Is Germany to blame for World War I

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Originally posted by Bourbon


Once again, Americans needed a large navy just as little as the Germans did, their empires were about the same size. Plus, Germany could be easily blockaded (as did happen in WWI),while US probably could not be due to its sheer size and distance from Europe. AND German was not self-sufficient by that time, it needed imports almost as much as Britain. So it did need a navy in case of the war. Thus, Germany needed a large fleet probably more than US, so it would be hyprocritical for British to "forbid" them this. I completely agree with Produce Pete on this.

I must sayt that German's hated the Russians and despised the French, but their atitude towards Britain was much more ambiguos (something akin to love-hate). German intention was not to overthrow the British empire, but to become more dominant in Europe, cut Russia in size, and obtain a colonial empire proportional to its strenth. Obviously, that would indirectly weaken the British empire, but Germany never did intend to actually invade British Isles or anything like that.

So yes, Germany was agressive and ambitions, but so was every other European nation and US. The difference was that only Germany was simultaneously dissatisfied with the status quo (unlike the British or US) and had the power to change it (unlike the French or Russians), thus -it ended up being encircled and made a skapegoat.

Well I think that you could argue that the US needed a larger navy than Germany but I think that is a seperate issue in some respects.Both Germany and the US 'needed' a fleet , but as the British had effectivley withdrawn from the Pacific the increase in size of the US navy presented no potential conflict for the British.British economic interests were not immediatley threatened by a sizeable US navy.Germanys desire for greater strength in Europe , a 'place in the sun' could only be achieved with an imperial adventure outside europe following the British model.Almost certainly that could only be achieved at the expense of British interests.The British , then quite rightly IMO percieved the German navy as being built with one express purpose.There is ample evidence to support this contention , but little to offer an alternate explanation for a German naval build up.

I agree with you , in terms of abstract rights , who is to say who can have a navy and who cant? Sure , I think you are right but I dont think that is what is happening in this case , it isn't the reason the British are getting upset.

And I dont think there were any plans for an invasion of Britain and I also agree that the German ruling class thought well of their relations in Britain.However Germanys plans ran counter to the best interests of the British , hence the problem with the shipbuilding.

And yes , from a moral or ethical perspective everyone in power in Europe is pretty rotten , but I think thats an argument for another thread.They are all as bad as each other in those terms IMO.

 

[Keynes]

On the immediate topic, I would generally concur with Johnny Canuck that the German general staff played a key role in egging on the Austrians, out of fear that a strategic window of opportunity was closing, with Russian rearmament and modernization proceeding just as the SDP-dominated German parliament sought to trade guns for butter in the Imperial budget battles (also there was great resistance from German conservatives to reducing the role of the individual states and centralizing the budget at the Imperial level which made future war finance a dubious proposition).

But Sven Sture puts his figure on the critical factor, which is the bizarre behavior of Austria-Hungary. Few countries had better reasons to maintain the status quo and refrain from rocking the boat than A-H. Unfortunately, the Empire at the time was dominated by Conrad, who believed in the quixotic strategy of strengthening the Empire by engaging in dangerous wars of expansion. It was Conrad who pressed the issue against Serbia even after the Serbs gave in to all the material Habsburg demands in the assassination crisis. The German role was in foolishly issuing him the "blank check".

 

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I do subscribe to the theory that the German high command felt that there had to be a showdown before Russia had built up their army,navy and infrastructial support even further then in 1914. So I guess the main blame goes to Germany for their lack of restraint in 1914, however it must be said that because of the alliance schemes no one of the major powers is without fault and that no one showed a willingness to back down and that everyone felt it was a good time to take the ultimate test - because there was a basic lack of understanding of what war with the available resources would be like.

Due to the thinking of the times when power, wealth and influence of nations was still percived in terms of territory and colonies a major war seems inevitable.

On the subject of Dreadnoughts: I believe that it was the early 20th century equalent of todays nuclear weapons - the ulimate weapon of power projection, mere possession of a substantial navy them made the nation a "great" power - as witnessed by the rise of Japan. Every nation of the time with an interest in world politics/power projection were building them: Russia had a plan of a great fleet to remedy the situation after the russo/japanese war, the US was planning a large fleet to maintain their possessions after the spanish war, Italy felt they had to have some to deterr France and Austria, The Ottomans needed them to scare Greece and vice versa, the South Americas had their own Dreadnought game...

 

[v. Berlichingen]

Originally posted by BRYCON316
All the Germans must be asleep, because there hasn't been any Francophobic sentiment set. I guess we'll ahve to wait until morning.

German Francophobe reporting on duty, Sir! Why, those no-good snail-eatin', absinth-drinkin' fould-mouthed Frenchies who have been stealin' land from us for the last 500 years...

Enough fun for now. I think quite a lot of the blame for WWI is to be assigned to the gerenal staffs of the various countries, who all believed, and told their governments, that any coming war would be short, bloodless, and easily won. Think about it, if you're a political big-wig, and your alleged experts in the field of military matters tell you:
'Just sign that DOW, boss, and in 3 months, you won't find their country on any politicial map ever again, we'll steamroller all the way back to [insert-capital-here] and back in a breeze.',
what would you do?
Good old Conrad v. H. surely had strange ideas about a war being good for A.-H. The truly tragic thing is that the blank-cheque given to the Austrians for handling the Serbian matter was based on the uninformed, but not-too-unreasonable assumption of German Reichskanzler Theobald v. Bethmann-Hollweg that his OHL had a plan of some kind for a war in the east. Turned out they only had the Schlieffen-Plan...
Basically, Theo thought along the following lines in the year since the 2nd Moroccon Crisis:
'There probably will be a war in Europe soon, and it'll get real tough for Germany. Under some certain circumstance, though, we just might be able to emerge unscathed, or even victorious:
1) The Social Democrats have to support us.
2) A.-H. needs to support us fully.
3) The Brits must stay neutral, at least for a time.'

Given these thoughts, the situation of 1914 was rather ideal: A.-H. would definitely be involved fully, after all, it was their war in the first place. As Serbia was an ally of Russia, an involvement of Russia was likely, and as Russia was the most oppressive and backward regime in Europe at that time, it was rather likely the SPD would support going to war against them (that the SPD turned out to be even more patriotic was a surprise to almost everyone when war was declared, so Theo probably needn't have worried at all ). And, for the last point, if Russia's ambition to gain access to the Mediterranean and Constantinople were pushed down a notch or two by a war against Germany and A.-H., well, that wouldn't really run contrary to British interests at all.
Those thoughts led to Theo sending that infamous blank cheque. Now had he consulted with his OHL and Moltke there, they'd have told him that the German High Command had no plan for a war focussed on the Eastern Front at all. Their one and only plan for any war whatsoever was the Schlieffen-Plan, an all-out attack against France while violating the neutralities of countries who had British guarantees protecting them. It's easy to see why such a plan didn't really match with point three of Theo's list.
So, in short, what Theo wanted, planned for, and based his policy on, was a war against Russia, while stricly defending against France who'd be supporting her ally. What he got was an all-out German attack on France, complete with the seizing of Antwerpes, a city once called 'a pistol aimed at England's heart'...
As to why the heck the German government and the German high command never just sat and talked, while all the world thought of Germany being the pinnacle of militarism...don't ask me, I simply think it's a model case of criminal negligence.

About the naval arms' race between Germany and Great Britain: Unluckily, our emperor Wilhem II. wasn't exactly an anglophile. His mother was a member of Biritsh Royalty, a daughter (or granddaughter?) of Queen Victoria, IIRC, and her and him just didn't get along at all, partially, it is rumoured, because she could never accept the fact that Wilhelm had been crippled during birth, and because she made some remarks that clearly showed the disdain she felt for him. So, it s said, Wilhelm developed an animosity against his mother and their relatives early on, and sometimes interferred with his Empire's foreign policy later on just to spite the Brits.
As was the case when he sent an encouraging 'Well done, and keep going!' telegram to Ohm Krueger during the Boers war, after a particularly nasty defeat the Brits suffered at the Boers' hands.
No, I'm not going to blame all the German-British problems to the personal problems of Willi and his Mom, but they certainly influenced his decisions, when it came to implementing Tirpitz' program. Besides, Wilhelm was a sucker for anything marine-wise, be it sailing yaughts or battle cruisers (British heritage, maybe?), he really liked the idea of having a big fleet, and probably didn't think too much about the possible uses such a fleet might have in the eyes of other ship-owners.
That the British and the Germans didn't manage to find a solution to this (especially for Germany) minor problem of a maritime arms' race, despite numerous attempts at talking over these things, as well as British-German conferences about colonial expansion of Germany, is a particularly tragic chapter of pre-WWI history. It wouldn't have taken much, only the Germans accepting a maybe 5:3 ratio with the British ships (like the Japanese accepted with the brits and the US after WWI, until they decided to get tough), and the British accepting that the fleet wasn't meant to stay in the North Sea, but meant to sail the waters of the Marianas, scare Chinese and Hottentots, and parade in front of the Kaiser at the Kieler Woche.
Wait, you say, I mentioned 'German colonial expansion'? Wouldn't that mean war, and/or a threat to Great Britain?
Nope. The colonial expansion plans that were discussed in earnest in Germany before WWI (they were also discussed in what was described as a 'friendly, almost chummy' atmosphere with 2 British delegations) were these: Acquire the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola once Portugal went bankrupt, and would have to sell some of her possessions to pay off foreign debt, and maybe buy the Congo from the Belgian King, thus forming a central/south-African colonial 'empire' including Kamerun, (Belgish-) Kongo (little chance to get more of the French Congo after 1912 ), Angola, Deutsch-Ostafrika (Tansania), Mozambique, and Deutsch-Südwest (Namibia). Such an increase in overseas possession and therefore overseas trade would surely have warranted a reasonable fleet-buildup, and if done while all the while consulting with the Brits, it would probably have gone off rather smoothly.

Missed opportunities, foolish people at the helm, and a complete misjudgement of the state of military science and hardware. Those, in my eyes, are the things that are to blame for WWI.

[French-bashing]
(This is for you, Brycon )
Naww, who am I kiddin'? It's all the fault of them damn frogs, seducing stalwart Brits to take up arms against their German brothers, paying the Serbs to give Conrad von H. (a French sleeper-agent) a CB against them, then insidiously sending a false cable to the German embassy in Russia, telling the good ambassador to DOW the Czar!
Did you know that the v. Tirpitz family couldn't come up with proof that their Great-great-Grandmother actually came from Karlsruhe, as was claimed? Thorough investigation by the NFL of Germany (Nationalist French-Loathers) revealed that the time of her birth coincided with a French Army passing nearby during the 30 years' war! So it is likely that she was French, after all, and that her subersions came to fruit in her great-great-grandson Admiral v. Tirpitz, who used his plan for naval build-up to further alienate the British and the Germans, only to further the goals of the dastardly French!
It all began when the 'Huguenots' were 'expelled' from France. According to recent statements made by the WWF (Worldwide Weirdo Federation), based upon secret documents smuggled out of Paris by some heroic nutcases, these Huguenots actually all were agents of the French Crown, sent out to infiltrate, corrupt and subvert the other governments of Europe. Do you think it was an accident that Prussia fell so easily when Napoleon came? It was the result of the Huguenot 'refugees' (those that Friedrich the Great foolishly allowed to settle in Brandenburg) having successfully undermined the King's will to fight, not to mention their having taken over a significant part of Prussia's miliary industry, leading in turn to the Prussian army being out-gunned by the French army.
It's all obvious now, isn't it? For centuries, the French have done everything they could to gain dominance in Europe, and just make existing a real pain in the b*** for all other countries in the world. Modern examples of this scheme are nouvelle cuisine, haute couture, and all TV appearances by Richard Kléidermann. We MUST unite, and fight against this menace, or we will all end up eating FRENCH fries and filet mignon, drinking Perrier or Merlôt, and speaking Frog. They _ARE_ out there! Lurking around! BEWARE!!!
[/French-bashing]
Now I just have to pray that the French who read this are _not_ part of that conspiracy, else I'm toast

 

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reply

I am very dissappointed to hear that Germany could've stopped the war if they didn't declare war on Russia.
Don't mean to be insulting BUT GERMANY WAS AUSTRIA'S ALLY. It was their duty, according to them, to help out their ally, and to help out their ally they needed to protect their ally. Russia was going to attack Austria due to them both wanting to take the Balklands.
So, Germany wanted to stop Russia from attacking Austria's Balklands, so they declared war on the Balklands.
Now all the alliances kicked in and world war began.

If you want to say that Germany could've prevented war, you could also say Britain could've prevented war. They could've not declared war on Germany when they marched into Belgium. But Belgium was Britian's ally and they wanted to protect them. Germany wanted to protect Austria, their ally.

You see, Britain and Germany wanted to protect their allies, so you can't say it was solely Germany's falt.

This thread is going great. No fights yet, so keep the posts comin'!!!

 

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In regards to concentration camps, I know that the Spannish used them with great effect in Cuba before the US declaired war. Does anyone know of an earlier instance of the use of concentration camps?

 

[Heretic]

looks like you posted 'new thread' not 'reply'

there is always the alternative of not fighting...

Heretic

 

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Originally posted by Johnny Canuck


Although the Germans hated the Russians, the feeling was not mutual. The Russians had no real reason to hate the Germans. Indeed, the Russians had more reason to hate the British, who historically blocked the Russians from their goals of Constantinople and piercing the Northwest Frontier in Afghanistan.

The German intention was to overthrow the British Empire; it was Weltpolitik, not Europe-politik. The goal was to defeat the British Empire, and replace it as the dominant empire, both in Europe and overseas. No, the Germans did not (as far as I am aware) seriously consider the logistics of invading Britain, but they never had to. However, merely controlling the waters around Britiain would have been sufficient to bring the nation to its knees in a matter of weeks. A Germany that had fulfilled its Weltpolitik goals would have resulted in a situation where the British would only exist on the sufferance of the Germans. They would have lived with a knife forever at their throat. Again, the analogy with Soviet missiles in Cuba in '62. Intolerable for any nation with even a threat of self-respect.

I guess we just have different information sources. I have never read about Germans having the ambition to overthrow British Empire. They DID want to become dominant in Europe and yes, to become a world power, but they were never SPECIFICALLY aiming for the British. They just wanted a place in the sun commesaruate with their strenght, which the French, and Russians and especially the British, - long accustomed to ruling the world, did not want to give to them.

 

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"Actually, the Germans never really needed a large fleet. During the Franco-Prussian War, the French fleet blockaded what few Prussian naval vessels there were in port for the duration. It didn't do them much good while the Prussians lay seige to Paris. As Churchill said, for the Germans, their fleet is a luxury. "

Just because Germans didn't need a navy in a short war, doesn't mean they wouldn't need one in a protracted war. PLus, by 1914 after the Second Industrial revolution, most European countries (save for Russia) had to export heavily to obtain needed materials and foodstuffs missing from their own small territories. Thus, the situation would have been very different than in 1870.

I believe that if Germans would have built a navy equal to the British by 1914, they would have won the war, since they would have prevented their own blockaded (which did hurt them unlike the French one in 1870) AND might have prevented vital American shipments to the allies.

 

[unmerged(3522)]

Originally posted by Fromtia


Well I think that you could argue that the US needed a larger navy than Germany but I think that is a seperate issue in some respects.Both Germany and the US 'needed' a fleet , but as the British had effectivley withdrawn from the Pacific the increase in size of the US navy presented no potential conflict for the British.British economic interests were not immediatley threatened by a sizeable US navy.Germanys desire for greater strength in Europe , a 'place in the sun' could only be achieved with an imperial adventure outside europe following the British model.Almost certainly that could only be achieved at the expense of British interests.The British , then quite rightly IMO percieved the German navy as being built with one express purpose.There is ample evidence to support this contention , but little to offer an alternate explanation for a German naval build up.

I agree with you , in terms of abstract rights , who is to say who can have a navy and who cant? Sure , I think you are right but I dont think that is what is happening in this case , it isn't the reason the British are getting upset.

And I dont think there were any plans for an invasion of Britain and I also agree that the German ruling class thought well of their relations in Britain.However Germanys plans ran counter to the best interests of the British , hence the problem with the shipbuilding.

And yes , from a moral or ethical perspective everyone in power in Europe is pretty rotten , but I think thats an argument for another thread.They are all as bad as each other in those terms IMO.

I actually sort of agree with your post. Basically, the way British saw it (partially incorrectly) was that German core interests ran counter to theirs, while Americans ones didn't. So it was simply a Darwinian struggle, - Germany wanted to take advantage of their national strength, while British wanted to stop that from happening since this would hurt their own interests.

What I am saying is that you can't say Germany was the bad guy here just cause it wanted to pursue its own national interests. Hey, in the 1600 and 1700s Britain did exactly the same thing by taking colonies from Spain , Dutch, and France.

 

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Produce Pete, you're talking rubbish. South Africa had not been independant all along. The first Boer war ended in negotiation, effectively the British won. As they did with the 2nd.

Also, the spanish invented concentration camps. And the british "concentration camps" were not the same as the nazi ones.

Plus your ramarks on the Belgian Congo are absolutely DISGRACEFUL. If you bothered to read up on one of the many history books on the subject you would realise that. The Beligians pracitsed covert slavery longer than any other European nation and routinely cut the hands and feet off locals who refused to cooperate.

The Germans faced rebellions in their colonies too. They tended to react by torturing prisoners and burning entire villages in reprisals.

your comments are offensive both because of their content, because you are obviously just exercising some sort of anti-British bias and also because you clearly haven't read round the subject at all and are just making up "facts" as you go along to support your bizarre argument.

 

[King]

Originally posted by Bourbon
"Actually, the Germans never really needed a large fleet. During the Franco-Prussian War, the French fleet blockaded what few Prussian naval vessels there were in port for the duration. It didn't do them much good while the Prussians lay seige to Paris. As Churchill said, for the Germans, their fleet is a luxury. "

Just because Germans didn't need a navy in a short war, doesn't mean they wouldn't need one in a protracted war. PLus, by 1914 after the Second Industrial revolution, most European countries (save for Russia) had to export heavily to obtain needed materials and foodstuffs missing from their own small territories. Thus, the situation would have been very different than in 1870.

I believe that if Germans would have built a navy equal to the British by 1914, they would have won the war, since they would have prevented their own blockaded (which did hurt them unlike the French one in 1870) AND might have prevented vital American shipments to the allies.

You assume a lot. I ask you this if the Germans had built a fleet equal to the British fleet could they have still have had such a powerful army. The answer is no me thinks. Secondly if Germany had kept Britain out of the war Britain would have used its fleet to ensure free trade rather than blockade Germany. After all why only trade with one side when you can double your profits by trading with both.

 

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Now I feel at home since the Francophobes are out and about.

I believe that risk theory actually worked, according to how Tirpitz worked it out. He said that the fleet would be big enough so that UK couldn't attack without losing so many of her ships that she would cease to be a naval power. During the war, the UK, even at Jutland, wouldn't engage the German navy full-scale. The faulty part of risk theory is that the UK could have attacked the German navy before it became fully powered. Since the UK didn't attack the German navy until the navy was at full-scale power, Tirpitz' theory actually worked in practice.

England stated in 1871 that they don't care if Germany has hedgemony over the continent, since England was a world power, not a European power. But by 1900, after the building of the fleet, the UK stated that they wouldn't allow France to be defeated in the same manner as 1871.

 

[King]

The difference between 1871 and 1914 was that Germany could ask France for colonial gains if she won the war. This would give the Germans their place in the sun and give them bases to become a greater threat to British interests.

 

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Richard Hakluyt also makes an excellent point regarding concentration camps in South africa. The garrisons in charge of these camps suffered deaths in a similar ratio to he internees. This was partly through disease and also because often Boer ambushes stopped essential supplis coming through. There is a large amount of evidence form actual internees that although they did not like the policies and hated the camps, the British did not mistreat the prisoners.

 

[Johnny Canuck]

Originally posted by Bourbon


I guess we just have different information sources. I have never read about Germans having the ambition to overthrow British Empire. They DID want to become dominant in Europe and yes, to become a world power, but they were never SPECIFICALLY aiming for the British. They just wanted a place in the sun commesaruate with their strenght, which the French, and Russians and especially the British, - long accustomed to ruling the world, did not want to give to them.

My primary source on this is the memorandum that Vice-Admiral Tirpitz sent to Wilhelm II in 1897 that proposed the creation of the High Seas Fleet. Unfortunately, I don't have my copy readily available right now, but from what I remember, the memorandum stated explicitly that the new fleet was being built for the sole purpose of a naval war with Britain. When outlining specifications for light cruisers, for example, they were compared with British light cruisers, not French or Russian. Also, if I remember rightly, the memorandum mentioned the short ranges of the proposed warships & stated that longer ranges would not be needed for the purpose they were to fulfill. The memorandum also outlined the infamous risk theory, directed against Britain. Wilhelm enthusiastically endorsed this memorandum, & it formed the basis of the German naval building programme for the next decade and a half.

Also, you have a point about the differences between a naval blockade of Prussia in 1870 & a naval blockade of Germany in 1914. I would, however, state that the blockade of Germany was only one factor in Germany's defeat (the most important being the panic of the German High Command in early October 1918 that led the civilian leaders to assume that defeat was inevitable), & the blockade took four years at that. A similar blockade of Britian would have brought it to its knees in six weeks. Therefore, the German fleet posed a much greater risk to Britain than the Royal Navy posed to Germany.

 

[Johnny Canuck]

Originally posted by BRYCON316
Now I feel at home since the Francophobes are out and about.

I believe that risk theory actually worked, according to how Tirpitz worked it out. He said that the fleet would be big enough so that UK couldn't attack without losing so many of her ships that she would cease to be a naval power. During the war, the UK, even at Jutland, wouldn't engage the German navy full-scale. The faulty part of risk theory is that the UK could have attacked the German navy before it became fully powered. Since the UK didn't attack the German navy until the navy was at full-scale power, Tirpitz' theory actually worked in practice.

England stated in 1871 that they don't care if Germany has hedgemony over the continent, since England was a world power, not a European power. But by 1900, after the building of the fleet, the UK stated that they wouldn't allow France to be defeated in the same manner as 1871.

I believe that Tirpitz's risk theory was one of the worst military-strategic blunders in modern history. The idea behind the risk theory was that Germany would have a large enough fleet to deter an attack by the Royal Navy out of fear of losses. Due to this, England would be forced into an alliance with Germany as the senior partner. Obviously, this failed spectacularly. Britain reacted by allying with Germany's enemies, not with Germany. The risk theory was a diplomatic catastrophe for Germany.

The risk theory also was an enormous failure for Germany militarily. It assumed that, in war, the Royal Navy would sail to engage the High Seas Fleet in the first weeks of the war, in order to support a close blockade of the German coast. The Germans assumed that a Nelsonic impulsion ("engage the enemy more closely") would drive the Royal Navy into the arms of the High Seas Fleet. What they did not realize was that the Royal Navy had abandoned the idea of a close blockade, and instead blockaded Germany from the exits of the North Sea through the Channel and north of Scotland. In this case, the onus was on the Germans to sail to engage the Grand Fleet in battle.

However, it was in the interests of the Grand Fleet to avoid battle. The Royal Navy had the superior position. Not only was the Grand Fleet significantly larger than the High Seas Fleet, the Grand Fleet had the superior defensive position. In order to blockade Germany, they had to do nothing at all. For Germany to break the blockade, they would have to engage the Royal Navy, defeat it without suffering crippling losses, and then seize naval bases (likely in Norway and the French Channel coast) to began a blockade of Britain, considering that the range restrictions of the German capital ships effectively prevented a blockade being operatined from their bases in Germany. As such, the Royal Navy could gain absolutely nothing from engaging the High Seas Fleet, as by merely existing in port it ensured a blockade of Germany. Obviously, though, the Royal Navy had much to lose in a naval encounter, if they engaged the High Seas Fleet under any circumstances in which the High Seas Fleet had a reasonable chance of victory. Such a reasonable chance would have been the entirety of the High Seas Fleet being able to engage only a segment of the Grand Fleet, or the Battle-Cruiser Squadrons. Hence the generally defensive posture by the Grand Fleet, especially under Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, which had nothing to do with the risk theory.

Also, your characterization of the Battle of Jutland is erroneous. The main battle fleets only engaged each other beginning late in the afternoon of 31 May 1916, leaving precious few hours of daylight for battle. Also, as soon as the High Seas Fleet saw that it was about to engage the full force of the Grand Fleet, Admiral von Scheer ordered his ships to turn and sail away from the combat. He realized that if his ships faced the Grand Fleet, the High Seas Fleet would be rapidly annihilated, so great was the margin of superiority of the Grand Fleet by the summer of 1916. Hence, the fact that the Battle of Jutland fizzled was not due to any unwillingness of the Grand Fleet to fight, but due to the fact that, put bluntly, the Germans ran away at the first sign of serious trouble.

 

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Canuck,

Your take on Risk Theory is different from my interpretation. I know that feelers were put out towards an Anglo-German alliance, but they never quite got into bed together despite numerous meetings in London. Hajo Holburn, who is the greatest German historian of modern times, said that Tirpitz risk theory was designed to prevent decisive action by the Royal Navy, and give the Germans initiative at the time the great battle would occur. After the construction of the Kiel canal, the Germans should have had freedom of movement and initiative, since in theory, the navy couldn't be bottled up in the North Sea.

Jutland can be considered a tactical draw, but almost every military expert and historian that I have read believes that the German Navy had an advantage over the Royal Navy, and that if the Social Democrats hadn't pushed for the High Command to build the Submarine fleet at the expense of the High Seas Fleet, the Germans could have eventually broken the blockade by force, even if they couldn't have been able to subsequently begin a blockade of their own.

 

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Originally posted by King



You assume a lot. I ask you this if the Germans had built a fleet equal to the British fleet could they have still have had such a powerful army. The answer is no me thinks. Secondly if Germany had kept Britain out of the war Britain would have used its fleet to ensure free trade rather than blockade Germany. After all why only trade with one side when you can double your profits by trading with both.

Not AS poweful, but still the best in Europe. Remeber, the Germans built the world's second best navy in ten years from scratch without having any naval traditions, while still mantaining the world's best army.

And secondly, how would Germany be sure that Britain would not interefe as long as Germans would give up ambitions for a navy? Remember, in the 1870s, when German bullied France, the British complained pretty loudly. That was before any naval building program has started.

 

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Originally posted by BRYCON316
Now I feel at home since the Francophobes are out and about.

I believe that risk theory actually worked, according to how Tirpitz worked it out. He said that the fleet would be big enough so that UK couldn't attack without losing so many of her ships that she would cease to be a naval power. During the war, the UK, even at Jutland, wouldn't engage the German navy full-scale. The faulty part of risk theory is that the UK could have attacked the German navy before it became fully powered. Since the UK didn't attack the German navy until the navy was at full-scale power, Tirpitz' theory actually worked in practice.

England stated in 1871 that they don't care if Germany has hedgemony over the continent, since England was a world power, not a European power. But by 1900, after the building of the fleet, the UK stated that they wouldn't allow France to be defeated in the same manner as 1871.

Not really, England repeatedly said that they would be opposed to elimination of France as a great power.