I think you can't read. Rommel said that a very limited effort (not just a stop gap) would have given to the Axis the opportunity to conquer Alexandria and then to link up with the Italians on the horn of Africa and then to get the hands on the middle east (INCLUDING PERSIA). This could have given, also the opportunity to link up with the Japanese in India and to put pressure on Turkey to join the Axis and then....
This was the ONLY strategic opportunity that the Axis had to win the war.
Rommel was day-dreaming and you are being obtuse.
Rommel had no idea of logistics and distances. Eg: Tripoli (the main Italian port in North Africa) to the Persian Refinery in Abadan is 4500 KM, that is nearly 3 times the distance of Berlin to Moscow. If the AXIS couldn't supply their armies from Warsaw/Koenigsberg to Moscow despite having decent quality roads and good rails how will they supply with shi**y quality roads and "0 railways?".
The AXIS laced the Trucks, and also the Oil to supply those trucks to get a "Red ball Express" moving from Tripoli to Alexandria and beyond. Franz Halder had his staff conduct a study before they sent Rommel to North Africa and considering the "limited Trucks and Oil supplies", 3-4 mobile divisions i.e. 2 tanks + 2 motor infantry divisions is all that Germany could afford to support and field in the North African region. As was seen, this was not enough.
The British had infinite access to Oil via their own supplies and via Iran, further they had infinite access to Rubber, required for Trucks via Sri-Lanka, India and Malaya.
The Royal Navy was no longer the pre-eminent Navy in the world but had enough ships and shipping to transport men and material on a worldwide basis.
The same Italian Navy whom you have glorified refused to send its Capital ships out to Sea most times because it sorely lacked the Oil.
Just the distance from Suez to Tripoli is over 2000km, that is more than Stalingrad to Warsaw distance.
Every single battle in North Africa before the Americans arrived depended on the "Logistics chain" for victory or defeat, when the British Over-extended, Rommel cut them off and defeated them and he was repaid in the same way whenever he over-extended.
Historical example: for nearly 6 months the Oil fields of Grozny and Maikop (relatively large ones though not as big as BAKU or ABADAN) they could not extract any Oil as the Russians had already destroyed the machinery and put the wells on fire rather than allow the Germans the chance to profit, why will British Intelligence/SAS not do the same?
Port of Alexandria can be totally gutted, all the air-fields destroyed, the entire Railway line from Alexandria inward and outward destroyed and the Suez canal mined and silted making it useless for everyone.
Germany did not have the naval capacity to transport entire Railways, Heavy Machinery etc from their homeland via Sea to North Africa.
Further the entire Pipeline structure can be blown or sabotaged, even Abadan itself - the machinery can be destroyed and the wells be turned into flaming infernos. All this happened even in the "Iraqi retreat from Kuwait" - Scorched Earth Policy is Old and New.
For the AXIS, War against USSR was inevitable - sooner the better, if they would have waited by 1942/43 the USSR would have launched its own offensives into Germany.
It is relatively straightforward- to win the War crush the USSR and then you can do anything you want or else anyway the War is lost.
P.S.: It was calculated that an PanzerCorps of 2 Panzer + 1 Mot will consume close to 40000-50000 Tons of Supplies (of all kinds including Fuel, Water etc) per month.
The Ports in North Africa could support only 100000 Tons (Tripoli had 50000, Benghasi had 25000-30000 and Tobruk had theoretically 30000 but did more like 15000) so, all the 8 or so Italian divisions including 2 light Panzer and 2 Motorised will have to subsist on only 50000+ tons of supply per month.
Again the single coastal road in Libya was so poor for transportation that even the supplies that actually reached the docks stayed put for several weeks before reaching the front.