If Germany controlled all of Continental Europe, where are the likely points of Allied Attack?

[Easy-Kill]

Germany didn't have much of a domestic car production in the interwar years. Trucks yes, some, but private automobile ownership was much lower than in France or UK.

Hmm. Well, very interesting. Thanks!

 

[Greenskyguy]

Interesting side note, in the First World War, Italy outproduced Germany in motor vehicles. In fact, Italy outproduced pretty much everyone save Britain, a nation several orders higher in economic development, and about 1/5th larger in population.

Interesting thing, would you have a source on that?

 

[DoomBunny]

Interesting thing, would you have a source on that?

Off the top of my head, John Gooch, The Italian Army and the First World War, (Cambridge University, Cambridge, 2014), I would however have to check the page number. This is part of an (as I understand it) ongoing series that Cambridge are doing, eventually planning to cover the armies of all major belligerents and give a reasonably lengthy and in depth study whilst remaining a single manageable volume.

For those interested, the Italian, French, American, and British volumes have been released so far. I have read the first three; Gooch's work on Italy is good and invaluable because one will find little else in English, Greenhalgh's work on the French army is excellent (as might be expected), and Woodward's coverage of the American army is somewhat middling IMO (I found it somewhat stand-offish, would have liked a more analytical approach, and also questioned some of his arguments).

 

[Zinegata]

Yeah, want to give me a quote for that, instead of pulling that out of your ass? At least tell me who said who to what?

Quote was by Admiral Jellicoe, lifted right out of Massie's Castles of Steel.

Yes, it worked, but at what cost?

War is hell. Sometimes there aren't easy answers. That's why Monty is perpetually underrated in popular history but was actually more popular among his men than many American commanders who supposedly "cared for their men". Monty knew that attacks that were costly in life and material were sometimes necessary, because if you don't tie down the enemy somewhere then they're simply free to redeploy and counter your maneuvers.

Patton for instance was only able to do his Cobra breakthrough because the British were bleeding in Caen. If the British weren't pushing hard and keeping the Germans occupied, the German Panzers could redeploy to face him in battle more easily.

The entire reason for Germany not using motors for logistics was lack of fuel. Unless we assume the Axis still haven't managed to tap the Baku when the Allies come knoking on Normandy (which you assume), this is much less of an issue.

Germany produced fewer trucks than General Motors on its own; indeed their main truck produce was a pre-war subsidiary of General Motors (Opel). Moreover getting oil from the Baku in the historical operation was a fool's errand. The Germans had no capability to restore oil production after Russian sabotage at the much smaller field at Maikop - the only oil city they captured - because all of their drilling equipment had been bought from America pre-war.

Point me to the point where I threw a hissy fit, let alone was trying to. Prove that part first. By your logic, you're throwing a hissy fit over Tuscany.

Pointing out that Tuscany is completely strategically useless is not a hissy fit. Arguing it's a valid invasion location without presenting any facts to back it up is throwing a hissy fit.

Seriously, stop acting like a child and using the arguments of one.

Secondly, if I knew everything from the start, and why, I wouldn't have made this thread in the first place. If I wasn't willing to present wrong ideas, I would not have made this thread. I don't know if it is wrong if no one tells me, because I can't read people's minds. People have different posting behaviors.

Maybe consider that before acting like a complete douchebag?

Why do you think I am still responding despite your insistence on bad and unfeasible ideas, like your avoidance of attrition which is in fact just an avoidance of battle itself?

People are going to die in a war. In many cases the casualties will seem very high for the advantages gained. But the most essential - and indeed most unavoidable - point about the actual wartime American War Plan (the "VIctory Plan") is that Germany cannot be defeated by avoiding the issue of "fighting the German Army". It has to be fought and defeated at some point. Tuscany doesn't do that. Italy doesn't do that. Only the reconquest of France and the Ruhr gets you there.

And a note: Some folks have suggested attacking Romania and the oil fields, but it's worth remembering that Germany already had large-scale synthetic oil production; and most of this was based in the Ruhr. Romania would certainly rob the Germans of a great deal of mobility, but the Ruhr factories will still produce synthetic oil and still make bullets. Capturing it will still generate the most far-reaching economic effects that will cause a collapse of the German Army and nation as a whole.

That is why the German Army won't just sit quietly and allow the Ruhr to fall, and that is why the strategic battle plan must assume a great battle between the Allied and German armies. And that battle plan needs to play to Allied strategic strengths - intelligence-gathering, air superiority, and strategic mobility - rather than their weaknesses. Fighting the Germans in the mountains of Italy doesn't let the Allies maximize the Allied strengths of aerial superiority and strategic mobility. There is little room for clever counterintelligence work either when all the Allies can do is bash their head against the Alps. Multiple landings in France and Holland however - with the overall goal of a breakthrough in one location to create an encirclement battle - does play to these strengths.

 

[Zinegata]

The American ideal was to land in northern France or the low countries, capture one or more major ports, build up a lodgement area, deploy a hundred divisions and then drive into Germany - Game Over! Its easy to see why they were so attached to this scenario. Northern Europe was easier to bring to being in troops and supplies from Britain or direct from the United States. Although I believe the later didn't work out in practice, even once they'd reopened Cherbourg. Also the allies might have been heavily motorised but they faced severe logistical challenges operating far from their supply ports without a functioning rail network. This would also have been a problem operating a major deployment out of Naples, Marseilles, Athens or Thessalonika.

The Scilly- Italy route was by far the most difficult for the Germans to defend. After the Italians collapse initially the Germans didn't intend to even try to defend Rome and southern Italy. They saw the potential for their troops to be cut off by landings further north and never thought the allies would give them enough time to make a defence in southern Italy. The great disadvantage of Italy is that even if full captured it would probably require another landing in the Mediterranean. Attacking through Slovenia was far from. Attacking into France well nigh impossible. However airbases in italy could be used to support operations in Greece, Albania, Yugoslavia and Southern France.

My argument would be that if the allies had aggressively pushed operations in the Mediterranean and Morocco from The US entry into the war, landing in Sicily, Greece, Albania, Yugoslavia and southern France as and when good opportunities availed, by June 44 the Germans would not had the resources to defend Normandy and the allies could have made a landing in Northern France in 44 anyway but without the huge focus of resources and planning that overlord entailed.

Italy was ultimately a strategic dead end for the Allies, because to get to Germany you have to go through the Alps. Your argument would basically ensure that the Soviets would have to do almost all of the fighting. There is simply no going around the reality that the German Army must be fought at some point for the war to be won.

 

[fredinno]

Quote was by Admiral Jellicoe, lifted right out of Massie's Castles of Steel.



War is hell. Sometimes there aren't easy answers. That's why Monty is perpetually underrated in popular history but was actually more popular among his men than many American commanders who supposedly "cared for their men". Monty knew that attacks that were costly in life and material were sometimes necessary, because if you don't tie down the enemy somewhere then they're simply free to redeploy and counter your maneuvers.

Patton for instance was only able to do his Cobra breakthrough because the British were bleeding in Caen. If the British weren't pushing hard and keeping the Germans occupied, the German Panzers could redeploy to face him in battle more easily.



Germany produced fewer trucks than General Motors on its own; indeed their main truck produce was a pre-war subsidiary of General Motors (Opel). Moreover getting oil from the Baku in the historical operation was a fool's errand. The Germans had no capability to restore oil production after Russian sabotage at the much smaller field at Maikop - the only oil city they captured - because all of their drilling equipment had been bought from America pre-war.



Pointing out that Tuscany is completely strategically useless is not a hissy fit. Arguing it's a valid invasion location without presenting any facts to back it up is throwing a hissy fit.

Seriously, stop acting like a child and using the arguments of one.



Why do you think I am still responding despite your insistence on bad and unfeasible ideas, like your avoidance of attrition which is in fact just an avoidance of battle itself?

People are going to die in a war. In many cases the casualties will seem very high for the advantages gained. But the most essential - and indeed most unavoidable - point about the actual wartime American War Plan (the "VIctory Plan") is that Germany cannot be defeated by avoiding the issue of "fighting the German Army". It has to be fought and defeated at some point. Tuscany doesn't do that. Italy doesn't do that. Only the reconquest of France and the Ruhr gets you there.

And a note: Some folks have suggested attacking Romania and the oil fields, but it's worth remembering that Germany already had large-scale synthetic oil production; and most of this was based in the Ruhr. Romania would certainly rob the Germans of a great deal of mobility, but the Ruhr factories will still produce synthetic oil and still make bullets. Capturing it will still generate the most far-reaching economic effects that will cause a collapse of the German Army and nation as a whole.

That is why the German Army won't just sit quietly and allow the Ruhr to fall, and that is why the strategic battle plan must assume a great battle between the Allied and German armies. And that battle plan needs to play to Allied strategic strengths - intelligence-gathering, air superiority, and strategic mobility - rather than their weaknesses. Fighting the Germans in the mountains of Italy doesn't let the Allies maximize the Allied strengths of aerial superiority and strategic mobility. There is little room for clever counterintelligence work either when all the Allies can do is bash their head against the Alps. Multiple landings in France and Holland however - with the overall goal of a breakthrough in one location to create an encirclement battle - does play to these strengths.

So, it took you over half a month to respond?

 

[JodelDiplom]

So, it took you over half a month to respond?

You can request that mods close this thread since you started it.

 

[Easy-Kill]

Italy was ultimately a strategic dead end for the Allies, because to get to Germany you have to go through the Alps. Your argument would basically ensure that the Soviets would have to do almost all of the fighting. There is simply no going around the reality that the German Army must be fought at some point for the war to be won.

It was also an operational dead end for Germany. By accepting a strategic stalemate, the allies were able to tie down considerable German formations (which they needed elsewhere), and substantial resources (which they didn't have) to stop the allies from advancing through the Alps. It stopped the Germans from concentrating more force in places where the allies would struggle to achieve an operational force overmatch (i.e. Normandy) .

It was a strategic dead end for the allies, but with substantial operational benefit, while for the Germans it was a strategic ''seagul" and operational defeat .

 

[Zinegata]

So, it took you over half a month to respond?

Yeah, because I don't frequent the forums that often.

 

[Baron Jukaga]

Google the Anglo-American Nazi War pdf. I'd direct link it but it's on the Alternate History forum. I'm sure many here have read it but for those that have not it's a pretty entertaining read.

 

[fredinno]

Yeah, because I don't frequent the forums that often.

Then maybe you can actually try to be civil next time. I'm sick of responding to your aggressive behavior.

 

[DoomBunny]

Then maybe you can actually try to be civil next time. I'm sick of responding to your aggressive behavior.

Men in glass houses?

 

[Tonagus]

In 1945 the US would have long range fighters and heavy tanks available in huge numbers. So yes they would invade. However, not without strategic diversions. Their navy would be massive. Counting more than 120 carriers and 350 destroyers. A 1000 - 2000 vessel navy.

Denmark would be the first diversion. Copenhagen and Zealand would be captured, Jutland threatened, maybe raided now and then. From Denmark the distance to Berlin is very short. Zealand is an Island that the German navy would have no chance of invading. And the Island is big enough for the US airforce to plant hundreds of new airstrips, for an intensified air raid campaign on northern Germany. From Zealand the Polish and Baltic coast sectors would also be raided now and then. Especially the german navy installations in the Baltics.

Holland would be the second diversion. For the same reasons as with Denmark, except Ruhr would be the immediate target to threaten. In Holland the rivers would act as defensive barriers for the invading force. A german counter attack would be close to impossible. And in Holland hundreds of new US airfields would be planted for an intensified air campaign against the Ruhr district. Bombing it back to stonge age.

This setup would force the German high command to place its best units in both of these sectors, weakening its peripheral frontlines. It would be forced to spread out its army along the coast of the Baltic sea.

Hereafter, when the US beach heads in both Denmark and Holland had been consolidated, and turned into strongholds, then the real series of invasions could be launched. These would hit the weakest sectors in the periphery of the Nazi empire. The overall goal would be to cut off as many German units as possible. So basically the same strategy that the US has already practiced in the Pacific ocean. With the exception that is, of the two diversionary invasions close to the enemy motherland.

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

I think this is the first time I have seen a USAboo

120 carriers lmao.
The best is the island hoping comparison tho

 

[Culise]

I think this is the first time I have seen a USAboo

120 carriers lmao.
The best is the island hoping comparison tho

I'm not sure why that number in itself seems so amusing. The US *did* technically build...let's see, now, if I managed to get this right:

• 24 Essex-class (8 additional planned)
• 9 Independence-class
• 3 Midway-class (3 additional planned)
• 45 Bogue-class
• 50 Casablanca-class
• 21 Commencement-class (12 additional planned)
• 10 further assorted merchant/oiler conversions

We can discount the Midways: the first was commissioned October 1945. Seven Essexes can be discounted the same way. The Bogues can probably be discounted because most of them were transfered to the UK under Lend-Lease, which leaves us with perhaps a dozen or so shy of 120. The number, however, isn't that bad; if anything, it neglects the fact that the US historically began gearing down its production as the end of the war came into sight, which wouldn't have occurred with Germany standing bestride Europe like the Colossus of Rhodes. The problem is simply that the number includes escort carriers, which were built for a very different role and thus were designed that way from the keel up (figuratively or literally): a Bogue had space for perhaps two dozen fighters and torpedo bombers, and a Casablanca a whopping 28. While one can say 120+ carriers, it's still important to note that only the Essexes, Independences, and Midways are fleet carriers. And thus, I suspect the reason for your mirth stands undiminished. ^_^

I suspect that's not even the least of it, though. An attack on Copenhagen seems to be begging for a great turkey-shoot in the Skagerrak and Kattegat as the Americans sail a massive fleet into constrained waters under the air envelope of an undaunted Luftwaffe. This was a similar issue to that which occurred the idea of landings in the Netherlands (which the post also proposed, I note) even in the historical situation where Germany was reeling in the East: too close to Germany proper and the Luftwaffe during the critical initial landings, (EDIT) and too far from the UK and its airfields, which can support far more and far larger aircraft than even the largest American carrier. Holland also has the issue of preventing any breakout due to precisely those rivers. It's suggested that these will serve as diversions to force the best units to be deployed to these areas, but there's no reason to actually deploy the best: most any divisions will be able to hem in and prevent any breakout.

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

The US utilized 53 aircrafft carriers of all types during ww2 and this even includes the Langley. The reasons for reducing and canceling builds late in the war have several reasons. The need of that steel and labour elsewhere is the main one. Medium AA was also a severe bottleneck. Not even the US could keep up with their Bofors demand.

The US had 10 fleet carriers available in 1945. The rest where lost or burning hulks beyond repair. Albeit if they really really wanted they could have 6 more in early 1946



While the USN capabilities been impressive they are also always overstated. For example the Essex class carriers that seen action all have been under construction pre war bar one already.
And no, in 1945 they didnt thought they have enough, quite the opposite after Okinawa with seting eyes to Japan.

 

[Culise]

The US utilized 53 aircrafft carriers of all types during ww2 and this even includes the Langley. The reasons for reducing and canceling builds late in the war have several reasons. The need of that steel and labour elsewhere is the main one. Medium AA was also a severe bottleneck. Not even the US could keep up with their Bofors demand.

Ah, you're right. I kinda forgot that the whole thing about wars is that the other side is trying to sink your ships and will sometimes actually succeed in that aim. To wit, I'm an idiot who summed the numbers I had without checking on the casualty lists at all. I mistrust myself enough that I'm not even going to try to figure out an absolute number for what a mid-1945 Europe invasion would look like. My apologies. >_<

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

Ah, you're right. I kinda forgot that the whole thing about wars is that the other side is trying to sink your ships and will sometimes actually succeed in that aim. To wit, I'm an idiot who summed the numbers I had without checking on the casualty lists at all. I mistrust myself enough that I'm not even going to try to figure out an absolute number for what a mid-1945 Europe invasion would look like. My apologies. >_<

Yeah well no, you are not an idiot. I actually enjoy reading your posts. Also a forum without debate an errors would be boring.

Not to mention that you picked up a number and tried to make sense out of it.

 

[Antediluvian Monster]

The US utilized 53 aircrafft carriers of all types during ww2 and this even includes the Langley. The reasons for reducing and canceling builds late in the war have several reasons. The need of that steel and labour elsewhere is the main one. Medium AA was also a severe bottleneck. Not even the US could keep up with their Bofors demand.

They gave whole bunch of CVEs to Britain as well (30-40 or so).

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

Ach CVEs...havnt you seen what happened when Greyjoy covered his invasion of Japan with CVEs....*mutters*