Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Japan
Originally posted by joel rauber
"I do not understand the relevance of this to the analogy of British supply difficulties for the North African theater. "
I am not addressing the NA theater, simply pointing out that ships were sent to Aust in ballast to pick up munitions and supplies for Britain, rather than send them in ballast they could have carried specialist supplies (not produced in Aust) without adding to the shipping burden at all.
Re Jap Sub Doctrine-
"Perhaps, but perhaps not radically different. Also, as we look at further comments below, remember the Japanese were somewhat suicidal. "
I'm afraid it is radically different - the Japs saw merchant ships as being largely targets that were unworthy of a warrior (amazing, given that they were to watch their own military/industry strangle under Sub attack and still not change beyond limited ops - that whole idiot Samurai thing), you would have to change the entire IJN culture to change it.
"The German U-boat force was only destroyed ultimately. Hardly the case in 1941 or much of 1942. And they were destroyed in more restricted waters. "
Certainly, but the IJN sub force was not in the same league as the U-Boat force and their equipment was much worse, their boats were big, slow diving, shallow diving and noisy, had no radar till mid 1944 and they would be facing men who were trained to take on the best equipped with the fruits of research that was aimed at the best.
They could have caused more problems than they did (they hardly could cause less) but they would not have a big impact, the allies accepted the use of the convoy system and were rapidly getting better at ASW, by 43 the U-boat fleet was in real trouble, I suspect the Jap boats would have been in more trouble sooner (given their technical inferiority).
"I never particularly said there was much point. I'm only saying that it was a distinct possibility given the hypotheticals. Reason's could be simply a demonstration of force, or as a feint, or a misguided effort to achieve a slightly better negotiating position. etc. "
This I have a problem with, there is no credible reason to do it and not enough shipping to do it, the troops can't be spared yet you suggest that the IJA would agree to throw away a Div?
They were not confident of success with 12 Divs (which suggests they had a pretty fair idea that they would face 8 - 10 Divs), so they would have to know that any smaller force would be a disaster.
"Certainly more difficult to supply New Caledonia than Guadalcanal, but I doubt it is impossible. "
Not impossible, you just have to choose what to give up - future production (fiddling with production snowballs badly, as future projects that need the goods are delayed and so on)? starve a garrison?, halt an offensive? these are the choices the Japs faced because their Merchant fleet was too small.
"I think you misunderstood my last sentence. The last sentence was intended to lend legitimacy to the second to the last sentence; which I gather is in agreement with the point you make above. "
Oh, I see now, sorry.
"If I understand you above, a dramatically reversed Midway changes the situation in the pacific not one whit? I think you have legitimate points when you refer to the long term strategic situation; but it certainly changes everything for at least about 6 months."
But it doesn't change it in a way that actually helps the IJA on land.
" In the context of the above operations, there is little to no US Naval interference in the Solomon's or the New Guinea/Bismark theatre. This changes the air superiority situation immensly; not to mention the Japanese supply situation. "
The Bismark sea would be little changed, it was largely covered by land based air.
The Solomons, the Japs could have been left there to rot.
It doesn't help Jap supply one bit, they still lack the transports to move troops and supply.
In the fourth quarter of 1942, Japanese oil production (which was almost entirely concentrated in her conquered territories, such as the Indies) was 1,194,000 tons. Of that, only 643,000 tons made it to Japan (which is where practically all the refineries were), the rest being either lost to attack, or consumed in the conquered territories. So roughly 214,000 tons of oil per month was making it to Japan. However, the Imperial Navy alone was consuming about 305,000 tons of heavy oil (in the form of fuel oil) per month by this stage in the war (Parillo, p. 237).
The IJNs problem would be made worse by the extra carriers and escorts that survived...
Re a smaller than 12 Div limited invasion of Aust-
"You brought up the Japanese "character" above. What I say is rather in keeping with the Japanese character. They didn't particularly mind suicidal operations, did they? "
But they expected a gain, the Japs didn't go looking for chances to squander troops.
Re Why would the IJA throw away a Div in Nth Aust-
"Historical precedence, e.g. they agreed to throwing away divisions at Guadalcanal. Where the environment did a rather good job. And we note that the Japanese forces lasted about 5 months against well equipped divisions there. "
A few differences, they thought they could achieve something, the US troops were believed to have massive supply problems on the same scale as the Japs and they thought that Jap land based air and the IJN might make a difference, none of this applies to Aust.
"I'd basically agree here, though I think one could paint a 10% probability scenario that would take Darwin or maybe Townsville for a very short period of time. And don't forget the Japanese mentality was one of "if we can just make the war to much of a pain for these weak willed democracies, they may negotiate a peace". I think we both agree that that mentality was dead wrong; but despite being wrong it could never the less provide motivation for actions we'd find senseless. "
I think that by Mid 42 it was clear that the weak willed democracies were able to fight, the Japs had met 7 Div and the US Army and USMC and were finding the going tough.
"We simply disagree. I consider quite plausible that the Japanese could dig up a force of 12 divisions. Don't hold me to the number twelve. Let's say 8-15 divisions. Manpower shortages were the least of the Japanese worries. "
Which Divs and from where? - they only had a force of roughly 11 Divs to do the Pacific on Dec 7 1941
"umhhh, in discussing hypotheticals I don't see the relevence of this; particulary if all we are saying is decrease the offensive capability for a period of time."
Unless you propose a Japan that attacks the US and C'wealth for no reason (has no troops in China and hence doesn't need oil), we are pretty much stuck with a Japan that has Japans historical war aims, but if you choose to deviate widely from Japans 1941 forces, goals, dispositions and production then I would expect the same lattitude which would turn this discussion into a farce pretty quickly.
" Also, I'm not as good at reading the Japanese mind as you are. Why wouldn't they decrease some of their offensive operations in China for a year in order to address some serious issues in the pacific? "
Because they could not move or supply them and China was the goal, the Pacific was a sideshow.
"There certainly were advocates (mostly Navy) for increased emphasis on the Pacific. "
And the army ran the China war, there was no way they were going to put the big event (that they were running) on hold to play second fiddle in an IJN sideshow.
The Jap interservice politics were worse than that, it would be like expecting Macarthur to volunteer to cancel the landings on the Phillipines to publically be Nimitzs boot cleaning boy in an exercise on the US coast.
"Why is it so implausible to imagine that the Japanese might infer that in 1941,1942 that Stalin was too busy with the Germans to mount a serious threat to Manchuria. And therefore they (the Japanese) could reduce their Manchurian garrison a bit? "
Because the Japanese lost so badly to the USSR last time and Stalin was known to be a man who did not know the meaning of forgive and forget, it would have left the whole goal of the war open to attack from someone they had mightily p'd off recently.
Re 12 Divs to invade Aust-
"IMO you have it backwards. Lack of manpower was the least of the Japanese worries. I rather think the other showstoppers are the ones that make the "manpower showstopper" close to irrelevant; which is to say they stop the show first, not manpower shortages. "
I think here we are both right, its just that the manpower shortage stopped it even going any further, either of the others would have stopped it, but the IJA looked for troops and couldn't find them first.
Re No Aviators on staff (coral sea)-
"You will need to explain this. How did the Japanese manage to fly airplanes off of their carriers without any aviation experience? I fear I misunderstand your comment. "
I may not have been clear, on their planning and command staffs there was nobody who had any aviation experience, naval or land - obviously the Sqns had pilots, but they were told what to do and had no input into how to plan to do it, it meant that the people in charge did not have a realistic idea of what airpower could and could not do and had nobody on hand to ask.
"Both sides had significant problems with recon in the early battles. I believe Fletcher lost his job a month or two into Guadalcanal, in part over mismanaged recon at Coral Sea and Guadalcanal; in part for a lot other reasons as well. "
The Japanese committed a far lower percentage of a/c to recon than the US, it meant much of the time they were rather blind.
"I suspect we must agree to disagree. I fully believe that a dramatically reversed Midway would have changed much in the Pacific war for 6-12 months. And I will use the "N" word here; IMO it is nonsense to say otherwise. "
I'm afraid not, you put in the time it takes to replace most of the air group and historically you have already lost 2 months (Zuikaku took several months after Coral Sea), but what you haven't done is found another tanker, merchant vessel or soldier which are what you really need.
"I will refer you to Bergurud's book, where he does significant analysis of the numbers. The Japanese pilot shortages, in terms of numbers, (i.e. from the replacement training pool) didn't show up seriously until well into 1943, and mostly appeared first not as a shortage of numbers but of quality. I doubt that a reversed Midway would see these shortages appearing earlier than historically"
No, but you would need to take time to replace them, historically the Japs didn't need to replace most of their CV air wings (having lost the CVs) from Midway.
"BTW, we have managed to vigorously disagree for a few posts without ad hominem attacks! Good Show! "
Where the people involved are not idiots it is quite possible to argue without ad homs, Hannibal could learn from this.