Oh, the design itself mattered. The Panther, just like the Tiger, was an over-engineered mess that was in no way suited to the kind of mass production that produced the T-34 or M4. The complicated design and the many novel design solutions meant that the Panther took far longer to make (and in extension cost more) then it would have had the design aimed for simplicity and ease of production.
One does not exclude the other. The Panther was a disaster as it was too complex to be the main medium tank of the German forces and took too long to produce and to service. The Tiger II was a mess for different reasons. Whether or nor the Panther was a god tank otherwise, it was not a good tank for the situation Germany was in.
You can't be serious with this logic. Production numbers do not equate to losses. Producing more then necessary is a common thing in wartime, as you simply can not have too much equipment, no matter if we are talking about tanks, uniforms, rations or ammunition. More importantly, both the USA and USSR ended the war with thousands, if not tens of thousands, of tanks in service. Both nations would go on to sell these tanks cheaply to their allies, which is why India, Pakistan, Israel etc. all used Sherman tanks for a long time and why the entire Eastern Bloc (and China and North Korea) used the T-34/85 all the way into the 80's. This simple fact alone means your logic of extrapolating losses from production numbers is wrong, since that would mean that neither the USSR or USA would have any tanks left at war's end, especially not in sufficient numbers to then saturate the second hand market for tanks with their surplus WW2 equipment for decades afterwards.
No. The reason why you keep making loads of tanks in 1945 is that the war was won in May 1945 in Europe and September 1945 in Asia. The people who decided on tank production could not say when the war would end or how much fight was left in the enemy, so they kept making tanks as if the war would go on "forever", since winding down production too early would mean that your forces could potentially be left without replacement tanks, food, ammunition and all those other things you decided you didn't need so many off when the war would be won "soon". It is well worth noting that as soon as Germany was defeated all the Allies, both east and west, begun winding down their wartime production significantly, because that was the first time when it was safe to do so from a military standpoint.
Your idea of an economically sane conclusion requires the planners to have knowledge of when the war would end. Information that they, obviously, didn't have.
- 9
- 2
