Allowing self determination for the former Soviet citizens. Hitler would have probably rolled into history as the great liberator rather than the foolish conqueror.
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If Life gave Hitler a second chance,what must he do for Germany to gain a favourable outcome in WW2?
- Thread starter Magnus Imperator Rex
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Hitler should have chosen to lead economically rather than emotionally. The money that was used to separate the desirable from the undesirable could have been used to separate the innocent from the guilty, and his wrath could have been directed against those who didn't pay taxes rather than to those who were of a specific ethnicity. He could have actually studied Nietzsche rather than using him out of context to make a society based on individual responsibility rather than state-babysitting. He could have improved on the already existing systems of communism and capitalism into what would have been known to be the bastion of freedom.
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@PhroX, Of course it stands without question, that Germany was screwed the day it decided to wage war. I just wanted to single out the Battle of Britain because It was pretty much the point where the limitations of their war machine suddenly became glaringly obvious and there was no longer any short term military solution for the mess they were in.
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The opposite view in a book......
Ian Kershaw: Hitler
Product details
- Paperback: 1072 pages
- Publisher: Penguin (25 Feb. 2009)
- Language: English
- ISBN-10: 0141035889
- ISBN-13: 978-0141035888
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The opposite view in the English curriculum
https://www.google.co.uk/search?esp...qKnJAhUHvBQKHcI3ByoQvwUIGygA&biw=1341&bih=933
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Kensai7 has a long, detailed, well illustrated, and fascinating HOI3 AAR based on a Bismarckian approach to German domination, something I find an attractive approach to try in HOI4. War as a final resort once other means have accomplished all they can, which is quite a lot.
Hitler was quick to pull the trigger and resort to aggression and force since it seemed to work well for him, so much so that it seemed to remove self-doubt about his military judgment and deprecate the wisdom of his generals. Rash pride goeth before a fall. Like the declaration of war on the US, which was good public relations but rash and unnecessary - a gift beyond price to Churchill and Roosevelt.
Then there are also the unlikely snafus that divert history. Yamamoto understood the US and knew it was critical that the declaration of war be delivered prior to the first attack on the US so that Japan's belligerency would be lawful. The long exposition of Japan's claims and grievances and declaration of war was translated slowly and delivered late. At that point, what the Japanese said no longer mattered - the Secretary of State wanted the president to deliver a detailed rebuttal of the Japanese document to Congress in his war speech, but Roosevelt realized that the key element that would most anger, unite and commit the previously divided American public for a war to the utter defeat of of the dastardly Japanese was the treacherous nature of the sneak attack in peacetime and his speech was one of the more magnificent and effective ones on record.
Had the Japanese been timely with their declaration of war, their declaration would have to have been addressed on the merits, which would have weakened and diffused the message that the devil was at the door.
On the economic side, the US could outbuild Japan in a war of attrition. Everyone knew it. But many Japanese considered the Americans soft and unlikely to accept a long war of attrition over Japan's activity in Asia, especially given the strong anti-war sentiment before Pearl Harbor. The strategy was to disarm the US for a year or so and then build a defensive position so strong that the US would accept a realpolitik (EU4 style) peace that recognized Japan's Asian conquests and ideally restored the US colonial possession of Hawaii to Japan (it was by virtue of Japanese settlement considered by Japanese since the 19th century as a natural part of the Empire, as 1930s-40s propaganda expounded). Americans did not and do not appreciate the level of the Empire's interest in Hawaii. Of course, the Japanese in turn did not appreciate how attached Americans were to Hawaii, and became all the more so after Pearl Harbor. (See John J. Stephan's "Hawaii Under the Rising Sun (Japan's Plans for Conquest After Pearl Harbor)", a rare study on this topic.)
Was also reading "Rising Sun Victorious" recently - one of the many books with military historians speculating on some of the many military what ifs of the Pacific War - some good chapters for event modders -
Hitler was quick to pull the trigger and resort to aggression and force since it seemed to work well for him, so much so that it seemed to remove self-doubt about his military judgment and deprecate the wisdom of his generals. Rash pride goeth before a fall. Like the declaration of war on the US, which was good public relations but rash and unnecessary - a gift beyond price to Churchill and Roosevelt.
Then there are also the unlikely snafus that divert history. Yamamoto understood the US and knew it was critical that the declaration of war be delivered prior to the first attack on the US so that Japan's belligerency would be lawful. The long exposition of Japan's claims and grievances and declaration of war was translated slowly and delivered late. At that point, what the Japanese said no longer mattered - the Secretary of State wanted the president to deliver a detailed rebuttal of the Japanese document to Congress in his war speech, but Roosevelt realized that the key element that would most anger, unite and commit the previously divided American public for a war to the utter defeat of of the dastardly Japanese was the treacherous nature of the sneak attack in peacetime and his speech was one of the more magnificent and effective ones on record.
Had the Japanese been timely with their declaration of war, their declaration would have to have been addressed on the merits, which would have weakened and diffused the message that the devil was at the door.
On the economic side, the US could outbuild Japan in a war of attrition. Everyone knew it. But many Japanese considered the Americans soft and unlikely to accept a long war of attrition over Japan's activity in Asia, especially given the strong anti-war sentiment before Pearl Harbor. The strategy was to disarm the US for a year or so and then build a defensive position so strong that the US would accept a realpolitik (EU4 style) peace that recognized Japan's Asian conquests and ideally restored the US colonial possession of Hawaii to Japan (it was by virtue of Japanese settlement considered by Japanese since the 19th century as a natural part of the Empire, as 1930s-40s propaganda expounded). Americans did not and do not appreciate the level of the Empire's interest in Hawaii. Of course, the Japanese in turn did not appreciate how attached Americans were to Hawaii, and became all the more so after Pearl Harbor. (See John J. Stephan's "Hawaii Under the Rising Sun (Japan's Plans for Conquest After Pearl Harbor)", a rare study on this topic.)
Was also reading "Rising Sun Victorious" recently - one of the many books with military historians speculating on some of the many military what ifs of the Pacific War - some good chapters for event modders -
Hitler was not a totalitarian dictator, that is true. He took a hands off approach to many systemic policy issues and made token attempts to place the state in every German home (mandatory heiling, e.g.), but largely left Germans not involved in the war effort to do as they pleased. I have read several authors that have noted that the Nazis had less direct state control of industry than any other major power in the war.
However, this is not really related to his security as dictator or his ability to set policy on his own initiative without the need for approval from influential power blocks. It's an interesting proposition, but I don't think much evidence supports it. If there were groups who could have threatened Hitler's continuation as Fuhrer if he did not attack the Soviet Union, then where were these groups when Hitler was making unpopular decisions and why couldn't they effect change then? Hitler's security as dictator mostly continued to grow even as the situation grew hopeless. Yes, there were assassination attempts and the Valkyrie coup attempt, but if his position was so tenuous that he was locked into extremely dangerous policies that he supposedly lacked interest in, then why did they not only fail but the Reich continued on with business as usual afterwards?
Ah, that was under some extenuating circumstances. There were many in the Japanese government and military who were willing to continue the war, but the Emperor and several key officials put their feet down. Japan had been driven to some pretty desperate straits already by years of conventional bombing, too.
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Playing Devil's advocate. The nukes in Japan would disagree with your statement.
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Although there would be many dozens of decisions that could have altered things, I'll whittle it down a bit;
1. Initiate the 72 hour work week on Sept 1, 1939.
2. Make sure that everyone understands the the PZ Mk III is to be rearmed with the 50MM high velocity gun--not the low velocity gun.
3. Do everything possible to keep the U.S. out of the war--certainly do not issue a DoW against the U.S. until victory is assured.
4. Get Martin Borman out of Berlin. Put him on a sub to Madagascar as a spy--anything.
5. Revoke Dr Morrell's credentials and perhaps send him to prison.
6. Force Goering to check into a rehab center.
7. Replace Todt with someone else who thinks outside of the box.
8. Do whatever is required to help Italy capture Malta--ASAP.
9. Uh, plan on two campaigns (2 years) to defeat the USSR.
There is no way to know for certain how a world wide conflict would end, but those few suggestions would have put Germany on the road to possible victory--instead of certain defeat.
1. Initiate the 72 hour work week on Sept 1, 1939.
2. Make sure that everyone understands the the PZ Mk III is to be rearmed with the 50MM high velocity gun--not the low velocity gun.
3. Do everything possible to keep the U.S. out of the war--certainly do not issue a DoW against the U.S. until victory is assured.
4. Get Martin Borman out of Berlin. Put him on a sub to Madagascar as a spy--anything.
5. Revoke Dr Morrell's credentials and perhaps send him to prison.
6. Force Goering to check into a rehab center.
7. Replace Todt with someone else who thinks outside of the box.
8. Do whatever is required to help Italy capture Malta--ASAP.
9. Uh, plan on two campaigns (2 years) to defeat the USSR.
There is no way to know for certain how a world wide conflict would end, but those few suggestions would have put Germany on the road to possible victory--instead of certain defeat.
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Given scenario:
1.9.1939 Germany at war with Poland.
First choice: withdraw and avoid British and French dow few days later. --> doesn't equal victory in any way, so let's discard that.
Germany did almost perfectly in 1939 (blitzing Poland and not attacking France in winter), so let's skip to 1940.
1940:
Norway was alright, although it cost the Kriegsmarine dearly further hindering Sealion, but that was unrealistic anyways.
Fall Gelb went perfectly until Dunkerque. That was Hitler's first huge blunder. With about 250.000 Allied p.o.w. the diplomatic possibilities would have been endless in this fateful summer.
Germany's best chance at victory was the summer of 1940. Churchill's position would have been weak with a disaster at Dunkerque.
Hitler then should have proposed a white peace with Britain and France, restoring the Low Countries and the Scandinavian conquests, only keeping Poland.
There's zero reason why that should not have worked. What sane person in France and Britain wouldn't have accepted that proposal? Churchill of course, but he would have been ousted out of power.
I won't go any further than 1940 cause the rest is way too complex. Barbarossa has been discussed into oblivion, the US-dow as well...
PS: Hitler 2.0 should have immediately backpedalled on the Jewish question. German propaganda accused jews of becoming lawyers and doctors instead of taking "honest" jobs. Yeah... Pol Pot had similar views.
This fictional Hitler 2.0 should have apologized for any harm done to the German jews pre-war to avoid further brain-drain and diplomatic consequences. Seriously, chasing away the single most productive demographic is retarded!
1.9.1939 Germany at war with Poland.
First choice: withdraw and avoid British and French dow few days later. --> doesn't equal victory in any way, so let's discard that.
Germany did almost perfectly in 1939 (blitzing Poland and not attacking France in winter), so let's skip to 1940.
1940:
Norway was alright, although it cost the Kriegsmarine dearly further hindering Sealion, but that was unrealistic anyways.
Fall Gelb went perfectly until Dunkerque. That was Hitler's first huge blunder. With about 250.000 Allied p.o.w. the diplomatic possibilities would have been endless in this fateful summer.
Germany's best chance at victory was the summer of 1940. Churchill's position would have been weak with a disaster at Dunkerque.
Hitler then should have proposed a white peace with Britain and France, restoring the Low Countries and the Scandinavian conquests, only keeping Poland.
There's zero reason why that should not have worked. What sane person in France and Britain wouldn't have accepted that proposal? Churchill of course, but he would have been ousted out of power.
I won't go any further than 1940 cause the rest is way too complex. Barbarossa has been discussed into oblivion, the US-dow as well...
PS: Hitler 2.0 should have immediately backpedalled on the Jewish question. German propaganda accused jews of becoming lawyers and doctors instead of taking "honest" jobs. Yeah... Pol Pot had similar views.
This fictional Hitler 2.0 should have apologized for any harm done to the German jews pre-war to avoid further brain-drain and diplomatic consequences. Seriously, chasing away the single most productive demographic is retarded!
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Agreed. Maybe if Germany had been less nazi and more...european, they could have probably built the bomb with all those smart jewish scientists.
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How about Halifax coming power in Britain instead if Churchill. Halifax wanted to make a separate peace with Germany, and he was even willing to give some concessions to the Germans. Whereas Churchill was willing to sacrifice the Empire to contain Hitler, Halifax wished to maintain what he could of Britain's colonies. It was possible for Germany to keep all their gains after the Battle of France, and make peace with Britain. Without Lend Lease or the British blockade, Germany would have a much easier time getting much needed raw materials, which could turn the tide of the war in the East once Barbarossa kicks off. After Hitler gains his Lebensraum, there will be no penetrating Fortress Europe, and Nazi Europe and America could face off in a Cold War.
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I believe european (small e) is the new civilized. Not sure what the new words for savage, barbarian, or smelly due to failure to understand basic hygiene through supposedly willful ignorance are.
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Yes, Germany's economy was very short term and would have collapsed if they remained peaceful. Still, it gets them the Danzig, which is what OP was asking about. He gets what he wants. Now, how to keep it...
France of course! Russia is mostly Asia, geographically speaking, and France is more to the center of Europe than Italy is. Plus, Italy sucks. You... with your pizza... and beautiful coastlines...
I used european as a synonym of sophisticated/civil. The truth is that Germany was led to doom by this radical leadership who were mostly uncouth working class plebs. No real geopolitical mastery or diplomacy game. The nazis were the total opposite of the traditional refined german establishment. No wonder, as they came from the periphery of german culture. Bismarck would be ashamed of them. Remember, this was after all, the homeland of Goethe, Bethoven, Einstein, Nietzche, Wagner, to name a few. The nazis as a sociopolitical phenomenom were the exception rather than the norm in german historiography.
And to respond your question, imo Italy in essence & symbolically for being the birthplace of Roman and Western Civilization.
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Reading this thread has made me 99% sure Hitler could pretty much not won the war after 40
I wouldn't be so sure. A better led Germany with a more rational ( that is, no insane racial ideology) and a more limited and realistic foreign policy agenda ( that is, don't fight most of the world's major powers at the same time ), has much better chances in my opinion to achieve a favourable state of power in a post-war order. I'm thinking, more like 1871, less 1941. More realpolitik, less political idealism.
Well, he was welcomed into the country by places such as Ukraine. The problem is they soon turned against him when they realised the SS and death-squads parading around weren't exactly any better than Stalin. - Though, Stalin exacted swift and terrible retribution against these peoples for their support of the German Army anyway... I feel sorry for them really, as they were in a lose-lose situation.
I think the key point the started the 'turn' of the tide, so to speak, is the disaster of Crete. He was won over by one of his generals to do that air invasion with paratroops and gliders, and the cost was so high that it not only closed his mind to what would be another avenue of modern warfare, but it also seems to have turned him against listening to his General's advice, or at the very least hardened his resolve against being persuaded to do things differently.
From that point on, the "Listen to your generals" point, as broad and as boring as it is, becomes important to the discussion. Because it was no longer a case of the generals putting forward ridiculous or ambitious ideas that were being rejected, but a simple matter of manoeuvrability and survival. Once Hitler had decided that mobile warfare was to be dispensed with in favour of static and unrelenting defence, that was it, the war was lost. I genuinely believe that Germany could have upset the apple cart with the Soviet Union, particularly if they waged a more mobile defensive war, or if they took the time to build up the defences/numbers before the re-assumption of offences, something which was neglected because Hitler believed that Germany as the aggressor couldn't be seen to lose the initiative. However, in doing exactly that, he lost the initiative.
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