Is Napoleon the greatest tactician that ever lived?

[PEP]

Napoleon was facing the same coalition that had defeated him in 1814 (with granted, more veteran troops) that outnumbered him 4 to 1. What else could happen ?

He could have won? Let's not forget the Belgian campaign that ended with Waterloo was a very close call for the Brits and the Prussians. Had Napoléon won, who knows what could happen next.

Out-brained Wellington so well that he lost.

Wellington did perform quite poorly and was out-brained by Napoleon during the 1815 campaign. He made up for it during the battle of Waterloo by avoiding defeat and standing his ground admirably but in the end the Allies victory has more to do with sheer luck than tactical or strategic brilliance on Wellington's part.

 

[BaronNoir]

Okay, here are three glaring tactical mistakes at Waterloo from the supposed ''best general ever '' (those errors are not the kind of one that appears only with hindsight)

1)On the left wing, spending several hours assaulting the Hougomont farm without a single gun in support, which ended up pinning down a whole corps

2)On the centre, using cavalry against infantry squares without artillery or infantry support (a manoeuver that could only fail in conventional military wisdom). Stating afterward ''Ney did it without my orders'' is not an excuse and is really hard to believe. (Not to mention that Napoleon could have ordered Ney to withdraw the units or not commit his own guard cavalry)

3)On the right wing, he failed to guard his flank (the Prussians achieved almost complete tactical surprise at Placenoit, not meeting pickets or sentry in chokepoints) and lied to his own troop about Grouchy arrival.

 

[highsis]

Fighting in a disadvantageous situation says nothing about a generals skill.

1812 was Napoleon's worst campaign.

Out-brained Wellington so well that he lost.

In this case, perhaps do not attack.

Are you even trying to read, or is it dyslexia?

"Fighting in a disadvantageous situation says nothing about a generals skill." = Being offensive means one is inherently fighting in more disadvantageous terrains than not. Winning most of those tells about one's skill. Isn't it really obvious?

"1812 was Napoleon's worst campaign." I was talking about Napoleon's decline in talents and health, not the worst 'result.' You are not reading properly.

"Out-brained Wellington so well that he lost." Did the part about disadvantageous terrain, Nei's mistake of not following Napoloeon's order twice, being outnumbered missed your eyes somehow?

"In this case, perhaps do not attack." OK, finally there is one point that makes sense. Napoleon attacked to pin down the enemy in position because he didn't want them to retreat. His reinforcements were delayed with blizzard and French suffered massive casualties. I'm not saying it was the best decision, but still it was not entirely stupid.

 

[BaronNoir]

Where exactly this ''Ney did not followed my orders'' defence appears ?

Ah, yes : in Napoleon memoirs.

The excuse of the incompetence of the marshals (Soult, Ney and Grouchy) is as odd as old, since Napoleon put them at those posts. (and nominated Grouchy even for it). That's even more curious considering that Napoleon had at his disposition Marshall Davout (who was way more competent than Soult and Ney), who was back at Paris.

But Marshall Davout was a show stealer : he had won a brilliant battle (outnumbered) against the Prussians....

 

[PEP]

Okay, here are three glaring tactical mistakes at Waterloo from the supposed ''best general ever '' (those errors are not the kind of one that appears only with hindsight)

I never claimed he was the best general. And I do believe he was at his worst during the Battle of Waterloo. I merely said that Wellington wasn't particularly brilliant either during the 1815 campaign and owed his victory to chance and unexpectedly stupid mistakes on the part of the French more than to his own "brilliance".

 

[Yakman]

Dunno about, or if the question can be answered, but it's hard to argue that his defense of Paris in 1814 wasn't one of the most brilliant campaigns ever waged

 

[unmerged(515410)]

I'd say he was the best of his era.

I dunno why Egypt is so often held against Napoleon. I doubt he truly believed that he could get all the way to India through Egypt, though he certainly wouldn't have passed on that opportunity in the very unlikely event it presented itself. It's more likely he went glory hunting for political reasons, and in that respect, Napoleon's campaign in Egypt was a sound success.

Napoleon in his late career? Eh he simply got fat, complacent, and lost most of his cavalry. Happens to the best of them. Take Alexander, if the man didn't die so young there's a very solid chance he too would have lost some of that verve and swagger, what with all the boozing and partying he was fond of. Didn't help that the Corps system was rapidly emulated across Europe. I believe that in his later career Napoleon realized his enemies were now organized on level equal or superior to his army, that he had suffered substantial losses in personnel on all levels throughout his various campaigns, and exploited the superior morale of his army, the only real advantage he had left, thus the increasingly common battering-ram tactics.

 

[Andrelvis]

That's a fair point. I even think Hannibal is the second best next to Napoleon among European generals

Eh?

 

[Sejong]

He could have won? Let's not forget the Belgian campaign that ended with Waterloo was a very close call for the Brits and the Prussians. Had Napoléon won, who knows what could happen next.

Even if he wins the battle, what changes? He's still got a massive coalition set against him and even if he wins Waterloo it's only a matter of time before the resources and manpower of france are completely exhausted.

 

[Herbert West]

Wellington did perform quite poorly and was out-brained by Napoleon during the 1815 campaign. He made up for it during the battle of Waterloo by avoiding defeat and standing his ground admirably but in the end the Allies victory has more to do with sheer luck than tactical or strategic brilliance on Wellington's part.

Apart from Briton self-congratulation, I don't understand why Wellington gets all the credit, when it was Bluchers arrival that decide that battle.

 

[BaronNoir]

Well, the battle was about pinning down Napoleon in place long enough for Blucher to arrive. Once Blucher had arrived, the conclusion was forgeone (Blucher did move with commendable speed)

 

[PEP]

Even if he wins the battle, what changes? He's still got a massive coalition set against him and even if he wins Waterloo it's only a matter of time before the resources and manpower of france are completely exhausted.

Well with the British and Prussian armies out of the picture for some time Napoleon would have been free to turn around and face the armies of Russia and Austria. A quick victory on the field followed by diplomatic openings toward the Austrians might be enough to break the coalition. One has to remember that the British maritime hegemony made them almost as hated as the French on the continent, would Napoleon be prepare to make concession and treat with the Austrians as equals who knows what could have happened. Obviously the most likely scenario is that a French victory at Waterloo would merely postponed Napoleon's downfall but still, who knows?

Apart from Briton self-congratulation, I don't understand why Wellington gets all the credit, when it was Bluchers arrival that decide that battle.

My point exactly.

Well, the battle was about pinning down Napoleon in place long enough for Blucher to arrive. Once Blucher had arrived, the conclusion was forgeone (Blucher did move with commendable speed)

Well Waterloo was a gamble for both Napoleon and Wellington. The former was hopping Grouchy would prevent the Prussians from rescuing the Brits while the latter was betting on Blücher reaching the Battlefield on time. Waterloo was nothing more than a simple bet and therefore Wellington's victory mostly comes down to luck (and an undeniable ability to hold his ground which sure served him well but wouldn't have been enough without Blücher).

 

[BaronNoir]

The issue is that France enthousiasm for Napoleon was already dying down (except in the army). In the hundred days, Napoleon had trouble finding people to accept jobs as ministers, which is a pretty telling sign of poor support.

 

[99KingHigh]

Okay, here are three glaring tactical mistakes at Waterloo from the supposed ''best general ever '' (those errors are not the kind of one that appears only with hindsight)

1)On the left wing, spending several hours assaulting the Hougomont farm without a single gun in support, which ended up pinning down a whole corps

2)On the centre, using cavalry against infantry squares without artillery or infantry support (a manoeuver that could only fail in conventional military wisdom). Stating afterward ''Ney did it without my orders'' is not an excuse and is really hard to believe. (Not to mention that Napoleon could have ordered Ney to withdraw the units or not commit his own guard cavalry)

3)On the right wing, he failed to guard his flank (the Prussians achieved almost complete tactical surprise at Placenoit, not meeting pickets or sentry in chokepoints) and lied to his own troop about Grouchy arrival.

Everything is easier with the benefit of hindsight.

 

[PEP]

The issue is that France enthousiasm for Napoleon was already dying down (except in the army). In the hundred days, Napoleon had trouble finding people to accept jobs as ministers, which is a pretty telling sign of poor support.

Popular support was there. It's just that the Elite believed Napoleon would be quickly defeated and therefore accepting a job from him would make you a traitor when the King returns. That could change quickly if Napoleon defeats the Brits and the Prussians in Belgium though.

 

[DoomBunny]

He could have won? Let's not forget the Belgian campaign that ended with Waterloo was a very close call for the Brits and the Prussians. Had Napoléon won, who knows what could happen next.

At Waterloo, Napoleon could have dealt a severe blow to the British-Allied force and then turned on the Prussians. In the best case scenario, where Napoleon somehow takes only light losses and renders these two forces ineffective, he must still face new enemy forces.

1815 is not a campaign the French can win, only survive.

Wellington did perform quite poorly and was out-brained by Napoleon during the 1815 campaign. He made up for it during the battle of Waterloo by avoiding defeat and standing his ground admirably but in the end the Allies victory has more to do with sheer luck than tactical or strategic brilliance on Wellington's part.

Wellington did not have his best day, sure, but he was hardly out-brained. It was Napoleon, not Wellington, who failed to beat Blucher decisively, failed to cover him effectively, and then failed on the field of battle by being inattentive.

2)On the centre, using cavalry against infantry squares without artillery or infantry support (a manoeuver that could only fail in conventional military wisdom). Stating afterward ''Ney did it without my orders'' is not an excuse and is really hard to believe. (Not to mention that Napoleon could have ordered Ney to withdraw the units or not commit his own guard cavalry)

Napoleon was asleep at the point Ney initially went in IIRC, which was not necessarily such a bad decision as is often made out. Ney gets a lot of stick for his actions at Waterloo, but from his position he saw a heavily engaged enemy beginning to retreat. He was also somewhat shell-shocked from his ordeal in Russia.

Either way though, it was hardly a good move.

Are you even trying to read, or is it dyslexia?

A little of all three, but not so much of the first 2 or the last one.

"Fighting in a disadvantageous situation says nothing about a generals skill." = Being offensive means one is inherently fighting in more disadvantageous terrains than not. Winning most of those tells about one's skill. Isn't it really obvious?

Not really. I'm not normally fond of the cherry-picked quote, but there's one or two by Sun Tzu that I'm somewhat fond of.

"For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill."

"Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win."

"1812 was Napoleon's worst campaign." I was talking about Napoleon's decline in talents and health, not the worst 'result.' You are not reading properly.

In terms of health, maybe. In terms of talent, 1812 was a campaign which from the outset was self-sabotaged.

"Out-brained Wellington so well that he lost." Did the part about disadvantageous terrain, Nei's mistake of not following Napoloeon's order twice, being outnumbered missed your eyes somehow?

Napoleon failed to exercise proper command of his subordinate (who was always somewhat eager and was still rather effected by the Russian campaign), and Wellington had the advantage. That Wellington picked the terrain and that the Allies had a superior force from the outset hardly shows a lack of brain function.

"In this case, perhaps do not attack." OK, finally there is one point that makes sense. Napoleon attacked to pin down the enemy in position because he didn't want them to retreat. His reinforcements were delayed with blizzard and French suffered massive casualties. I'm not saying it was the best decision, but still it was not entirely stupid.

No, but Eylau is far from a well fought battle, and along with others shows that Napoleon was not invincible pre-1809.

Where exactly this ''Ney did not followed my orders'' defence appears ?

Ah, yes : in Napoleon memoirs.

The excuse of the incompetence of the marshals (Soult, Ney and Grouchy) is as odd as old, since Napoleon put them at those posts. (and nominated Grouchy even for it). That's even more curious considering that Napoleon had at his disposition Marshall Davout (who was way more competent than Soult and Ney), who was back at Paris.

But Marshall Davout was a show stealer : he had won a brilliant battle (outnumbered) against the Prussians....

Davout was left behind because Napoleon wanted someone reliable in Paris. There wasn't much point winning the campaign only to return to a coup.

Apart from Briton self-congratulation, I don't understand why Wellington gets all the credit, when it was Bluchers arrival that decide that battle.

Well, that whole "holding the French long enough for the Prussians to come up" thing. It's also somewhat missing the point, if Blucher hadn't been around then Wellington wouldn't have fought as he did.

Though there's not much reason other than anti-Briton trolling to suggest that Blucher did all the work.

 

[BaronNoir]

At Waterloo, Napoleon could have dealt a severe blow to the British-Allied force and then turned on the Prussians. In the best case scenario, where Napoleon somehow takes only light losses and renders these two forces ineffective, he must still face new enemy forces.

1815 is not a campaign the French can win, only survive.



Wellington did not have his best day, sure, but he was hardly out-brained. It was Napoleon, not Wellington, who failed to beat Blucher decisively, failed to cover him effectively, and then failed on the field of battle by being inattentive.



Napoleon was asleep at the point Ney initially went in IIRC, which was not necessarily such a bad decision as is often made out. Ney gets a lot of stick for his actions at Waterloo, but from his position he saw a heavily engaged enemy beginning to retreat. He was also somewhat shell-shocked from his ordeal in Russia.

Either way though, it was hardly a good move.



A little of all three, but not so much of the first 2 or the last one.



Not really. I'm not normally fond of the cherry-picked quote, but there's one or two by Sun Tzu that I'm somewhat fond of.

"For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill."

"Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win."



In terms of health, maybe. In terms of talent, 1812 was a campaign which from the outset was self-sabotaged.



Napoleon failed to exercise proper command of his subordinate (who was always somewhat eager and was still rather effected by the Russian campaign), and Wellington had the advantage. That Wellington picked the terrain and that the Allies had a superior force from the outset hardly shows a lack of brain function.



No, but Eylau is far from a well fought battle, and along with others shows that Napoleon was not invincible pre-1809.



Davout was left behind because Napoleon wanted someone reliable in Paris. There wasn't much point winning the campaign only to return to a coup.



Well, that whole "holding the French long enough for the Prussians to come up" thing. It's also somewhat missing the point, if Blucher hadn't been around then Wellington wouldn't have fought as he did.

Though there's not much reason other than anti-Briton trolling to suggest that Blucher did all the work.

I completely agreee with Doombunny assessment that Napoleon needed someone reliable in Paris (mostly because he had put Fouché in Paris in the first place...) : however, and Napoleon knew it plainly, if he lost a battle against the Allies, then there would be revolt in Paris in any case.

The thing is, Marshal Davout, one of the handful of Napoleon commanders that had shown a knack for independant command, was not that much used after Jena.

 

[Herbert West]

Well, that whole "holding the French long enough for the Prussians to come up" thing. It's also somewhat missing the point, if Blucher hadn't been around then Wellington wouldn't have fought as he did.

Though there's not much reason other than anti-Briton trolling to suggest that Blucher did all the work.

Where is "Bluchers arrival that decided that battle" equal to "Blucher did all the work"? Please, I need to know.

 

[Calad]

What about waging war in Spain and Russia at same time? You dont need much education to understand its folly.

 

[BaronNoir]

That would be a strategic mistake, not a tactical one.