropa – Von politisch-wirtschaftlicher Einflußnahme zur offenen Gewaltanwendung und Unterdrückung. In: Wolfgang Michalka (Hrsg.): Der Zweite Weltkrieg – Analysen, Grundzüge, Forschungsbilanz. Verlag Piper, München/Zürich 1989, ISBN 3-492-10811-3, S. 532–550.
• -Gerhard Schreiber: Deutschland, Italien und Südosteuropa. Von der politischen und wirtschaftlichen Hegemonie zur militärischen Aggression in: Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3: Gerhard Schreiber, Bernd Stegemann, Detlef Vogel: Der Mittelmeerraum und Südosteuropa – Von der »non belligeranza« Italiens bis zum Kriegseintritt der Vereinigten Staaten, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1984, ISBN 3-421-06097-5, S. 413.
  -Mario Cervi: The Hollow Legions. Chatto and Windus, London 1972. S. 293. ISBN 0-7011-1351-0.
  

 

[mbarbaric]

this has gone really far and it is interesting indeed. however, the remaining question is still there. why did nazis in the first place go to greece?

first, there were plans from before to protect the south flank and oil fields in romania from british in greece so they would go there anyway. poor state of italian campaign just made it more important as even hitler didnt want the hit in prestige if italians were utterly defeted and thrown back from albania to the point that he ordered greece forces to surrender twice. first time to german forces who deated them and second time reenacted the whole ceremony so greeks could surrender to italians. he even let italian troops to enter athens as victours.

really friendly chap.

 

[Centerbe]

true but looking the situation from when the game starts, there really is no other way for italy than to go the way it did with the leadership they had.

joining entante because of austria is too much given up territory just to opose german influence on austria. besides, by that point italy already has all the austrian provinces it desires. so to fight germany for no territorial gain is hard to imagine.

also, if they joined the democracies, how could italy fulfill mussolini's dream of rule over mediterrane? they couldn't fight english in africa, french in africa, greece (ally of england)...

they could go only against yugoslavia and that only if it chose to pursue axis allignment instead of entante getting on opposing side from italy.

in that case of all desired territories in africa and europe italy could get only (maybe) yugoslavian coast and very probably albania. i think mussolini himself would spit on such idea

in case england doesn't join the entante and remains neutral or even go to axis side they could attack greece and parts of english colonies in africa but that is too far into "what if" scenario.

u are talking historically meaning....
but the focus tree for all the other majors is absolutely not historical.
Take a look on the others focus trees, u can do totally unistorical focis
http://www.hoi4wiki.com/File:France_National_Focus_Tree.jpeg
as join comunist with germany or join axis with france, and other crazy things, than why not for italy?

All generals who fought in WWI are sacked by Mussolini, why? He feared that they are more loyal to the King, thats all. They received back water posts. Even as Italy was on the brinck of collapse in Albania and Greece, he had no balls and put them back in charge.

Who that generals was? A. Diaz for example died in 1928, sure one of the best if not the best italian general.

 

[mbarbaric]

u are talking historically meaning....
but the focus tree for all the other majors is absolutely not historical.
Take a look on the others focus trees, u can do totally unistorical focis
http://www.hoi4wiki.com/File:France_National_Focus_Tree.jpeg
as join comunist with germany or join axis with france, and other crazy things, than why not for italy?

ah, had no idea about focuses for other nations. indeed then it should be available for italy as well.

Who that generals was? A. Diaz for example died in 1928, sure one of the best if not the best italian general.

would like to know that as well

 

[amalric de g.]

Who that generals was? A. Diaz for example died in 1928, sure one of the best if not the best italian general.

I´m sorry, i read it, but forgot where. But after examining it in detail, the source i quotet is obviously wrong.

 

[Centerbe]

ah, had no idea about focuses for other nations. indeed then it should be available for italy as well.

Yep, i was referring to the odd italian focus tree in comparison to all other majors.
I just wrote it in italian DD's thread, look like italy its condemned to be in the axis at all cost, and aniway.
No focus for join allies and comitern and also the odd italian national spirit "vittoria mutilata".
Let it drag less than all majors to other ideologies.

I dont think the historical path is a reason for such choice.
Italy into the allies its not more unistorical than France into the axis.... maybe the contrary its more plausible.

I´m sorry, i read it, but forgot where. But after examining it in detail, the source i quotet is obviously wrong.

I was only curious dont worry, i dont need source or reference im sure you had read it.

But it is a national pride thing for our italian friends to denie the truth.

I dont think italians deny the truth, and in general italian have few national pride by their character.
But strenuously defend what they subjectively believe is right.

 

[Pippo Franchino]

But it is a national pride thing for our italian friends to denie the truth.

Italians and national pride are opposite stuffs, if you find an italian that don't criticize everything that Italy have done tell me about him please! Autocriticism is sometimes a bad stuff , but i see the lack of it for some (not every) Germans for example and for many others populations who really need a lot of autocriticism but keep going cause their national pride.

u are talking historically meaning....
but the focus tree for all the other majors is absolutely not historical.
Take a look on the others focus trees, u can do totally unistorical focis
http://www.hoi4wiki.com/File:France_National_Focus_Tree.jpeg
as join comunist with germany or join axis with france, and other crazy things, than why not for italy?

You make me urge to try to play as Communist France My hope is that modders will do what developers have avoided to do: give Italy a chance.

The second point is, if germany didn´t helped their Italian allies, the italian army would have been in real trouble, the Commonwealth Divisions and the greek ones had kicked them out of Albania, can you imagine what happens, if 500.000 italian soldiers got caught in Albania?

It won't happen because Greeks won't able to advance against italians and as tommy have said ,Greeks were going to fall cause lack of supplies and ammos.. The German intervention speeded up the stuffs cutting the Greek army from behind and facing only some division overhelming the Greeks and facing some Allied division that was not at all destroyed but just evacuated from Greece. Germans caught 20.00 prisoners cause Brits cut them off flooding Coritnh canal leaving them back.

And the Wiki numbers are total crap, example: the german casualties are from Hitlers speech to the Reichstag in May 1941 for the whole Balkan Campaign, the numbers are way to low. Hitler lied straight in the Face of the Members of the Reichstag.

In Greece and Jugoslavia the Wehrmacht lost exactly 2559 soldiers and 3169 missing. But nearly all soldiers died in Greece.

Jugoslavia was a cake walk, the Luftwaffe bombed all resistance in to the dust. After two days all jugoslavian communication was done and the jugoslavian airforce was obliterated. The army couldn´t move and the highcommand was unable to give orders. The Axis troops picked most jugoslavian Divisions piecemeal of and the rest dissintegrated and fled.

Also the numbers of the Allies and Italians are wrong. Depending on source the Commonwealth lost 983 - 3.700 soldiers in Greece. Please pick a number.
And the italian numbers i posted are from the Greece campaign only, 38.832 dead (until March 1941)

I see the reference for your numbers , but i think wiki is more reliable then some books posted there because i can't know what is inside of this books and who written them and i see more then half of them are germans, so i trust more wiki page. Facts remains , Germans faced just some division and generally the backguard of Greeks and then engaged some battle with Allied troops that have lost all their light tanks because german superiority probably.
There is no point continue this because i don't trust a lot your sources and your thinking based over that...

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Italian focus tree is something that made me a lot sad, there is no way to turn communist or democracy as the others great powers
http://www.hoi4wiki.com/File:Italy_national_focus_tree.jpeg

Italy have got impossible national spirits that are against any logic:

-King Victor Emanuel III, the King provides a small national unity increase each month.

Vittorio Emmanuele III was a little man that won't make nobody trust him and the fact he increase national unity is a lot funny...He was so little and evil that he tried to never appear in public

-Vittoria Mutilata, which increases their fascist political leanings, and make them less likely to fall for democracy or communism.

Italy was the only major axis country with a lot of partisan activity before the war and after that with many socialist/communist/ catholics fighting against the Fascists.
Taking numbers from wiki we speak about 300,000/ 350,000 members (and those were fighters, you have also people who just helped) partisans during the Civil War inside Italy
plus 150,000 soldiers from Kingdom of Italy against half million of Fascist plus their german allies.

It is really bad that Paradox have not considered this meanwhile making the National sprites and the focus trees.

I firmly believe that Italy going against germany would have been for sure strike to the German action:

-French could have retreated on south France because they were not encircled by Nazi-fascist forces

-British could have use more forces to help French/Italians

-Italians resistance would have been fierce as during WW1 and the Natural/artificial defences are hardly easy to pass with Bliztrkrieg tactics.

-Italian troops were not prepared for attack, but their ww1 tactics would still useful during a mountain warfare where they would have had a better position and high numbers to reinforce the losses.

-Many Italians manouvers gone bad cause bad timing, lack of supplies (see Africa),bad leadership (Mussolini asking always to attack when army was not ready for example), lack of sources in mainland for factories

-Unfortunatly fascist would look like the goods and that is not good.

 

[amalric de g.]

Josip "Jozo" Tomasevich (March 16, 1908 – October 15, 1994; Serbo-Croatian: Josip Jozo Tomašević, pronounced "tomashevich") was a prominent Yugoslav, and later Croatian-American,[3][4] economist and military historian. He was professor emeritus at San Francisco State University.

• Tomasevich, Jozo (1934). Die Staatsschulden Jugoslaviens [The National Debt of Yugoslavia] (in German). Zagreb: Drukerei "Merkantile".
• Tomasevich, Jozo (1935). Financijska politika Jugoslavije, 1929–1934 [Fiscal Policy of Yugoslavia, 1929–1934] (in Serbo-Croatian). Zagreb: Vlastita naklada.
• Tomasevich, Jozo (1938). Novac i kredit [Money and Credit] (in Serbo-Croatian). Zagreb: Vlastito izdanje.
• Tomasevich, Jozo (1943). International Agreements on Conservation of Marine Resources: With Special Reference to the North Pacific. Stanford: Food Research Institute (printed by Stanford University Press). OCLC 6153373.
• Tomasevich, Jozo (1955). Peasants, Politics, and Economic Change in Yugoslavia. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
• Tomasevich, Jozo (May 1958). "Agriculture in Eastern Europe". Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 317: 44–52. doi:10.1177/000271625831700107. JSTOR 1031076.
• Tomasevich, Jozo; Vucinich, Wayne S. (1969). Contemporary Yugoslavia: Twenty Years of Socialist Experiment. Berkeley: University of California Press.
• Tomasevich, Jozo (1975). War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: The Chetniks 1. Stanford: Stanford University Press. ISBN 0-8047-0857-6.
• Tomasevich, Jozo (1976). "The Tomašević extended family on the Peninsula of Pelješac". In Byrnes, Robert F. Communal Families in the Balkans: The Zadruga Essays by Philip E. Mosely and Essays in His Honor. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. ISBN 0-268-00569-9.
• Tomasevich, Jozo (2001). War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration 2. Stanford: Stanford University Press. ISBN 0-8047-0857-6.

Mario Cervi (Crema, 25 marzo 1921 – Milano, 17 novembre 2015[1]) è stato un giornalista e saggista italiano.

Biografia
Durante la Seconda guerra mondiale fu ufficiale di fanteria in Grecia dove, dopo l'8 settembre del 1943, venne fatto prigioniero dai tedeschi.

La sua vita professionale fu segnata da due tappe: il «Corriere della Sera» e «il Giornale». Iniziò la carriera di giornalista nel 1945 come cronista del «Corriere». Come inviato speciale si occupò di cronaca giudiziaria, seguendo i grandi processi. Fu testimone di importanti avvenimenti esteri: dalla crisi di Suez (1956) al golpe dei colonnelli in Grecia (1967), al golpe di Augusto Pinochet in Cile (1973) (Cervi fu uno dei tre giornalisti italiani presenti a Santiago il giorno della morte di Salvador Allende), all'invasione turca di Cipro (1974).

Nel giugno del 1974 lasciò il «Corriere della Sera» per fondare, insieme a Indro Montanelli ed altri, «il Giornale». Cervi fu editorialista e inviato, poi anche vice direttore con Montanelli col quale ebbe un consolidato rapporto di amicizia e collaborazione. Scrisse i tredici volumi della celebre collana Storia d'Italia, firmata con lo stesso Montanelli e Milano ventesimo secolo. Cervi seguì il suo direttore anche nell'esperienza de «La Voce»; dopo la chiusura del quotidiano collaborò con i giornali del gruppo Monti («il Resto del Carlino», «La Nazione» e «Il Giorno»), per poi tornare al «Giornale» come editorialista[2], accettandone la direzione dopo l'abbandono di Vittorio Feltri[3].

Lasciata la direzione nel 2001 al suo braccio destro e operativo Maurizio Belpietro, continuò la sua collaborazione come editorialista. Per molti anni aveva curato anche una rubrica politica sul settimanale «Gente».

Nel 2007 ottenne il Premio Boffenigo per il Giornalismo (giunto quell'anno alla 5a edizione), conferitogli il 15 settembre 2007 a Costermano sul lago di Garda.

• L'aviatore, Firenze, Vallecchi, 1962.
• Storia della guerra di Grecia, Milano, Sugar, 1965; Milano, A. Mondadori, 1969.
• La giustizia in Italia, Milano, Longanesi, 1967.
• Dove va la Grecia? Dal colpo di Stato al referendum, Milano, Mursia, 1968.
• L'8 settembre, a cura di, Milano, A. Mondadori, 1973.
• Caporetto, a cura di, Milano, A. Mondadori, 1974.
• Eisenhower, Novara, Istituto geografico De Agostini, 1977.
• La piovra corporativa. Vizi e misfatti della perversione burocratica e clientelare, Milano, Editoriale Nuova, 1978.
• L'Italia littoria (1925-1936), con Indro Montanelli, Milano, Rizzoli, 1979.
• Due secoli di guerre, con Indro Montanelli, 10 voll., Milano, Editoriale Nuova, 1980-1983.
• L'Italia dell'Asse (1936-10 giugno 1940), con Indro Montanelli, Milano, Rizzoli, 1980.
• L'Italia della disfatta (10 giugno 1940 - 8 settembre 1943), con Indro Montanelli, Milano, Rizzoli, 1982.
• L'Italia della guerra civile (8 settembre 1943-9 maggio 1946), con Indro Montanelli, Milano, Rizzoli, 1983. ISBN 88-17-42723-3.
• L'Italia della Repubblica (2 giugno 1946-18 aprile 1948), con Indro Montanelli, Milano, Rizzoli, 1985. ISBN 88-17-42022-0.
• L'energia e la storia, con Indro Montanelli, Roma, Ente Nazionale per l'Energia Elettrica, 1986.
• L'Italia del miracolo (14 luglio 1948-19 agosto 1954), con Indro Montanelli, Milano, Rizzoli, 1987. ISBN 88-17-42725-X.
• L'Italia dei due Giovanni (1955-1965), con Indro Montanelli, Milano, Rizzoli, 1989. ISBN 88-17-42726-8.
• Milano ventesimo secolo, con Indro Montanelli, Milano, Rizzoli, 1990. ISBN 88-17-42727-6; 2002. ISBN 88-17-11719-6.
• L'Italia nella seconda guerra mondiale (1940-1942), con Indro Montanelli, Milano, Rizzoli, 1990.
• L'Italia degli anni di piombo (1965-1978), con Indro Montanelli, Milano, Rizzoli, 1991. ISBN 88-17-42805-1.
• Mussolini. Album di una vita, a cura di, Milano, Rizzoli, 1992. ISBN 88-17-85305-4.
• 25 luglio - 8 settembre '43. Album di una disfatta, a cura di, Milano, Rizzoli, 1993. ISBN 88-17-84258-3.
• L'Italia degli anni di fango (1978-1993), con Indro Montanelli, Milano, Rizzoli, 1993. ISBN 88-17-42729-2.
• I vent'anni del Giornale di Montanelli, con Gian Galeazzo Biazzi Vergani, Milano, Rizzoli, 1994. ISBN 88-17-84323-7.
• L'Italia di Berlusconi (1993-1995), con Indro Montanelli, Milano, Rizzoli, 1995. ISBN 88-17-42810-8.
• Salò. Album della repubblica di Mussolini, a cura di, Milano, Rizzoli, 1995. ISBN 88-17-84399-7.
• L'Italia dell'Ulivo (1995-1997), con Indro Montanelli, Milano, Rizzoli, 1997. ISBN 88-17-42810-8.
• L'Italia del Novecento, con Indro Montanelli, Milano, Rizzoli, 1998. ISBN 88-17-86014-X.
• L'Italia del millennio. Sommario di dieci secoli di storia, con Indro Montanelli, Milano, Rizzoli, 2000. ISBN 88-17-86608-3.
• Il duca invitto. Emanuele Filiberto di Savoia e la storia della sua terza armata mai sconfitta, Milano, Il Giornale, 2005.
• Sprecopoli. Tutto quello che non vi hanno mai detto sui nuovi sprechi della politica, con Nicola Porro, Milano, Mondadori, 2007. ISBN 978-88-04-57346-3.
• Gli anni del piombo, con Luigi Mascheroni, Milano, Mursia 2009, EAN 9788842541103

If you trust some guy who wrote a wiki page more than this two, then i have nothing more to say.