Is Japan doomed from the start?

[Pwyll]

The same can be said about the Germans though in 43....the Russians felt they had enough then to win the war ....pressuring the allies for a second front but it didnt really matter....Germany was finished....there is no way they could compete with Russian production or manpower....the tactics may have changed since WWI but the attrition part still would have caught upto and overtaken German production capabilities....Like all WW2 games I've played there is a maximum that an axis party will grow to and after that the sheer numbers will collapse the balloon...they need quick and decisive victory or none at all....barring a huge blunder....The axis cant win when they have stopped advancing. That will be the test for all of us players...( as the axis ) to keep those tanks moving forward....when we are stopped its pretty much over.

This is pretty much how the Axis High Command tought as well they knew I think they could not win a long drawn out war...

 

[MacGregor]

Originally posted by husky65


The problem is, Midway simply didn't matter - look at the US production figures already posted, I haven't bothered posting US aircraft figures (which are way higher than the Japanese) AND from late 42/early 43 were increasingly better a/c, then we throw in Pilot and Mechanic training programs where the US trained so many Pilots that the program was cut back because they didn't need them all, Japan on the other hand was always desperate for aircrew.

Even without reading the Japanese codes, the Japs were done for by sheer numbers, better quality enemy equipment, better trained men, and their own logistic weakness and contempt for defensive tasks like convoy duty.

Getting the Sub base would have been nice, but would only have delayed the inevitable, the Subs would have sortied from Townsville and Freemantle until Pearl was rebuilt.

I promised myself I wouldn't get into a pissing contest with you but I'm finding it hard to refrain. PBI writes a concise, intelligent post which posits only mildly controversial possibilities. In return, you post a snippet of his post (a largely accurate snippet) and repond "Midway simply didn't matter" because of US production capabilities. What was your point? Did your response add anything other than allowing you to get in the last word? Do you really think PBI had forgotten the US's great industrial capacity? An equally valid point would be to say, "Midway simply didn't matter" because the US was developing the A-bomb and while it may have had only 2 or 3 in August 1945, by '47 it would have had 50+ and Japan would have been smoked. By implication, you were inferring that the rest of PBI's was rubbish simply because the US was eventually going to win the war. Duh.

Now Husky, you seem to be well read and have some valuable contributions you can make to this board. But you need to work on your board etiquette.

Otherwise, we'll have to petition Paradox to scrap production of HOI because Husky65 has already told us how the war ended. "Japan was doomed." Now you don't want that to happen do you?

 

[unmerged(8840)]

Originally posted by MacGregor


"I promised myself I wouldn't get into a pissing contest with you but I'm finding it hard to refrain. "

I would suggest that you refrain, to date you have announced that you have no knowledge of the logistics/production figures - yet feel qualified to offer opinions as if they were valid, you have based a hypothetical Jap invasion on a US troop figure 10 x lower than the real figure, suggested bombing Hawaii from Midway in spite of the lack of facilities to support such an effort and given no info as to how you would support an amphib operation in any case.


" PBI writes a concise, intelligent post which posits only mildly controversial possibilities. "

Which change nothing.

" In return, you post a snippet of his post (a largely accurate snippet) "

Exactly how would I post an innacurate snippet of his post?

"and repond "Midway simply didn't matter" because of US production capabilities. What was your point?"

If you don't get the point yet, you never will - but for the studio audience I will recap - Midway didn't matter, a total US defeat at Midway would not have set the US timetable back by not much more than about 9 months (I could post the figures but you don't handle actual figures well do you?) and would have had no effect on the US Sub fleet which would go on to sink aprox 55% of the Jap merchant fleet, strangling Jap ops regardless.


"Did your response add anything other than allowing you to get in the last word? Do you really think PBI had forgotten the US's great industrial capacity?"

His post certainly suggested it, it also made no allowance for the US sub fleet.


" An equally valid point would be to say, "Midway simply didn't matter" because the US was developing the A-bomb and while it may have had only 2 or 3 in August 1945, by '47 it would have had 50+ and Japan would have been smoked."

How would they have delivered them? - you really don't think this stuff through do you?

Midway didn't matter because within 9 months the USN would have had parity in deliverable a/c numbers (from carriers) - which were the big guns of the pacific naval war and after that the gap would have increasingly widened.


" By implication, you were inferring that the rest of PBI's was rubbish simply because the US was eventually going to win the war. Duh."

I think you are doing a spot of transference here, you saw your own drivel treated as such and got angry, you then saw reasoned argument between grown ups who have subject knowledge and thought it equated to you being told to read up on the subject and then come back so you responded - I'm sure PBI is capable of arguing his own points, certainly more capable than you..


"Now Husky, you seem to be well read and have some valuable contributions you can make to this board. But you need to work on your board etiquette. Not everyone here is a testosterone hyped 19 year old who needs to prove his manhood (not saying that's you )."


You mean I have to learn to be insulting and then put little smiley faces there to pretend I'm not being insulting?

No thanks - get the subject knowledge, then you can talk with the grown ups.

 

[Mattias]

US (and Commonwealth) politics

There seem to be some agreement (?) about the US (and allied) unwillingness to set for peace once the war started. I think this is quite probable but there are one or two examples of the opposite - i think of Korea (and Vietnam but it mightn't be a fair comparasion). I also remember USA telling France, Israel and Britain to withdraw in the 1956 Suez-war.

To me the american people seems to be a bit reluctant both to jump into (other nations) wars and to keep fighting if victory seems far away AND the conflict doesn't threaten vital US interests - Am i right in this assumption?

IF the US stayed out of the conflict then Japan has quite a big advantage and thus easier to achive their goals (after all american dislike alone don't kill any soldiers).

regards /M

edit: (Please discuss the subject, avoid bashing others if they are wrong or not - this forum is no battle zone.)

 

[unmerged(6780)]

Originally posted by husky65


The problem is, Midway simply didn't matter - look at the US production figures already posted, I haven't bothered posting US aircraft figures (which are way higher than the Japanese) AND from late 42/early 43 were increasingly better a/c, then we throw in Pilot and Mechanic training programs where the US trained so many Pilots that the program was cut back because they didn't need them all, Japan on the other hand was always desperate for aircrew.

I really have to disagree with the assertion that Midway didn't matter; that's kind of like saying that none of the battles mattered, that it was all logistics. And yes, I know the axiom about tactics and logistics, but it is somewhat flawed. Tactics and logistics are the military equivalents of short-term and long-term, more-or-less, and they are interlinked. Ignore logistics, and you can have the best tactics in the world and it won't matter, because bullets run out. Ignore tactics, and you can have an unending amount of supply, and it won't matter, either, as the other guy will just happily shoot up all those shiny tanks and troops that keep getting fed to him.

Having said that, I do have to agree that US production potential was so huge that Japan's only real chance was to score a lot of truly brilliant victories, enough to at least come out of the war with some sort of negotiated advantage, large or small, before the US material advantage began to truly be felt. Yamamoto himself said that he could run wild for 6 months to a year, at best, before the ballon caved in, but his superiors said 'yeah, whatever'. He alone realized that Japan's only possibility of victory was to gamble big, and correctly, without fault. Not the best basis for going to war.

Having said that )), the other calculation that has to be taken into account is the fact that Japan was more-or-less counting on preoccupation with Europe to aid them in achieving their war aims. Without a Eurpoean war going on, Japan may very well have acceeded (sp?) to US demands to get out of China.

Getting the Sub base would have been nice, but would only have delayed the inevitable, the Subs would have sortied from Townsville and Freemantle until Pearl was rebuilt.

Well, delaying the inevitable was Japan's, or at least Yamamoto's basic strategy, wasn't it, hoping that if things could be made painful enough for the US, particularly if things were going tough with the Germans, that the US would allow Japan some gains and call it quits to go beat on the Nazis?

 

[Pwyll]

I agree with PBI here in almost every way...The Axis have to peak at the same time...become a threat in both theatres, make the allies choose...spread them thin. Banking on allied love for peace is a bit tough to swallow though...this is one of two things that concerns me the most in the game...because it is so abstract and you just cant pin it down and say "this is how it was ". For me the use of a consumer goods whatever supply is also of concern that a democracy might perform horribly if certain luxuries are not met....I mean heh Britain was on rationing till 1955....it did not seem to hurt them much...you do what you have to do to get the job done. This is also a very abstract idea and has little foundation or facts but maybe they need a way to penalize the democratic player.....sorry should have saved this for a new thread..

 

[unmerged(1798)]

Re: Re: Re: Japan

Originally posted by husky65


. . .

Australias supply situation would have been incomparably better than Japans and it would simply be impossible for Japan to blockade Aust.

Frank's widley acclaimed Book on the Guadalcanal Campaign is riddled with discussion on the very real possibilites of "blockading" Australia by a thrust in the South Pacific. My reading tells me that if Midway's results had been the reverse that this could've been a very real possibility. And I imagine one that may have been in partial conjunction with limited landings on the Australian northern coast.

 

[unmerged(2539)]

Japans goal was to fight a limited war, it sought to gain the areas it required, and then end the war, however it chose to attack at PH to destroy the PF to allow its operations to gain those areas, this, for a number of reasons spelt defeat, because the ability to put a limit to the war was now lost, and was now against its operational aims, drawn into a protacted war of attrition she was unable to effectivly compete in.

Logistics huh, how many tons did it take to maintain a US soilder, and how many pounds per Japanese one, logistics are not the whole answer because logistics are not the whole question.

Hanny

 

[unmerged(1798)]

Originally posted by husky65

Originally posted by joel rauber


"Perhaps he was refering to the limited northern invasion option"


Then they were not "close" to invading Aust, it was rejected as unfeasible - "close" implies that it nearly happened rather than was merely discussed and rejected.

"close" can mean many things to many people. Under much of the hypotheticals in this discussion; "Midway dramatically reversed"; I'd venture to guess that the limited northern invasion options become quite a real and close possibility.

"Not knowing numbers doesn't immediatly imply that any statements are not respective of understanding of important issues. "

I'm sorry, but when it comes to strategy, logistics, "the numbers' IS the key - you can argue tactics without bothering with logistics, but not strategy.

I didn't make my point explicit enough. When one's opponent in a discussion admits that they don't know the numbers (i.e. voluntarily telling you where their opinions are weak; it doesn't automatically mean that all of what they say is without merit. And it certainly doesn't mean you should make statements such as " Which means that what you post has no grounding in reality and you know it. "

I agree in the context of an invasion of Hawaii, logistical considerations of the kind you have brought up are very important if not paramount. And you are quite right to bring those issues to bear on the discussion.



"Often generals conclusions can be made regarding issues that are relatively insensitive to the numbers. Though, in this case, if you are referring to immediate invasion during the first 6-12 months of the war I agree with what you are saying. "

Once again, Japan was NEVER going to be in a position to invade Hawaii, on any scale - they lacked the transports, the amphib equipment, doctrine, fuel, the list goes on.

Again, I fear I must be more explicit. My comment was made regarding any discussion on any subject. Namely that their are some issues that are relatively insensitive to numbers. And therefore intelligent commentary may be made regarding those issues without knowing numbers.

Again, I agree that the Hawaii invasion is probably not an example of an issue of that type. Particularly in the context of the discussion.

. . . I snipped the rest of your post, because it was a rehash of numbers and conclusions that I do not dispute.

 

[Barnacle Bill]

Originally posted by husky65

Japan was doomed.

I agree completely that Japan's position is hopeless once they lose the strategic initiative, due to production and resource issues. The only way they could "win" is a negociated peace while still in a position of strength.

I do not believe that Americans in general are wedded to the notion that all wars must end in the surrender of the other side - especialy back then. That's sure not what we achieved in 1812 Americans of that era were not very interested in far of places. If the Japanese could inflict defeat on US arms without doing anything to arouse "righteaous wrath" then they could have negociated a peace if their terms seemed reasonable and magnanimous. Admittedly, that would all be very out of charactor for the Japanese regime of the time, but not impossible.

Part of the deal would have ben studious restraint from atrocities - treat all prisoners according to the rules as understood by Westerners, treat the indiginous polulation in Western colonies as if Japan was really there to liberate them, don't lay a finger on Western civilians except possibly comfortable internment, etc... kid glove treatment all the way. The idea would be to inflict a military defeat without doing anything "infamous" in the process or threatening actual US teritory (again the Phillipines didn't count as we were giving them up ourselves in 5 years).

 

[AlanC9]

Originally posted by Hannibal Barca
Japans goal was to fight a limited war, it sought to gain the areas it required, and then end the war, however it chose to attack at PH to destroy the PF to allow its operations to gain those areas, this, for a number of reasons spelt defeat, because the ability to put a limit to the war was now lost, and was now against its operational aims, drawn into a protacted war of attrition she was unable to effectivly compete in.

Yes, exactly. The Japanese general strategy was for a limited war, but their military operations made unlimited war certain. This is why I've always found Yamamoto overrated; he knew that the United States would inevitably beat Japan in a total war, and yet he deliberately chose a plan of action which would bring about that total war.

I've often thought that Japan would have been a lot better off by attacking only the Dutch possessions. Would the US really have declared war on Japan to preserve the Dutch colonial empire? I don't see it happening, not in 1941. And Britain was hardly in a position to interfere without American participation.

 

[unmerged(8451)]

Originally posted by AlanC9


Yes, exactly. The Japanese general strategy was for a limited war, but their military operations made unlimited war certain. This is why I've always found Yamamoto overrated; he knew that the United States would inevitably beat Japan in a total war, and yet he deliberately chose a plan of action which would bring about that total war.

I've often thought that Japan would have been a lot better off by attacking only the Dutch possessions. Would the US really have declared war on Japan to preserve the Dutch colonial empire? I don't see it happening, not in 1941. And Britain was hardly in a position to interfere without American participation.

Japan would not have been content to have just the Dutch colonies. Her main goal was to remove ALL European colonialism from Asia. So a war with the United States was inevitable in order to "liberate" the Phillipines, which at that time was under American control.

I also think capturing the Phillipines was of some strategic importance.

 

[unmerged(8840)]

Originally posted by PBI


"I really have to disagree with the assertion that Midway didn't matter; that's kind of like saying that none of the battles mattered, that it was all logistics. "

It was all logistics, the logistics is what made it impossible for Japan to win, even if it won the battles - look at Japans a/c and Pilot losses at Midway - if you project similar losses as for the successul strikes onto the other hypothetically successful strikes, Japan is going to run very low on pilots and had no way of replacing them with effective pilots.

"And yes, I know the axiom about tactics and logistics, but it is somewhat flawed. Tactics and logistics are the military equivalents of short-term and long-term, more-or-less, and they are interlinked. Ignore logistics, and you can have the best tactics in the world and it won't matter, because bullets run out. Ignore tactics, and you can have an unending amount of supply, and it won't matter, either, as the other guy will just happily shoot up all those shiny tanks and troops that keep getting fed to him."

There is a quote from a German 88 Battery commander that refutes the above nicely-

'I was on this hill as a Bty commander with 6 x 88mm AT guns, and the Americans kept sending tanks down the road. We kept knocking them out. Finally we ran out of ammunition and the Americans didn't run out of tanks'

Japn would have needed to pull off a 'Total victory at Midway' every 9 months or so (the actual dates get closer together as US production ramps up), by 1943 the allied fighters are better than the Zeke and the Zeke has almost no room for development, the Japs are not producing enough capable pilots to replace losses even when they win - the US could have almost 'lost its way to air superiority!'

"Having said that, I do have to agree that US production potential was so huge that Japan's only real chance was to score a lot of truly brilliant victories, enough to at least come out of the war with some sort of negotiated advantage, large or small, before the US material advantage began to truly be felt. "

The Problem is that Japan didn't have any way to force the US to feel those victories (it was 4 years to the next election), the US had vast untapped military strength (that earmarked for Europe could be diverted at need), they could not make more than pinprick attacks on the US, they could not sieze Hawaii and they had no way to have an effect on US production, they also lacked the ability to run their own economy and the war machine (lack of shipping) and the US Sub force was about to start making that WAY harder.

"Yamamoto himself said that he could run wild for 6 months to a year, at best, before the ballon caved in, but his superiors said 'yeah, whatever'. He alone realized that Japan's only possibility of victory was to gamble big, and correctly, without fault. Not the best basis for going to war."

They could never win, it all balanced on one, utterly wrong assumption - that Democratic nations are decadent and weak, all the militarist ubermen nutcases thought (think) it - lord only knows why - we fought WW1 to victory only 20 years earlier!


"Having said that )), the other calculation that has to be taken into account is the fact that Japan was more-or-less counting on preoccupation with Europe to aid them in achieving their war aims. Without a Eurpoean war going on, Japan may very well have acceeded (sp?) to US demands to get out of China."

Japan could not get out of China, it was their war goal and 'destiny' - the IJA were assasinating Japanese leaders who hinted at such things (IIRC Yammamoto was sent to sea to keep him safe from the IJA - you thought Monty and Ike had disputes, the IJA/IJN were amazing).


"Well, delaying the inevitable was Japan's, or at least Yamamoto's basic strategy, wasn't it, hoping that if things could be made painful enough for the US, particularly if things were going tough with the Germans, that the US would allow Japan some gains and call it quits to go beat on the Nazis?"

As I said it was their best chance but it was never going to work, the US was capable of beating both at the same time, or equally ignoring the Nazis and letting the USSR crush them and focussing entirely on Japan.

 

[MacGregor]

Husky, I apologize for the snide statement in my previous post. It was classless and I have editted it out.

I will try in the future spare you the trouble of having to deal with my ignorance. Goodbye.

 

[unmerged(8840)]

Re: Re: Re: Re: Japan

Originally posted by joel rauber


"Frank's widley acclaimed Book on the Guadalcanal Campaign is riddled with discussion on the very real possibilites of "blockading" Australia by a thrust in the South Pacific."

Frank needs to get hold of a map of Australia, Holding the Sth Pac (How would Japan supply this thrust?) does not blockade Aust, shipping can go to Perth, Adelaide or to Melb - the allies produced enough shipping that it would be of little concern to stretch the convoy routes south.

BTW, what effect does Mr Frank postulate this would have? Aust was a major arms/munitions producer and exporter, making the shipping line longer to Aust (by Southern routing) would hardly threaten Aust.

"My reading tells me that if Midway's results had been the reverse that this could've been a very real possibility. And I imagine one that may have been in partial conjunction with limited landings on the Australian northern coast. "

Where are you getting the shipping and troops for this? you have just proposed 2 x major, simultaneous operations - both of them further away from Japans supply bases than has been done before.

Given that the IJA rejected the limited Nth plan because they didn't have 12 Divs to spare (and couldn't guarantee victory if they did), what has changed to give them 12 Divs plus troops for the Sth Pac thrust?

 

[unmerged(8840)]

Originally posted by Hannibal Barca


Logistics huh, how many tons did it take to maintain a US soilder, and how many pounds per Japanese one, logistics are not the whole answer because logistics are not the whole question.

How many pounds V how many tons only matters when the one who needs the tons can't get it - the US was able to provide way more tons of supply than the Japs could supply pounds.

Very few US troops starved to death, plenty of Japs did.

During Guadalcanal the Jap military pressed for allocation of a further 620,000 tons of shipping, but were told that it could not be spared. As Tojo remarked: 'Even if we wanted, we could not give the General staff all the ships they demand. If we did, our steel production quota would be cut by half and we would be unable to continue the war'.

In 1942 the US produced almost 5.5 million tons of merchant shipping.

 

[unmerged(8840)]

Originally posted by joel rauber

"close" can mean many things to many people. Under much of the hypotheticals in this discussion; "Midway dramatically reversed"; I'd venture to guess that the limited northern invasion options become quite a real and close possibility. "

Winning at Midway frees up not one Jap soldier (and the reason the IJA knocked back the IJN plan was they didn't have the troops), nor any significant number of merchant ships (AFAIK it didn't even get to a logistic feasibility stage, but given the already posted rejection of a mere 650,000 tons of shipping, it seems pretty unlikely that they had the vessels to spare), the Japs were never in a position to Invade Aust.

 

[unmerged(8840)]

Originally posted by Barnacle Bill


"I agree completely that Japan's position is hopeless once they lose the strategic initiative, due to production and resource issues. The only way they could "win" is a negociated peace while still in a position of strength."

The problem Japan faces is that their enemy cannot be defeated with what they have, and their enemy knows that they only have to last a short while to outnumber them, their enemy also has a very detailed appreciation of how submarine warfare has impacted on GB - not a good recipe.


"I do not believe that Americans in general are wedded to the notion that all wars must end in the surrender of the other side - especialy back then. That's sure not what we achieved in 1812 Americans of that era were not very interested in far of places. If the Japanese could inflict defeat on US arms without doing anything to arouse "righteaous wrath""

They invaded US territory and killed US troops, if Japan seeks a 'fair fight' ie doesn't do a Pearl Harbour, they run the risk of losing right from the start.

" then they could have negociated a peace if their terms seemed reasonable and magnanimous. Admittedly, that would all be very out of charactor for the Japanese regime of the time, but not impossible."

Totally out of character for the Japanese at the time.


"Part of the deal would have ben studious restraint from atrocities - treat all prisoners according to the rules as understood by Westerners, treat the indiginous polulation in Western colonies as if Japan was really there to liberate them, don't lay a finger on Western civilians except possibly comfortable internment, etc... kid glove treatment all the way. "

Impossible, the Japanese military had been performing atrocities as a matter of routine policy for years in China - you can't change that sort of culture overnight.



"The idea would be to inflict a military defeat without doing anything "infamous" in the process or threatening actual US teritory (again the Phillipines didn't count as we were giving them up ourselves in 5 years). "

The Phillipines certainly count, they were still US territory and the Japs killed US soldiers to get them - a fair analogy is Germany, they declared war on the US in a 'sporting' (but stupid) fashion, they committed few atrocities against US troops (certainly none I'm aware of early war), yet there was never any though of asking if they just wanted to call it quits, there was little public support for not fighting Germany.

 

[unmerged(8840)]

Originally posted by AlanC9


I've often thought that Japan would have been a lot better off by attacking only the Dutch possessions. Would the US really have declared war on Japan to preserve the Dutch colonial empire? I don't see it happening, not in 1941. And Britain was hardly in a position to interfere without American participation.

This is probably Japans best chance, grab Dutch stuff (with the Nazis giving them the legal 'paperwork' to do it) and keep the C'wealth and the USA out of it.

Then try to finish up China using those resources before the Allies finish Germany and demand the return of Dutch possessions.

Its a very big gamble - the US from pearl and the PI can cut the oil supply lines pretty much at will, but it just might give the Japs 3 years worth of Oil to work with and a chance to negotiate with the allies at the end.

Fighting the US as was done historically was not a gamble, it was suicide.

I'm not sure how the US would have reacted to Japan flouting the oil embargo by stealing the source, if they chose to fight immediately Japan would lose very quickly - but it might just give them a shot at getting their war aims without fighting the US.

 

[unmerged(8451)]

Originally posted by husky65


This is probably Japans best chance, grab Dutch stuff (with the Nazis giving them the legal 'paperwork' to do it) and keep the C'wealth and the USA out of it.

Then try to finish up China using those resources before the Allies finish Germany and demand the return of Dutch possessions.

Its a very big gamble - the US from pearl and the PI can cut the oil supply lines pretty much at will, but it just might give the Japs 3 years worth of Oil to work with and a chance to negotiate with the allies at the end.

Fighting the US as was done historically was not a gamble, it was suicide.

I'm not sure how the US would have reacted to Japan flouting the oil embargo by stealing the source, if they chose to fight immediately Japan would lose very quickly - but it might just give them a shot at getting their war aims without fighting the US.

Like I said, the Japanese wanted ALL Europeans out of Asia... They would ot be content to remove the Dutch alone.

And the capture of the American Phillipines was necessary to ensure a secure supply route to the Dutch colonies.

Sure, maybe attacking just the Dutch would have been a better idea strategically. But it would not have happened because the Japanese had an ambition to "liberate" Asia from the Europeans.