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This series of articles is dedicated to Miguel de Cervantes in the 400th anniversary of the publication of his masterwork "Don Quixote de la Mancha" in 1605.

[size=+1]The battle of Lepanto[/size]
"La más grande ocasión que vieron los siglos" (The greatest event that the centuries have behold). Miguel de Cervantes.

The battle of Lepanto is one of the most famous naval battles of all times. Its importance and significance are highly debated. It is clearly the last great galley fight. To understand it we need some background information about "Galleys warfare". This article drinks from many sources, about 25% is originally mine, and the rest is copied (often literally) from several articles, some of them unsigned. Of the signed ones there are two articles by John F. Guilmartin, JR. (LT COL, USAF ret. Professor of History at Ohio State University), one from José R. Cumplido Muñoz (Professor of History at Universidad del Pais Vasco), one from Paul Fregosi, and another one from José Miguel Buján.

Here we will discuss what the battle meant and how it was won and lost. Although I hope this constitutes the most complete information that you can get without resorting to read specialized books on the battle, I am sure it will contain small mistakes that I hope you can forgive.

1. Galleys at battle

It is difficult for us to imagine how a battle between galleys was fought, since they have been gone for so long. But for over three thousand years, galleys were used to wage war in the Mediterranean. Galleys were designed to operate under low wind conditions in relatively calm waters during the April to November season. Although galleys were mixed sailing-rowing ships, they did not usually fight under sail, having even the masts unset during combat. Use of the sails would make impossible to keep the tight formations required in galley fights, and make them very vulnerable to enemy fire. In general their armament was frontal and they were extremely vulnerable to attacks from the rear and specially from the sides. To protect the vulnerable sides, galleys fought in tight linear formation. The command of the fleet was critical to face the enemy with the right formation, and to react quickly to the changing conditions of the battle. Once the formation was broken, the melee was quickly won by the side that had more maneuverable galleys or more galleys. Two aspects are very important: The formations required a very slow pace, so battle would only take place if both sides were willing to it. In fact it was common that one of the sides would signal to the other their readiness for combat, and the other would answer in the same fashion before the battle would start. The second one is that during the first phase of combat ship loses were limited since the galleys would present their strong fronts to each other, but once one of the sides gained a tactical advantage, the loses would exponentially mount on the losing side, as more and more galleys would face the fewer and fewer defenders. In general the winning side of a galley battle, had moderate loses, while the losing side had catastrophic loses. Many precedents over the centuries had showed this to be the case. For example, a Venetian fleet of 96 galleys was completely obliterated by a Genoese fleet of 94 galleys at Korcula (Curzola) in 1298, where Marco Polo was captured, while Genoa suffered very light loses. Under those conditions it was very common that one of the sides refused battle if they perceived a disadvantage. There was not much that the other side could do to force the battle.

01Formacion.jpg


Galleys entered combat in a tight line formation, that did not allow the enemie galleys to slip through the small gaps between galleys.
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Another very important factor that we have to take into account, are the peculiarities of galleys outside a battle. The ship hull was actually cheap compared to the human crew of a galley. And the human crew was a lot more than the rowing gang or ciurma (chusma in Spanish). Galleys were extremely crowded ships, that could transport a very limited amount of military personnel, food and water. They had a very limited range of action before they needed to resupply, even with support ships, and when in hostile territory, they usually depended on pillage and were tied to the coast for it. A galley could have between 150 to 250 oarsmen, that could be conscripted, recruited or taken as slaves, and a variable number of "land people" to do the fighting, men-at-arms and soldiers that were embarked when required. But the most important people in the galleys were the technicians or experts: pilots, rowing masters, masters-at-arms, gunners, boatswains and their mates, coopers, caulkers, carpenters, surgeons, and skilled seamen needed to make a war galley work.*Given the lack of long range fisheries in the Mediterranean, the galley experts were in limited supply. We will come to them when we discuss the consequences of the battle. Basically, the galleys were easy to replace, but the men were not. Moreover, the Mediterranean powers could put only so many galleys in commission. The ultimate limiting factor was not timber, money, or raw manpower, though all of those were important; rather, it was experts.

Fernand Braudel estimated that at the time of Lepanto a total of some 500-600 galleys were operating in the Mediterranean. This indicates that the level of resources committed at Lepanto was prodigious.*Lepanto saw about 206 Christian ordinary galleys against 230 Muslim ordinary galleys. This indicates that somewhere between 70% and 90% of all Mediterranean war galleys in existence met at Lepanto…and the totals do not include the big North African galliots that were nearly as large as a galley.
 
2. The ships

Galleys were in 1570 approaching the end of their usefulness. Their design had reached a dead end and they could not be improved. If their mobility was improved, then their armament had to be reduced, and viceversa. This was discussed by Leonardo da Vinci and the directing engineer of the Arsenal of Venice in several occasions, and the great genius could not come with any useful invention to solve what was an insoluble problem. In addition, during the sixteen century, the wage/price spiral was attacking the Mediterranean world from West to East, the Spanish had been forced progressively to abandon free, salaried oarsmen in favor of cheaper slaves and convicts. Venice would be next, and the Ottoman Empire last. The change implied an attendant loss in combat effectiveness and propulsive efficiency. Moreover, some forces were needed to guard the convicts during combat in the Spanish galleys, while the Venetian free oarsmen and the Ottoman volunteers where able not only of taking care of themselves, but also of a limited offensive capability. This also led to differences in galleys design and capabilities. Venetian galleys were still rowed "alla senzile", or one skilled oarsman per oar, while spanish galleys were rowed "a scalozzio", where 5 convicts pulled a single large oar.

01Modes.jpg


Venetian galleys were still rowed "alla senzile", one rower per oar, a versatile but more demanding method. The rest of the galleys were rowed "a scalozzio", with five rowers at each bigger oar, when the complement was complete.
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The Turkish Arsenal of Kasim Pasha, on the Galata shore beyond the Golden Horn, with its "hundred vaulted arches, each long enough for a galley to be built under cover", was one of the two great manufacturing centers in the known world. The building of war galleys for the Sultan was carried on there principally by renegades who had served their time as shipwrights in Venice or Naples. The methods of construction in daily use at the Arsenal of Kasim Pasha were sedulously copied - just as the Turkish fleet itself had been copied, detail by detail - from Venice. The world's other great industrial center at that time, where all those methods had been invented and perfected, was the Arsenal at Venice.

1473arsenal1.jpg


The Venetian Arsenal was the biggest and more efficient shipyard of the Renaissance, and the reason why Venice was capable of standing up to the Turks for three hundred years and seven wars.
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But despite the similitude in construction methods, in Lepanto there were important differences in the way in which the galleys of the various contingents were armed, referring both to armament and manning. The galleys which fought at Lepanto were armed not just with artillery, but with fighting manpower and oarsmen. Let's review them:

The galeass. In fact, it was exactly what its name - galeaza in Spanish, galee grosse in Veneto - implies, a big galley. The six Christian galeasses which fought at Lepanto - the Muslims had none - were Venetian merchant galleys which had been laid up in the Arsenal some years previously when rising operating costs, the consequence of a large crew, had made them economically non-viable. When hostilities broke out, the Arsenal naval engineer Bresano took advantage of their large and stable hulls, the product of merchant origins, to fit them out with a heavy artillery armament (while Venice had an adequate supply of good cannon, the Spanish, by contrast, seem to have been short of artillery). Each galeass carried five full cannons, equivalent to an ordinary galley's main centerline bow gun, plus enough lesser cannon to have provided the secondary and tertiary armament for five galleys, and then some. The "large galleys" performed better under sail than ordinary galleys; this was of little tactical significance. They were considerably harder to row, which was. While considerably slower under oars - they taxed their ciusmi badly - they could, if competently handled, maneuver effectively in support of a fleet of galleys. They were competently handled at Lepanto. It has to be said that the galeasses that participated in Lepanto had to be towed into the Gulf or they would have never arrived into battle on time.

02Galeaza.jpg


A galeass under sail with its three masts and the oars fixed in the upper position. Its fire power was impressive and its elevation and protection made them practically invulnerable to galleys, but the enemy had to be willing to approach them or they were useless.
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The galliot. galliots typically had eighteen banks of oars; ordinary galleys typically had 24 banks by 1570, and larger than ordinary galleys, or bastardas, could have as many as 35. Quicker, handier, and more maneuverable than the galley, the galliot was more lightly armed. Riding lower in the water, it was at a considerable disadvantage in a formal, head on clash between opposing squadrons in line abreast. galliots were highly effective in a melee and ideal for raiding, particularly inshore, amphibious operations. With their modest logistic and manpower requirements, they were much favored by the lightly populated North African corsairing principalities. Both sides used still smaller oared warships, frigates and bergantins, to feed reinforcements into the main battle line as well as for scouting and to protect the unengaged flanks and sterns of galleys locked up in the line of battle. North African galliots tended to be better armed and larger than their Christian opposites, and Muslim galliots of as many as 21 rowing banks, almost as large as a galley, were common.

03Galeota.jpg


Corsair galliots spread terror in the Italian and Spanish coasts. In battle they could only cause serious damage if they were able to reach the flanks of the galleys. This model has 16 benches, while galliots at Lepanto were almost as big as galleys.
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The lantern galley. A characteristically Mediterranean concept, the lantern galley was an exceptionally well armed galley, formally recognized as such. Often, but not always, larger than ordinary galleys, lantern galleys were named for their larger and elaborate stern lanterns, the Mediterranean symbol of tactical superiority and combat leadership par excellence. The equivalent term in broadside sailing warfare was "flagship," yet the two concepts are quite dissimilar. The nearest equivalent to "flagship" in Mediterranean terminology is not lantern galley, but capitana - roughly, the leader's ship - or real, a royal capitana. Each squadron and national contingent at Lepanto, however small, had its own capitana. Each such squadron also had a patrona, a vice capitana. Plainly, we are dealing with a concept quite different from that of flagship: The basic distinction inherent in the idea of a flagship is one of command. By contrast, the idea behind the lantern galley was leadership. An exceptionally well found and heavily armed galley, the lantern galley served as a focal point for tactical decision. Most lantern galleys at Lepanto were not flagships; most of the Christian capitanas and patronas, at least, were not lantern galleys. Based on solid evidence, we know that there were 25 or 26 lantern galleys among the 206 or so Christian galleys at Lepanto. Based on circumstantial, but nevertheless persuasive evidence, there were a bare minimum of 21 Muslim lantern galleys in the force of some 230 galleys and 70 galliots, and perhaps as many as 25 or 30. The tactical superiority of a lantern galley was achieved by a greater weight of men and metal, that at the same time made it harder to row, whether the hull was actually larger than that of an ordinary galley or not. The lantern galley therefore required more oarsmen. But more oarsmen meant more weight and more weight called for still more oarsmen, a vicious circle which could not be broken. It is worth noting that the Venetians, whose ciurmi were mostly free and salaried, had by far the lowest proportion of lantern galleys of any national contingent, only seven out of 108 as opposed to 14 out of 75 among the galleys of Spain and her Italian clients. With free oarsmen who were armed and expected to fight, there was less tactical benefit to be gained from a larger fighting complement.

04GaleraFanal.jpg


Lantern galleys were the heavy ships in the fleet. Besides them, the capitanas and patronas also displayed elaborated lanterns indicating the presence of command.
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The galley. The galleys were the backbone of the line of battle. All galleys carried a main centerline bow gun on a forward firing mount firing a cast-iron cannonball of from 40 to 50 pounds. This cannon was invariably flanked by a pair of smaller guns that fired projectiles weighing from 10 to 14 pounds. They were flanked, in turn, by a second pair of cannons which were smaller still, typically firing a five to eight pound ball. The Spanish cannons, on the whole, were longer and heavier than the norm; Venetian guns were shorter, lighter, and fired larger projectiles, both in absolute terms and per pound of barrel weight. Their technically superior artillery probably enabled the Venetians to dispense with a third pair of still smaller flanking pieces, frequently carried on ordinary galleys of the western Mediterranean, so as to lighten the ship with improved tactical mobility the benefit. All cannons were fixed to fire forward and could be trained in azimuth only by turning the ship. They were supplemented by numbers of small swivel guns, mostly mounted in the bows, though some were also mounted at the stern and along the sides of the ship.

05Cannon.jpg


In the Spanish galleys, the main gun was protected by the arrumbada over-deck, but its front loading limited very much the number of shots that could be fired in battle, frequently only one before the clash.
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Mediterranean war galleys fell, according to their design characteristics, into three basic categories: First, the galleys of Spain and her Italian client states (Western galleys), Venetian galleys, and Muslim galleys. In the Western galleys, the loss in combat effectiveness and propulsive efficiency due to forced oarsmen as a byproduct of socioeconomic reasons was counteracted by embarking increasing numbers of Spanish regular infantry. Her client states followed her lead for the same economic reasons. Spain's strategic posture in the Mediterranean was basically defensive. Her Muslim enemies attacked her port cities and raided her coasts; Spain reacted. The great expense of keeping a well-armed galley constantly in readiness during the campaigning season from late March through mid-October to combat the elusive and unpredictable Muslim raiders acted to keep the Spanish standing fleet small. The lack of numbers was balanced by a galley for galley superiority in raw combat power. The galleys of Spain and her allies carried more and better specialized fighting men than any others. The weight of men - some of whom had to be reserved to guard the servile ciusmi - made Spanish galleys harder to row, a problem exacerbated by the fact that Spanish cannons were generally longer and heavier than the equivalent products of the Venetian arsenal or the Ottoman Tophane. Further exacerbating the problem were constructional differences: The galleys of Spain and her Italian clients had acquired, by 1571, a permanent raised structure above the bow artillery, the arrumbada. This served as a platform from which covering fire could be directed to cover the assault of infantry onto the low-lying deck of an enemy galley. It was highly effective tactically. It also added weight, and added weight was the antithesis of speed under oars, speed which had to be developed at all costs in the crunch of battle. The Spanish and their allies accepted these deficiencies and played to their strong suit. By packing the rowing benches with slaves and convicts - Spanish galleys at Lepanto had 200 oarsmen for 24 banks of oars - acceleration and dash speed were maintained. The cost was in sustained rowing speed, in which Spanish galleys were admittedly inferior to those of their friends and enemies alike.

06GaleraEspanola.jpg


The Spanish galley was heavy, slow and powerful. In a frontal clash it had the advantage, but it was as susceptible to a flank attack as any other galley, and its low maneuverability made it very prone to find itself in that situation if the line was broken.
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The strategic posture of Venice, like that of Spain, was defensive. Here, the similarities ended. Venice depended more on diplomacy and on an extended chain of fortified ports to defend her commerce than on her small standing squadrons of galleys. Unlike Spain, she had no large force of first class regular infantry which could be used afloat and on land indifferently. What Venice did have was a small, but adequate, class of merchant sailors, fishermen, and coastal villagers who could be called upon to pull an oar in time of war. Skilled oarsmen and mariners, they were tough customers who could take care of themselves in a fight - if not exhausted from rowing. Where Spain's normal maritime posture was a wartime footing and her instrument a small force of: hard core regulars, Venice stood ready to shut down peaceful commerce in time of war in order to mobilize a sizeable force of ready reservists. This force of oarsman/sailor/soldiers was underwritten by the unmatched technical resources of the Venetian Arsenal. Using a small but highly skilled permanent workforce, the Arsenal built, stored, and maintained a large fleet of galleys, laid up in ordinary against the day on which war would break out. As a result, the tiny Venetian peacetime fleet could be expanded overnight into a formidable force, totally out of proportion to Venice's modest demographic resources.

Where the Spanish galley was little more than transportation for Spanish infantry, the Venetian galley was a combat assault transport, designed to bring men and supplies into a besieged port city, unopposed if possible, opposed if necessary. The emphasis was on speed under oars, an emphasis made necessary by Venice's lack of specialized fighting manpower and made possible by her continued use of free, fighting oarsmen. An important contributory factor was the lightness and excellence of Venetian ordnance. The result was an emphasis on speed under oars and gunnery - and Venetian gunners were the class of the Mediterranean. Where a head-on boarding fight was the preferred option for the Spanish galley captain and his squadron commander, it was the last resort for their Venetian opposites. This orientation was reflected in constructional details: Where the Spanish galley had a heavy permanent fighting platform above the main battery, the Venetian galley had a much lighter, removable one. It was not that the Venetians were unwilling or unable to have at it hand-to-hand; they could and did - upon occasion with gusto. It was simply that they were acutely aware of their shortage of manpower and felt, with considerable justification, that there were usually better ways to skin the tactical cat.

07GaleraVeneciana.jpg


The Venetian galley was an intermediate between the Spanish and Turkish galleys. Light and well armed, its main problem in battle was the shortage of heavy infantry to resolve the hand to hand fight.
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Where Venice and the Habsburg Empire were on the defensive in the sixteenth century Mediterranean, the House of Osman was on the attack. This, and the social and economic conditions prevailing in the Ottoman domains - for the wage/price spiral was less advanced than in the western Mediterranean - gave the Turkish galley its unique characteristics. If the Spanish galley was an infantry assault craft and the Venetian galley a tactical assault transport, the Turkish galley was an armed strategic landing craft.

Not as fast under oars as a Venetian galley, though probably a bit more maneuverable, the Turkish galley was a better sailing vessel. This was no accident. The dominant tactical function of the Venetian galley was the relief or resupply of a besieged fortified port; that of the Turkish galley was to transport men, munitions, guns, and supplies to the site of a siege and to protect them from interference once there. Designed for a strategic role which was palpably offensive, its tactical function was almost purely defensive. Most of its offensive punch stemmed, almost incidentally, from the characteristics of Ottoman society. The Turks and their North African allies were unique among European military establishments in possessing a sizeable corps of skilled archers who wielded their composite, recurved bows with awesome efficiency, a direct product of the delayed impact of the wage/price spiral in the East. Badly outclassing ordinary small arms in both range and precision, Turkish archery was particularly effective in a free-swinging melee where the flanks of hostile galleys were exposed. Like the Venetians, the Turks relied heavily on free oarsmen, although in Lepanto, a great number of Christian slaves pulled the oars, most of them probably in the corsair galleys and galliots, although the Turks had recently completed their oarsmen with villagers captured in the coasts of Dalmatia. While a conscripted Anatolian villager could hardly be considered the equal of a hardened Spanish infantryman, he at least did not need to be guarded in combat. Muslim capitanas and lantern galleys were apparently rowed mainly by volunteer Arabs, hard core light infantrymen who could be trusted to give a reasonable account of themselves in a close fight. The Janissaries, of whom there were a fair number at Lepanto, took a back seat to no one in skill or ferocity. In place of the Venetian removable fighting platform and the Spanish arrumbada, Turkish galleys seem to have had a low, permanent platform which covered only the forward portions of the bow guns, leaving the breeches exposed.

08GaleraTurca.jpg


The Turkish galley, of great quality, were the lightest and more maneuverable of all, but their low line put them in a clear disadvantage in a frontal clash. In a melee fight they had already demonstrated to rule uncontested.
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Lower in the water than the Christian galleys of the western Mediterranean, the Turkish galley had better sustained speed under oars and was considerably more maneuverable. Muslim galleys drew less water than either Venetian or Western galleys, a fact of considerable importance at Lepanto. Christian galleys were, on the whole, less maneuverable than their Muslim opposites, but they were more powerful tactically, particularly in a formal, head-on clash when arrayed in an unbroken line. This fact was well established; its recognition was implicit in each side's order of battle as we will see.
 
3. The nations at war

The Ottoman Empire and the North Africans: The events surrounding Sultan Selim II's decision to commit his empire to war with Venice over Cyprus are worth mentioned, since a peace treaty between the Ottoman Empire and Venice was in effect. The first edict of Selim "the Sot" when he took power in 1566 after the dead of Suleyman, was to make wine easily available. For a while Grand vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha managed the government. In 1568 he made a favorable treaty with the Habsburg emperor. While the Ottoman navy and their North African allies were helping the Morisco rebellion in Spain, Constantinople renewed its treaty with Venice in 1567, but then the mufti Abu'l Su'ud issued a fatwa decreeing that treaties could be broken to retake lands that had once been Muslim. A Portuguese Jew and financier, Joseph Nasi, who helped Selim against his brother Bayazet, had been made Duke of Naxos and given the monopoly on the Black Sea wine import. He kept a personal score against Venice, and persuaded Selim to attack Cyprus for its fine wine and gold ducats, and Sokollu's objections to taking on Venice were to no avail. Sokollu's rivals Lala Mustafa commanded the army and Piali Pasha the fleet. Nicosia was taken by 50,000 Ottomans in six weeks; but Farmagusta, the second fortress on Cyprus, held out for eleven months before surrendering.

01Selim2ascension.jpg


An Ottoman illustration showing the ascension of Selim II. Sokollu, officiating the ceremony, hid the death of Suleyman until Selim, the least worthy of Suleyman sons, could take command of the situation.
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Frustrated in their attempt to take Malta in 1565, the Turks retained the initiative. Nevertheless, they had sustained serious damage and needed several years to rebuild and make good their losses, particularly in oarsmen and azabs (irregular conscripted infantry). The decision to strike at Cyprus rather than to drive westward, attacking Spain in isolation (by Spain, I mean the Spanish Habsburg Empire and its Italian clients, notably Genoa and the Papal States) requires explanation. The usual hypothesis is that Selim and his advisors regarded Cyprus, rich in land and tax revenues and close to their logistical bases, as a particularly tempting target and reasoned that the numbers of galleys Venice would add to the fleet arrayed against them would be offset by the greater distance from Christian bases.*This logic was no doubt buttressed by confidence that the inter-allied frictions that had split the Christian alliance of 1537-40 would again work to the Turks' advantage.*Finally, Spain's effectiveness on the defensive in 1565 argued against a renewed strike at Malta, all the more so in that the great siege's outcome demonstrated that Spain and her allies had begun to make good the damage to their fleet sustained at Djerba in 1560.*

The operational characteristics of galleys and galley fleets during the period of our concern were not static, but were continually evolving.*A major area of change was the progressive increase in costs just mentioned, due partly to an increase in the numbers of galleys in commission and partly to growth in the size of galleys and their complements.*An important consequence of the increase in size of galley fleets, of individual galleys, and of their complements was a diminution in strategic radius of action.*Since complements increased more rapidly than hull size - the need for additional oarsmen to drive the larger hulls was the driving factor - the inevitable result was less stowage space per man for provisions, and above all water. We can only speculate about the degree to which the actors in our drama were aware of these changes, but in light of their generally high levels of tactical, operational, and strategic competence they surely understood their long term strategic ramifications.*For the Turks, it would have been logical to conclude that their galley fleet was near the apex of its tactical power and strategic utility.*

02Selim2.jpg


Selim II was the first of a long list of useless Ottoman sultans that have prompted some historians to especulate that the House of Osman was secretly substituted after Suleyman. Actually genetics tells us that Suleyman himself had very few genes left from Osman, and Mehmet III, his grand-grandson was three quarters Venetian, one eighth slavic and the remaining eighth a mixture of many things.
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The consequences of Khaireddin Barbarossa's victory over Andrea Doria at Prevesa in 1538 gave clear indications of what that utility might be. Tactically, Prevesa was anything but a crushing victory; indeed, in terms of numbers of men and vessels lost, it was little more than a skirmish. Strategically, it was decisive. By forcing Venice from the Christian alliance, it gave the Turks a favorable balance of power, a balance made more favorable still by the Turks' on-again, off-again alliance with France. Ottoman galley fleets and squadrons routinely cruised the western Mediterranean in the 1540s and '50s, raiding as far west as the Balerics and effectively linking the Ottomans' North African dependencies to Constantinople. Still, Venice remained strong and a potential threat, if only defensively. Of equal importance, the Spanish still possessed powerful galley squadrons and reserves of superb professional infantry. If the Spanish could not prevent systemic raiding wherever the Turks chose to raid, they could - even in the aftermath of a crippling loss of skilled manpower at Djerba - frustrate attempts at territorial conquest… the very point of the siege of Malta. It surely did not escape the notice of Muslim, or for that matter Christian, observers that the strategic balance would have been more favorable still to the Turks had either the Spanish or Venetian galley fleet been eliminated.*

It is a possibility that the Ottomans might have considered that by forcing an alliance between Spain and Venice they could precipitate a decisive fleet engagement in which they could eliminate both enemy fleets at once, clearing the board of opposition. It is important to remember in this context that galley fights, once joined, tended to extreme outcomes unless the losing side could take refuge against a friendly shore. Djerba had demonstrated on a large scale what a host of lesser galley fights had already shown, that winners tended to come off with very light losses while losers were nearly obliterated.

03ottomans.jpg


Distance and resources differences meant that Cyprus was irrecoverable. The question to settle was the naval supremacy in the Mediterranean and the safety of Venice, Italy and Spain that were under threat.
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This brings us to the question of the Turks' strategy. If, in fact, their primary goal was territorial conquest, history should have suggested to them that all they needed to do was to frustrate attempts to relieve Famagusta - by the autumn of 1570 the only remaining Venetian position on Cyprus - and avoid a major confrontation with the Christian fleet. Denied the opportunity to inflict a sharp defeat on the Turks in order to secure a more favorable peace, the Venetians would surely, as in 1539, lose patience with their allies. Under severe economic pressure with their access to the sources of trade blocked, Venice would then conclude a separate peace. Recall that Christian losses at Prevesa were minor; what split the alliance was Venetian realization that there was no further hope of bringing Barbarossa to battle.*

That, however, is not what the Turks did. They sent their fleet west in full force the following spring. Moreover, after touching briefly at Cyprus to drop off reinforcements for the siege of Famagusta, Müezzenzade Ali, Kapudan Pasha (admiral) of the Turkish fleet, received unequivocal orders from Sultan Selim II to engage the Christian fleet in battle. The logical supposition is that Selim II's objectives encompassed more than Cyprus alone. In fact Famagusta surrendered in August, two months before the battle, a fact known to both sides before the battle started.

The Holy League: In 1566 Pope St. Pius V began forming "The Holy League" in order, "to act against the Ottoman power and for all Christian princes to fight and exterminate them". Eventually, the Papacy and Venice were joined by Spain, Milan, Sardinia, Naples, Sicily, Tuscany, Ferrara, Parma, Mantua, Urbino and Genoa. Spain, Venice and Rome were the key members of this alliance, solemnized in the Vatican on May 25, 1571. Each had unique goals they hoped to accomplish by joining. Venice was mostly concerned with the recovery of Cyprus, King Philip looked westward, hoping to wipe out the Barbary pirates in north Africa, while the Pope was committed, not just to driving every Muslim out of the Mediterranean, but from Constantinople as well. The Holy League was signed for twelve years and it was decided that a big fleet would be gathered, since it could advance everybody's goals. The Venetians refused to fight under command from the Genoese Gian Andrea Doria, the main Spanish fleet admiral, so Philip proposed his half brother Don Juan de Austria, a young man of talent, but with only four years of sea command, as chief commander of the fleet. Since Philip was providing half of the total cost of the League, it was accepted. Nevertheless, in that short time, the 25 year old son of King Charles and a German courtesan, had gained the respect from all, and there were no dissenting voices to his appointment.

04CossaliRosario.jpg


The Madonna dei Rosario, by Grazio Cossali, painted in 1597 that can be seen in the church of the Santa Croce in Bosco Marengo (Alessandria, Italia), from where Pius V was native. The painting shows Our Lady of the Rosary, to whom victory was adjudicated, flanked by Saint Domingo of Guzmán (introductor of the rosary during the Albigensis crusade) and Saint Catalina of Siena. Cardinal Bonelli and the members of the league, Saint Pius V, king Felipe of Spain and Doge Alvise Mocenigo of Venice receive the grace of victory. The flag waved carries the coats of arms of the three states.
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The divergence of objectives within the component States of the Holy League was sharp and barely reconcilable, a fact which was founded in economic reality and reflected in tactical objectives. Venice wanted a short war and a quick peace, something which good Spaniards considered almost treasonable. War with the Turk had cut Venice's commercial lifeline to the East and fleet mobilization had gutted her workforce. With her fishermen, farmers, and merchant sailors serving afloat as oarsmen, mariners, and fighting men, Venetian commerce ground to a halt - and Venice lived on commerce. Sebastian Venier, the Venetian Capitano Generale de Mar, wanted a major fleet engagement in the worst way; but he wanted it for anything but the proper reasons.

Mediterranean commerce meant little to Spain. Spain's vital trade with America was well out of the line of fire and Spanish commanders in the Mediterranean saw themselves as soldiers in an unending holy war with the Turk, a view shared by the Pope. The pressures on Spain were therefore more narrowly fiscal and military than those on Venice. Already saddled with as large a standing peacetime galley force as she could support, Spain found her naval obligations to the Holy Alliance to be modest expansion in an already large military budget. As long as strategic gains in captured port cities and destroyed Muslim forces justified the expense, Spain was content to keep fighting - and keeping the Turks at bay in the Eastern Mediterranean, far from his North African and Spanish Morisco allies, justified a great deal.

05felipe2SanchezCoello.jpg


Felipe II could afford to dedicate some effort to contain the Turks and to pacify the Mediterranean, but his main worry were already the Low Countries. Many voices claimed in Spain against the expense that the Holy League carried, and the financing of the interests of the Venetian enemy. Venice was the only Italian state not submitted to Spain and was famous for not being reliable. But the Prudent King never took any decision without meditating its consequences, and he finally decided that the Turkish menace could not be left at his back unchecked.
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The objectives of Spain's Italian client states - which is almost, but not quite, to say the objectives of Genoa and Gian Andrea Doria - were something else again. Genoa, like Venice, depended heavily on commerce. Forced largely to abandon her commercial outposts in the Eastern Mediterranean after centuries of bitter conflict with Venice, Genoa still traded in the Ottoman domains. But where Venice depended upon a monopoly of specified low bulk, high value, luxury trades, the Genoese competitive edge was more a matter of efficiency in hauling bulk cargos. This gave the Genoese considerably greater latitude in negotiations with the Turks; there are indications, for example, that Genoese merchants had provided the Tophane, the Ottoman Arsenal, with much of its bronze for cannon founding. But Genoa was also firmly within the economic and political orbit of the Spanish Habsburgs.

Characteristically, then, Genoa's main naval contribution to the Holy Alliance was in the form of 11 galleys under Gian Andrea Doria, serving under a thoroughly commercial and highly remunerative personal contract to the Spanish Crown. Not only were Doria and his fellow condottieri well paid for their trouble on a galley per month basis (each of Doria's galleys cost Spain a third more than an equivalent Spanish vessel), they were pulling down a 14 percent annual rate of interest on the money which Philip II had borrowed from them to purchase their services! It is not entirely unreasonable to assume, as the Venetians did, that Doria had little interest in coming to hand strokes with the Ottoman forces. As the shipowner of his galleys, Doria was anxious to keep his ships intact.

Mass defection of the ships of one ally or another in mid-battle was therefore a real possibility which the Spanish commander of the fleet, Don Juan de Austria, had to guard against.

06JuandeAustria.jpg


Don Juan de Austria. Undisputed leader of the Holy League fleet, and main producer of the victory.
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Just over half of the galleys in the combined Christian fleet which fought at Lepanto were Venetian, some 108 out of 206 or roughly 52 percent. Spain and her Viceroyalties of Naples and Sicily contributed 49 galleys, about 24 percent. Gian Andrea Doria had 11 galleys in his own squadron, 5 percent, while Genoa, Savoy, and the lesser Italian naval entrepreneurs accounted for another 23, another 12 percent, although they were paid for by Spain. The Papal contingent put 12 galleys on line and the Knights of St. John of Malta 3, or 7 percent between them.

These percentages are only roughly indicative of combat power. They do not, for example, include galliots and other, lesser oared fighting craft. They do not include the six Venetian galeasses, nor do they take into account the considerable differences in manning between the galleys of the various contingents. Nevertheless, galleys formed the main battle line, and each of the galleys included in our computations occupied a place there. Preservation of the tactical integrity of the line was absolutely vital to the Christian cause.

Other nations stance: England, under Protestant Elizabeth, of course had no part in the Holy League, although her Catholic half-brother (another of Henry's bastards) commanded three ships. France not only refused to join the coalition of the willing, but tried to sabotage it, for familiar reasons. When the Pope appealed to him in a personal letter, King Charles IX of France sent a cold, brief and negative reply. To offset this, the Knights of Malta - so many of whom were Frenchmen - were in the League heart and soul. Geographically France of all the Mediterranean powers was the least menaced by Turkish aggression, and had seized the opportunity of trading with some of the markets in the Levant temporarily lost to Venice. The Sultan's principal European enemies-Spain and the Holy Roman Empire-were the two of France's neighbours which she thought of as standing in the way of her territorial expansion. The Spanish ambassador in Paris sent a warning to King Philip that "here in France, everyone is doing his best to prevent the League from taking place. I would not be surprised if next year they do not offer Toulon to the Turks." If you think this is too much, you should know that in 1543 Khair ad-Din Barbarossa, Kapudan Pasha of the Ottoman fleet, after ravaging Naples and Sicily, with a fleet of 100 galleys, anchored in Toulon. There he met the French fleet under command of the Duke of Enghien, and under Francis I instructions, they went to attack Nice who was held by the Emperor's ally, the Duke of Savoy. The city surrendered and was sacked. But the citadel held out, until it was relieved by the approach of del Guasto by land and of Andrea Doria by sea. Barbarossa returned to winter at Toulon, where throughout the winter Christian slaves were openly sold. As the Duke of Alba told King Philip of Spain, the French "would be happy to lose one eye, if we lost two." After the battle, "The response of the nominally Catholic King of France to the great victory was secretly to offer Turkish Grand Vizier Sokollu a firm alliance against Spain... "

07turktoulon.jpg


The city of Toulon (France) in an Ottoman illustration. They clearly knew it very well. The sailing galleys carry the Turkish flag.
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In besieged Leyden, Dutch Calvinists there who followed the Prince of Orange wore little brass crescents in their caps. The Protestants of northern Europe were quite content with the help that the Muslims were giving in crushing Catholicism, as expressed by the Dutch slogan, "Liever Turk dans Paus" (Better Turk than Papist). But though excommunicated by the old Pope as a heretic and treated by him as a usurper, Elizabeth of England showed greater political penetration. For her, Lepanto was not so much a victory for Spain or the Pope as a triumph for all Christendom - a guarantee that the values upon which Western Europe had been established would survive. To show exactly what she thought, the Church of England which she had established by law was ordered to hold services of thanksgiving."

The French and Dutch also sold supplies to the Sultan for rebuilding his fleet after the battle. Venice signed a disadvantageous treaty with Constantinople and agreed to pay tribute in return for being allowed to resume its Eastern trade. In fact, the tribute was far less than the cost of maintaining its fleet on a war footing. Turkey, too, was short of cash. And Spain also had money problems to keep both the Low Countries operations and the Mediterranean fleet in operation.
 
4. The gathering of forces

The port selected as meeting point for all the Holy League ships was Messina, in Sicily, where Don Juan de Austria arrived on August 23, barely a week after the martyrdom of Bragadino, of which no one in Christendom yet knew anything. News travelled slowly in the days of sails and oars. It took a galley six weeks to cross the Mediterranean, from Constantinople to Tangiers. The fall of Famagusta and the atrocious death of the city's governor were still unknown in Christian ranks. Don Juan arrived with his naval counselor, Don Luis de Requesens. In Lepanto, Ali Pasha heard of the gathering of the ships against him from Uluj Ali (Occhiali in Italian, Luchalí in Spanish), the foremost Algerian corsair. Uluj did not believe the Christians would sail until next spring, he told Ali Pasha. But he was wrong. Ali Pasha and Don John would soon meet, for the first and last time in the Gulf of Lepanto (now Gulf of Patras), for the biggest naval battle of all times since Actium in 31 BC.

09Fleetmovement.jpg


Fleet movements before the battle of Lepanto. Christian fleet movements prior to the general assembly at Messina are shown as dashed red lines. The Venetians sent three fleets to Messina (only two shown), one from Venice, another under provveditore Barbarigo from Corfu and the third, commanded by Capitano generale Veniero from Crete. They manage to avoid no less than four Turkish and corsair fleets (one showed in green). The main one comanded by Pertev Pasha, that dropped reinforcements at Cyprus and proceed to join with the smaller fleet of Müezzinzade Ali Pasha, who came from Constantinople. The fleet of Uluj Ali was the one that devastated Crete and Corfu before joining the others in attacking the Dalmatian coast up to Zara. The fleet of Kara Hodja attacked Friuli, and his cannons could be heard from Venice. The Papal fleet under command of Marcantonio Colonna went from Pisa to Naples to embark papal soldiers, and then Messina. The Spanish fleet was also formed by three contingents, the one from Spain assembled at Barcelona under command of Don Juan, the one from Naples under command of Alvaro de Bazán, and the one from Sicily, commanded by Juan de Cardona. Bazán waited for Don Juan, and they arrived last to Messina. The joint Holy League fleet proceed then to Corfu, while the joint Ottoman fleet had already retired to Lepanto after attacking Corfu once more.
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The ships were arriving to Messina. The Venetian fleet was the first to arrive in June, under the command of a 75-year-old fire-brand, Sebastiano Veniero, with the redoubtable Agostino Barbarigo as his second-in-command. The Venetians contributed 140 ships, of which 104 galleys, 6 galeasses, and 20 brigantines. Of the galleys, 54 were from Venice, 30 from Crete, 7 from Ionia, 8 from Dalmatia and 5 from Terraferma. Every day some fresh reinforcement arrived.*The Duke of Savoy sent 3 galleys under Andrea Provanna. Cosimo de' Medici, newly invested Grand Duke of Tuscany by the Pope, made his contribution of 12 galleys manned by the knights of his new naval order of St. Stephen at the service of the Pope and under command of the quiet and competent Marcantonio Colonna, of an old Roman aristocratic family, second in rank in the fleet. The Pope's feudatories the Dukes of Ferrara, Parma and Urbino, and the republic of Genoa and Lucca equipped 20 galleys, to be added to the 11 of Gian Andrea Doria own squadron all under Spanish banner. The Knights of St. John sent 3 galleys. The last to arrive by the end of August was Don Juan, with 49 galleys, of wich 11 came from Spain and 38 from Naples and Sicily. He was accompanied by two Spanish admirals Don Alvaro de Bazan and Don Juan de Cardona

01FlotaMessina.jpg


The fleet assembled at Messina a lot later that agreed. Cardinal Bonelli, grand-nephew of pope Pius V, found difficulties to convince Felipe II to join the League, and the constitution took place at the end of May. Venetians were ready to start operations in June, but the Spaniards did not finish arriving until the end of August, in principle too late to start operations before winter, as Uluch Ali thought. But Don Juan was a man of action and in only three weeks was ready to take to sea.
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By banners, or funders, the ships were: 104 Venetian galleys (140 ships), 83 Spanish galleys (154 ships), 12 Papal galleys (18 ships) and 3 Maltese galleys (8 ships). For a total of about 300 ships, of which 202 were galleys.

The men were 13,000 sailors, 43,000 oarsmen and 31,000 soldiers. Of this, 20,000 were at the service of Spain (8,000 Spaniards from the Tercios, 5,000 Germans, and 7,000 Italians), 8,000 at the service of Venice, 2,000 at the service of the Pope, and 1,000 volunteers from all over Europe. Some of them armed at the expense of French and English gentlemen that wished to participate in the enterprise, formed the "Squadron of adventurers" and were entrusted by Don Juan to Vincenzo Marullo, count of Condojanni, owner of one of the Sicilian galleys under Spanish banner. Since the Venetian galleys were undermanned in soldiers, about 5,000 soldiers at the service of Spain went to them, while 6,000 more were to be embarked in Corfu.

03AlvaroBazan.jpg


Don Alvaro de Bazán, Marquis of Santa Cruz. On command of the 30 galleys reserve, his cold mind and courage were decisive for the victory.
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Upon news of the assembly of a Christian fleet in Messina, Selim II assembled all his ships from the Cyprus campaign under command of his Kapudan Pasha, the young Müezzinzade Ali Pasha. He was reinforced by two fleets one leaded by the experienced bey of Cairo, Mehmet Suluk (known as Scirocco), and the other was the Corsair fleet of the Bey of Algiers, Uluj Ali, who brought the news of the Christian fleet and his opinion that they would not be ready before spring. Uluj Ali merits especial mention: Luca Galeni was a fisherman from Calabria that was studying to become a priest when he was enslaved during a corsair raid in 1536. A man of extraordinary talent, he soon rose between the slave oarsmen of a corsair ship to the first bench at the bow, being responsible for giving the rhythm of rowing. To obtain his freedom, he converted to Islam, and soon he demonstrated such abilities that he was made responsible for a corsair ship. He was known to the Italians as Occhiali, and in Spain as Luchalí, for his muslim name Uluj (renegade) Ali (he is also found as Euldj or Uluch). He served under the famous corsair Dragut, and won a well deserved reputation for his extreme cruelty and hatred for Christians. But in addition to a formidable seaman, he was also an extraordinary administrator and diplomat, and in 1568 Suleyman made him Beilerbey (Governor) of Algiers. His name instilled fear in the Christians of all the Mediterranean from the coasts of Spain to Crete. After the battle of Lepanto he was congratulated and made Kapudan Pasha (admiral) of the new Ottoman fleet. He was also given the new name of Kilij (Sword) Ali. If you can read French, you can enjoy his amazing novelled biography by Paul Mombelli: "Autobiographie du dernier roi barbaresque d'Alger". It includes his view of the battle of Lepanto in chapter 44. The book is extremely well documented, and it also highlights the strong ties of France with the North African corsairs and the Ottoman Empire.

04ochiali.jpg


Uluj Alí in an illustration for Paul Mombelli's book. If something must be highlighted in the battle of Lepanto was the excellence of command in both sides. The best naval commanders of the Mediterranean had an appointment on October 7, 1571, to settle its domination. The Ottoman chief Admiral (Kapudan Pasha) was Müezzinzade Alí, and under his command were admirals Pertev Pasha, Piali Pasha, Mehmet Saiderbey and Mustafa Esdri. The Barbary contingent was under command of Uluj Alí and Kara Hodja, and was formed by famous corsairs like Caur Alí, Piali Murad and Murat Reis, while the Egyptian contingent was under command of Mehmet Suluk Sirocco.
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Uluj Ali is also mentioned in The Quixote, where Cervantes writes about his own experiences as a captive in Alger: [Finally the fleet returned victorious and triumphant to Constantinople, and a few months later died my master, the Uchali, otherwise Uchali Fartax, which means in Turkish "the scabby renegade;" for that he was; it is the practice with the Turks to name people from some defect or virtue they may possess; the reason being that there are among them only four surnames belonging to families tracing their descent from the Ottoman house, and the others, as I have said, take their names and surnames either from bodily blemishes or moral qualities. This "scabby one" rowed at the oar as a slave of the Grand Signor's for fourteen years, and when over thirty-four years of age, in resentment at having been struck by a Turk while at the oar, turned renegade and renounced his faith in order to be able to revenge himself; and such was his valour that, without owing his advancement to the base ways and means by which most favourites of the Grand Signor rise to power, he came to be king of Algiers, and afterwards general-on-sea, which is the third place of trust in the realm.] El Quixote de la Mancha, chapter XL.

Ali Pasha had under his command a larger fleet than Don Juan. In addition to 230 galleys, they had 70 large Corsair galliots and quite a few smaller ships and supply vassels to over 400 ships total. On that fleet they had a similar number of sailors 13,000, 45,000 oarsmen and 34,000 soldiers, of which a fair number (between 3,000 and 7,000) were the feared janissaries, the christian children brought up as elite fighters for islam, armed with arquebuses.

The Turks and their North African allies had few firearms, but that was more than compensated by their sizeable corps of skilled archers who wielded their composite, recurved bows with awesome efficiency, a direct product of the delayed impact of the wage/price spiral in the East. Badly outclassing ordinary small arms in both range and precision, Turkish archery was particularly effective in a free-swinging melee where the flanks of hostile galleys were exposed. The Turks were however outclassed in artillery pieces, 1850 Christian ones for their 750, and this they could not compensate.

05Famagustaconquest.jpg


The conquest of Famagusta. Extraordinarily well fortified, Famagusta resisted for almost one year against tremendously superior forces, and only surrendered due to the shortness of food, water and ammunitions, after the defenders ate all the animals present in the city. The resistance of Cipriots and Venetians, that rebuilt the walls with the fragments produced by cannon shots, was as epic as the defense of Constantinople. In this Turkish picture we can see the Janissaries at the right with their arquebusses, and the cavalry (Sipahi) that is disembarked from a galley at the left.
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On the summer, the Ottoman fleet had dropped reinforcements in Cyprus, and then proceeded to attack the coastal towns of Dalmatia, where they completed their oarsmen complement with captured slaves. On the way back to their base in Lepanto they attacked Corfu unsuccessfully. The Turkish flagship Sultana flew a green silk Sufi standard taken from Baghdad by Suleiman the Magnificent, decorated with a white crescent, quotations from the Koran, and the names of Mohammed and his successors, among which was carefully inserted the name of the founder of the Othman dynasty. For both sides it was going to be a clash not only of nations and civilizations, but also of religions.

06BannerLeague.jpg


The Holy League banner, with its crucifix and the coats of arms of the Pope, Spain and Venice. The Holy League was signed for 12 years, but held only two.
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To Mesina arrived a bishop with the Pope's indulgences for the crusaders and a blue banner decorated with a crucifix, the Holy Virgin of Guadalupe and the arms of Spain, the Pope and Venice. On September 16, the Holy League fleet departed Messina and in ten days crossed the Adriatic arriving to Corfu. There they received bad news. The Turkish had attacked Corfu twelve days before and the 6,000 Venetian troops were no longer available. Some Turkish prisoners told them that the Turkish fleet was composed of 160 galleys, but they did not believe it could be so big. The next stop was in enemy territory, in Igoumenitza, at the coast of Albania to refill the water reserves. A couple of incidents there reveal the rivalry and enmity of the Christian commanders. Don Juan gave orders to inspect all the ships, but when Gian Andrea Doria attempted to board the capitana of Sebastiano Veniero, he stop him under threat of hanging him if he set foot on his ship. Don Juan, conciliatory, sent Marcantonio Colonna instead. But the old Venetian admiral would still provoke a new incident when he hanged a Neapolitan captain, Mucio de Cortona, and three of his men after a fight with some Venetians, when Mucio, at the service of Spain, challenged his authority over him. When Don Juan learned that they were hanged without giving them religious confession, he was about to hang Veniero, but finally, upon requests from Barbarigo and Colonna, decided not to do it since it would have broken the League. But he forbade Veniero from setting foot on the Real, and designated Barbarigo as the Venetian liaison.

Don Juan had sent out Spanish commander Juan Gil de Andrade with four fast galleys to discover where Ali Pasha's fleet was. He found they had been recently in one of the Ionian islands and reported back on September 28 that they had returned to Lepanto for the winter. The war council assembled at the Real. Requesens and Gian Andrea Doria advised against presenting battle, but Don Juan cut them abruptly: "Gentlemen, this is not the time for debates, but for combat".

07Route.jpg


After crossing the Adriatic and stopping in Corfu and the Albanian coast, the Christian fleet went South between the islands of Ithaca and Cephalonia, anchoring at the last one. Once it was found out about the enemy, the fleet went to the Northeast to fix the inshore wing to the coast, as it had been decided in Messina, and then went South following the coast to encounter the enemy. Despite the coast being enemy controlled, the Christians did not want to meet the enemy fleet at any distance from it.
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The last stop was in Cephalonia, on October 5, where they got news from a Venetian vessel that Famagusta had fallen two months ago, and all soldiers captured had been enslaved, while the officers had been slain. Particularly cruel was the death of the heroic commander Marcantonio Bragadino, that for so long resisted the Turkish forces. After honorably surrendering to Lala Mustafa on terms of their release, the Turkish chief commander had his pride hurt, because a few hundred badly equipped Venetians were able to inflict so much damage and resist for so long to his army of 200,000 Ottoman soldiers. So he did not keep the terms of the surrender. Bragadino was tortured, and had his nose and ears cut; all his officials were decapitated. After two weeks of torture and while still alive Bragadino was flayed and dismembered, his skin filled with straw and paraded in Famagusta over a cow. This news filled not only the Venetians, but all soldiers with rage and desiree to avenge him. Lala Pasha took the skin and the heads to Constantinople as a trophy, but the skin was later stolen by a Veronese and it was returned to Bragadino's sons in Venice. This is the only remain of Marcantonio Bragadino that is buried at his niche at the Church of Santi Giovanni e Paolo, as was officially attested in 1961.

08brutalidadturca.jpg


The Turkish brutality instilled terror and hatred in the Christians. The only Christian prince that decided to imitate their methods, Vlad Tepel Dracul of Wallachia, got his name tainted for all eternity.
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That night, the Algerian Corsair Kara Hodja (Black eyes) infiltrated the Christian fleet with his fast galliots painted in black to count the galleys, but for unknown reasons he reported to Ali Pasha that the Christians had only 150 galleys. Before the battle, both sides underestimated the enemy strength, a factor that probably was decissive in the battle taking place.

On the early morning of October 7 the Christian fleet entered the gulf of Patras, known then as the Gulf of Lepanto for the big Venetian fortress then in Turkish hands. Don Juan soon received news that he would fight the Turkish fleet that day. The soldiers and sailors all went to mass. Every galley had a chaplain, sometimes two, from the Dominicans or Franciscans, since the Jesuits had been turned down by the Spaniards.
 
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5. Battle tactics

After his arrival to Messina, Don Juan de Austria took a week to carefully inspect his forces. He was unhappy with the state of many of the Venetian galleys, on storage for too long without proper maintenance. But the only thing he could do was to reinforce the Venetian galleys with Spanish troops, since the Venetians were very short on soldiers. Basically all the Holy League galleys were short on oarsmen, to the point that on many oars that required five men, only three were available.

Both sides knew very well the strong and weak points of the enemy, and both Don Juan and Ali Pasha made the best tactical use of their forces long before the battle started. On September 9, a week before their departure, Don Juan had already established his marching order, and the disposition of the galleys was almost identical to their position in battle a month later. That disposition could not be farther from a random distribution of galleys and indicates that Don Juan and the Christian command had already decided how they wanted to present battle. Don Juan had several tactical problems to solve. The first problem was to distribute the forces of several nations that were already at odds with each other, and that had different agendas. Mass defection in mid-battle of a national contingent was one of the fears he had in mind. To prevent it he disposed that all the galleys from the different nations will be mixed in the line of battle, and that the capitanas from Venice, commanded by Sebastiano Veniero, and from Papal States commanded by Marcantonio Colonna would flank his Real at the left and right respectively, fighting within close view.

The other problem that Don Juan had to solve was to reduce the importance of the inherent lower maneuverability of the Christian galleys, and specially of the Western (Spanish) galleys and the bigger lantern galleys, while he had to play their intrinsic tactical advantage on a head-on fight. Don Juan ordered his fleet in the traditional four divisions: a center - the "main battle" - plus left and right wings and a reserve. The organization into four squadrons, observed by both sides, was dictated by the inherent limitations of galleys and galley fleets. The symmetrical nature of the Muslim and Christian dispositions as stated in raw numbers are evidence of this.

Each of the Christian wings on the day of battle had 53 galleys; this represented the maximum number of galleys which could maneuver in a line abreast without losing formation integrity. The Muslim right wing had 54 galleys, probably for the same reason. The Muslim left had no less than 87 galleys, but there is reason to believe that they were intended to turn the Christian flank individually, catch-as-catch-can, with no pretense at formation keeping.

The Christian center, with less need to maneuver than the wings, numbered 62 galleys, an arrangement mirrored by the Muslim center which had 61 galleys on line. Don Juan's reserve squadron had 30 galleys - apparently those left over after putting the largest number of galleys on line which was tactically feasible. Both Don Juan and Müezzinzade Ali Pasha based their tactical plans on a center of some 61 or 62 galleys flanked by covering squadrons of marginally smaller size. But where Don Juan concentrated his remaining galleys in a reserve squadron behind the main battle line as a defensive "stopper," Müezzinzade Ali Pasha, with more galleys under his command, kept a reserve of 32 big galliots and gave the bulk of the remaining Muslim galleys to his left wing commander, Uluj Ali, a master of maneuver, with the evident hope of using their superior numbers and maneuverability to turn the Christian flank.

01OrdenMarcha.jpg


The order of march, preserved at el Escorial, has demonstrated to reserchers that Don Juan knew very well the type of battle that he was going to fight a full month before it took place, and that his tactic comprehension of his own and his adversary strenghs and weaknesses was complete. The data also indicates that the enemy had a similar level of competence, if not superior given his past victories.
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Don Juan had decided in Messina to keep the left wing to the shore, and his main worry was to avoid the muslims to outflank his wings and turn the battle into a melee that would quickly resolve in their favor. As long as his wings could maintain the line of battle, his center of battle would eventually be able to grind down and overcome the lower, less strong muslim galleys. The fastest more maneuverable galleys were therefore assigned to the left wing under command of Agustino Barbarigo, who received mostly Venetian galleys, and the few Western galleys and lantern galleys under his command were assigned by Don Juan a position at the inner-side of the left wing. Clearly the lighter swallower galleys of Mehmet Suluk, who knew the coast, were going to try to outflank the Christian left wing by keeping close to the shore, and Barbarigo's role was a difficult one, to prevent it from happening.

In contrast to the left, the internal arrangement of the Christian right, under command of Gian Andrea Doria was symmetrical. As was the reserve force under command of Alvaro de Bazán. But the center of the battle was as asymmetrical as the left wing, with the highest mobility to the left, and the heaviest galleys to the right. Juan de Cardona commanded seven fast galleys in the vanguard, with reconnaissance functions and to assist wherever needed. Don Juan, clearly signaled his intention of fighting only in a well ordered line by ordering the projecting "spurs" cut off the bows of the Christian galleys so that their cannon could be depressed to bear down on the lower lying Muslim craft at the shortest possible range. The "spurs," used to break down the enemy rowing frame and then serve as a boarding bridge in a flank attack, clearly had little value in the sort of fight which he had in mind.

For the Muslims, the problem was almost insuperable. A melee, of course, was their forte. Give them a chance to catch the Christian fleet in disorder and they would have it for breakfast, as they had a Prevesa in 1538 when the great Barbarossa outmaneuvered Andrea Doria the Elder in a brilliant game of logistic bluff and at Djerba in 1560 when Piali Pasha had caught the younger Doria with his pants down. But against a commander of Don Juan's competence, this was nothing to bank on. Any partial engagement would surely tilt toward the heavier Christian galleys so long as they held formation. It was therefore all or nothing. Müezzinzade Ali Pasha would have to plan for a full, frontal clash knowing that his center would fight at a serious disadvantage.

To get at the Christian center, therefore, Müezzinzade Ali Pasha would first have to dispose of the Christian wings. This meant that he would have to suck them out of position, to turn their flanks, or to maneuver them so badly as to destroy their tactical integrity and produce a melee - for the Muslim squadrons would suffer the same tactical disadvantages in a head on clash on the wings as they would in the center, He would have to quickly eliminate at least one Christian wing as a tactical factor, for his center could not be expected to hold for long.

With this in mind, his basic plan is clear. He knew that he would take grievous losses in the center, yet he had to give his wings a solid base on which to maneuver. He possessed, in addition, an advantage over Don Juan in that he could allow his wings to run on a comparatively loose rein. The powers of maneuver of the Muslim flanking squadrons were undoubtedly superior to their Christian opposites, even if the Venetian galleys were individually faster. So Müezzinzade Ali Pasha backed up the galleys of his center with no less than 8 galleys and 24 galliots under command of Murat Dragut, to feed in reinforcements - attrition fillers in the antiseptic terminology of modern war. These would give the center a degree of organic close-in, flank protection in addition to that provided by the small reserve squadron so that the wings could run more freely still.

02Lepanto.jpg


The battle representations, like this one at the Vatican, are usually very inexact. In this one the scale of the terrain is several times smaller that the scale of the fleets, it shows the Christian fleet in a disposition that never achieved, and the Turkish fleet with the four squadrons in line. This is due to an attempt to represent the battle as a fight between the Christian cross (the four squadrons displayed as a cross) and the Muslim crescent (the four squadrons in line with the wings advanced). Despite this, it has the interest of representing both before and during combat simultaneously. Notice that the two galeasses in the Christian right wing never reached their battle position. The red point marks the position of the castle of Lepanto.
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Ali Pasha then gave his wings their marching orders: Mehmet Suluk on the right would take advantage of the shallow draft of the Muslim galleys to work close inshore around the Christian flank. This was the key to the Muslim plan. If Barbarigo, commanding the Christian Left, left him any inshore room at all, he could quickly force numbers of galleys into the Christian rear. Since a galley was effectively helpless if attacked from the flank or rear (under such circumstances a galliot could take the measure of a first class galley, and often did) this would break the Christian line.

Uluj Ali on the left, with unlimited sea-room, was given the preponderant force, at least thirty galleys more than he could put on line. He must have intended to work them around the Christian seaward flank in a loose gaggle. At the very least, this would force Doria to play an exceedingly cautious game; at best, it would pull him out of the fight altogether and unleash the better part of Uluj Ali's squadron into the Christian rear. The Christian reserve would then have to be dealt with, of course, but by that point the chances for confusion - a factor which would work to the Muslim advantage - would be great. A bit of miscalculation or a premature decision to commit the Christian reserve, and he would be home free, whether or not Mehmet Suluk had run his gambit successfully on the right.

Hence the two opposing fleets were forced to work their way cautiously along the shore toward each other, the Christians from the north, the Muslims from the south. When the Christian advance guard rounded Point Scropha at the northwestern entrance to the Gulf of Corinth early on the morning of 7 October to sight the Muslim fleet up the Gulf to the East, both sides were well prepared.

03Tactics.jpg


The day before the battle the Christian fleet had adopted the battle disposition, following a Northeast course so the Left wing could make contact with the shore safe from enemy interference. Next the fleet took a very slow South course (at formation rowing), to turn point Scropha and meet the enemy. Despite its slower rowing, the in-shore end of the Christian left wing was considerably more advanced, and the line of battle was a Northeast-Southwest diagonal. This should not have been a problem for the Christians, that advanced like that during hours to meet the enemy. However, the exhausted rowers that towed the galeasses of the right wing were not capable of taking them to their battle position.
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There is evidence that the inshore squadrons of both fleets were well in advance of their respective centers and offshore squadrons, the opposing forces advancing in staggered echelon with the seaward flanks refused. This may have been by deliberate tactical design; advancing the inshore squadrons may have given the centers better inshore flank protection and enabled them, in turn, to better support their inshore covering forces. It may have been an unavoidable result of the time and place of engagement; the curvature of the shore dictated that the Christian right and center, in particular, had a considerably greater distance to cover between initial sighting and engagement. This view is supported by the fact that all of the Christian galeasses, which Don Juan had intended to deploy ahead of the Christian line to disorder the onrushing Muslim galleys, did not get into position. The two galeasses assigned to the Left clearly got into position ahead of Barbarigo's galleys and did considerable damage to Mehmet Suluk; the two galeasses assigned to the Center seem to have engaged with some effect as well. But the two galeasses assigned to cover Doria's line were well to the rear when the action began; it appears that they never engaged. Conversely, one of the two galeasses on the left, probably that of Antonio Bragadino, actually managed to reenter the battle after having initially engaged the Muslim galleys as they swept past to attack the Christian left.

04patraspace.jpg


The Gulf of Patras, where the battle of Lepanto took place. Probably its bottom is still covered by the rests of the more than 120 sunk ships and the guns and armour of those that drowned. The battle took place South of the wavy beach that extends to Point Scropha, in the lower left corner. Lepanto is found at the other side of the strait that connects the Gulf of Patras with the Gulf of Corynth, near the upper right corner of the picture. The North area is Continental Greece, and the South the Peloponnese.
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6. The battle of Lepanto: The inshore

Early in the morning, the Christian fleet was turning Cape Scropha when they saw the Turkish fleet coming with favorable wind at 15 miles away. A Turkish cannon shot from the Sultana of Ali Pasha invited the Christians to the battle. The response was another cannon shot from the Real accepting the invitation. The vanguard group of Juan de Cardona was formed by 8 galleys, 6 of them formally assigned to the reserve, while his Capitana and Patrona belonged to the Right wing. Apparently they had no time to occupy their positions. Meanwhile the Galeasses started advancing to take their position, towed by smaller ships. Both fleets started their maneuvers as they slowly approached each other. While the priests gave absolution, and the soldiers readied their arms, the carpenters finished sawing the "spurs". The conscripts in the Spanish galleys had been released of their chains. The hatred of the muslims for a hundred years of coastal raids in Spain and Italy was so deep-rooted that Don Juan knew that on this occasion the conscripts were eager to participate in the fight. Their freedom had been promised to them if victory was achieved.

01cadenagaleote.jpg


Galley conscript feet chain that is preserved at the Naval Museum of Madrid. Galley conscripts were poor, miserable men that did not live for long. living in the galley for months in a row, without protection against the elements, infested with ticks and bedbugs, dressed in rags and badly fed, and with one of the hardest jobs to be found. Surrounded by their own filth, they were easy prey to fevers and pestilences. It is said that in favor of the wind, galleys could be detected from miles away by the stench they released.
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Around 11 am, the wind changed, favoring now the approach of the Christians. It was interpreted as a good omen. Uluj Ali had obtained permission from Müezzinzade Ali Pasha to try a diversion. His ships started heading south, parallel to what was going to be the battle line, and Gian Andrea Doria followed suit, perhaps to prevent being outflanked from the offshore side, perhaps to distance himself from the battle that was approaching. In the war at sea, honor dictated that the capitanas of each fleet signalled themselves with a big elaborated lantern at the stern. This served to concentrate combat and often to decide the outcome of the battle before loses were too high. Being an international fleet, all the Capitanas in the Holy League fleet carried their lantern, the maltese Capitana from the Knights of St. John, under command of their Prior, the Venetian Pietro Giustiniani, the Capitanas from the Papal fleet under command of Marcantonio Colonna, and from the Venetian fleet under command of Sebastiano Veniero, and the Capitana from the left wing under command of Agostino Barbarigo. The Real was signalled by 3 lanterns to indicate her supreme command to the enemy. All but the Capitana from the right wing, under command of Gian Andrea Doria, who took his lantern off before the combat on the excuse that it was a precious gift from his wife. This was interpreted by the rest of the commanders in the fleet as a sign of cowardice for disguising his presence to the enemy.

02Inshore.jpg


Battle disposition in the in-shore wing. Turkish lantern galleys are indicated by "fano", and also the count of the Turkish galleys is written down. Ochiali is Uluj Alí and Caracoza is Kara Hodja, who contributed their own ships. We can observe also the disposition of the galleys of Barbarigo and Scirocco at the end of the wing, the position to lead the maneuvers and also the most dangerous of all.
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At noon the Turkish front line reached the position where the galeasses were waiting, almost static, half a mile from the main line. They didn't know what to make of those behemoths that they saw for the first time, so they opened their lines to leave them behind without attacking them, as it would have broken their line of battle before engaging the Christians. But the cannons of the galeasses, bigger and more numerous than those of a galley, where able in a brief time to provoke significant damage to the Turkish fleet, sinking two galleys and damaging some more, and no doubt affecting their morale before the fight (Rodgers cites only one sunk galley in "Naval warfare under oars", but other sources cite two). A shot from the galeasse commanded by Francesco Duodo destroyed a lantern of the Sultana of Ali Pasha, another bad omen for the Turks.

03sanlorenzo.jpg


San Lorenzo (?) galleasse in an illustration by eslovac artist Avor. It is based in a venetian engraving. It is probably the galleasse of Antonio Bragadino that has sunk a Turkish galley. Next to it we can see another galleasse, and behind the galleys of the Christian line, that probably were not using the sail. At the far back we can see the Turkish watch tower at Point Scropha. The morning was clear, although the smoke from the cannons rose over the fleet.
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Thus, although the opposing fleets had sighted each other shortly after dawn, it was around noon before the first shots were exchanged. This was on the inshore flank where Mehmet Suluk's galleys, probably maintaining line for as long as possible to conceal their intentions, broke for the shallow inshore waters to work their way around and into the Christian rear. They very nearly succeeded. The fight was confused and bitter in spots, approaching the melee that the Muslims desired so ardently. They were frustrated when Barbarigo managed, under difficulties which we can only imagine, to pivot his entire squadron door-like, pulling his left flank backwards to change his front by nearly 90 degrees and pin the Muslims against the shore.

04turkishlepanto.jpg


There was little protection for the clouds of arrows that the Turkish galleys released in their approach. A skilled archer could throw up to 5 arrows per minute until tiredness would slow him down. The rain had to be withstood. The arrows were more accurate than the bullets, because these, having to be necessarily smaller than the gun barrel, came out of it with a slight random angle that spoiled the aim at mid-range. The only advantage was that arrow wounds, unless mortal, were less disabling than an equivalent gun wound, although apparently there were poisoned arrows at Lepanto.
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The Christian losses were heavy since Muslim archery seems to have been particularly telling in the early stages of the fight, but the result was that the Muslim right did not outflank the Christian left. This was achieved only through the ability of the galleys of the Christian left to maneuver effectively as a formation under conditions of extreme difficulty. The galleys on the inshore end of the line would have had to back water, using their bow artillery as best they could to cover their retrograde movement, conserving their powers of combat and maneuver as much as possible while waiting for their commander to determine when - and if - they could go over to the attack. Military history attests to few maneuvers more intrinsically difficult than a retrograde movement under fire. That they succeeded in pulling it off speaks well for them, and for the skill and foresight of the Christian command in disposing their forces in such a way as to make the maneuver possible. However, the six galleys commanded by Scirocco (Suluk) fell upon the Venetian Capitana, where Barbarigo was hit by an arrow in the left eye and was taken to his cabin mortally wounded. His nephew Gian Marino Contarini came to his rescue from the offshore side of the left wing, that was doing better, throwing his galley in the middle of the Ottoman galleys, breaking the rows and benches of one of them, only to be killed himself by the combined fire from the rest of Scirocco's galleys.

05VeroneseBarbarigo.jpg


Agostino Barbarigo in a portrait made by Paolo Veronese in 1572 that is in the Cleveland Art Museum. A study of this portrait showing only the head is in the Budapest Fine Arts Museum. Lets emphasize his serenity in holding the arrow that just went through his left eye and got incrusted into his brain.
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At that time it looked like the Venetians were going to be defeated in the inshore side. Alvaro de Bazán decided not to commit his reserve forces that could be needed later on, confident that the Venetians could still turn the battle around, since the Turkish had not managed to break their line. Federico Nani took the command of Gian Maria Contarini's galley and Condottiero Paolo Orsini, on board the galley, despite being injured by an arquebus shot in the right shoulder, gathered the surviving soldiers and after repelling the boarding, assaulted one of the six galleys of Scirocco, where the Christian slaves freed themselves and attacked the Turks from the rear. The capture of this galley, where all the Turks were killed by the furious slaves, provided the needed break. Soon Antonio da Canal and Silvio de Portia joined their galleys to Federico Nani in attacking Mehmet Suluk, sinking his galley. Suluk himself was rescued from the sea, but so badly wounded that Giovanni Contarini cut his head with his sword to put an end to his misery, or at least that is the official version. As the battle in the inshore side was being won by the Venetians, several of the muslim galleys beached their stern, disembarking many of their men while continuing the fight. When the battle was lost, many of the muslims from the Muslim right wing took refuge inland, some after swimming from their galleys.
 
I have made a series of graphics to show the development of the battle. They are merely orientative and should not be taken too seriously. In particular the positions of Cardona are doubtful and deduced from his known engagements both in the main body and against Uluj Ali galleys. Some of you may have seen better ones in specialized bibliography. The proportions are however better than in most graphics. Every little ship in the graph represents three galleys or big galliots, except the galleasses that are all shown. The time frame is also orientative. The color of a little ship means that at least two galleys of that nationality were at that position, and respects the global proportions, first by wings and then for the whole fleet.

Plano1.jpg

Plan2.jpg
 
7. The battle of Lepanto: The Center group

The center battle was fought as the Spaniards wanted, an artillery duel followed by an infantry clash. While Don Juan hoped to win the battle before his wings were turned upside down, Müezzinzade Ali Pasha hoped to resist long enough for his wings to get to the back of the Christians. In the end neither of them was right, but when the Christian lines were ruptured, the experience and caution of Alvaro de Bazán made the Christian reserve available at the right time in the right place.

01CenterBody.jpg


Battle disposition in the main body. In the Turkish side many galleys that were in the reserved, and that joined the line during the battle, have been incorporated to the line. The Turkish galleys at the bottom left corner are those of Uluj Ali, and they belong to an episode that is narrated in a later chapter.
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The Christian center came to grips with the Muslims perhaps a half hour later than the initial contact on the inshore flank and probably with the issue still in doubt there. Again, the Venetian galeasses seem to have disordered and inflicted some loss on the onrushing Muslim galleys as they passed. There is no evidence of disintegration of the Muslim formation, so Müezzinzade Ali Pasha's forces must have reformed ranks in the brief moments before contact, using reinforcing galliots to fill gaps in the line. The fight was particularly bitter in the center, focusing on Ali Pasha's Sultana and the Christian Real, with individual Muslim galleys and galliots attempting to force their way through small gaps in the Christian line to outflank it internally. In the event, the Christians managed to hold their ranks and bear the Muslims down with greater weight.

02JuanLunayNovicio.jpg


The Real about to engage the Sultana in a painting by Philipino artist Juan Luna y Novicio under assignment from the Spanish Government in 1884. Don Juan directs combat from the arrumbada, although probably it was placed higher and more protected or Don Juan would have been one of the first casualties.
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As honor required, both admirals directed their galleys against each other. The clash was terrible, and the "spur" of the Sultana penetrated the bow of the Real up to the fourth bench. But even more terrible was the effect of the Spanish artillery on the deck of the Sultana. But reloading the cannons was not possible. The Real and the Sultana were joined in a mortal embrace that could only end with the loss of one of them. The Sultana had the support of the galleys of Kara Hodja and Mehmet Saiderbey and seven more galleys and two galliots. Their Janissaries were boarding the Sultana from the stern and joining the battle. The Real had 300 soldiers of the Spanish Tercios on board, and the survivors of the rain of arrows emptied their arquebuses and jumped to the Sultana from their higher deck. Some sailors covered them with their fire from the arrumbada, the elevated over-deck. The Real had to be supported by the Patronas of Luis de Requesens and Juan Bautista Cortés, and the Capitanas of Sebastiano Veniero and Marcantonio Colonna, but the Capitanas from Venice and Papal States were engaged with other muslim galleys, and Veniero and Colonna could only offer partial fire support to the fight between the Real and the Sultana. The 76 years old Venetian admiral had a sailor recharging arquebuses for him so he could fire constantly over the Turks. He was a personal friend of Bragadino and wanted to avenge him as best he could.

03Veniero.jpg


Veniero contributed cover fire, but he had his own problems, as did Colonna, due to the higher number of Muslim ships, and the result was a shortage of soldiers on board the Real where the battle could be decided. When soldiers fell to the water they sunk like lead due to the weight of their equipment. Observe in the close plane a Muslim archer with his recurved composite bow, that being stretched from the opposite side where the string is located generates a huge tension. The galleys carried a permanent detachment of archers. On his side fights a janissary, recognizable by his curious hat, from which a piece of cloth hangs to the shoulder.
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Meanwhile the combat had been going forward in the center between Don Juan and Ali Pasha, whose galleys blazed with an incessant fire of artillery and musketry that enveloped them. For the first and last time, the two best infantry units of the XVI century, the Spanish Tercios and the Ottoman Janissaries were fighting each other. The Tercios could not use the formation tactics that made them invincibles until their enemies adopted them, since the fight was taking place on a platform nine meters wide for 120 long. Both parties fought with equal spirit, though not with equal fortune. Twice the Spaniards had boarded their enemy, and both times they had been repulsed with loss. Still their superiority in the use of their fire-arms would have given them a decided advantage over their opponents, if the loss thus inflicted had not been speedily repaired by fresh reinforcements that the Sultana had in bigger supply. Through the whole engagement both commanders exposed themselves to danger as freely as any common soldier. Ali Pasha was a reputed marksman with the composite bow, and he was shooting arrow after arrow to the Spaniards. Don Juan, directing the fight from the top of the arrumbada, with his big sword in his hand, received a wound in the foot. It was a slight one, however, and he would not allow it to be attended to till the action was over. Although over the center line of combat the Christians were gaining the advantage, the fight at the critical center point was tilting towards the Muslim side due to their higher numbers.

04soldiers.jpg


At the back left we can see a Spanish arquebuisser. Arquebusses had a permanently lit wick during combat that had to be applied to the powder box at the same time the gun was kept aimed. At the front is a Spanish musketier, with the elements for each shot in a separate paper bag. The janissaries, at the right, constituted an elite corps that during XV-XVI centuries were equipped with the best weaponry.
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We have now to turn to the events that were taking place in the offshore side, the Christian right wing under Gian Andrea Doria, and the Muslim left wing under Uluj Ali.


Plano3.jpg
 
8. The battle of Lepanto: The offshore

As the centers locked up in mortal combat, the offshore squadrons entered into a positional contest, a contest which Uluj Ali won. We have to remember that both Gian Andrea Doria and Uluj Ali had advised their respective commanders to refuse combat, since both were fighting with their own ships. Taking advantage of having more galleys and large galliots under his command (93 to Doria's 52 plus the eight from the vanguard commanded by Juan de Cardona), Uluj Ali was extending his line moving towards the south instead of advancing to meet the Christians. He could afford to separate his ships more, since the Christians would not seek a melee fight. Gian Andrea Doria decided to accompany Uluj Ali in his maneuver, despite a message from Don Juan that he was leaving the center body uncovered. As the gap between the center and the right wing was becoming bigger and bigger, Cardona was getting more and more worried. The center was clearly having problems, yet Doria was refusing to engage in combat. He had many reasons to believe that Doria was being treacherous as his uncle before him in Prevesa in 1538. So Cardona with the seven galleys of the vanguard squadron moved to the center fight, while Doria's wing separated more and more.

01Offshore.jpg


Battle disposition in the offshore wing. Juan de Cardona and the patrona of Sicily appear asigned to the left end of the right wing, despite both constituting, together with six of the reserve galleys, the vanguard group. The numbers show 52 ships against 90, but it seems they were actually 52 against 93. Doria and Uluj Alí (Ochiali) are assigned to the ends, and the quick run at full sail with favorable wind of Uluj Ali is showed, although with all probability this maneuver was performed behind his own line of combat.
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Once Uluj Ali had Doria where he wanted him, he moved to attack. By then the Christian right wing was fragmented, and the more numerous North African Corsairs fell upon them. This was the closest to the melee that the Muslims sought, and they showed why. In a short time the Christians lost 11 of the 52 galleys. Six of them were Venetians. Benedetto Soranzo had his galley exploded before surrendering it and in doing so avoided the fate that awaited anyone surrendering, because the Corsairs were taking no prisoner and everybody that surrendered or was captured had his throat slit, even the oarsmen. Antonio Pasqualigo died from his wounds in the arms of his 12 years old little brother, that he brought along in his galley to show him how to serve the Serenissima Repubblica. Savoy lost the two galleys, of the three contributed, that were in the Right wing, one sunk and the other with everybody on board butchered. Spain lost one, and the Pope lost one of the galleys provided by Cosimo de Medici, where the Knights of St. Stephan were killed to the last man. It is at the very least curious that Gian Andrea Doria, who commanded the most dangerous position in the last galley at the rightmost position, did not suffer greatly. In a symmetrical position Barbarigo and Mehmet Suluk lost their lifes. It is clear that all the maneuvering of the Right wing prior to the battle was successful at least in putting him out of danger. Had Uluj Ali succeeded in outflanking the Christian Right, Doria's galley would had been the first to fall. Doria's maneuvers however had uncovered the galleys at both sides of the gap left with the Christian Center, creating two points of danger instead of one.

02Arquebusiers.jpg


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The situation had become very dangerous to the Christians. While the offshore wings were tied in a combat favorable to the Muslims, Uluj Ali, observing the widening gap between the bulk of the Christian Right and Center turned inward with 16 galleys and shot the gap between them, with the wind in his favor, slamming into the exhausted right flank of the Christian center with deadly effect. Now the battle turned back to the Center, where after over an hour of bloody and indecisive combat, the battle was going to be decided by the new players.


Plano4.jpg
 
9. The battle of Lepanto: The victory

The left half of the Christian center body was slowly getting the upper hand, specially after Juan de Cardona arrived to the rescue of Paolo Giordano Orsino with his group and sunk the galley of Pertev Pasha, who wounded, was able to scape in a smaller ship. Juan de Cardona, free from having to keep a line of battle, then turned once more and moved to help the right wing, when he saw the galleys of Uluj Pasha making headway for the gap, in their attempt to get to the back of the center body. For Cardona it was almost a sacrifice, since his eight galleys were no rival to the 16 galleys of Uluj Pasha in a melee combat. The men on the decks of Cardona's group were decimated in minutes. Juan de Cardona received two shots of arquebus and lost all his officers and nine tenths of his soldiers. In the infirmary of the galley San Juan de Sicilia, sergeant Martín Muñoz abandoned his bed saying that he did not want to die of fever and jumped to the Corsair galley killing four muslims. He got past the main mast with nine arrow wounds, when a bullet cut his leg. He sat down to die and said: "Gentlemen, everybody do as much".

Despite Cardona's sacrifice, seven of the 16 galleys under command of Uluj Pasha fell upon the exhausted right side of the center body. The rightmost galley was Uluj's objective. The Capitana from Malta was clearly identifiable, painted in black, with her lantern and the banner of the Knights Hospitalliers of the Order of St. John. A banner that Uluj had learned to hate very much when, under command of Dragut and all the might of the Sultan's fleet, he assaulted the fortress of Malta six years before. Despite the difference in numbers of more than 10 to 1, the knights resisted, inflicting a heavy toll on the assailants, until with the arrival of a Spanish fleet, the Ottomans had to lift the siege having lost 15,000 men including their commander Dragut. Now his revenge was at hand. Upon his signal all his seven galleys attacked the Maltese galley, commanded by the Prior of Messina, Pietro Giustiniani, who fought him at Malta. The knights fought like lions repelling the boarders time after time, but were quickly decimated by the arrows and arquebus shots. Giustiniani took five arrows, and when the Corsairs boarded the galley, only 36 men were standing. They were murdered immediately after surrendering. The other two Maltese galleys also suffered a heavy attack with great loses, and one of Doria's galleys was sunk by Uluj Ali group. Finally La Fiorenza of Tommaso de Medici under Papal banner was attacked by four Corsair galleys, and all the men on board, including the Knights of St. Stephen were massacred.

01StElmo.jpg


This painting by Matteo Pérez d'Aleccio belongs to a series about the great siege of Malta of 1565, and shows the capture of Fort St. Elmo in June. At the right we can see the Turkish commanders Mustafa Pasha of the army, and Piali Pasha of the fllet. Between them is Uluj Alí, with the head inclined towards the left. The death of his commander Dragut, that took place during the capture of Fort St. Elmo, was hidden to the Turks, because his arrival had lifted the Ottoman's army low morale. The arrival in September of a small army of 8,000 Spaniards caused the Turkish flight, that in two days left the island. There is a painting copy of these frescoes. The copies belonged to emperor Carlos I and several of them are now at the London Maritime Museum at Greenwich, while the complete fresco series can be admired at the walls of La Valetta fortress, in Malta.
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While the battle was taking place, Alvaro de Bazán in command of the reserve group was carefully deciding where he was more needed. He only had 30 galleys in a battle that involved over 400. He was right in not committing too early in the inshore battle of Barbarigo, because he was now needed in two spots simultaneously. Troops were badly needed in the center fight between both admirals, and ships were badly needed by Doria's right wing that was being cut into pieces by the Corsairs. Fortunately Cardona had provided some help reducing the danger in the gap between the center body and the right wing. Alvaro de Bazán sent 26 galleys to reinforce the right wing, while he himself with three more galleys went with the best troops to help in the central fight.

The arrival of the reserve galleys alleviated the desperate situation of the right wing, making the battle more even. Of the reinforcements, the Venetian La Donna of Giovanni Bembo was sunk, and the Spanish La Marquesa suffered heavy casualties. In the infirmary of La Marquesa was a 24 year old soldier under the name of Miguel de Cervantes. He had joined the Italian Tercios six months before, attracted by the good pay and easy life that the Tercios enjoyed in Italy. He was suffering from fevers, but he requested his infantry captain Francisco San Pedro to join the fight at the most dangerous spot. He was assigned to the launch. All the galleys were releasing launches filled with soldiers that attacked enemy launches and galleys from weak spots, even boarding them when appropriate. The launches were extremely dangerous places if targeted by the fire from a galley, and many were adrift filled with corpses. La Marquesa suffered 40 casualties, including her captain Juan de Machado, and 120 wounded, between them Miguel de Cervantes, who received two arquebus shots in the breast and one in the left arm that caused him to lose the movement of the left hand "for a higher glory of the right one".

02Marquesa.jpg


La Marquesa in a fight with a North African lantern galley. Between the Christian soldiers that fight from the launch against two pirate launches, a young soldier with his left arm strapped by a sling distinguishes himself swinging his sword left and right. Miguel de Cervantes, that was so proud of his service to his king, will become bitter in his later years by the eternal ingratitude of Spain for its soldiers, praising in El Quixote how the Ottoman Sultan was better at acknowledging the merits of people born to another religion, like Uluj Ali, than the Spanish king to his own subjects.
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To the center of the battle, the arrival of Alvaro de Bazán and his four galleys was providential. Marcantonio Colonna had joined the combat on the Sultana, when a Turkish galliot was advancing towards the flank of his galley. Giovanni Battista Contarini saved him by crashing against the Turkish galliot, sinking it. Less luck had the other two galleys that accompanied Alvaro de Bazán to help the Real. The Venetian galleys of Giovanni Loredano and Caterino Malipiero were sunk by the Turkish reinforcements. But La Loba (She-wolfe) of Alvaro the Bazán sunk one Turkish galley with his cannons, and he personally directed the boarding of another one, capturing her. Soon the soldiers of La Loba joined those of La Real for a third attempt at taking la Sultana.

03Lanterns.jpg


At the left, the lantern from Don Álvaro de Bazán's ship, La Loba (She-wolf), now in the Naval Museum of Madrid. At the right a Muslim lantern captured in Lepanto, kept in the house of the Marquises of Santa Cruz in Madrid.
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With the fresh reinforcements, the third assault was successful. The Janissaries resisted to the death as was their custom, but the stern castle was conquered at last, and captain Andrés Becerra captured the Turkish banner that belonged to the Sultan. Between the bodies on the deck was Müezzenzade Ali Pasha that was wounded from a shot in the head. He was discovered and drawn forth by some Spanish soldiers, who, recognizing his person, would at once have despatched him. But the wounded chief, having rallied from the first effects of his blow, had presence of mind enough to divert them from their purpose by pointing out the place below where he had deposited his money and jewels, and they hastened to profit by the disclosure before the treasure should fall into the hands of their comrades. Ali was not so successful with the next one, a convict, - one of those galley-slaves whom Don Juan had unchained from the oar, and furnished with arms. He could not believe that any treasure would be worth so much to him as the head of the Kapudan Pasha. Without further hesitation he dealt him a blow which severed it from his shoulders. Then returning to his galley, he laid the bloody trophy before Don Juan. His commander gazed on it with a look of pity mingled with horror. He may have felt that Ali Pasha deserved a better fate. He coldly inquired "of what use such a present could be to him," and then ordered it to be thrown into the sea. Far from being obeyed, a soldier had the head stuck on a pike and raised aloft on board the captive galley. At the same time the banner of the Crescent was pulled down, while that of the Cross run up in its place and the soldiers started shouting victory.

04AliPasha.jpg


This German engraving, printed the same year of Lepanto's victory, shows Ali Pasha before and after the battle. Printings like this one, pressed in multiple copies throughout Europe, and nailed to church and village doors as primitive newspapers, show the importance given to the defeat of the extremely dangerous Turk at the time and within the context of its period, a far cry from the scant importance given to it after the French revisionism. Incidentally, this is the only representation I have been able to find of poor Müezzinzade Alí Pasha, not very well treated by fate.
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The news run from ship to ship in both sides. The Turks acknowledged their defeat and surrendered. Kara Hodja died from an arquebus shot, and his galley surrendered to Juan Bautista Cortés with his summer bounty of 40,000 ducats. Mustafa Esdri surrendered to the Papal Toscana commanded by Metello Caracciolo, who had a double joy because this galley was the former Papal Capitana lost to Piali Pasha at Zerbi in 1560, and because Esdri was the administer of the fleet treasury, with all the gold coffers on board. Another galley captured by the Tercios, carried on board two sons of Müezzenzade Ali Pasha, Mehmet Bey of 17 and Sain Bey of 13. Both were taken to Don Juan, crying, and he took them under his protection and after giving them some comfort for the loss of their father, sent them to be fed and cared according to their custom. His secretary, Juan de Soto, surrendered his quarter to them.

Uluj Ali was retreating towing the captured galleys towards the rearguard of his group still fighting Doria's wing. He could see far away the galleys of Mehmet Suluk running ashore, clearly having failed to turn around the Venetians. He saw that the Sultana had been taken and the Turkish center defeated. Perhaps he saw the head of his commander on a pike. After a promising start, his North African galleys had not been able to break the Christian Right wing, and the arrival of the reserve was turning the tide quickly. Already some of Don Juan's ships that have fared better were starting his pursuit, as did Alvaro de Bazán. Uluj Ali was compelled to abandon his prizes and provide for his own safety by flight. He cut adrift the Maltese Capitana, which he had lashed to his stern, and on which three hundred corpses attested the desperate character of her defence, and released also the other captured galleys. He felt that nothing remained but to make the best of his way from the fatal scene of action, and save as many of his own ships as he could. A rocky headland, stretching far into the sea, lay in the path of the fugitive, and his enemies hoped to intercept him there. Some few of his vessels stranded on the rocks. But the rest, 25 galleys and 20 galliots all damaged from the battle, safely doubled the promontory, taking refuge in Lepanto before heading for Constantinople with the only prize they could take from the battle, the banner of the Capitana of Malta. For that prize he was made the new Kapudan Pasha of a soon to be rebuilt fleet by Selim. The defeat was presented as a victory, and the lost ships were referred to as the dispersed fleet.

05StaRosaLimaMEX.jpg


Pius V found about the victory before anybody else, as while he was praying he had a vision in which he could contemplate the victory, and with joy he announced it to those that accompanied him. He instituted October the 7th as the celebration of the Holy Virgin of the Victory, that his successor Gregory XIII changed the name to Holy Virgin of the Rosary that remains today. Pius V was a Dominican, and was a great reformer of the Church and the introducer of the Rosary that his order had discovered. He was later canonized. This polychrome relief in the Church of Santa Rosa de Lima in Mexico City shows Saint Pius at the moment of receiving his vision. Although the small angels have been censored, it wasn't by me.
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By 4 p.m. the battle was over. Several galleys were drifting filled only with corpses. When the Capitana of Malta was boarded, they found three survivors that were unconscious from their wounds and mistaken for dead by the Corsairs. One of them was the captain, Fra Pietro Giustinniani, who after recovering, would live for one year with the honor of being the only man that had defeated twice the main fleet of the Ottoman Sultan.


Plano5.jpg
 
10. The battle of Lepanto: The aftermath

The sight after the battle was a horrible one. The waters of the Gulf of Patras were stained in red. There were so many corpses and human remains in the waters, that it looked as if the ships were stuck in them. The sky, which had been almost without a cloud through the day, began now to be overcast, and showed signs of a coming storm. Before seeking a place of shelter for himself and his prizes, Don Juan reconnoitred the scene of action. He met with several vessels in too damaged a state for further service. These mostly belonging to the enemy, after saving what was of any value on board, he ordered to burnt them. He selected the neighboring port of Petala, as affording the most secure and accessible harbor for the night. Before he had arrived there, the tempest began to mutter and darkness was on the water.

The next morning the bad weather continued. In the safety of the harbor, the Christians counted their loses and captures. 15 galleys were found missing, although 30 others would have to be dismantled for the heavy damage sustained. Between them the Real, although a replica can be visited today at the Maritime Museum of Barcelona. The most decorated galley of all, with beautiful paintings and sculptures.

01LaReal.jpg


The loss of the Real was a pity because it was practically a floating museum, although it is doubtful that in any case it could have been preserved till our days. The replica, made from the detailed descriptions that were preserved, does it justice, and surprises that in such a small warship, so many people could be embarked. Notice the three lanterns that denote the supreme command.
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No galley was lost from the Left wing, while from the Center Gian Andrea Doria lost one of his galleys and Spain another one. The Venetians lost 6 galleys from the right wing and 3 from the reserve, while Doria, Spain and Savoy lost one galley each from the right wing. Cardona lost one Spanish galley from his group. Why did the Venetians bear 60% of the total loses? Let's remember that they were overrepresented in the Left wing, where they did not lose any galley. In the Right wing they were only 42% of the forces, and 40% of the Reserve. Three are the likely explanations. As Don Juan had noted in Messina, many Venetian galleys were not in good shape. Their prolonged storage at the Arsenal probably was sub-optimal, an they showed signs of rotten wood in the hulls. An adittional factor was that they were undermanned in the on-board infantry, as a consequence of Venice shortage of manpower and dependency on mercenaries, and due to the lack of reinforcements at Corfu. Finally the design of the Venetian galleys made them less apt than the Spanish galleys for the type of fight that took place at Lepanto, even if better than the Muslim galleys.

A large amount of booty, in the form of gold, jewels, and brocade, was found on board several of the prizes. The galley of the commander-in-chief alone is stated to have contained one hundred and seventy thousand gold sequins, - a large sum, but not large enough, it seems, to buy off his life.

170 Muslim ships were captured, although only 130 were kept afloat, 117 galleys and 13 galliots. 67 ships were sunk during the battle and 40 more after it, of them 80 galleys and 27 galliots. The total Turkish loss was therefore of 237 ships or 84% of their fleet. Probably higher, since it is said that Uluj Ali burnt many of the surviving ships at Lepanto. By contrast, the Christians lost 7% of their fleet in the battle, and another 14% had to be dismantled at port.

Despite this incredibly high numbers, it is the number of men lost that it is staggering, due to the crowding in the galleys at battle and the little protection they carried, together with the easiness with which galleys were sunk with everybody on board. The human loss of the Ottoman Empire was calculated at 25,000 dead, and 5,000 prisoners, while 12,000 Christian slaves were liberated from the captured ships. The Venetians lost 5,000 men, 2,000 the Spaniards, 800 the Papal forces, and 400 from Malta. 14,000 more were wounded. On October 7, 1571, in just four hours, 32,000 men died. To get an idea of this magnitude, we can compare it to the 3,000 men that died between French, English and Spanish in Trafalgar. It is very difficult even to find land battles where so many people died in so little time. At Gettysburg, two hundred years later, 48,000 men died over the course of three days.

For three days the fleet remained at Petala, and a war council was held, when once again the differences between allies showed up. Some wanted to return to port, some wanted to attack Constantinople, the Venetians wanted to attack Morea and promote Albanian and Greek insurrections as they had done before, only to leave the Greeks and Albanians on their own to be massacred by the Turks when it was no longer convenient to continue the hostilities. Finally Don Juan's proposition of attacking the castles of the Gulf was accepted.

02LEPANTO.jpg


Lepanto was a very well fortified position, and controlled the gulfs of Corynth and Patras and the strait between both. It was key to control it if one wanted to dominate the Morea at the other side of the gulf. Often it served as refuge to the Turkish fleet that asolated the coasts of Italy and the Adriatic. In any case it would have not been easy to capture, and even less at winter. It was surrendered by its Venetian commander in 1499, after the battle of Sapienza, when he lost the hope of receiving the supplies required to hold it.
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The next day, October 11, Gian Andrea Doria and Ascanio de la Corna went to conquer Lepanto, but when they got there, as it could not be otherwise being Doria involved, they decided that it was not worth the effort of conquering it and defending it from the Turks. Finally they all decided to go back. On the 22nd they arrived to Corfu and divided the booty. Three weeks later, Don Marcantonio Colonna, commander of the Papal squadron, wrote to the Doge of Venice:* "Only by a miracle and the great goodness of God was it possible for us to fight such a battle: and it is just as great a miracle that the prevailing greed and covetousness have not flung us upon one another in a second battle." Philip II received half of the total, 58 galleys, 6 galliots, 74 cannons and 1740 slaves. The other half was for the Venetians and the Pope to divide, but a tenth of their half was for the commander of the fleet, Don Juan de Austria. The young princes, in the division of the spoil, were assigned to the pope. But Don Juan succeeded in obtaining their liberation. Unfortunately, the elder died at Naples. The younger was sent home, with three of his attendants, for whom he had an especial regard. Don Juan declined the present, sent with a request for his liberation by his sister Fatima. In a letter to the Turkish princess, Don Juan remarked, that "he had done this, not because he undervalued her beautiful gift, but because it had always been the habit of his royal ancestors freely to grant favors to those who stood in need of their protection, but not to receive aught by way of recompense."

03JuandeAustria.jpg


Don Juan was not only an excellent commander, as he showed repeated times, but also a noble and sensible man. There was a sharp contrast of behavior between the Ottoman and North African leaders and the Christian leaders. Equally courageous in battle, their behavior with the defeated cannot be put at the same level.
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Selim II reacted to the news of Lepanto by ordering all the Spaniards and Venetians in his empire executed; but Grand vizier Sokollu, who was not Turkish but a Croatian devshirmeh (Christian boys levied as tax), canceled that horrendous edict. The drunk Selim II fell and cracked his skull, dying in 1574. Sokollu was assasinated by his enemies in 1579.

04Sokollu.jpg


The assassination of Sokollu was conveniently attributed to a mad dervish, but previous to it, every one of his supporters had been killed or imprisoned. With his death, the last of the participants in the greatness peak of the Ottoman Empire disappears. From then on, interrupted only by short periods, The Ottoman empire enters the decadence that will lead to its disappearance.
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The Holy League fleet pursued a tiresome campaign the next year in the coasts of Morea, during which they captured a single Turkish ship, because Uluj Ali refused battle in several occasions during the months of August and September. Venice was aware that the next year the Holy League fleet would go against the North of Africa as Felipe wanted, so that winter they signed a peace treaty acknowledging all the conquests of Selim II and agreeing to pay 300,000 ducats for three years, so their merchants were allowed to resume their trade to Alexandria. In the end, the sum paid was less than the cost of keeping the fleet active and the shutting down of the commerce. The loss of Cyprus, however, was a big step towards the decadence of the former Mediterranean power.

Felipe II was furious when he knew of the Venetian defection. The League was dissolved and Don Juan ordered the Holy League banner substituted by the Spanish one. The next year Don Juan de Austria conquered Tunis in his last fight against Islam before being destined to the Low Countries.
 
11. Analysis of the battle

It has been said that the result of the battle was inevitable because the Christians were armed with arquebuses. It has been said that the Christians had better galleys. It has been said that the galeasses were determinant for the victory. Nothing of that is true. Despite the diference in loses, consequential to a galley battle, Lepanto was a close call. The Left wing was able to withhold under the most difficult circumstances, the Center was saved by the timely arrive of reinforcements, the Right wing was clearly defeated by the Muslims, and only rescued both by reinforcements and by the battle being won at the Left and Center. The Christians were able to win only because the right decisions were taken in the disposition of the fleet. The Muslims lost only because the Christians did not fail. Having faced the same fleet under less able command, the Muslims would had won on account of their bigger numbers, their higher maneuverability and their good commanders.

Be that as it may, the battle unfolded much as Don Juan had intended and as Müezzinzade Ali Pasha had feared. Both commanders had planned well; both had thoroughly prepared their forces; both had delegated authority wisely. In the event, the performance of certain of their subordinate commanders was nothing short of brilliant. The performance of the Christian Left under Agostino Barbarigo, who died leading his forces at what we must assume, for lack of evidence to the contrary, to have been the critical tactical focal point, was particularly noteworthy. In Mehmet Suluk's defense, it must be said that he played an unexpectedly bad hand unexpectedly well; the inshore fight seems to have been a close one. Laurels must also go to Don Alvaro de Bazan, who committed the Christian Reserve at precisely the right time, using the characteristically Spanish tactical caution on which Don Juan must have depended. Gian Andrea Doria is the only commander that cannot be praised. Uluj Ali Pasha, in perhaps the most brilliant maneuvering of the day, nearly salvaged victory from the ashes of defeat. For his part, Don Juan commanded wisely and fought well. The fact that he delegated the more spectacular maneuvering roles to seasoned and experienced subordinates - for he was a relatively inexperienced mariner - speaks well for him. Müezzinzade Ali Pasha erred only in accepting battle at all, and there is evidence that he was under Imperial orders to engage. There is also evidence that he underestimated the size of the force arrayed against him. In the final analysis, his only real hope for victory was in bringing about a loss of tactical cohesion on the Christian side. Galley warfare was an explosive, all-or-nothing business and serious ruptures in the Christian ranks could have brought victory to the Muslims almost to the last act. He nearly succeeded.

01Marquesa.jpg


Although it is not possible to properly illustrate an analysis, I cannot resist including less accurate illustrations that are nevertheless curious and interesting. This is a picture of Cervantes contribution to the battle. La Marquesa (with a wrong X) appears here as a strange hybrid ship, while the launch or galley on whose deck Cervantes is fighting, shows surprisingly the cannons of a ship of the line.
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Did the Turks have a reasonable chance of defeating the fleet of the Holy League at Lepanto and what would that victory have looked like? Analysis of the battle suggests that the answer to the former question is yes. It was a close-run thing, and little imagination is required to identify turning points that might have turned the other way. What if Barbarigo, the heroic Venetian commander of the Christian Left, had been less effective in holding his inshore flank - which he barely did, and at the cost of his life - and pivoting his line to pin the Turkish Right against the shore? What if Alvaro de Bazán had overreacted to Barbarigo's predicament, sending to his aid the galleys that he would later need to counter Uluj Ali's attack on the Christian Center and Right? What if the Christian Left and Center had not held their formations with rock-like steadiness? In those cases where the Christian line abreast formation faltered or was broken, the more agile Muslim galleys and galliots wrought havoc. As it turned out, they did so on a relatively small scale: on the extreme Christian Left at the beginning of the fight and in the seam between the Center and Right at the end. In both cases the Christians contained the chaos, but only by remarkable competence and fortitude and, in the second case, by Bazán's foresight as well.

The alternative scenarios listed above are dependent only upon human decisions made during the course of the battle. Others, dependent on factors external to or predating the battle, are not hard to imagine. The six Venetian galleasses made a significant contribution to Christian victory and their presence in the line of battle was an improbable thing. Galleasses and galleys performed very differently as sailing vessels and under oars and cooperation between the two was extraordinarily difficult to achieve; indeed, Lepanto is virtually the only significant example of close and successful tactical cooperation between galleasses and galleys. If, in the days before the battle, sea and wind conditions had differed appreciably from those that prevailed it is most unlikely that four of the six galleasses would have been at their assigned places before the opposing fleets met and the other two close enough to weigh in before battle's end. Don Juan's decision to spilt the various national contingents was a major contributor to victory, as was his weighting of the Left with Venetian galleys under a Venetian commander. These bold and unprecedented decisions played a major role in the Christian victory.

02Lepantob.jpg


This painting, of unknown author to me, presents the battle of Lepanto according to the battle plan, but introducing a geometrical regularity. The gulfs of Patras and Corynth are represented at the center below. Around we can see an allegory. The three women represent Venice, with the Ducal corno, Papal States, with the papal mitre, and Spain, with the military uniform, with the angels pouring blessings over them. At the other side, angels pour curses over the Turks, and death overcomes them. This representation is inverted, with the Christian fleet at the right, and the gulf of Corynth at the left.
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In sum, Christian victory depended not only upon extraordinary competence but on a healthy measure of luck as well and the outcome was anything but a sure thing, quite the contrary in fact. The question, then, is What would a Muslim victory have looked like? War is an uncertain business. Anything can happen and often does, but the preponderance of the evidence suggests that a Muslim victory would almost certainly have been just as crushing as that which the Christians actually won. If anything, it would likely have been worse, for the comparatively ponderous Western galleys would have found it very difficult to escape a lost battle, as in fact some forty ships under Uluj Ali did.
 
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12. The consequences of Lepanto

Muslim losses at Lepanto were enormous, in vessels, guns and men. But, as John F. Guilmartin Jr. maintains, the most crippling loss was in experts. We know that these men were an essential and virtually irreplaceable component of Mediterranean power at sea and were recognized as such. We know this for a fact, for the victorious allies took the extraordinary measure of identifying them and having them killed, even in the aftermath of victory (from the Spanish and from Venetian and Spanish communication on the subject that is preserved). And in fact, although the Turks were able to put an enormous number of galleys to sea in the following years, they assiduously avoided combat with the Christian fleet - and with good reason, for the lack of experts rendered their galleys uncertain tactical instruments.

The precise numbers of experts killed and captured is a matter of speculation. The Christians captured in excess of 3,486 Turks; the number is that mentioned in communiques detailing the distribution of booty among the victors and thus surely understates the total. Of these, the vast majority would have been experts, timariots, janissaries and naval archers, the latter functionally falling in the same category as experts since their skills required a lifetime of experience. The only other sizeable category of Turks subject to capture was conscript oarsmen, and these would surely have been enslaved and pressed into service on the spot, unrecorded; as simple villagers, they had no ransom value. The benchmark for comparison is the Spanish loss of oficiales - experts - at Djerba where the Spanish and their allies lost 28-30 galleys and 600 oficiales and 2,400 sailor-arquebusiers. This works out to an average of some 20 experts and 80 sailor-arquebusiers per galley. If we assume that the proportion of experts to others among the 3,486 Turkish captives was the same as that which prevailed for the Spanish at Djerba and consider that the Christians captured 117 galleys and 17 galliots at Lepanto, we get an average of only five to six experts per galley captured. But in light of the ferocity of the battle, the ratio of killed to captured must have been high, surely at least thee or four to one, so the total loss would have been much higher. Note, too, that an additional eighty to ninety Turkish galleys were sunk or destroyed, their experts presumably with them. If Djerba hurt Spain, Lepanto crippled the Turks.

And the damage was permanent. To be sure, Uluj Ali wrought prodigies as Kapudan Pasha, facing off the allied fleet in 1572 and retaking Tunis from the Spanish in 1574 without much opposition. But the recapture of Tunis was Ottoman sea-power's last gasp; the Constantinople-based galley fleet fell into decay in the aftermath of Uluj Ali's triumphant return and never regenerated. The Ottoman galley fleet never fought another big battle after Lepanto.

For Spain, the Ottoman Empire was one more peripheral enemy, and was relatively low in the list of priorities. Many in Spain had spoken against the Holy League, and it was the morisco problem and the religious factor who finally tilted the scales. Spain was the last to join the league. For Spain a victory meant having more secure costs, and a free hand at attacking the corsair nests in North Africa. It is as absurd to think that Spain could seriously damage the Ottoman Empire as it is to think that Spain could seriously be damaged by the Ottoman Empire, since they were so far away of each other. Of course prestige could always be lost and cause secondary effects in other places.

01TIZIANO.jpg


1571 was a very good year for Felipe II. Finally his heir was born, and his armies obtained a very important victory. Plethoric, he ordered Titian a painting to celebrate it, but the old master was at the end of his life, and either didn't take much interest or wasn't capable of more. The allegory shows Felipe raising his son, who is blessed by Victory, over the booty of Lepanto.
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Venice depended totally on her commerce. For Venice, victory was the way to negotiate a more favourable business deal. They were under no illusion that they could completely defeat an empire the size of the Turkish. Even the recovery of Cyprus was beyond their means, once lost. Spain could recover Cyprus at a tremendous cost, but why would they do it? Spain was not interested in Cyprus even if they could keep it, so they obviously were not going to do the job for Venice. For Venice it was important to deter the Turks from further aggressions, and to negotiate a deal that would be acceptable even if they had to pay a compensation. Both things were achieved.

02Veronesse.jpg


The Venetian Signory also ordered a painting to Veronesse about Lepanto. He chose a more religious representation where St. Peter, St. Carlos Borromeo, St. Catalina of Siena and St. Mark with his lion, solicit the Holy Virgin her intercession for a Christian victory. Light from heaven illuminates a Christian fleet with conspicuous display of Venetian banners. Darkness falls over the Turks, that receive also arrows shoot by angels.
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So the consequences of Lepanto were the best that could be hoped by the two nations that were in the defensive, Venice and Spain. Let us examine the possible consequences if the battle had turned the other way.

What might such damage have meant for the Christians? It is impossible to paint a rosy scenario. Recall that Don Juan - with at least the implicit support of his superiors and no objections of note from his subordinates - had committed everything to a single throw of the dice. On the day of battle, the total Venetian reserves comprised fourteen ordinary galleys and two galeasses in the upper Adriatic. Had Venice lost almost all of her experts at Lepanto, little would have stood between Venice and the victorious Turks the following year. Venice was well fortified, to be sure, and would no doubt resisted capture, but what of her commercial and political future without a viable galley fleet? The Turks benefited from Venetian trade, and would no doubt have allowed its continuance… on their terms, perhaps with Venice reduced to effective dependency in the manner of Ragusa.

And with Venice neutralized, what might the Turks then have done? They would have waited a year or two to build up their strength, but time was on their side. It took more than five years to regenerate a corps of experts as the Spanish had learned after Djerba, and had Lepanto gone the other way the loss of Christian experts would have made the loss at Djerba seem insignificant. Crete would have been an obvious target, a conquest that would have cut even more deeply into Venetian strength. A renewed attempt at Malta would likely have been in the cards as well, a new siege mounted with far less concern for an aggressive Spanish relief than in 1565. And with Malta in Turkish hands, the western Mediterranean would have been subjected to a contagion of Muslim raiders. The Balerics would have been at risk and the prospect of rendering meaningful aid to the Spanish Moriscos entirely feasible.

We should remember that the Osmanli Sultans had arrogated themselves the right of conquest over the Roman Empire. Mehmet II called himself Kayser-i Rum (Roman Caesar), and laid claim to all lands the Roman emperors once ruled. The conquest of Constantinople realised the promise of Muhammed the Prophet as when he was asked which of the two cities would be liberated first, Constantinople or Rome, he said: "The city of Heracle (i.e. Constantinople) would be liberated first." [Ahmad, authenticated by Al Albany]. After that, the city of Rome became the Ottomans' next goal: "To Rome! To Rome!" was the constant cry of Mehmed II's great-grandson Suleyman the Magnificent. The conquest of Otranto a hundred years before, in 1480, made clear the intentions of Mehmet II of conquering Italy; so clear that Rome was evacuated. Only the dead of Mehmet the following year stopped that offensive. Otranto was attacked again in 1537, 1614 and 1644. Sicily was also a target of the Turkish imperialistic aggressions, having been a Muslim territory before. The traditional Muslim view is that they have the right to retake any territory that has once been Muslim. A conquest of Italy by the Ottomans was perhaps too much for them, given their early stages of internal decline, but certain parts of Italy could have fallen under the Ottoman Empire for many years.

Due to Lepanto, of course, no such things occurred. Christian galleys cruised the Levant with impunity in the years that followed, and on into the 1640s, mirroring the Muslim advantage that accrued after Prevesa. Spain's attention turned north, a shift in strategic priorities made possible by the neutralization of the Turkish menace at Lepanto, and Venice remained commercially and militarily viable for another two centuries. The Ottoman Empire also shifted the attention to Persia, and the Mediterranean was mostly forgotten and left in the hands of merchants and pirates, its central strategic role gone forever.

Did Lepanto save Christendom? It depends, of course, on what you mean by "save!" Venice would probably have preserved her independence, albeit on the Sultan's terms, and a reversal of the Spanish reconquista seems most unlikely. Clearly, however Turkish victory at Lepanto would have been a catastrophe of the first magnitude for Christendom and Europe would have followed a historical trajectory strikingly different from that which happened.

Lepanto put an end to the expansion of the Ottoman Empire in the Mediterranean, that would only see very limited Turkish conquests after it. As Alexander Dumas pere, said in his novel "Ali Pacha", "The Osmanli race, bred on conquest alone, proved good for nothing when conquest failed." The failures at Malta, Lepanto and Vienna were the telling tales of the Ottoman decline.
 
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13. Appendix

01CervantesBalaca.jpg


Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, the most universal Spanish writer and an admirable man. On him the greatness and misery of the XVI century Spanish empire are represented. Men of war and peace, of slavery and fame, of prisons and letters. On ocassion of the fourth centenary of the publication of El Quixote, I dedicate to him this small effort with the hope of contributing to a better understanding of his figure.
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Miguel de Cervantes, a simple soldier, was visited by Don Juan de Austria during his recovery, as were all the Spanish soldiers wounded at the battle. He was promoted to first class soldier and had his salary increased in 3 ducats per month. Despite having lost the use of his left hand, he continued at the service of his king and participated in the campaigns of Don Juan in Navarino, Tunis and Corfu. After 5 years of service, in 1575 he returned to Spain, but his ship was captured by Algerian corsairs. The letters of recommendation that he carried from Don Juan had the effect of giving him a ransom price beyond the means of his modest family. He was to spend 5 years as a slave, being tortured several times for his continuous attempts to escape. He was finally ransomed by a Trinitarian monk, one of the mendicant orders that in Spain went from place to place raising money to rescue destitute Christians from the hands of the corsairs.

02BaosArgel.jpg


Miguel de Cervantes spent five long and hard years as a slave of the muslim pirates in the infamous baths of Alger. Despite having enough reasons, Miguel de Cervantes does not seem to have hated his enemies, and it is possible to apreciate his respect for them in his work.
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His experiences transpire in his works. For example, he was so impressed by the hardness of the life of the galley convicts that Don Quixote will rescue a group of convicts that were taken to galleys for petty crimes. Don Quixote depicts so well human nature that it became an instant success when published in 1605. By then Cervantes was 50 years old, still poor, and had known every misery in life, including the jails of Spain and the Inquisition. Don Quixote is the first novel in the world in the sense that we give now to that word. It is without doubt the zenith of Spanish literature, and one of the best books ever written. One wonders if without Miguel de Cervantes' participation in Lepanto, Don Quixote would have ever been written.

03quixotegaleotes.jpg


The liberation of galley convicts by Don Quixote, in an illustration by August Doré for the French edition of Don Quixote. Doré's illustrations are the most famous, and can be found in many modern editions in all languages.
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In the little village of Spelonga, in Marche (Italy), 150 villagers participated in the battle of Lepanto under Papal banner. They brought home the banner from one of the Turkish galleys that they conquered and keep it since then in the church of St. Agatha of Spelonga. Every 3 years they celebrate the "Festa bella" and commemorate the event by capturing a replica of the banner from a mast, under command of a villager taking the place of Marcantonio Colonna. A few years ago a Turkish delegation showed up in the village to request the return of the banner. Apparently they had to leave the village very quickly to avoid the fate their ancestors met at Lepanto, given the indignation that the villagers showed.

06Spelonga.jpg


Left, villagers from Spelonga cutting a mast that would be transported to main square, where the village braves will assault it to capture the flag. Right, the original Turkish flag kept in the church of St. Agatha of Spelonga.
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Only one thing is missing for Lepanto, and that is a good movie from Hollywood with tons of money and special effects. There is even a role for a leading actress, because it is said that one of the Spanish soldiers that fought valiantly on the deck of the Sultana was a woman dressed as a man, that only revealed her nature after the battle. This anecdote could be for real, because she appears in a painting of the battle that is now at the National Maritime Museum of London (Greenwich), holding the head of a Turk in one hand and a sword in the other. You can read the description of the painting where she is mentioned. This picture appears to be copied from an older one that is currently at the Museo Correr in Venice. The original that inspired this paintings was an engraving made in 1572 by the Croatian Martin Roca Kolunic for Venice. This would indicate that the source is from the time of the battle. She is also mentioned in some Spanish chronicles, as someone named María la Bailaora (the dancer), that would had dissobeyed the order to all women to dissembark in Messina to stay with her lover.

04lepanto.jpg

05HLetter.jpg


Paintings of the battle of Lepanto. The older is a Venetian table from late XVI century, and is based of an engraving from 1572. The more recent one is from the Dutch school, and is based on the Venetian. It is signed with the letter H. In both many of the participant ships from both sides are identified, like those from Caracoz (Kara Hodja) and Ochialli (Uluj Alí). One can see the participation of the galeasses at the right side of the image. In both paintings a woman is shown in the third ship of the Christian side, although it is not possible to apreciate in these low resolution images.
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Finally here is the poem "Lepanto" by G. K. Chesterton (1911):

White founts falling in the Courts of the sun,
And the Soldan of Byzantium is smiling as they run;
There is laughter like the fountains in that face of all men feared,
It stirs the forest darkness, the darkness of his beard;
It curls the blood-red crescent, the crescent of his lips;
For the inmost sea of all the earth is shaken with his ships.
They have dared the white republics up the capes of Italy,
They have dashed the Adriatic round the Lion of the Sea,
And the Pope has cast his arms abroad for agony and loss,
And called the kings of Christendom for swords about the Cross.
The cold queen of England is looking in the glass;
The shadow of the Valois is yawning at the Mass;
From evening isles fantastical rings faint the Spanish gun,
And the Lord upon the Golden Horn is laughing in the sun.

Dim drums throbbing, in the hills half heard,
Where only on a nameless throne a crownless prince has stirred,
Where, risen from a doubtful seat and half attainted stall,
The last knight of Europe takes weapons from the wall,
The last and lingering troubadour to whom the bird has sung,
That once went singing southward when all the world was young.
In that enormous silence, tiny and unafraid,
Comes up along a winding road the noise of the Crusade.
Strong gongs groaning as the guns boom far,
Don John of Austria is going to the war,
Stiff flags straining in the night-blasts cold
In the gloom black-purple, in the glint old-gold,
Torchlight crimson on the copper kettle-drums,
Then the tuckets, then the trumpets, then the cannon, and he comes.
Don John laughing in the brave beard curled,
Spurning of his stirrups like the thrones of all the world,
Holding his head up for a flag of all the free.
Love-light of Spain—hurrah!
Death-light of Africa!
Don John of Austria
Is riding to the sea.

Mahound is in his paradise above the evening star,
(Don John of Austria is going to the war.)
He moves a mighty turban on the timeless houri's knees,
His turban that is woven of the sunsets and the seas.
He shakes the peacock gardens as he rises from his ease,
And he strides among the tree-tops and is taller than the trees;
And his voice through all the garden is a thunder sent to bring
Black Azrael and Ariel and Ammon on the wing.
Giants and the Genii,
Multiplex of wing and eye,
Whose strong obedience broke the sky
When Solomon was king.

They rush in red and purple from the red clouds of the morn,
From the temples where the yellow gods shut up their eyes in scorn;
They rise in green robes roaring from the green hells of the sea
Where fallen skies and evil hues and eyeless creatures be,
On them the sea-valves cluster and the grey sea-forests curl,
Splashed with a splendid sickness, the sickness of the pearl;
They swell in sapphire smoke out of the blue cracks of the ground,—
They gather and they wonder and give worship to Mahound.
And he saith, "Break up the mountains where the hermit-folk can hide,
And sift the red and silver sands lest bone of saint abide,
And chase the Giaours flying night and day, not giving rest,
For that which was our trouble comes again out of the west.
We have set the seal of Solomon on all things under sun,
Of knowledge and of sorrow and endurance of things done.
But a noise is in the mountains, in the mountains, and I know
The voice that shook our palaces—four hundred years ago:
It is he that saith not 'Kismet'; it is he that knows not Fate;
It is Richard, it is Raymond, it is Godfrey at the gate!
It is he whose loss is laughter when he counts the wager worth,
Put down your feet upon him, that our peace be on the earth."
For he heard drums groaning and he heard guns jar,
(Don John of Austria is going to the war.)
Sudden and still—hurrah!
Bolt from Iberia!
Don John of Austria
Is gone by Alcalar.

St. Michaels on his Mountain in the sea-roads of the north
(Don John of Austria is girt and going forth.)
Where the grey seas glitter and the sharp tides shift
And the sea-folk labour and the red sails lift.
He shakes his lance of iron and he claps his wings of stone;
The noise is gone through Normandy; the noise is gone alone;
The North is full of tangled things and texts and aching eyes,
And dead is all the innocence of anger and surprise,
And Christian killeth Christian in a narrow dusty room,
And Christian dreadeth Christ that hath a newer face of doom,
And Christian hateth Mary that God kissed in Galilee,—
But Don John of Austria is riding to the sea.
Don John calling through the blast and the eclipse
Crying with the trumpet, with the trumpet of his lips,
Trumpet that sayeth ha![/i]
****Domino gloria!
Don John of Austria
Is shouting to the ships.

King Philip's in his closet with the Fleece about his neck
(Don John of Austria is armed upon the deck.)
The walls are hung with velvet that is black and soft as sin,
And little dwarfs creep out of it and little dwarfs creep in.
He holds a crystal phial that has colours like the moon,
He touches, and it tingles, and he trembles very soon,
And his face is as a fungus of a leprous white and grey
Like plants in the high houses that are shuttered from the day,
And death is in the phial and the end of noble work,
But Don John of Austria has fired upon the Turk.
Don John's hunting, and his hounds have bayed—
Booms away past Italy the rumour of his raid.
Gun upon gun, ha! ha!
Gun upon gun, hurrah!
Don John of Austria
Has loosed the cannonade.

The Pope was in his chapel before day or battle broke,
(Don John of Austria is hidden in the smoke.)
The hidden room in man's house where God sits all the year,
The secret window whence the world looks small and very dear.
He sees as in a mirror on the monstrous twilight sea
The crescent of his cruel ships whose name is mystery;
They fling great shadows foe-wards, making Cross and Castle dark,
They veil the plumèd lions on the galleys of St. Mark;
And above the ships are palaces of brown, black-bearded chiefs,
And below the ships are prisons, where with multitudinous griefs,
Christian captives sick and sunless, all a labouring race repines
Like a race in sunken cities, like a nation in the mines.
They are lost like slaves that sweat, and in the skies of morning hung
The stair-ways of the tallest gods when tyranny was young.
They are countless, voiceless, hopeless as those fallen or fleeing on
Before the high Kings' horses in the granite of Babylon.
And many a one grows witless in his quiet room in hell
Where a yellow face looks inward through the lattice of his cell,
And he finds his God forgotten, and he seeks no more a sign—
(But Don John of Austria has burst the battle-line!)
Don John pounding from the slaughter-painted poop,
Purpling all the ocean like a bloody pirate's sloop,
Scarlet running over on the silvers and the golds,
Breaking of the hatches up and bursting of the holds,
Thronging of the thousands up that labour under sea
White for bliss and blind for sun and stunned for liberty.

Vivat Hispania!
Domino Gloria!
Don John of Austria
Has set his people free!

Cervantes on his galley sets the sword back in the sheath
(Don John of Austria rides homeward with a wreath.)
And he sees across a weary land a straggling road in Spain,
Up which a lean and foolish knight for ever rides in vain,
And he smiles, but not as Sultans smile, and settles back the blade....
(But Don John of Austria rides home from the Crusade.)

Fodoron.
 
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Senators,

The third treacherous attack by the Austrians did not caught us unprepared. Our best general, Giulio Savorgnano was in Tirol, with all our artillery, and the Italian army, under command of colonel Dandolo, was quickly shipped to Istria. Aureo Barbarigo was ordered to come from Macedonia as quickly as possible, while 10,000 Stradioti cavalry was shipped from Egypt in slow galleys, leaving a reduced Africa Corps under command of colonel Cornaro in Nile.

Due to the strengh of the Austro-Bavarian army invading Tirol, we ordered Savorgnano to retreat to Venice through Mantua. Dandolo tried to defend Istria, but was defeated by the Austrian reinforcements brought into battle. It was regretable, but we lacked all initiative. Tirol and Istria were invaded by very strong forces, while more Austrian armies waited in Steiermark, closing any access to Austria or Bavaria. So I assambled two armies, one under command of Savorgnano in Veneto, and a bigger one under command of Dandolo in Dalmatia. Soon Trieste (Istria) fell into Austrian hands, unable to resist an assault constantly reinforced by fresh troops. Our fleet was ready to evacuate our forces from Dalmatia or even Veneto in an attempt to outmanoeuver our stronger enemy. The situation was bleak.

1581.jpg

Then we received the news that the Duke of Savoy had joined our cause. Its effect on the battlefield was immense, as the Austrian forces evacuated Istria, and through Steiermark and Tirol went to Baden, leaving an opening for our forces to the heart of Austria. While Daniele Barbaro tried to recover Trieste, the army of Dandolo penetrated Austria, leaving Seboden to siege Odenburg, and establishing a siege also in Presburg and Moravia. Savorgnano took control of the siege of Steiermark, while Miozozny took the artillery to the impresive walls of Vienna. In little more than three months, Istria and five Austrian provinces were under siege. But by then Tirol was lost to Bavaria, making it two to nil against us. Our warscore reached its lowest point, -12.

1581d.jpg

But the war quickly turned into our favor. Odenburg was captured by Seboden, and although Dandolo had to abandon the siege of Moravia due to a particularly harsh winter, Presburg soon fell into the hands of Cuthbertus. A little over a year into the war, with a few battles won against small Austrian armies, and after the recovery of Istria by Daniele Barbaro, the warscore turned into a positive +5. We are winning this war!

1581e.jpg

Dandolo tried to capture Ostmarch, but finally was forced to retreat, as the Austrians reorganize their defenses. Meanwhile Savoy has lost Baden, and we are worried that Charles Emmanuel might drop from the war. Daniele Barbaro is sent to recover Tirol as a first step to participate in the Western front.

1582.jpg

It is May 1582, and after only 18 months of war, Vienna surrenders to Miozozny. Rudolph becomes our prisoner, but he refuses to come to terms, since he still holds Tirol and Baden. I give orders to have the emperor taken to Venice, as this is an issue for our Doge to negotiate. After the conquest of Steiermark by Savorgnano, and the fall of Alsace into the hands of Charles Emmanuel, who leads his armies in person, I inform the Doge that perhaps this is a good time to negotiate a peace, as the resistance of Tirol to our armies and Franche-Comte to the Saboyards is determined, and big Austrian armies are assembling North of the Danube. Vassalization of Bavaria is impossible, as they are a vassal of Austria, while vassalization of Austria will require a frontal assault against the stronger and more numerous Austrian armies. Up until now the war has been relatively cheap, as our loses are light, less than 10% of our forces, and half of those due to attrition.

Fodoroni
 
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To: High Command, Signoria, Maggior Consiglio.
From: Capitano generale della gente de terra Augustus Fodoroni.
Regarding: Major operations during the war of 1585-1589 against the Ottoman Empire.
Restriction: Confidential. For your eyes only.

1. Theater of operations: Ottoman provinces in Europe.
This theater of operations was the least conflictive of all. Colonel Miozozny was designated in charge of the operations, with an army made of our siege artillery and a few knights and a small regiment of infantry to protect the artillery from attrition. The sieging capabilities of Miozozny's army were amazing, and he was able to surrender in a quick succession the Ottoman provinces in Europe. Serbia in 1585, Rumelia in 1586, and Dobrudja and Bujak in 1587. After the fall of Bujak, Miozozny's forces were assigned to general Savorgnan's army in the siege of Smyrna. No battles were fought in this sector.


1588b.jpg


Dots and dates indicate the capture of the province.
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2. Theater of operations: Levant.
Despite not having sufficient troops in Egypt, the lack of enemy activity at the beginning of the war allowed our forces to have the initiative. The main commanders in the sector were Colonel Norrefeldt from the Africa Corps, and Colonel Seboden on command of the Indian Colonial Army, that arrived from Kerala. Colonel Gandolfi was in charge of conquering Quattara with new recruits.

1585d.jpg

The conquest of Sinai and Jordan at the end of the first year of war, provoked an Ottoman reaction, and the army of Colonel Gatt was almost destroyed, with the survivors being incorporated into Norrefeldt's army. After that our armies avoided direct confrontation, while taking advantage of the Ottoman lack of follow through to continue conquering provinces. Judea and Quattara in 1586, Samaria and Syria in 1587, and while Norrefeldt continued the conquest of Lebanon and Aleppo in 1588, Seboden's forces, reinforced by those of Gandolfi, were asigned to Colonel Lando's army. Norrefeldt's army is currently in Adana.


1588c.jpg


Dots and dates indicate the capture of the province. Crosses indicate major battles (lost). Minor battles won are not indicated. In red, Norrefeldt and Mikael Gatt. In blue, Seboden. In green Arturo Gandolfi. Gandolfi's forces joined Seboden army at Syria, and they joined Lando's army at Nuyssaybin.
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3. Theater of operations: North.
Colonel Benito Lando's army was too small (9k men) to assign it a main role in the offensive, and so his modest goals were to secure the North through the conquest of Sochi, and to attempt the capture of Trabzon, as one of the possible war prizes. However, by 1586, Lando had accomplished both, and clearly the enemy was unable to respond efficiently to a multifront war. So Lando was given permission to continue capturing Ottoman provinces. In 1587 he captured Kurdistan, and the next year Nuyssaybin, despite suffering a defeat in his first attempt. He was then reinforced with Seboden's colonial army before capturing Sivas, just two months ago, in October 1588. He is currently in Angora.


1588d.jpg


Dots and dates indicate the capture of the province.
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Continues...
 
4. Theater of Operations: Thrace and Anatolia.
The invassion of Thrace by 90,000 Ottoman troops, while about 75,000 more remained in Asia Minor, indicated clearly were the bloodiest battles were going to take place. Murad had assigned his best general, Ferhad Pasha, to the invassion force, and his best admiral, Piali Pasha to guard the straits. We did the same. The Ottoman navy is smaller than ours, and Piali decided not to fight for the supremacy in the Aegean and set to port. The arrival of general Savorgnano after a failed assault on Constantinople, surprised the Ottomans and allowed the lifting of the siege, but Savorgnano was no match for Ferhad Pasha, and soon the Ottomans were again at the walls of Constantinople, while we were licking our wounds and constantly recruiting new soldiers.

1585b.jpg

But Savorgnano did not gave up and continued attacking with as big an army as we could support, because he noticed that attrition was making the Ottoman loses superior to ours, while they were not replacing the loses with new recruits. At the third battle lost by Savorgnan, only 16,000 Ottoman sipahi (cavalry) were left, and since they could not siege Constantinople, they also retreated, but at the end of the month they did not have a safe place to retire, so all of them were disbanded. The body of the great Ottoman general, Ferhad Pasha, has been identified. Savorgnano had just fullfilled his first mission, as no Ottoman soldiers were left alive in Europe, and the Ottoman army had been reduced to half, although at a great cost.

Taking advantage of the increasing problems of the Ottomans to be everywhere, Savorgnan landed in Anatolia, and despite being repelled the first time by an Ottoman reaction, the second time he established a stable siege on Bursa, reinforced by new landings. After the fall of Bursa, a siege was set in Smyrna also. After the fall of Smyrna in May 1588, it was considered that Savorgnan had completed satisfactorily all his goals. An Ottoman army trying to recover Bursa was anihilated, because after the death of Ferhand Pasha, Savorgnano performs much better than the default Ottoman colonels.

1588e.jpg

5. Final status.
After the capture of Smyrna, the conquest of Sivas and Aleppo in October, has increased our warscore to the maximum (99%). There is no point in continuing the war. Of the 26 Ottoman provinces, we have captured 19, and three more are under siege, one of them Tripolitania by the Spaniards. Murad controls only 4 of his provinces. The Ottoman army was destroyed down to 4,000 men, although it has increased back to 14,000. Our forces are being kept at 95,000 men, to discourage a backstabing by the Austrian emperor.

1588f.jpg


Shaded Ottoman provinces are under control of Venice. Red dots indicate provinces currently under siege by Venice and Spain.
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Fodoroni
 
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Diaries of the fourth Veneto-Austrian war of 1594-1598
By Fodoroni

I. The first year of war. 1594

July
By now the senators must be bored to death with my tactics on dealing with the Austrians and Bavarians, but they never seem to learn from past mistakes. However there is always room for improvement. I have come to notice that instead of assembling their army before sending it to attack Tirol, the Germans like to send their detachments as soon as they are ready, assembling their troops at the siege of Tirol. I have decided to exploit that weakness, and already before the war started, I had our biggest army stationed in Tirol, under the orders of General Giulio Savorgnano. The results were amazing, as he was able to win six battles, before loses and attrition reduced his army to dangerous levels, and he was ordered back to Veneto. From then on attrition would continue fighting our enemies in the Alps.

August
Baden from Savoy and Venetian Tirol are the main goals of our enemies. Our goals are multiple. While Savorgnano defends our northern borders, Ernesto Gandolfi has arrived to Romagna with his cavalry from Holy Land. The situation in Emilia is forcing us to keep an army tied up awaiting developments there.

September
Charles Emmanuel II of Savoy leads his 30,000 men into Franche-Comté. He must react to the invasion of Baden by Bavaria and Austria, but he leaves Savoie undefended, giving a chance to Dauphiné. At the same time, the main Austrian army of 65,000 men in Steiermark marchs towards Tirol. The armies of Fabio Trevisan in Veneto, and Brynano Cornaro in Istria, both with 20,000 men, have now their chance to invade Austria.

October
Fabio Trevisan sets siege to Steiermark, while Cornaro continues towards Odenburg. Meanwhile Bavaria establishes a siege also in Alsace.

November
Cornaro leaves Roberto Contarini in charge of the siege of Odenburg and crosses the Danube to Presburg. So far the war is playing like a script, except that Savoy is receiving a strong attack, and might not resist it until the end of the war.

December
Brynano Cornaro leaves Angelo Pesaro in charge of the siege of Presburg. But winter has arrived and due to heavy snowing in Moravia, Cornaro decides to attack Erz, since the fortifications in Ostmarch and Bohemia are too strong for his army. Savorgnano arrives to Veneto. Tirol will have to resist itself.

At the end of the first year, we have already entered Austria, where there is little resistance. We have established three sieges, but our enemies have established another three.

1595w.jpg

II. The second year of war. 1595

January
Winter seems to ally with our enemies. The Savoyards are hit by snow in Franche-Comté, while Angelo Pesaro sees also his siege in danger, and must abandon Presburg, and go to Moravia, now free of snow.

February
The worst of the winter is past. Cornaro and Pesaro establish sieges at Erz and Moravia respectively. Dauphiné finally decides to attack Savoie with her 30,000 men. This does not look good for our ally, now reduced to 14,000 men. I send him messages urging him to resist. The army of Savorgnano has recovered its morale, and is sent with all the artillery to siege Viena, the capital of the Austrian empire. The capture of Viena is essential to the war plans traced by the Signoria.

March
Alsace falls in the hands of Bavaria after a successful assault. Savoy is still trying to conquer Franche-Compté. Luckily for Charles Emmanuel, the siege of Baden is lifted by Austria. Apparently the siege of Tirol is a sink for Austrian regiments, and Ferdinand is nervous by the siege of Viena.

April
What a month! On the first of April, the Duchy of Parma declared independence from Savoy. Bastards, Charles Emmanuel is in no condition of recovering her soveraignty. What an April's fool joke. One of the rebels, Ranuccio, is elected Duke. We send Ernesto gandolfi to conquer the city and capture him. The next day I receive the news that Roberto Contarini has conquered Odenburg. Our first capture. I send him orders of proceeding to Presburg across the Danube. But Doge Cicogna could not celebrate the news. He was already quite sick, and he died on the second of April, barely after receiving the news about Parma. The election of our new Doge took the whole month, as it required 70 ballots over 24 days. Finally the extremely wealthy 63 years old Marino Grimani was elected our 89th Doge. Before Grimani was elected, Rannuccio I of Parma decided to ally with our enemies, Bavaria, Austria and Dauphiné. Great move. A week later Gandolfi has set siege to Modena (Emilia, Parma).

1595c.jpg

May
Bavaria sets siege to Baden. The crowning of our Dogaressa, Morosina Morosini is said to have been explendid. I am sorry I missed it, but it is good that the morale is high in the Serenissima. The Austrian armies can be in Tirol, but our armies are everywhere in Austria.

Fodoroni.
 
Along the history of Venice there hasn't been many Dogaressas, because most Doges were either bachelors or widows. Between these few Dogaressas, Morosina Morosini, the wife of Marino Grimani is remembered by history for the magnificence of her proclamation.

The most important events of the Serenissima Republic, including visits by kings and emperors and the crowning of the Dogaressa, culminated in a regatta, a spectacular exhibition of skill and pageantry that the citizenry joined in more enthusiastically than for any other festive occasion. Nobles, citizens, craftsmen and the general population took part in the preparations for the parade that preceded the regatta, adorning their boats at their own expense with all kinds of precious materials and props, often designed by leading artists. Very often indeed the water parades mounted in Venice had a special magical quality about them - so magnificent was the choreography, and so exorbitant the luxury. But the parade that accompanied the celebrations for the coronation of the Dogaressa Morosina Morosini, dearly loved wife of Doge Marino Grimani, was a triumph of pomp such as is seen only in fairy stories: an absolutely astonishing scene. It was the 4th May 1597 when the Duchess boarded the Bucintoro, the gilded ship of the Republic on state occasions. The Doge’s wife was dressed in gold cloth with a silver floral-patterned gold cloak. On her head she bore the ducal horn-shaped hat from which trailed a silk veil, and at her breast was a golden necklace and a diamond-studded cross. She also wore the golden rose, a present from Pope Clemente VIII for the ocassion. She was accompanied by the magistrates, and gentlewomen dressed in white and silver silk robes with very large pearls and precious jewels set in the collars and in their hair. There were also two dwarves who appeared as though out of some legend.

1595doga.jpg

The Bucintoro, in gold and silk embroidered bunting, was followed by a crowd of boats. The small ship of the cotton-wool merchants – or bombasari – was very beautiful. It took the form of an ancient chariot drawn by two huge marine horses “so well got up that they seemed to be straining at their harness and prancing”. On the bow, Adriatic - the marine god - restrained the horses; at the stern, Neptune held the tiller. Other figures represented the allegory of Venice astride two lions, crowning the Doge and Dogaressa respectively flanked by Justice and Religion, and Faith and Prudence. Then, making its spectacular but elegant progression was a temple called “Theatre of the world”, drawn along by four boats: designed by Scamozzi, it accommodated the gentlemen organizers of the festivity. There were gondolas with fringes and tassels of every colour, gilded barges adorned with statues, dolphins and tritons; and boats furbished with dazzlingly coloured drapes and gold veils embroidered with stars, feathers, flowers and bas-relief decorations.

1595bucen.gif

The parade passed along the Grand Canal and music and bells provided the “soundtrack”. In the background, artillery thundered and there were volleys of firecrackers. Bridges, quaysides, windows and rooftops were packed with people acclaiming Morosina.

After three days of festivity and games, finally came the regatta. Along the usual course – the marsh of Sant’Antonio (now the Giardini area), St Mark’s Basin, rounding the marker pole at Rio de la Crose, and then returning to the “Machine” in the vicinity of Ca’ Foscari – dashed the boats decorated with deluxe fittings and manned by curiously dressed oarsmen. The regatta brought the festival to a close. For three days, Venice had revelled in displaying its pride and opulence… and its fairytale-like marvels.


After Daniela Zamburlin, slightly modified by Fodoron.
 
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Diaries of the fourth Veneto-Austrian war of 1594-1598
By Fodoroni

(Second part, 1595)

June
It has been 12 months of war, and our citizens are still taking it rather well. We have lost about 10,000 men only. However Giulio Savorgnano died during the siege of Vienna. Our general, that so well served us in so many campaigns, was wounded in the leg a few months ago. Although initially he did not think much of it, just one more scar, his wound became infected, and nothing could be done for him. Colonel Svantevid has inherited the command of our army at Viena. Honors to the hero that died fighting for his country.

August
Brynano Cornaro captures Erz, and moves to Bohemia. He will need reinforcements to establish a siege there, but the sieges at Presburg and Moravia are about to conclude.

September
A good month for the alliance. Charles Emmanuel captures Franche-Comté, while Roberto Contarini captures Presburg, and Angelo Pesaro conquers Moravia. The war could be finished to our advantage right now, but the instructions of the Consiglio are clear. Unconditional surrender from Austria. Pesaro and Contarini are ordered to reinforce Cornaro. The time for tactics is past and we must prepare for some tough fighting.

1595wb.jpg

October
Ernesto Gandolfi conquers Modena, and takes Rannuccio to Venice. Apparently he convinced the Doge that the Parmesans were not willing to be ruled by Savoy, but they were willing to become Venice vassals. I don't really care, what matters to me is that Gandolfi's army is finally available for the war, where he is badly needed in the Western front.

December
We are having unusually mild winters. While this is good for our troops in Austria, it is also helping our enemies in Tirol, that have not seen any snow in two winters.

III. The third year of war. 1596

January
After the worse Christmas in their lifes, the citizens of Viena surrender their city to Svantevid. One of our major goals has been accomplished. Let's hope we can defend the city until the end of the war. Svantevid is ordered to cross the Danube and attack Ostmarch. Also Fabio Trevisan finally conquers Steiermark and moves to Salzburg. Ferdinand Habsburg has not much left. Ernesto Gandolfi, however, is defeated in Tirol by Ferdinand Wittelbach of Bavaria. There is no point in fighting him. Not even Savorgnano could defeat him. The Bavarians are turning once more into our stronger enemy.

1596w.jpg

February
We have reached a sweet standing in the war. Ferdinand Habsburg offers us Steiermark, and Franche-Comté for Savoy, plus money for all, but the Signoria rejects the offer. Charles Emmanuel protests loudly. He is under dire circumstances, and does not understand our unwillingness to settle for such good offer. I hope for his own good that he sits tight, and he will be able to come out of the war in good order.

April
I am afraid things are starting to go wrong for the alliance. Bavaria has conquered Baden from Savoy and Tirol from us. Counting their many victories, our warscore is quite negative against them, and Ferdinand Wittelbach is quick to reclaim Tirol (overall ws. +54. Against Bavaria -21).

June
Our attempts to recover Tirol end in more failure.

July
The Austrians set siege to recover Franche-Comté.

August
Savoie is conquered by Dauphiné. Charles Emmanuel only controls Bern, now. The East front continues providing victories, as Svantevid conquers Ostmarch, and moves to Sudeten. The Habsburg can now only recruit in Würtemberg.

September
The armies of Dauphiné invade Piemonte.

October
Cornaro captures Bohemia. It is time to invade Bavaria and he is ordered to Ansbach. It is a difficult capture since the supply limit of the province is lower than the number of troops required to establish a siege. Ernesto Gandolfi makes a brave attempt at stopping Ferdinand of Bavaria from joining the siege of Piemonte, attacking him in Lombardia with cavalry, but there is no case. When he recovers from the defeat and is reinforced, he is sent to recover Tirol.

1596wb.jpg

November
Ferdinand of Bavaria arrives to Piemonte and launches an assault conquering the fortress. He keeps insisting that Tirol should be surrendered to him. To make things worse, the Austrians recover Franche-Comté. From the initial 5 provinces at the beginning of the war, Charles Emmanuel only controls Bern. He feels abandoned by us in his refuge in Bayreuth.

December
While the Bavarian troops return through Franche-Comté, the French of Dauphiné invade Lombardia.

After two and a half years of war, the enemy is recovering. We must now fight to establish and lift sieges, and the casualties are raising quickly. We can still get our goals, but we must out-spend our enemies, and accept staggering casualties.

IV. The fourth year of war. 1597

January
Awful winter conditions in Ansbach leave our army out of supplies, forcing Cornaro to lift the siege and retire to Sudeten with Svantevid, as his army has suffered grave loses.

February
Salzburg is captured by Fabio Trevisan. He is to cross the river to Ostmarch and then proceed to Ansbach.

1597w.jpg

May
Fabio Trevisan is defeated in Ansbach and has to lift the siege.

June
Ernesto Gandolfi recovers Tirol. Bavaria asks for Piemonte.

July
All our forces in the Easter front, 42,000 men, are concentrated in a single army in Sudeten, to protect that siege from a strong Bavarian army of 23,000 men entetring Austria. Ernesto Gandolfi defeats the French in Lombardia and pursues them to Piemonte.

August
Ernesto Gandolfi defeats the French again and establish a siege to recover Piemonte. Sudeten is conquered by Cornaro (most senior commander). The regiments are reorganized. A new regiment with all the artillery and troops to protect it, is send to Ansbach under command of Norrefeldt. Cornaro takes the rest of the troops through Ostmarch and Salzburg towards Bayern.

November
A dance has started. Austria is defeated, but keeps a 35,000 army going around trying to decide where to attack. Bavaria keeps also a 35,000 army defending Bayern. Our forces are split in the sieges of Piemonte and Ansbach, and Cornaro's army is no match for our enemies.

After three and a half years of war, we seem to have reached a limit. All the Eastern Austrian provinces have been conquered, but conquering the Western provinces and Bavaria requires a lot of fighting.

V. The fifth year of war. 1598

January
This is indeed a very long war. We are at present fighting against three nations without any help, and our allies have become more a liability than an asset, as our enemies keep a high warscore over Savoy.

March
Dauphiné establish a siege on Bern.

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May
Piemonte surrenders to Ernesto Gandolfi.

July
I had to take a rather difficult decission. The last province of Savoy is under siege. When Ernesto Gandolfi arrived to Savoie, I ordered him to continue to Dauphiné instead of recovering Savoie. The reason is clear. By recovering Savoie, we would still have a negative warscore against Dauphiné, while if we conquer her capital, we could easily knock the French out of the war and recover Savoie all at the same time. Neither Dauphiné, nor Bavaria are our enemies, so we don't want anything from them. However to Charles Emmanuel of Savoy this accounts to treason. There is nothing left to him to hope, since even his Venetian allies refuse to liberate his capital.

September
Austria has established a siege at Steiermark, while Ferdinand of Bavaria tries to recover Viena.

October
Charles Emmanuel decides to end the war by surrendering Alsace and Baden to Bavaria. Too bad for our ally. But for us it means that all our goals are suddenly fullfilled. Immediatly the Signoria signs a white peace with Dauphiné. After all a draw is a victory for the defendant. With Bavaria we still have a negative warscore, so we wait for a few weeks until Norrefeldt conquers Ansbach, and Ferdinand of Baviera is just too happy to sign a white peace. After all he is the big victor of the war, with two new German provinces.

On the same day, Ferdinand Habsburg accepts to become our vassal and pays 150[,000] ducats in war indemnities to be shared with Spain and Jerusalem. The war is over.

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