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Originally posted by AlanC9
The question is, could any of those events, or even all of them, have staved off Japan's inevitable defeat, given that the US was mobilized for total war?

I don't see how. Even if Japan had sunk Enterprise , Lexington , and Saratoga at Pearl Harbor, that would have simply delayed the US offensive for a year or two. And even if Japan won a few battles, US morale would not have broken.

Maybe the Japanese could have staved off defeat until 1948 or so. But it would still be crushing, unmitigated defeat

The only rational strategy for Japan is to avoid such a total war altogether.

And of course, the chance for AI Japan to pursue a rational strategy should be very, very, small.

Holding the US off until 48 or so is kind of the point, though, from agame viewpoint, assuming that victory is tied to Japan's historical surrender date. And if Germany does much better than they did historically, then the US election in 44 might possibly see a peace candidate come to power. Granted, that's a lot of what-ifs, but there was a possibility, small though it may have been.

Two address your last point, the only way I see Japan avoiding war with the US would be to cave on the US demand to get out of China and I just can't see the Japanese ever even contemplating that. I do wonder, though, if Japan had only gone after the Dutch and left the US alone, would the US have entered the Pacific war? The Brits may have gone in on the Dutch side, but that might be seen as being 'overly agressive' by the US public (maybe not) and would have given Japan the excuse they needed to attack the British posessions in Asia while keeping the US neutral. Maybe.
 

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Originally posted by Captain Krunch
Germany honored the pact when they declared war on the United States after Japan attacked. But for some reason the Japanese did not honor their part of the agreement by Declaring war on the Soviets after the Germans did. If Japan had honored this agreement she could have found her oil in the Siberian region of the Soviet Union, and would then not have had to worry about the East Indies.


The Japanese fought a little border war with the Soviets in 1939 and got their fannies kicked by Soviet mechanized forces. This is the same pre-war Red Army that had such a hard time with the Finns. The Japanese militarists were pretty dumb, but after that experience they had no interest in tangling with the Soviets in a general war. Nobody in the West (including their Axis partners) knew about this at the time, though.

Also, the Axis treaty did not require its members to join in on wars of agression. Neither did the Anti-Comintern treaty to which the Axis powers and a lot their minor allies were signatory. So, Japan was under no treaty obligation to attack the Soviet Union just because Germany and its vassals did. Interestingly, Nationalist China was also signatory to the Anti-Comintern Treaty.

The Germans were also under no treaty obligation to declare war on the US just because Japan did. They did so in hopes of a tit-for-tat Japanese DOW against the Soviets (again in ignorance of the Japanese motivation for letting sleeping bears lie). In the novel alternate history novel "1945", by Newt Gingrich & William Forstchen (I suspect mostly written by Fostchen), Hitler misses the moment to do that and the US fights a one-front war against Japan (which we win in 1943). That should be a possibility in the game - in the absence of a German DOW then FDR can't get the votes in Congress for a DOW against Germany.
 

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Originally posted by PBI


Some of those answers depend on how oil will be handled. The oil embargo was, I think, the most compelling reason for Japan to go to war.

. . .

This brings up an interesting point. I agree that the oil embargo was the most compelling reason.

In the "game", will the US get lots of brownie points for *not* going to war.

Imagine a US policy of trying to stay isolated. The clever US realizes that instituting the oil embargo would in the Japanese mind force them to attack the US thereby embroiling them in the war. So as the US player you don't "check the apply oil embargo against Japan". Japan doesn't attack the US and the rest is "history".

What should the game results be for the above scenario?
 

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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Japan

Originally posted by husky65
Originally posted by joel rauber

"It is clear in the book that Frank has gotten a hold of a map of Australia. It does cut the major supply route from the US to Australia."

You can hand Noumea and Fiji to the Japs and convoys can be routed further south - it doesn't cut the supply line, it just stretches it and the allies had enough merchant shipping to do it.

You can even give Japan New Zealand and still ship to Aust from the US east coast to the Aust west coast.

There is no credible possibility where the IJN can blockade Aust.

It was a problem for the British when they had to route convoys to Egypt around the horn rather than through the Med. It would be a problem for the US if they have route convoys along these longer routes.

Also, since we are talking about somewhat plausable alternative scenarios. Combine what I have been saying with a different Japanese doctrine for use of their submarines. See further comments below.


" Cutting such supply routes would be a major concern for US and Australia and 'was a major concern'. "

Which doesn't make it a realistic concern, we have the benefit of knowing what supplies, shipping etc Japan had and what other commitments they had - in early WW2 they were guessing and had to guess on the pessimistic side for safety.

Readers of these debates will have to read the references to draw any conclusions for themselves as to how realistic the concerns were. The significant players at the time certainly so them as being very very realistic concerns.

. . .

"I'm just disputing the idea that under certain plausible hypotheticals that Japan could not blockade Australia, and by blockade I mean cutting the major supply route from the US. Naturally this does not imply a full blockade in the sense of no shipping what-so-ever reaching Australia. Perhaps I should've said 'limited blockade' or 'cutting of major supply routes' (not all supply routes, of course) "

I'm sorry but the above is just not sensible - blockade means blockade, not 'just cutting off Aust from the US' - keeping Americans out but letting a Brit armoured div in, is not very productive and you have not shown how siezing part of the south pac would provide the extra fuel tankers needed to support IJN ops in the southern ocean (holding a few islands is not the same as being able to operate well south of them) - that where the allies can route convoys if they need to and there is nothing Japan can do about it.

Which is why I clarified what I meant by blockade. If by blockade one means a complete naval blockade of all or all minus minor smuggling than not even Nazi Germany was blockaded in WWII as they got significant shipments from Sweden of iron ore and other supplies.

"I assume that a successful South Pacific thrust would make a limited N. Australia invasion more plausible. "

Less plausible as it leaves you with less troops, supply and way less shipping to work with.

It all depends on both time frame and whether or not you are trying to hold the South Pacific islands for a long time with significant forces or just with minor forces for a temporary time.

"Would you grant that if Midway was reversed, that it is plausible that Port Moresby could be taken? "

I seriously doubt it, the Japanese logistics were too poor and trying to come into Moresby by sea would have exposed the Japanese to contested landings, something they were very bad at.

The book "MacArthur Strikes Back : Decision at Buna, New Guinea 1942-1943" describes the events w/o a dramatically reversed Midway, i.e. the historical situation. IIRC the Japanese land thrust in late '42 got within 12 miles or so of Port Moresby. This is all while Guadalcanal is going on. One could interpret this as almost taking it in the actual event. One could also interpret it as the Japanese way overachieving and that they really had no chance of making it the remaining 12 miles. I think its legitimately debatable.

However, that was the actual events. I believe that a dramatically reversed Midway would enable that remaining 12 miles to be a quite plausible reach. Perhaps not certain, but plausible.



"Why would a limited N. Australia operation require 12 divisions?"

You would probably need to ask the IJA who felt that 12 Divs was the bare minimum, however given that Aust could assemble 8 Divs by Mid 42 (plus various US units and a Brit Armoured Div promised in case of invasion) it is quite clear that 12 Divs is insufficient - throw in the material superiority of the Aust Divs and a 12 Div limited invasion is in lots of trouble.

I don't need to ask the Japanese because I don't necessarily mean, nor imply, that by "limited northern invasion" that I mean the same thing as the 12 division plan you are talking about. I believe, under the hypotheticals, that a limited one division or so invasion at the tip of the Cape York peninsula would be possible. This is why I was carefull, I hope, to say that I was making few claims as to the strategic implications of such a limited venture.

More interesting would be: could they take Darwin or Townsville, even for say a 6-12 month period of time?


" And whether or not the divisions could be spared is debatable anyway. Japan did not have a shortage of rifle divisions. They fielded more than the US did in WWII."

As I recall the US was not invading China as a principal war aim, which rather significantly lowers the amount of rifle divs they needed, Japan on the other hand was trying to take China, hold Malaya/Singapore, take Burma/India, hold Borneo/Indonesia, hold the Phillipines, take New Guinea, take Guadalcanal plus Japanese Garrisons, Korea etc - when you have lots of tasks, you can have lots of men and still be spread a little thin - they could not spare 12 Divs.

The point was that man-power limitations was not the problem for Japan finding 12 divisions. US war aims are irrelevant; Japanese war-aims are relevant here. Change those slighty, allow for less homeland defence in 42. More trust that Stalin won't attack, decrease offensive capability in China, the raising of a few more division in Japan and you can find the troops. As I point out and I state below, finding the troops isn't the problem, shipping them is.


" Of course, you'd be correct to point out that you also have to have the shipping for the divisions as well. I don't consider a limited N. Australian operation as requiring 12 divisions or anything close to that. I stress the word 'limited'. "

. . .
"And again all this is predicated on a dramatically different 'Midway'. If you also additionally allow a different 'Coral Sea' result, the plausibilities naturally become somewhat more plausable."

Given that none of the Japanese Coral sea commanders had any experience in air ops, nor did they have anyone on their staffs that had air ops experience, Coral sea was never going to go well for Japan.

Nobody had wartime experience with naval carrier vs carrier air ops at the time of Coral Sea. I think the Japanes and US staffs were equally inexperienced at the time. One could argue that the US was more inexperienced. The Japanese at least had the experience of the Pearl Harbor raid and more carrier raiding experience than the US at the time.

My reading of the first two major carrier battles of WWII, Coral Sea and Midway is one of incredible serendipity. If its easy to postulate a dramatically different Midway (this might be debatable, but it is the assumption of all this discussion) then I'd find it just as easy (actually easier in my mind) to imagine a rather different Coral Sea. Japanese search planes finding the Lexington first and US search planes missing their Shoho sighting and a few other small changed "acts of god" and who knows.
 

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The Japanese were in a bad position but with a couple of breaks, like a decisive victory at Midway and some more victories, they might have been able to sue for peace. If Pearl Harbor had not been a "sneak attack" I think American resolve might not have been so strong. The Japanese were not "doomed from the start." Just disadvantaged.
 

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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Japan

Originally posted by husky65
snip You can hand Noumea and Fiji to the Japs and convoys can be routed further south - it doesn't cut the supply line, it just stretches it and the allies had enough merchant shipping to do it. snip
Actually you're a bit careless with numbers here - in summer 1942 the allied fought wery hard to supply the British Isles (+Russia via Murmansk) with food, oil, ammunition and other basic products. In 1942 allied shipping still lost much more than they could build despite the capacity of the american shipyards (8 245 000 tonnes sunk, 7 182 000 tonnes built - dtw atlas zur Weltgesichte 1966, swedish translation 1987). This should be added to the accumulated losses since 1939 (9 612 000 tonnes sunk, 3 535 000 tonnes built). The situation didn't change until 1943 (3 611 000 tonnes sunk, 14 585 000 tonnes built). This of course affected the allied war effort considerably (also - in 1941 the British still could use the Mediteranian route to Egypt to spare shipping, in 1942 this was impossible).

My conclusition is that in summer 1942 the allied supply situation (still) was a bit troublesome, also bear in mind that they still didn't know the war would turn in only 6-12 months (worst monts for the atlantic convoys actually was in the beginning of 1943 IIRC). This makes every new burden a quite heavy burden - there certainly was no allied overcapacity in shipping at that time!

Regards /M
 
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Something else to consider, it required 144.000tons of shipping to transport a single US Inf div, with its attendunt food vehicles and services, if it was armoured that requirment rises to 250,000 tons, this is not small potatoes, and its effect puts limits to even the US ability to project power.

just as the numbers of personel in the PTO, to illustrate the logistical point, to keep 1 japanese supplied at ther front took 1 jap, to keep 1 yank cost 18, in ETO 1 german to keep 2 at the front, and the US 2 to keep 1.

This is because the US methods were not the Japanese methods, a different focus on the value of training, importance of logistics, the importance of character and strength of will, and so on.

To therfore argue success of the US method is pre determined is to argue that the allied victory was pre ordained.

It was not and in late 42 it certainly looked not even likly, to a casual observer.

Hanny
 

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Originally posted by Hannibal Barca

"Dictate?, no. negoitiate yes."

Why would the US negotiate? - they had a pretty clear idea of the production rates and Japan could never have an impact on those rates.

" You seem to feel that the game should not allow such concepts as blitztkrieg, founded on the precept of defeating a qunatiative supperior by having a qualative advantage over him in the short term, just because historicly the outcome went one way and not another is no reason to hold the concept as flawed, history also shows that it was not in other conflicts."

Blitzkrieg failed against any country where the logistics prevented it from siezing (or destroying) the enemy production/logistic centers - look at Great Britain and Russia, GB was safe because the Germans could not damage production (largely because of the channel, the RAF and the RN), the USSR was safe because Blitzkrieg, without adequate logistic support was unable to reach the Soviet production centers.

Basically if the country was small and/or accessable it was Blitzable - The USA was neither.

Your argument supports my argument, thank you.

"To ignore japaenses war aims as irrelevant is absurd, what they thought posible and achiavable is paramount, not hindsighted viewpoints."

What they THOUGHT achievable is paramount???? belief does not = reality, reality is paramount.

They could not end the war at will (and could not hold what they snatched), hence what they wanted and believed are of no concern - the war wasn't a matter of "once Japan gets the oilfields it ends".

" The run up to ww2 was full of compromise, in europe, in the PTO, invade china and get thrown out of the l of nations, not a bad swap, and again what they beilived then is important, not the end result that showed them wrong, as the game will not follow immuttable logic, it follows that alternativ outcomes will play a part."

Not sure what your point is here, could you clarify?


"You cant have a short war because of the US electoral system?, i dont think so."

Show how Japan could credibly force the US to accept an armistice, there is no way but the only vaguely possible way would be by making the offer (it would have to be a damn good one) in the run up to an election where it might become an issue that decides who runs the country.

Japan can't force a short war and can't win a long one - they are stuck with wearing whatever the US wants to do and they had no goodwill and nothing to offer in an attempt to end it.
 

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Originally posted by PBI


"Maybe people have given up on trying to refute your arguments because it has become apparent that you really don't want to listen either - just what you are accusing us who disagree with you of doing."

The problem is that I am dealing with facts and the "Midway would have changed the war" is nonsense, simple production figures and troop numbers on Hawaii show that.


"I suppose that next you'll be telling us that the UK never was in any real danger of a German invasion and that the USSR was never really on the brink of collapse?"

The UK was never in any real danger from a German invasion, it would probably have shortened the war by a year or so.

The USSR was not on the brink of collapse, Germany had hit the end of its logistic tether at the outskirts of Moscow, once again Germany needed a short war but had no way of forcing one, because the Soviets could trade space for time to bring their industry on line.


"I find it hard to credit that you seem to just shrug off suggestions that the major battles that were fought didn't mean anything, that everything was predetermined. How can you seriously say, for example, that the failure of the Japanese to destory any US carriers in the Pearl Harbor attack had no significant affect? "

Because the US produced 18 x CV/CVL/CVE (as well as others that they could transfer if needed) and 47,836 a/c in 1942.

" Or that the failure of Kurita to destory the 7th Fleet at Leyte Gulf had no affect?"

By Leyte it was already over, the Jap merchant fleet was almost half the size that it had been the year before, even if the Japs had won they could no longer supply their forces, even to the limited extent that they had been doing and realistically what effect would an American inability to recapture the Phillipines have had? embaressed Mac, thats about it..

" Or even that the failure of the Japanese to set up a proper convoy system had no affect?"

This is their best chance, but there is little they can do, they don't have the ASW skills, don't have enough DDs and don't have the industry to produce them, throw in the cultural fact that defensive work such as convoying is seen as being below them and its a pretty hard one to fix.

"In quite a few of the posts I've read, folks seemed willing to at least try and meet you half-way and acknowledge that, yes, even if most of the major fighting had gone Japan's way that Japan would still have been in serious trouble, but that there was still a possibility of Japan fairing not as badly as they did historically, but you don't seem willing to return the courtesy."

Its not about coutesy, its about facts - if I state that the Moon is made from green cheese, I can hardly expect people to meet me half way and say that it is in fact a nice King Island Double Brie - I would expect them to point out that samples have been returned showing what it is made of (and for the apollo hoax theorists - spectrographs have been done comparing it with spectrographs of cheese) - I have presented facts and figures, facts that substantially refute the ideas presented, so you complain that it is discourteous?

"I'm not ignoring the logistical might of the US in the Pacific, I'm just drawing different conclusions than you, based on my own reading of military history. "

Then you have not read enough - you conclusions are not credible, look at the a/c losses (naval aviation) that Japan took even when they were winning, compare it to their training output of pilots - they were a shrinking pool even when they were winning the battles.
 

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Originally posted by husky65



"I suppose that next you'll be telling us that the UK never was in any real danger of a German invasion and that the USSR was never really on the brink of collapse?"

The UK was never in any real danger from a German invasion, it would probably have shortened the war by a year or so.

The USSR was not on the brink of collapse, Germany had hit the end of its logistic tether at the outskirts of Moscow, once again Germany needed a short war but had no way of forcing one, because the Soviets could trade space for time to bring their industry on line.


[/B]

Bah, you bet me too it. Well, for the record I agree with the above and just about everything you've said about the PTO.
 

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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Japan

Originally posted by joel rauber

"It was a problem for the British when they had to route convoys to Egypt around the horn rather than through the Med. It would be a problem for the US if they have route convoys along these longer routes. "

Given that the Brits were sending convoys to Aust to pick up munitions and supplies, sending occaisional convoys with specialist munitions and specialist supplies rather than in ballast is hardly going to present a major undertaking.

"Also, since we are talking about somewhat plausable alternative scenarios. Combine what I have been saying with a different Japanese doctrine for use of their submarines. See further comments below. "

We are starting to get into the area of a "plausible scenario" being Japan not being run by the Japanese or to Japanese cultural norms, aren't we? - however, the Japanese Sub force was quite poorly equipped, would have had a lot of water to search and would have been in real trouble against people trained in techniques that destroyed the U-boat force.

"Readers of these debates will have to read the references to draw any conclusions for themselves as to how realistic the concerns were. The significant players at the time certainly so them as being very very realistic concerns. "

It was their job to take everything seriously, it is our responsibility to learn what was plausible and what is the result of lazy historical work.

"Which is why I clarified what I meant by blockade. If by blockade one means a complete naval blockade of all or all minus minor smuggling than not even Nazi Germany was blockaded in WWII as they got significant shipments from Sweden of iron ore and other supplies. "

Hence we agree that Japan is not capable of blockading Australia.

"It all depends on both time frame and whether or not you are trying to hold the South Pacific islands for a long time with significant forces or just with minor forces for a temporary time. "

If you go for a long time frame, the USA smashes you with its logistic/production sledgehammer, if you are there for a short time what is the point? and why do you think minor forces can do the job?

Minor forces squatting on islands does nothing to cut the convoy route, you just sail past out of their view - if you want to support a force capable of annoying a convoy route to any extent, you need to base a/c, ships, a serious garrision and all it entails.

Will you bring them back when they are finished their holiday or are they to be abandoned? - how will you supply them?

"The book "MacArthur Strikes Back : Decision at Buna, New Guinea 1942-1943" describes the events w/o a dramatically reversed Midway, i.e. the historical situation. IIRC the Japanese land thrust in late '42 got within 12 miles or so of Port Moresby. This is all while Guadalcanal is going on. One could interpret this as almost taking it in the actual event. One could also interpret it as the Japanese way overachieving and that they really had no chance of making it the remaining 12 miles. I think its legitimately debatable. "

Hardly, the Japanese were largely held up by Maroubra force, by the time they got to their furthest extent they had met the newly arrived (from the Mid east), veteran 7th Div - the Japanese were forced to manpack most of their supplies from Buna, the allies a much shorter distance from Moresby, the Japs were at the end of their tether, just when they met 2 new bdes of Veteran troops.

"However, that was the actual events. I believe that a dramatically reversed Midway would enable that remaining 12 miles to be a quite plausible reach. Perhaps not certain, but plausible. "

How? - what possible difference will it make? - which riflemen will Midway free up, what supply vessels?

"I don't need to ask the Japanese because I don't necessarily mean, nor imply, that by "limited northern invasion" that I mean the same thing as the 12 division plan you are talking about."

That was the limited northern invasion - anything less is simply suicide.

" I believe, under the hypotheticals, that a limited one division or so invasion at the tip of the Cape York peninsula would be possible. This is why I was carefull, I hope, to say that I was making few claims as to the strategic implications of such a limited venture. "

The only question is would you bother killing them or let the environment do it for you, I've worked up there when I was in the Army - just how long do you think one poorly equipped div would last against say 4 well equipped Divs? and why do you think the IJA would agree to throw that div away?


"More interesting would be: could they take Darwin or Townsville, even for say a 6-12 month period of time? "

The answer is a simple no, if you can't do it with 12 divs and you cant supply either the divs, the supplies or the shipping how can you do it with less?

"The point was that man-power limitations was not the problem for Japan finding 12 divisions. US war aims are irrelevant; Japanese war-aims are relevant here. Change those slighty, allow for less homeland defence in 42. More trust that Stalin won't attack, decrease offensive capability in China, the raising of a few more division in Japan and you can find the troops. As I point out and I state below, finding the troops isn't the problem, shipping them is."

Utter nonsense - Japan is in the war for one thing, China - that means they have a built in manpower shortage, they are trying to take something way bigger than themselves and lack the resources to do it.

Decrease offensive capability in China = lose the war from the Jap perspective, trust Stalin? he kicked their backsides last time Japan attacked them and now you want to leave Japan and its possessions open for him to return the favor big time? finding the troops is the showstopper and why the IJA didn't do it, it was such a showstopper that it didn't even get onto the other showstoppers, moving, supplying and how do we win against a superior force near its own supply centers.

"Nobody had wartime experience with naval carrier vs carrier air ops at the time of Coral Sea. I think the Japanes and US staffs were equally inexperienced at the time. One could argue that the US was more inexperienced. The Japanese at least had the experience of the Pearl Harbor raid and more carrier raiding experience than the US at the time. "

The Japanese force had no one on the staff that had ANY aviation experience, this was from a military that had been using naval aviation for quite some time, the US at least had people who had thought about employment of aviation on staff.

"My reading of the first two major carrier battles of WWII, Coral Sea and Midway is one of incredible serendipity. If its easy to postulate a dramatically different Midway (this might be debatable, but it is the assumption of all this discussion) then I'd find it just as easy (actually easier in my mind) to imagine a rather different Coral Sea. Japanese search planes finding the Lexington first and US search planes missing their Shoho sighting and a few other small changed "acts of god" and who knows."

The fact is the Japs did not put enough emphasis on recon - the other fact is that Japan winning Midway would have changed little (they lost too many aviators in their successful strikes, project similar losses onto other hypothetically successful strikes and they run low on pilots fast.
 

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Originally posted by Robb
The Japanese were in a bad position but with a couple of breaks, like a decisive victory at Midway and some more victories, they might have been able to sue for peace. If Pearl Harbor had not been a "sneak attack" I think American resolve might not have been so strong. The Japanese were not "doomed from the start." Just disadvantaged.

How could they have sued for peace? they had nothing to offer that they could afford to give.

Several people have suggested that Japan could sue for peace, could someone tell me what was in it for the USA?


Japan Disadvantaged????

Paul Kennedy's "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers" -

% of Total Global Warmaking Potential (1937)-

USA= 41.7%
Japan= 3.5%

Certainly you are a master of understatement...
 

unmerged(8840)

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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Japan

Originally posted by Mattias

"Actually you're a bit careless with numbers here - in summer 1942 the allied fought wery hard to supply the British Isles (+Russia via Murmansk) with food, oil, ammunition and other basic products. In 1942 allied shipping still lost much more than they could build despite the capacity of the american shipyards (8 245 000 tonnes sunk, 7 182 000 tonnes built - dtw atlas zur Weltgesichte 1966, swedish translation 1987). This should be added to the accumulated losses since 1939 (9 612 000 tonnes sunk, 3 535 000 tonnes built). The situation didn't change until 1943 (3 611 000 tonnes sunk, 14 585 000 tonnes built). This of course affected the allied war effort considerably (also - in 1941 the British still could use the Mediteranian route to Egypt to spare shipping, in 1942 this was impossible)."


You've made the classic mistake, just looked at allied sinkings V production (not being critical - at least you are using figures rather than just pretending to know), you need to look at the 'total size of the merchant fleets' of the US and UK in any given year - Sinkings/Production numbers ignore the time-charters, requisitions, purchases and transfer of flag vessels.

In fact the 1941 figure is 32,988,000 - the 42 figure is 32,076,000 - a tiny decline and given that any credible attempt at blockade of Aust by Japan would have to occur in very late 42, the 1943 figure is of interest - 35,571,000


"My conclusition is that in summer 1942 the allied supply situation (still) was a bit troublesome, also bear in mind that they still didn't know the war would turn in only 6-12 months (worst monts for the atlantic convoys actually was in the beginning of 1943 IIRC)."

Yet the available tonnage of merchant vessels stayed quite stable from 1940 to 1942, then the US production really kicked in.

Actually 42 was the worst year, in the first part of 43 U-boat efficiency dropped markedly.

" This makes every new burden a quite heavy burden - there certainly was no allied overcapacity in shipping at that time!"

The fact is its not that much of an extra burden, Aust didn't need much in the way of equipment (but would take all it could get on precautionary grounds) and was exporting supplies to Britain (the same ships could bring specialist parts/equipment in.
 

unmerged(8840)

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Originally posted by Hannibal Barca

"Something else to consider, it required 144.000tons of shipping to transport a single US Inf div, with its attendunt food vehicles and services, if it was armoured that requirment rises to 250,000 tons, this is not small potatoes, and its effect puts limits to even the US ability to project power."

The US had the shipping.

"just as the numbers of personel in the PTO, to illustrate the logistical point, to keep 1 japanese supplied at ther front took 1 jap, to keep 1 yank cost 18, in ETO 1 german to keep 2 at the front, and the US 2 to keep 1. "

Yet the US had the manpower.

"This is because the US methods were not the Japanese methods, a different focus on the value of training, importance of logistics, the importance of character and strength of will, and so on. "

The Japanese methods were a recipe for disaster, they got it in full.

"To therfore argue success of the US method is pre determined is to argue that the allied victory was pre ordained. "

It was.

"It was not and in late 42 it certainly looked not even likly, to a casual observer."

The difference is that you are a casual observer, I have studied the facts.
 

unmerged(2539)

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Originaly posted by someone who has studied the facts.
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Why would the US negotiate? - they had a pretty clear idea of the production rates and Japan could never have an impact on those rates.
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To end a war with japan on favourable conditions for the US, that allowed the US to concentrate on Germany, who was the prime threat. Up till 1942 with the thought of the Nazis being ahead in Atomic research, the apparant fall of the SU, along with siezing the resources they had, requiring a 200 odd US division eastablishment, that ment a industrial workforce vastly reduced and so on, are all reasonable arguments.

Wars are fough in the national intrest, and concluded when those intrests are secure, the total defeat of your oponent, at the conclusion of a long and costly effort is no more effective than an early end that still insures the same intrests.


Originaly posted by someone who has studied the facts.
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Blitzkrieg failed against any country where the logistics prevented it from siezing (or destroying) the enemy production/logistic centers - look at Great Britain and Russia, GB was safe because the Germans could not damage production (largely because of the channel, the RAF and the RN), the USSR was safe because Blitzkrieg, without adequate logistic support was unable to reach the Soviet production centers.

Basically if the country was small and/or accessable it was Blitzable - The USA was neither.

Your argument supports my argument, thank you.
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It most certainly does not, because you misunderstand my argument. Something you would not have done had you studied my posts. The other alternative is that you misunderstand blitzkieg, something your reply strongly suggests. Either way please try and pay more attention.

You continue to argue from hindsight, at the time, the limits of blitzkrieg where not set in stone, all that was known by the allies was that to wanted this wonder of the age that deliverd much, but was as yet understood. History showed prior to that that a smaller industrial base/manpower defiecency did not preclude a swift defeat of an enemy who enjoyed those advantages, post ww2 history continues to illustrate the point that GDP, logistical, manpower advantafes are not in themselves sufficent to insure defeat.

Since the Invasion of the US, or AUS was never a war aim, to ascribe logistical and operational limits prevented that course of action is to miss the point that resources were allocated to the war aims, not to what ifs.


Originaly posted by someone who has studied the facts.
What they THOUGHT achievable is paramount???? belief does not = reality, reality is paramount.
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Oh stop kidding about...

You know as well as i that reality is determined by perception, what they thought feasable, then, acording to the data they had, is what is real, not looking back with 20/20 and access to all relevant data that they had no knowledge of.

For instance the axis emphasis on fighting skills that inflicted defeats on the allies forced the allies to incease the quality of their own troops, instead of relying on mere quantity alone.

What the axis thought was doable, based on a premise that quantity does not determine outcome, forced the allies to become more effective themselves.

Originaly posted by someone who has studied the facts.
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They could not end the war at will (and could not hold what they snatched), hence what they wanted and believed are of no concern - the war wasn't a matter of "once Japan gets the oilfields it ends".
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yes ignoring one sides objectives, aims, goals and the method they adopt to achieve it is certainly the way to go here.


Originaly posted by someone who has studied the facts.
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Not sure what your point is here, could you clarify?
=================================================================================================
This thread is about the game system, and how it portrays history. You take a determinlistic aproach, you wont like the game, buy a vid of the war instead.

The game will not follow the course of the war, for that buy a history book, historicly japan took advantage of the european situation, with the german successes, to sieze the resources it required, even that sequence hapening out of phase presents huge imbalcing problems in game terms, particulry if the game engine ascribes greater emphasis to numbers, than to the quality the numbers represent, the doctrine to use those numbers effectivly, the political will to use them in the first place.



Originaly posted by someone who has studied the facts.
=================================================================================================
Show how Japan could credibly force the US to accept an armistice, there is no way but the only vaguely possible way would be by making the offer (it would have to be a damn good one) in the run up to an election where it might become an issue that decides who runs the country.
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Jan 1941.
H Hopkons Roosvelts personal emissary to churchill, conveyed the presidents conviction " That if England lost, america too would be incircled and defeated"

Churchill " No option for the US and UK but an unwilling peace", in reference to the SU going under.

Really you dont acept that the war was losable? I find that most worrying, its almost as if the facts have no merit unless they fit a determilistic model, certainly they dont need intpretaion if that is the case.

Originaly posted by someone who has studied the facts.
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Japan can't force a short war and can't win a long one - they are stuck with wearing whatever the US wants to do and they had no goodwill and nothing to offer in an attempt to end it.
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opinion only does not make it so.



The problem is that I am dealing with facts and the "Midway would have changed the war" is nonsense, simple production figures and troop numbers on Hawaii show that.
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well i tried to stay out of this, primarily because its a what if, but also because of your posts contain such intelictual dishonesty as to make objective reasoning unlikly.

The Nazi-Societ-Japanese pact would kick the allied arses all over the shop on your determinlistic view, fourtunatly the real world works not as you believe.

Midway itself was won against the numbers, further evidence that the numbers dont tell the whole story, and was won by a dozen bombs at the right time hitting the right circamstances to do the most damage, the whole battle could have gone the other way, Prof T Cooks(William patterson Univ of n Jersey) detailed examination shows just how easy it could have been the US losing its carriers along with flight crews, the consequences of which lead to a US with a single CV in the Pacific. Shortly therafter the already planned follow up would take Hawaii, the work of Prof J Stephens (Hawaii under the rising sun:Japans plans for conquest after PH) clearly demonstarte the effects of a japanese success at Midway would have in the PTO, to say nothing of the effects on US commitments to the ETO, and Atlantic fleet, in his work showing the next planned stage was the reduction of Hawaii, and its impact on the US. as youve studied the facts i shall omit the conclusions and proofs of these works that run contary to your posistion.

Facts are of no use without their correct intpretation, me ill follow the experts who have academic qualifications, or military experience over the posits you post, the content of some leave me in no doubt that:

Then you have not read enough - you conclusions are not credible.





Originaly posted by someone who has studied the facts.
================================================================================================
The US had the shipping.
================================================================================================
And Midway was won against a japanese overwheming naval strength, its almost as if the numbers dont tell the whole story. But i digress, to post numbers of US production, without putting it into perspective is of limited value, i thought to do this for you. The other point is when do they have the shipping, and what other calls on that shipping are more relevant than the mere numbers show.


Originaly posted by someone who has studied the facts.
==============================================================================================
Yet the US had the manpower.
=================================================================================================
And the germanys had the resource base in 42 to match the allied one, yet did not match the output of the allies. Its almost as if what you do with it is more important than the fact youve got it in the first place.

you again misunderstand the point, let alone the content of a post. Which was to show that doctrinal differences produced markedly different ratios of supply to combat effective strength, all that logistical support comes at a price, it dont gaurantee a thing. Except in the US case, taking x from industry yields y fewer at the front as most are eaten up in the logistical chain.


Originaly posted by someone who has studied the facts.
==============================================================================================
The Japanese methods were a recipe for disaster, they got it in full.
=================================================================================================
Yes that explians the opening years to a tee. Glad your here to point that out. Its almost as if you studied the facts.


Originaly posted by someone who has studied the facts.
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It was.
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Was not.

Since the US came late to war, it had to gear up,( against states that had 50% NP in wartime production, which had talen 4/5 years to achieve, the Us did it in a year) the speed that other nations had done so when taken in comparison are striking, no one could predict such a pace of transistion, certainly not the germans who based their plans acording to the US taking years to put large well armed fources against them. That speed gave the possobility of victory, it did not give it automaticly.

The Allied victory was earnt, by the commitment of the men and women who fought it, not just because they had more this or more that, the amounts of who had the most of changed throught the course of the war in any event, which further shows the absurd posistion of determilism in this regard.



Originaly posted by someone who has studied the facts.
==============================================================================================
"It was not and in late 42 it certainly looked not even likly, to a casual observer."

The difference is that you are a casual observer, I have studied the facts.
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And yet drawn incorrect conclusions. Only speaking as a casual observer, its not as though im particulry well versed in the PTO.

In 42 it was a worst case scn, US was not armed, and would not be till 43, the SU had lost its industrial base and the axis stood at the ddorstep of the caucasus and M East oil fields, its in that context that Churchill and Hopkins discussed the possible outcome, and THEY WERE NOT CASUAL OBSERVERS.

A casual observer of this thread.
 

unmerged(1798)

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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Japan

I shall only respond to some of husky's posts. Neglect of response does not imply agreement.

Originally posted by husky65


"It was a problem for the British when they had to route convoys to Egypt around the horn rather than through the Med. It would be a problem for the US if they have route convoys along these longer routes. "

Given that the Brits were sending convoys to Aust to pick up munitions and supplies, sending occaisional convoys with specialist munitions and specialist supplies rather than in ballast is hardly going to present a major undertaking.

I do not understand the relevance of this to the analogy of British supply difficulties for the North African theater.

"Also, since we are talking about somewhat plausable alternative scenarios. Combine what I have been saying with a different Japanese doctrine for use of their submarines. See further comments below. "

We are starting to get into the area of a "plausible scenario" being Japan not being run by the Japanese or to Japanese cultural norms, aren't we?

Perhaps, but perhaps not radically different. Also, as we look at further comments below, remember the Japanese were somewhat suicidal.

- however, the Japanese Sub force was quite poorly equipped, would have had a lot of water to search and would have been in real trouble against people trained in techniques that destroyed the U-boat force.

The German U-boat force was only destroyed ultimately. Hardly the case in 1941 or much of 1942. And they were destroyed in more restricted waters.


"Which is why I clarified what I meant by blockade. If by blockade one means a complete naval blockade of all or all minus minor smuggling than not even Nazi Germany was blockaded in WWII as they got significant shipments from Sweden of iron ore and other supplies. "

Hence we agree that Japan is not capable of blockading Australia.

Yes, if you mean blockade Australia into submission.

"It all depends on both time frame and whether or not you are trying to hold the South Pacific islands for a long time with significant forces or just with minor forces for a temporary time. "

If you go for a long time frame, the USA smashes you with its logistic/production sledgehammer, if you are there for a short time what is the point? and why do you think minor forces can do the job?

I never particularly said there was much point. I'm only saying that it was a distinct possibility given the hypotheticals. Reason's could be simply a demonstration of force, or as a feint, or a misguided effort to achieve a slightly better negotiating position. etc.

Minor forces squatting on islands does nothing to cut the convoy route, you just sail past out of their view - if you want to support a force capable of annoying a convoy route to any extent, you need to base a/c, ships, a serious garrision and all it entails.

Will you bring them back when they are finished their holiday or are they to be abandoned? - how will you supply them?

Certainly more difficult to supply New Caledonia than Guadalcanal, but I doubt it is impossible.

"The book "MacArthur Strikes Back : Decision at Buna, New Guinea 1942-1943" describes the events w/o a dramatically reversed Midway, i.e. the historical situation. IIRC the Japanese land thrust in late '42 got within 12 miles or so of Port Moresby. This is all while Guadalcanal is going on. One could interpret this as almost taking it in the actual event. One could also interpret it as the Japanese way overachieving and that they really had no chance of making it the remaining 12 miles. I think its legitimately debatable. "

Hardly, the Japanese were largely held up by Maroubra force, by the time they got to their furthest extent they had met the newly arrived (from the Mid east), veteran 7th Div - the Japanese were forced to manpack most of their supplies from Buna, the allies a much shorter distance from Moresby, the Japs were at the end of their tether, just when they met 2 new bdes of Veteran troops.

I think you misunderstood my last sentence. The last sentence was intended to lend legitimacy to the second to the last sentence; which I gather is in agreement with the point you make above.

"However, that was the actual events. I believe that a dramatically reversed Midway would enable that remaining 12 miles to be a quite plausible reach. Perhaps not certain, but plausible. "

How? - what possible difference will it make? - which riflemen will Midway free up, what supply vessels?

If I understand you above, a dramatically reversed Midway changes the situation in the pacific not one whit? I think you have legitimate points when you refer to the long term strategic situation; but it certainly changes everything for at least about 6 months. In the context of the above operations, there is little to no US Naval interference in the Solomon's or the New Guinea/Bismark theatre. This changes the air superiority situation immensly; not to mention the Japanese supply situation.

"I don't need to ask the Japanese because I don't necessarily mean, nor imply, that by "limited northern invasion" that I mean the same thing as the 12 division plan you are talking about."

That was the limited northern invasion - anything less is simply suicide.

You brought up the Japanese "character" above. What I say is rather in keeping with the Japanese character. They didn't particularly mind suicidal operations, did they?

" I believe, under the hypotheticals, that a limited one division or so invasion at the tip of the Cape York peninsula would be possible. This is why I was carefull, I hope, to say that I was making few claims as to the strategic implications of such a limited venture. "

The only question is would you bother killing them or let the environment do it for you, I've worked up there when I was in the Army - just how long do you think one poorly equipped div would last against say 4 well equipped Divs? and why do you think the IJA would agree to throw that div away?

Historical precedence, e.g. they agreed to throwing away divisions at Guadalcanal. Where the environment did a rather good job. And we note that the Japanese forces lasted about 5 months against well equipped divisions there.


"More interesting would be: could they take Darwin or Townsville, even for say a 6-12 month period of time? "

The answer is a simple no, if you can't do it with 12 divs and you cant supply either the divs, the supplies or the shipping how can you do it with less?

I'd basically agree here, though I think one could paint a 10% probability scenario that would take Darwin or maybe Townsville for a very short period of time. And don't forget the Japanese mentality was one of "if we can just make the war to much of a pain for these weak willed democracies, they may negotiate a peace". I think we both agree that that mentality was dead wrong; but despite being wrong it could never the less provide motivation for actions we'd find senseless.

"The point was that man-power limitations was not the problem for Japan finding 12 divisions. US war aims are irrelevant; Japanese war-aims are relevant here. Change those slighty, allow for less homeland defence in 42. More trust that Stalin won't attack, decrease offensive capability in China, the raising of a few more division in Japan and you can find the troops. As I point out and I state below, finding the troops isn't the problem, shipping them is."

Utter nonsense - Japan is in the war for one thing, China - that means they have a built in manpower shortage, they are trying to take something way bigger than themselves and lack the resources to do it.

We simply disagree. I consider quite plausible that the Japanese could dig up a force of 12 divisions. Don't hold me to the number twelve. Let's say 8-15 divisions. Manpower shortages were the least of the Japanese worries.

Decrease offensive capability in China = lose the war from the Jap perspective,

umhhh, in discussing hypotheticals I don't see the relevence of this; particulary if all we are saying is decrease the offensive capability for a period of time. Also, I'm not as good at reading the Japanese mind as you are. Why wouldn't they decrease some of their offensive operations in China for a year in order to address some serious issues in the pacific? There certainly were advocates (mostly Navy) for increased emphasis on the Pacific.

trust Stalin? he kicked their backsides last time Japan attacked them and now you want to leave Japan and its possessions open for him to return the favor big time?

Why is it so implausible to imagine that the Japanese might infer that in 1941,1942 that Stalin was too busy with the Germans to mount a serious threat to Manchuria. And therefore they (the Japanese) could reduce their Manchurian garrison a bit?


finding the troops is the showstopper and why the IJA didn't do it, it was such a showstopper that it didn't even get onto the other showstoppers, moving, supplying and how do we win against a superior force near its own supply centers.

IMO you have it backwards. Lack of manpower was the least of the Japanese worries. I rather think the other showstoppers are the ones that make the "manpower showstopper" close to irrelevant; which is to say they stop the show first, not manpower shortages.

"Nobody had wartime experience with naval carrier vs carrier air ops at the time of Coral Sea. I think the Japanes and US staffs were equally inexperienced at the time. One could argue that the US was more inexperienced. The Japanese at least had the experience of the Pearl Harbor raid and more carrier raiding experience than the US at the time. "

The Japanese force had no one on the staff that had ANY aviation experience, this was from a military that had been using naval aviation for quite some time, the US at least had people who had thought about employment of aviation on staff.

You will need to explain this. How did the Japanese manage to fly airplanes off of their carriers without any aviation experience? I fear I misunderstand your comment.

"My reading of the first two major carrier battles of WWII, Coral Sea and Midway is one of incredible serendipity. If its easy to postulate a dramatically different Midway (this might be debatable, but it is the assumption of all this discussion) then I'd find it just as easy (actually easier in my mind) to imagine a rather different Coral Sea. Japanese search planes finding the Lexington first and US search planes missing their Shoho sighting and a few other small changed "acts of god" and who knows."

The fact is the Japs did not put enough emphasis on recon -

Both sides had significant problems with recon in the early battles. I believe Fletcher lost his job a month or two into Guadalcanal, in part over mismanaged recon at Coral Sea and Guadalcanal; in part for a lot other reasons as well.

the other fact is that Japan winning Midway would have changed little (they lost too many aviators in their successful strikes, project similar losses onto other hypothetically successful strikes and they run low on pilots fast.

[I suspect we must agree to disagree. I fully believe that a dramatically reversed Midway would have changed much in the Pacific war for 6-12 months. And I will use the "N" word here; IMO it is nonsense to say otherwise.

I will refer you to Bergurud's book, where he does significant analysis of the numbers. The Japanese pilot shortages, in terms of numbers, (i.e. from the replacement training pool) didn't show up seriously until well into 1943, and mostly appeared first not as a shortage of numbers but of quality. I doubt that a reversed Midway would see these shortages appearing earlier than historically.
/B]


BTW, we have managed to vigorously disagree for a few posts without ad hominem attacks! Good Show!

:)

Also, I have mentioned several different plausible operations. I hope that you haven't inferred that I'm claiming everything I'm suggesting could be happening simultaneously, or for that matter even serially. I'd agree 100% that even under the hypotheticals all I have mentioned couldn't occur simultaneously and for all the logistical reasons that you mention.
 
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Blockading Australia? I don't see how it is possible to bloackade a continent... anything the people of Australia may have needed, I'm sure could have been provided locally.
 

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Well, I just reread the essays in What If pertaining to the Pacific war. I believe the main one was written by the professor whose name Hannibal invoked above. Here are a few thoughts I gleened:

Had Midway gone as reasonably expected, the Japanese would have lost 1 carrier to our three. Shortly after the battle two more would have joined the active Japanese fleet after post-Coral Sea repairs. The US would be down to 1 (Saratoga - in California for refit during Midway). Given the US commitments in the Atlantic and the construction of both sides, Japan could expect to have naval superiority in the Pacific through the end of 1942, and possibly into mid-1943. During that time, the Japanese could expect to keep a force of 5 carriers employed while having others in refit. Any shift of resources from the Atlantic would have the effect of prolonging the war in Europe.

The US was pursuing a very well-planned military build-up. Panic induced by major defeats in the Pacific (Midway plus whatever the Japanese did next) could very well have disrupted that. This could have gone so far as to divert resources from "Big Science" projects (like the bomb) to more conventional forces sooner, and also to more troops in uniform cutting into industrial production. Nothing decicive, but a lengthening of the war.

The Japanese had plans to invade Hawaii after Midway. This was controversial, but Yamamoto backed it - believing that it would bring the US to the negociating table (the good professor doubts it would happen that way, though). The plan did not call for a frontal assault on Oahu. Rather, Fiji & Samoa would be picked off first, followed by a landing on the relatively undefended Big Island. With naval superiority, Japanese interdiction of Hawaii combined with Hawaii's non-self sufficiency even in food would put the US in the same shoestring logistical basis as the Japanese, making a Hawaian campaign feasible. Oahu would be "reduced" before the final assault (estimated timing the end of 1942). The big issue from the Japanese side would be political - Yamamoto would have to sell the idea to the IJA because it would take a substantial commitment of army troops & land based air to pull it off.

Hawaii lost would be expected to increase the panic & disruption in US command circles and public opinion. The expected result would be abandonment of the Central Pacific offensive in favor of a northern route from Alaska.

With Fiji & Samoa lost, there would be no logistical route from the US to Australia. The effect of that would be to pull the plug on McArthur's offensive in the South Pacific. Australia's connect would be via the Indian Ocean, but this would be vulnerable if the Japanese did better in the Burma-India theater. More Japanese success could be expected to increase anti-British problems in India, possibly opening opportunities for the Japanese there.

The result in the end would still be US victory, but it would take longer and cost more lives. Diverted resources from Europe might leave Germany in a position to last long enough to deploy more of the "wonder weapons" and cause even more trouble. One of the principle diversions of resources expected would be to nix the strategic bombing campaign and send all those heavy bombers to the Pacific. That would result in the Luftwaffe being available to contest air space over the battlefield instead of concentrating on air defense of the Fatherland - i.e. further lengthening of the war in Europe. Elsewhere in the book, it was revealed that the Germans and Soviets were both considering a separate peace in 1944 - another thing that might be more likely in those circumstances.

Finally, it seems the Soviets were planning to invade the northernmost Japanese home island months before our Operation Olympic would have gone down. As it was, if the Japanese had held out only a couple of weeks longer this might have happened, and apparently the Soviets cancelled the operation at the last minute because of a warning from Truman to stay out of Japan. A big delay in the US offensive against Japan could have made this possibility real. The result would have been partition of Japan as with Germany and Korea.
 

unmerged(8840)

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Originally posted by Hannibal Barca

"To end a war with japan on favourable conditions for the US,"

It was always going to end on favorable terms for the US.

" that allowed the US to concentrate on Germany, who was the prime threat."

The US had the resources to do both, throw in the resources of the UK and USSR and Germany was done for - they hit their high water mark in Russia a few days before Pearl Harbour anyway.


"Up till 1942 with the thought of the Nazis being ahead in Atomic research, the apparant fall of the SU, along with siezing the resources they had, requiring a 200 odd US division eastablishment, that ment a industrial workforce vastly reduced and so on, are all reasonable arguments."

Yet none account for the fact that the USA had the resources to easily run 2 major wars and a nuclear weapons research program, the US started the war with heaps of unemployed/underemployed, they had scads of 'slack' to take up.

The Manhattan project was not that expensive - the B-29 project alone cost more.

"Wars are fough in the national intrest, and concluded when those intrests are secure, the total defeat of your oponent, at the conclusion of a long and costly effort is no more effective than an early end that still insures the same intrests."

Show me where the national interest could possibly leave the USA with a well armed, imperialist nation that had already started a war against them and was in the process of gaining further resources (China) and had gained the one thing it needed to really start expanding, oil.

Why would the US give them the chance to expand their industry and shipping when the US had the ability to crush them?

"It most certainly does not, because you misunderstand my argument. Something you would not have done had you studied my posts. The other alternative is that you misunderstand blitzkieg, something your reply strongly suggests. Either way please try and pay more attention."

Fact free paragraph, please include content.

"You continue to argue from hindsight, at the time, the limits of blitzkrieg where not set in stone"

Yes they were and that stone was the supply system supporting it - tanks and planes are remarkably ineffective without fuel, troops without food water and ammo (see Russia, Nth Africa as classic examples).

"all that was known by the allies was that to wanted this wonder of the age that deliverd much, but was as yet understood. "

Nonsense, the US and UK had officers who had read the various books written by the Germans on the subject, in fact you'll find that Liddel Hart basically invented Blitzkrieg.

"History showed prior to that that a smaller industrial base/manpower defiecency did not preclude a swift defeat of an enemy who enjoyed those advantages, post ww2 history continues to illustrate the point that GDP, logistical, manpower advantafes are not in themselves sufficent to insure defeat."

More nonsense, give examples.

"Since the Invasion of the US, or AUS was never a war aim, to ascribe logistical and operational limits prevented that course of action is to miss the point that resources were allocated to the war aims, not to what ifs."

The Japanese had critical operational aims (to support the gaol = China), they were get the US Pac Fleet, get Singapore, get the Phillipines to to secure the path to the oil once they had the oil it was to sieze a few more outposts to close the circle of fortresses protecting Japan and dig in and inflict casualties until the corrupt democratic nations gave up.

They did not have the resources to achieve those aims, how is it you ascribe the potential to achieve additional (huge) aims when they could not achieve their original aims?

The fact is they would have to give something up - China, suggest it and the odds are you will be assassinated (the IJA were not playing games) - Malaya and Singapore, your oil is not secure, you lose - Phillipines, your oil is not secure, you lose - Leave the US Pac fleet alone your, oil is not secure, you lose - not try for the fortresses, your oil is not secure, you lose.

Tell me which ops you will give up?

In fact giving up Malaya Singapore will not give you the shipping you need (mostly by land/short haul from Thailand (Siam)) - so do you give up Phillipines or Leave the Pac Fleet?

We have seen the quote from Tojo re giving the shipping up to the Military and being unable to prosecute the war and the IJA stated clearly that they had no troops to spare, you have none of either to spare, which ops will you lose to conduct these hypothetical operations?


"You know as well as i that reality is determined by perception, "

Seek help, you are actually unwell if you believe that.

"what they thought feasable, then, acording to the data they had, is what is real, not looking back with 20/20 and access to all relevant data that they had no knowledge of."

What tripe, if I go to the top of the Sydney harbour bridge utterly convinced that I can fly, 'thinking that it is feasible, according to the data I have, not looking back with 20/20 vision and access to all the relevant data that I have no knowledge of', then I am in for a rude shock when I attempt to execute my plan to fly.

Reality is in no way changed by perception as demonstrated above, if you lack the ability, you lack the ability.

"For instance the axis emphasis on fighting skills that inflicted defeats on the allies forced the allies to incease the quality of their own troops, instead of relying on mere quantity alone."

The Russians forced the superior Germans back using quantity alone, later they increased quality but few would suggest that the Soviet army of 1941/42 was a well trained army.

"What the axis thought was doable, based on a premise that quantity does not determine outcome, forced the allies to become more effective themselves."

See above, the allies logistic and productive superiority allowed them to have both, however you are mistaking the fact that the Germans knew the war was coming and trained and equipped for it and the allies started getting ready late in the game for cause and effect, it was just 'lag' in the system.


"yes ignoring one sides objectives, aims, goals and the method they adopt to achieve it is certainly the way to go here. "

So you have no answer for the fact that Japan has NO way to end the war, once its started they are at the mercy of the US in regards ending it, your goals only matter if you can force an end when you achieve them, Japan had no way to do so.


"This thread is about the game system, and how it portrays history. You take a determinlistic aproach, you wont like the game, buy a vid of the war instead."

Trying to cahnge the thread from 'Is Japan doomed from the start?' to something else?

If you have a look at the first post you will see a fairly realistic appraisal of Japans chances based on history, as such the historical situation that pertains is of paramount importance.

The only reference to the game system is a question relating to how would such a crippled nation be playable in the game from either side (AI or human).

You are losing the argument so now you want to change the terms of discussion while the original post is still readable - not very clever...

"The game will not follow the course of the war, for that buy a history book, historicly japan took advantage of the european situation, with the german successes, to sieze the resources it required, even that sequence hapening out of phase presents huge imbalcing problems in game terms, particulry if the game engine ascribes greater emphasis to numbers, than to the quality the numbers represent, the doctrine to use those numbers effectivly, the political will to use them in the first place."

Irrelavent to this argument as above.


"H Hopkons Roosvelts personal emissary to churchill, conveyed the presidents conviction " That if England lost, america too would be incircled and defeated""

He was wrong, Japan could barely reach the USA - Germany was only able to do so until King was forced to run convoys.

"Churchill " No option for the US and UK but an unwilling peace", in reference to the SU going under."

Churchill was renowned for painting the bleak picture to get more aid as fast as possible.

"Really you dont acept that the war was losable? I find that most worrying, its almost as if the facts have no merit unless they fit a determilistic model, certainly they dont need intpretaion if that is the case."

What you have posted are not facts, they are opinions - you do know the difference don't you?


"opinion only does not make it so."

You have yet to disprove it - show how Japan could force a short war or win a long one.

Bueller... Bueller... Bueller... Bueller...



"well i tried to stay out of this, primarily because its a what if, but also because of your posts contain such intelictual dishonesty as to make objective reasoning unlikly."

Ah, the ad hom, not winning the argument so you play the man, not the ball.

"The Nazi-Societ-Japanese pact would kick the allied arses all over the shop on your determinlistic view, fourtunatly the real world works not as you believe."

I assume you mean Soviet? and since we are discussing History can you explain how it is that the Nazis and Soviets became allies and how the Japanese got in on this (given that they had been fighting the Soviets in 1939 and were holding an armed stand off with them for most of the war).


"Midway itself was won against the numbers, further evidence that the numbers dont tell the whole story, and was won by a dozen bombs at the right time hitting the right circamstances to do the most damage, the whole battle could have gone the other way, Prof T Cooks(William patterson Univ of n Jersey) detailed examination shows just how easy it could have been the US losing its carriers along with flight crews, the consequences of which lead to a US with a single CV in the Pacific. Shortly therafter the already planned follow up would take Hawaii, the work of Prof J Stephens (Hawaii under the rising sun:Japans plans for conquest after PH) clearly demonstarte the effects of a japanese success at Midway would have in the PTO, to say nothing of the effects on US commitments to the ETO, and Atlantic fleet, in his work showing the next planned stage was the reduction of Hawaii, and its impact on the US. as youve studied the facts i shall omit the conclusions and proofs of these works that run contary to your posistion."

Utter crap, Prof T Cooks is a crackpot as has been shown earlier total defeat of the USN at midway would have left the IJN with few pilots (project their successful strike casualties onto further hypothetical strikes and you run low on pilots fast), the US had 100,000 troops in Hawaii and Japan cannot ship enough to deal with that, they also face 250 USAAF a/c on Hawaii plus the extra 80 or so a/c flown in from Saratoga (plus any more hurried in) and up against a defence supported by Radar, theres heaps more but I couldn't be bothered.

Try reading this-

http://www.combinedfleet.com/pearlops.htm

"Facts are of no use without their correct intpretation, me ill follow the experts who have academic qualifications, or military experience over the posits you post, the content of some leave me in no doubt that:

Then you have not read enough - you conclusions are not credible."

The problem is you haven't been able to refute any of it, you give opinions supported by no numbers and no facts.


"And Midway was won against a japanese overwheming naval strength,"

No it wasn't - the USN had 255 CV a/c (the big guns of the Pac war) plus land based support from Midway, Japan had 325 CV a/c - hardly overwhelming numbers, you really need to check the facts yourself rather than just rely on such sloppy academics.

" its almost as if the numbers dont tell the whole story."

But then, the basis of the above assumption is flawed in that it assumes that the US was outgunned.

" But i digress, to post numbers of US production, without putting it into perspective is of limited value, i thought to do this for you. The other point is when do they have the shipping, and what other calls on that shipping are more relevant than the mere numbers show. "

Yet the US serviced those calls nicely.


"And the germanys had the resource base in 42 to match the allied one, yet did not match the output of the allies. Its almost as if what you do with it is more important than the fact youve got it in the first place. "

Nope, Germany did not have anywhere near the resource base that the US alone had, let alone the C'wealth - you have to give numbers, not just make this nonsense up - what the Germans had was also insanely badly managed, subject to sabotage by workers and run by less productive workers.

Please read some references before you post.


"you again misunderstand the point, let alone the content of a post. Which was to show that doctrinal differences produced markedly different ratios of supply to combat effective strength, all that logistical support comes at a price, it dont gaurantee a thing. Except in the US case, taking x from industry yields y fewer at the front as most are eaten up in the logistical chain."

The above is absurd, the US was just hitting is productive stride in 1945 and unlike the Germans, they utilised the other 50% of the population extensively, that is why the US expenditure of ammunition was so huge, they could easily afford it - they lost whole trains to the black market in Europe and it had little effect, the only time the allies had supply problems in europe was when the Germans were collapsing way faster than anticipated.


"Yes that explians the opening years to a tee. Glad your here to point that out. Its almost as if you studied the facts."

So the fact that the opening 6 months of the Pac war were succesful (not years) for Japan, when conducted against largely poorly trained, poorly equipped, second and third rate troops with little (and obsolete) air support by forces trained specifically for those objectives and landed unopposed, suggests that Japan was able to continue this against trained, supported troops like they did against 7th Div on Kokoda and at Milne Bay and the US Army and USMC on Guadalcanal. Its almost as if you have a clue. But not quite.



"Since the US came late to war, it had to gear up,( against states that had 50% NP in wartime production, which had talen 4/5 years to achieve, the Us did it in a year) the speed that other nations had done so when taken in comparison are striking, no one could predict such a pace of transistion, certainly not the germans who based their plans acording to the US taking years to put large well armed fources against them. That speed gave the possobility of victory, it did not give it automaticly."

The USA was already gearing up well before they entered the war, are you really that ignorant of the facts?

From 1939 to 1941 the US produced almost 2 x the amount of Tanks and SP guns that Japan produced from 39 to 45 as one example.

1940 US produced 3,806 a/c, 1941 US produced 19,163 a/c, 1942 US produced 44,479 a/c as another. (in the entire war Japan built 61,914 a/c).

You didn't have to predict the pace of transition, just observe it - it was already happening.

"The Allied victory was earnt, by the commitment of the men and women who fought it, not just because they had more this or more that, the amounts of who had the most of changed throught the course of the war in any event, "

No, the Allies had the most from day one, the USA was supplying them.

"which further shows the absurd posistion of determilism in this regard."

The allied victory was won by the allied commitment of massive resources, the battles had to be fought but they were never going to lose the war, the axis didn't have the capability to win.



"And yet drawn incorrect conclusions. Only speaking as a casual observer, its not as though im particulry well versed in the PTO."

Clearly.

"In 42 it was a worst case scn, US was not armed, and would not be till 43,"

So the 16000 or so planes that the USAAF had in Dec 42 don't count? the US Pac and atlantic fleets? The US Army?

" the SU had lost its industrial base"

Lost?, it was being moved.

" and the axis stood at the"

End of its logistic teather and was embarking on that famed German victory, Stalingrad.


"ddorstep of the caucasus and M East oil fields, its in that context that Churchill and Hopkins discussed the possible outcome, and THEY WERE NOT CASUAL OBSERVERS."

Just totally wrong.


"A casual observer of this thread. "

Don't sell yourself short, you are far less than that.
 
Last edited:

unmerged(8840)

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Apr 21, 2002
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Originally posted by Captain Krunch
Blockading Australia? I don't see how it is possible to bloackade a continent... anything the people of Australia may have needed, I'm sure could have been provided locally.

You are right, I can even give you production figures and info on some items that were not proceeded with (because they were not needed).

Some specialist imports would have been required but not much.