I am not in agreement to after war analysis of WW2 Strategic Bombing

[gagenater]

The US ruthlessly destroyed the Japanese navy just as the British did to the Kreigsmarine long after it was a threat. To me this was more to stop ships falling into Russian hands at any subsequent peace deal.

IMHO this is because the USN was attempting to obtain Naval supremacy - not merely control. Remember, the US was planning an invasion of the Japanese home islands. Any IJN ships that were seaworthy would do what they could to break up or disrupt an invasion. Even a couple of destroyers in the wrong place at the wrong time could do a lot of damage before they were sunk, and the Japanese had already shown plenty of willingness to commit to suicide missions.

 

[unity100]

Not at all. The biggest naval yards of Japan were Yokosuka, Kure, Sasebo and Maizuru.

True, Nagasaki was a centre of shipbuilding, and the Mitsubishi yards there did build warships - mostly escort carriers and cruisers. Hiroshima had very little strategic military significance at all, although troops were stationed there and there were supply depots in the region.

In fact, one of the biggest reasons for choosing those two cities for the first nuclear attacks was precisely because they had so little importance from a military perspective. It meant that the US air force hadn't bothered to bomb them already, so they'd offer undamaged targets to test the effectiveness of the atomic bombs.

they were after all, shipbuilding and servicing centers then. and the ones which havent been bombed yet, so therefore, active. makes them logical choice.

they could have chosen any random, obscure city in japan to do terror bombing. it wouldnt matter. any city would be destroyed totally.

As for it not being a terror attack, here's what the Targeting Committee headed by Oppenheimer gave as its criteria for choosing the targets they did:

How else would you categorise "obtaining the greatest psychological effect" except as a terror attack? It maybe wasn't the only reason for the bombing, but it was surely one of the most important.

i can make a lot of comments and guesses about oppenheimer's personality and the contents of his heart from what i read, but i will refrain.

 

[krieger11b]

i can make a lot of comments and guesses about oppenheimer's personality and the contents of his heart from what i read, but i will refrain.

Then there were his immortal words he made before the first nuclear test.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n8H7Jibx-c0&feature=related

 

[Smirfy]

Just wondering what you mean by 'over-engineered' Smirfy? The Lancaster was after all an overengineered Manchester

My definition would probably be thus. The specification exceeded the current need delaying its operational availability

For instance the electro boats were fitted with a shower and a revolutionary reloading system. Was this required? The He 177 spec changed every two weeks. Take the Mosquito as a counter example, they did not worry about making it a maritime strike aircraft or nightfighter half way through the design process. They got it operational in under a year from its first flight.Once production was up and running they converted the thing.

I think where I'm coming from is that ultimately the ideas being put forward were actually viable. The problem was the short research and development cycles which led to problems which then needed to be rectified which led to further problems. It does seem we fixate on German failures in this regard, when ample parallels are available of the western Allies doing the same thing and finding the same problems of unreliability and need to send things back to the drawing board. The changes to the B-29 were coming through so fast from the design team that they were wheeled from the factory floor to a workshop for the modifications to be made. Overengineered or symptom of advanced design which hasn't had enough time in development?

The Americans could afford to over engineer, but the b29 ended up area bombing at night The B29 definitely influenced the course of the war in the Pacific.

 

[krieger11b]

Quite frankly I cannot understand why Germany bothered to even care about strategic bombing of the UK after losing a devastating amount of bomber there.

The USSR yes, but the UK, come on really?

The loss of General Wever in 1936 is when Germany lost the war 3 years before it began. I am reading a fascinating book made by many German Staff Officers of the Luftwaffe, I can go on forever about this but to sum it up in two statements. This is what they lost by losing Wever.

1st and most critical was Wever was the only man that could make a strong link between Milch and Georing, and have any pull. After him it was a constant battle between Milch and the Luftwaffe High command, generally being a pain in the ass, always interfering with the High Command he fought so hard to stop from forming. A genuine backstabber that guy was. Georing was most often non present, not a good thing when you are Hitlers second in command and trying to build a brand new Air Force from scratch.

2nd is Wever was the only man in the Luftwaffe that got any pull on building 4 engine long range level bombing strategic bombers, everything else went towards dive bombing. When they finally went for a strategic bomber they did the He-177 and we all know what a disaster that plane was, a strategic bomber that had to dive bomb.

 

[unmerged(71032)]

Dive bombing fad had some internal logic though - it was direct result of Spanish Civil War, where level bombers of Legion Condor proven their poor effectiveness against the ground targets. Dive bombing, even from shallow dive, was going long way in allowing bombers of the era to actually hit something.

Interestingly enough, Soviets went to the same conclusion, delaying very succesful Tu-2 frontline bomber project and building their Ar-2 (based on SB-2 very good dive bomber), Pe-2 (another dive bomber, quite poor because based on high alt escort fighter project) and flying rocket artillery carrier, Il-2.

The difference was that Soviets had resources to develop strategic bombers as well (long range DB-3, later, TB-7/Pe-8 and also failed project Yer-2) but in the end (just like Germans), they had no production capability to manufacture them along the frontline planes in meaningful numbers.

 

[Smirfy]

I.m not sure the Luftwaffe would have been as successful if it went down the strategic bomber route. Strategic bombing requies time which was something the Germans did not have once war was joined. The conquests were only possible because of the interdependacy of the Luftwaffe and Heer. Lastly the JU 88 became one of Germanys primary defensive weapons, a four engined heavy bombercould not perform that role.

 

[Zebedee]

My definition would probably be thus. The specification exceeded the current need delaying its operational availability

For instance the electro boats were fitted with a shower and a revolutionary reloading system. Was this required? The He 177 spec changed every two weeks. Take the Mosquito as a counter example, they did not worry about making it a maritime strike aircraft or nightfighter half way through the design process. They got it operational in under a year from its first flight.Once production was up and running they converted the thing.

The He-177's design changes were primarily why Heinkel went into disfavour with the LW. He tinkered and tinkered and tinkered. Nothing to do with over-engineering and more to do with trying to solve a fundamental problem with not having engines available which could power a bomber using four propellors.

One of the reasons behind the shower was because of the extended periods under water forseen meant that the crew needed something which would help maintain morale. The reloading system was because it was hoped that by remaining unseen multiple attacks could be launched on each convoy found and so help increase the kill rate which would be decreased by the slower transit times between attacks.

The Americans could afford to over engineer, but the b29 ended up area bombing at night The B29 definitely influenced the course of the war in the Pacific.

haha - but it was being rushed through development and so the tinkering was regular to try and iron out the design flaws.

 

[krieger11b]

Well as far as Germany having a 4 engined strategic bombers goes, how would the Me-110 have fared against Spitfires and Hurricanes in the BoB when escorting at 20,000 feet?