you not know the italian dialects. Every city have their dialects, and the dialcts change very fast, of you take The dialcets from lecce and the from brindisi they not understand! And these two city are distance few km...the dialects in italy for non native are like the indian languace!
you not know the italian dialects. Every city have their dialects, and the dialcts change very fast, of you take The dialcets from lecce and the from brindisi they not understand! And these two city are distance few km...the dialects in italy for non native are like the indian languace!
you not know the italian dialects. Every city have their dialects, and the dialcts change very fast, of you take The dialcets from lecce and the from brindisi they not understand! And these two city are distance few km...the dialects in italy for non native are like the indian languace!
this is true, but for you know in the film, the two person at radio, are the same region, but are distant 20km the receiver of artillery attack, attack the allied position instead enemy beacause the dialects change fast with distance, the dialects are the "languace of the village" they change a bit between neigthboord city
On italian code...the link i have say, say much of these interesting thing 
I discovered, speaking with friends, that Hitler, for the counter-offensive of the Ardennes, said precisely not to use enigma but messages written by him! Even if he didn't know this ... so maybe Hitler, something he suspected, even the field phones are useful, they are interceptable, but already less ... if you have encrypted my code, but I am in radio silence and use written messages, you know nothing ...
I got to disagree in that one. Actually a polish cryptologist cracked Enigma in 1939 before the start of WW2. They started in 1932 with incomplete Documents the french provided and the modifications the Germans made to the cypher didn't really help.
And before anyone wants to disagree, maybe read some more about "Marian Rejewski"
However, I'd like to point out that it wasn't just the 'maverick genius' Rejewski, and it did not happen in 1939. In 1939 the Poles were actually in trouble because the growing complexity of the machine ~ more rotors~ created a need for computing power Rejewski's Bomba machine did not possess. The Poles cracked it for the 1st time in early 30's, true ~ using some documents obtained by the French,but also from their own intelligence assets in Germany ~ in the German army command and in the Enigma manufacturer. I guess what I'm really trying to say is that it was the collective effort of the Polish cryptology bureau and intelligence community as a whole. Rejewski was important, but so was Zygalski and numerous others. I think it's worth pointing out, since way too often ppl focus on individuals, like Turing (who met Rejewski in France, btw, where he learned of the bomb approach). Stressing the importance of the institutional approach tends to prevent ppl to express opinions like the one in OPs original post.
English sources aren't the only ones to look at, check axis sources too
We are talking about Secret Services in particular of the S.I.M (Military Information Service) one of the best of the Second World War, but as we well know as good Italians we self-flagellate ourselves and prefer to forget the amazing feats we have accomplished. The protagonist of this episode is the Major of the Carabinieri Manfredi Talamo.
On 11 December 1941, the withdrawal section of the S.I.M enters the United States embassy, in Via Veneto, and takes possession of the Black Code kept in the safe of the military Attaché in Rome, Colonel Norman E. Fiske. The astonishing action was directed by the Commander of Section "P", the major of the Carabinieri Manfredi Talamo, one of the most capable collaborators of Colonel Cesare Amé, director of the S.I.M.
The operation was prepared with intelligence and extreme care by Thalamus and therefore required a long time. As a first act, two agents were infiltrated in the US embassy, acting as ushers. On the appointed night Major Thalamus, two non-commissioned officers and the two infiltrators, who had already taken the imprint of five keys, went into action.
Codes and documents were brought to the nearby “Photographic Section” of the S.I.M where they were photographed (thousands of pages). After a couple of hours, everything was returned to the safe. The copies went to the cryptographic section of the Services, in Forte Braschi.
Upon entering the war, the United States did not change the Black Code, which was considered impenetrable. In Cairo, US Colonel Frank Bonner Fellers, liaison officer with the English Command in the Middle East and with the Command of the Eighth Army, transmitted all the plans of the aforementioned British commands to the US Department of Defense: naturally using the Black Code. at Forte Braschi it intercepted and decrypted, also transmitting what was of interest to the Germans (Comando Forze Sud, in Frascati, of Kesselring) who poured them into North Africa at Rommel. It was thanks to this informative action that, starting with the Italian-German counter-offensive of January 21, 1942, all the plans of the VIII Army were intercepted and decrypted. The victorious actions of the Italian-German Army were also achieved thanks to the operation of Major Talamo.
The situation in our favor will end on 9 July 1942 due to the fault of the Chief of Information Services of Afrika Korps, von Mellenthin, who had ordered the Company to intercept Captain Seebohm to take sides close to the front line. During the attack, the Australians, having defeated Seebohm's men, entered the Command structure, where they also found Fellers' messages.
Since then, the US codes changed, any possibility of interception ended. On the other hand, with the Ultra code, the British will be able to continue reading all the messages of the Italian-German army in real time. A notable help for the victory of the Allies in North Africa.
English sources aren't the only ones to look at, check axis sources too
We are talking about Secret Services in particular of the S.I.M (Military Information Service) one of the best of the Second World War, but as we well know as good Italians we self-flagellate ourselves and prefer to forget the amazing feats we have accomplished. The protagonist of this episode is the Major of the Carabinieri Manfredi Talamo.
On 11 December 1941, the withdrawal section of the S.I.M enters the United States embassy, in Via Veneto, and takes possession of the Black Code kept in the safe of the military Attaché in Rome, Colonel Norman E. Fiske. The astonishing action was directed by the Commander of Section "P", the major of the Carabinieri Manfredi Talamo, one of the most capable collaborators of Colonel Cesare Amé, director of the S.I.M.
The operation was prepared with intelligence and extreme care by Thalamus and therefore required a long time. As a first act, two agents were infiltrated in the US embassy, acting as ushers. On the appointed night Major Thalamus, two non-commissioned officers and the two infiltrators, who had already taken the imprint of five keys, went into action.
Codes and documents were brought to the nearby “Photographic Section” of the S.I.M where they were photographed (thousands of pages). After a couple of hours, everything was returned to the safe. The copies went to the cryptographic section of the Services, in Forte Braschi.
Upon entering the war, the United States did not change the Black Code, which was considered impenetrable. In Cairo, US Colonel Frank Bonner Fellers, liaison officer with the English Command in the Middle East and with the Command of the Eighth Army, transmitted all the plans of the aforementioned British commands to the US Department of Defense: naturally using the Black Code. at Forte Braschi it intercepted and decrypted, also transmitting what was of interest to the Germans (Comando Forze Sud, in Frascati, of Kesselring) who poured them into North Africa at Rommel. It was thanks to this informative action that, starting with the Italian-German counter-offensive of January 21, 1942, all the plans of the VIII Army were intercepted and decrypted. The victorious actions of the Italian-German Army were also achieved thanks to the operation of Major Talamo.
The situation in our favor will end on 9 July 1942 due to the fault of the Chief of Information Services of Afrika Korps, von Mellenthin, who had ordered the Company to intercept Captain Seebohm to take sides close to the front line. During the attack, the Australians, having defeated Seebohm's men, entered the Command structure, where they also found Fellers' messages.
Since then, the US codes changed, any possibility of interception ended. On the other hand, with the Ultra code, the British will be able to continue reading all the messages of the Italian-German army in real time. A notable help for the victory of the Allies in North Africa.
there are other Italian actions (even if they are more raids like those of Alexandria, maybe I can find something of espionage from Italy).
But he admits that they were better than you at using espionage ... even if he could admit that Italy could suspect something about the USA (if I'm not mistaken, history is full of warnings given by the secret services, regularly ignored)
