Berthier’s devastated command was forced to retreat back towards Chemnitz, where Napoleon’s last known position was. Numerous rides had been dispatched by Napoleon to Berthier, but none had returned with exact or even semi-good guess where the later general’s position was. Finally, on June 5th, both forces were both able to locate each other and agree to rendezvous at Freiburg; which was almost equal distance between Dresden and Chemnitz. Upon his arrival, Berthier was promptly removed from command by Napoleon – whose force now totaled about 161,000 strong. Meanwhile, the Allies, though not yet combined were standing at 164,000 between the Austrian and Prussian armies. Figuring as much, Napoleon sent off letters addressed to the commanders of armies and their respective monarchs begging for a truce.
The commanders agreed to a truce; until further instruction could be received from their corresponding capitals on the next steps to be taken in the field. This reprieve was acceptable to the commanders – as they knew they were in no position to challenge Napoleon’s forces without at least combining. Even the successful combining of forces; which was completed on June 9th, would not guarantee success. All sides knew that the truce was just a matter of convenience for both sides until reinforcements could be brought up and the battle renewed.
By June 17th, the game was beginning to unfold for Napoleon. The Russian army had finally arrived, bringing the total Allied strength (barring reinforcements) to 344,000; with additional reinforcements that were received from Prussian and Austrian homelands, the total strength was closer to 360,000. Napoleon’s numbers on the other hand had barely increased from 161,000 to 179,000 – as the III. Corps under Gneisenau and other partisan units was causing major havoc on French rear – intercepting desperately needed supply trains and effectively reducing Napoleon’s forces as reinforcements were needed to secure the routes.
On June 23rd, the battle of Leipzig would occur between the Allied armies and the 179,000 troops of Napoleon. Always eager to drive a wedge in his opponents, Napoleon though outnumbered was the aggressor in the battle. Believing – with adequate evidence to back up such tactics – that if he could force heavy causalities upon the enemy that they would withdraw in disarray. The brunt of the assault would be launched against the Austrian army; which had barely repulsed the first wave, when a second more substantial wave supported by the Imperial Guard came. Distrusting the Austrian command, the Prussians, supported by the Russians had created a combined corps of roughly 30,000 that was used as a strategic reserve to support any army that needed the additional support.
As the Austrian front collapsed, the Russo-Prussian corps was ready and waiting for the French. What followed was the end of Napoleon’s attack and the beginning of the Allied counter attack. When the French saw the reserve corps, they prepared to charge, but were repulsed with heavy artillery fire and devastating accuracy of the elite riflemen. The end result of the battle of Leipzig left a clear impression who the dominant powers were, of Austria 76,000 available troops (about 3,000 reinforcements from the previous battle), she suffered 24,000 losses (wounded, killed, missing). Prussia, who had close to 100,000 troops available at Leipzig (9,000 reinforcements received) suffered 15,000 causalities (wounded, killed, missing). Russia, with 180,000 troops available, bore the brunt of the Allied losses, losing a staggering 33,000 wounded, killed or missing. Meanwhile, Napoleon’s force of 179,000 was reduced to a mere shell just above 110,000 troops. With the Allies left in charge of the field, Napoleon was last seen fleeing for Paris.
