I am not in agreement to after war analysis of WW2 Strategic Bombing

[unmerged(10262)]

I defiantly agree that it was bombing of Ruhr factories and German infrastructure that had most of the effect and can be justified both economically and probably morally. Much of the criticism of the campaigns I think usually are both the early city bombings in particular Berlin (I guess you could argue that something like Hamburg at least was somewhat cost efficient but the bombings further east was a huge waste) and the really late war bombing. This is a pretty large share of all missions though.

As for your math exercise extrapolating is always dangerous and your numbers while significant I would guess are less than the British bombing commands share of the UK military budget?

 

[Rich Oliver]

Instead, from May 1943 until February 1944, the German armaments industry grew at an average rate of 0% per month. ie it stopped growing. I guesstimate this lack of growth to have been equivalent to seven months of peak German monthly production in 1942. That's just the lack of growth, lost potential, not including the cost of actually maintaining production at the level reached in May 1943 for a year.

Tooze reckons that if Bomber Command hadn't switched targets to Berlin in August 1943, the results would have been even greater and calls that decision one of the biggest mistakes of the war.

The main failing of the strategic bombing campaign was that it didn't really start having a serious effect until well into 1943. By this point the wars final result was not really in doubt. Bomber command did virtually nothing to take the pressure off the Soviet Union in the crucial period of 1941 to 42. I'm sure there was the potential to use those resources for far greater gain, either through more aid to the Soviet Union, in the Battle of Britain, Crete, North Africa, or the British defences in the East. If the Battle of the Atlantic could have been won quicker and at less cost and if more resources had been put into shipping, the allies could have pulled more German resources away from the East in those crucial first 18 months of the German invasion of the SU.

 

[unmerged(20628)]

The years from late 1943 onwards, where the bombing campaign showed its real strength when infrastructure and intermediate production was targeted, suggest that the bombings in the previous years had minimal effects. It would be unreasonable to assume that untargeted area bombing at nighttime could have an effect in any way close to the post-1943 bombings.

I also wonder whether a "reverse battle of Britain" with the RAF going on the all out offensive (and daytime raids) would have been considered feasible. Granted heavy casualties would have to be accepted by the RAF, but an earlier daytime bombing must have provided far superior results than the nighttime are bombing.

 

[unmerged(76495)]

I defiantly agree that it was bombing of Ruhr factories and German infrastructure that had most of the effect and can be justified both economically and probably morally. Much of the criticism of the campaigns I think usually are both the early city bombings in particular Berlin...

Was the purpose of city bombing, in particular Berlin, not to provoke the germans into bombing british cities, in particular London? Thereby stopping the attacks on RAF airbases and allowing them to recuperate, thus eventually swinging the Battle of Britain in favor of Britain.

 

[unmerged(10262)]

Was the purpose of city bombing, in particular Berlin, not to provoke the germans into bombing british cities, in particular London? Thereby stopping the attacks on RAF airbases and allowing them to recuperate, thus eventually swinging the Battle of Britain in favor of Britain.

We were talking about the large bombing raids in late 1943 which was expensive, lost a lot of bombers and had quite meagre results.

 

[unmerged(76495)]

We were talking about the large bombing raids in late 1943 which was expensive, lost a lot of bombers and had quite meagre results.

Ahhh sorry then.

 

[unmerged(71032)]

The main failing of the strategic bombing campaign was that it didn't really start having a serious effect until well into 1943. By this point the wars final result was not really in doubt. Bomber command did virtually nothing to take the pressure off the Soviet Union in the crucial period of 1941 to 42. I'm sure there was the potential to use those resources for far greater gain, either through more aid to the Soviet Union, in the Battle of Britain, Crete, North Africa, or the British defences in the East. If the Battle of the Atlantic could have been won quicker and at less cost and if more resources had been put into shipping, the allies could have pulled more German resources away from the East in those crucial first 18 months of the German invasion of the SU.

It's not that resources are as easily interchengable. In 1941, Bomber Command was mostly using Wellingtons. Were they supposed to be delivered to the Soviets? Or are we talking about total restructurization of the UK air industry earlier on to provide it more tactical bombers/fighters? What they could be used for then? UK had numerical advantage in those classes of planes anyway from 1941 on and couldn't effectively use more of them. Unless we are talking about even more radical changing of the industrial priorities and rising production of land unit equipment instead of planes.

I think we are falling in a trap of subconciously copying German issues with resources on UK and its industry. Great Brittain, having dominions, colonies and LLing USA behind it, was in comfortable position of being able to build ships AND tanks AND planes (of all classes) - contrary to the Germans that had to prioritize things even in their best days. So strategic bombers were something they could afford - and considering their limited ability to return to Europe, it was reasonable project.

 

[Zebedee]

As for your math exercise extrapolating is always dangerous and your numbers while significant I would guess are less than the British bombing commands share of the UK military budget?

The 'maths exercise' was for the results of a five month bombing campaign and excluded other German costs. The extrapolation is based on 5.5% monthly increases which was fairly standard, so it's not too whacky to suggest at least that level of increase to continue and the indices are split down into seven or eight components (not got Tooze in front of me right now to check Wagenfeuhr's figures) so they won't be too crazily wrong. If anything I may have understated things.

My gut feeling is that for those five months Bomber Command was well in 'credit', but someone else can do the hard financial figures to prove it

----

Rich - yeah I take your point. But until the Lancaster was available in dececent numbers and the targetting technology for night bombing had been improved, there wasn't much more Bomber Command could do. Closing the Atlantic Gap made a lot of sense and it was petty kingdom building which prevented it happening sooner as you say, although Bomber Command would have argued that what capacity they did have in 41 and 42 would have been diminished even futher if more planes had been diverted away from them. And the resources going into Bomber Command were needed to develop those techniques which started to pay off in 1943. Either is viable I guess, but the Atlantic battle was won in 1943 and Bomber Command crippled German industry for a year in five months so it didn't turn out too badly in the end.

 

[Rich Oliver]

@ Zebedee & Alojzy, your points are fair and of course I'm talking with the benefit of hindsight. Obviously once the bombers were built there uses were limited. I'm just arguing that they could have got more bang for their buck if they had spent the money resources on other things. A few tanks might have saved Crete or even another squadron of fighters, a stronger defence in Malaya and Burma could have reduced the Eastern Theatre emergency in 42 which delayed the invasion of French North Africa. When I mentioned the Battle of Britain, I meant that Britain would have been better off with more fighters and less bombers. Maybe more Close Air Support or Fighters could have stopped the Germans drive to the coast in May 40?

 

[unmerged(71032)]

Maybe more Close Air Support or Fighters could have stopped the Germans drive to the coast in May 40?

Arguably, Armee de l'Air and RAF had all the planes they needed to slow down (not stop, it's not Desert Storm ) Germans in their drive to the coast and later in Fall Rot.

Real problem was, as usual, not in numbers, but in tactics and coordination with other military arms.

If this money that went to heavy bombers program could be somehow converted into making RAF A.D.1940 superbly coordinated force, capable of reacting on the whim on enemy moves, coordinate its actions with BEF and its French allies, all of that while operating from allied (not home) territory, then yes, I would agree with you.

But somehow I feel that most of the early falls of British forces was more related to their tactical/operational faults, not to the lacks (especially numerical ones) of their equipment.

 

[King of Men]

Ah, but taking the tactical/operational inefficiencies as given, it's still true that quantity has a quality all its own. More planes, even badly handled ones, could still have made some difference, no?

 

[unmerged(71032)]

Ah, but taking the tactical/operational inefficiencies as given, it's still true that quantity has a quality all its own. More planes, even badly handled ones, could still have made some difference, no?

No, because they were not ready to fight the war Soviet way.

You could not just replace refined tactics, training and organization with hordes of half trained pilots in half finished planes in country like UK. You need proper conditioning both among the leaders and population to handle such strategy. Japan had it, Soviets had it as well - even Germans. Great Britain? Don't think so.

 

[unity100]

We were talking about the large bombing raids in late 1943 which was expensive, lost a lot of bombers and had quite meagre results.

meagre ?

how and why meagre ?

germans had gone berserk, used slave labor, moved production underground, called in dormant IC.

that does NOT mean that the bombing campaign was meagerly effective. it means germans tried VERY hard.

 

[unity100]

Was the purpose of city bombing, in particular Berlin, not to provoke the germans into bombing british cities, in particular London? Thereby stopping the attacks on RAF airbases and allowing them to recuperate, thus eventually swinging the Battle of Britain in favor of Britain.

well actually it was germans' fault.

at the start of the war, hitler ordered london not to be bombed under any circumstances. however a bombing group (i remember it was a he111 group) couldnt make out their target properly in the night and unloaded a load of bombs on a london dock. after that brits went and raided berlin. and so it started.

 

[krieger11b]

well actually it was germans' fault.

at the start of the war, hitler ordered london not to be bombed under any circumstances. however a bombing group (i remember it was a he111 group) couldnt make out their target properly in the night and unloaded a load of bombs on a london dock. after that brits went and raided berlin. and so it started.

Was it true on the movie Battle of Britain it was a mistake and they thought they were not over London.

 

[unmerged(71032)]

Was it true on the movie Battle of Britain it was a mistake and they thought they were not over London.

It most likely was, although it doesn't mean Germans had problems with pure terror bombing (Wielun, Warsaw, Rotterdam anyone?).

It's just that it was not part of that stage of air operations over Brittain - they were still fighting for air superiority over the southern England and leveling the RAF infarastructure.

 

[Rich Oliver]

It most likely was, although it doesn't mean Germans had problems with pure terror bombing (Wielun, Warsaw, Rotterdam anyone?).

I'm not sure if any of the bombings in world war II were "pure terror bombing". Were the above attacks area bombing in the way that Coventry, Hamburg and Dresden were? In these latter attacks a proportion of the incendiaries would contain explosives, although they looked identical to the ordinary explosives. This was to discourage adults and children from throwing the incendiaries out of the building in an attempt to save their homes from incineration. Things are very different morally now than they were back then. Now days if you say "the Earth is round", you risk being accused of being an evil Nazi, because that was what the Nazi's said. Back then the rule was: if the Nazi's did it, it was OK for us to do it.

 

[unmerged(71032)]

I'm not sure if any of the bombings in world war II were "pure terror bombing". Were the above attacks area bombing in the way that Coventry, Hamburg and Dresden were?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Wieluń

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Warsaw_in_World_War_II

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rotterdam_Blitz

Judge yourself. But yes, word "pure" is hard to use in case of terror bombings because you can always find some argument that makes action against the civilian target "military" - like with Wielun (8 hours of dive bombers attacks, because "somewhere in the area was cavalry brigade"), Warsaw (they were bombing military targets as well after all) and Rotterdam (they... well, they wanted make a statement to the Holland).

 

[unity100]

Was it true on the movie Battle of Britain it was a mistake and they thought they were not over London.

i read it from multiple sources in the past. i think it is true.

 

[unity100]

I'm not sure if any of the bombings in world war II were "pure terror bombing". Were the above attacks area bombing in the way that Coventry, Hamburg and Dresden were? In these latter attacks a proportion of the incendiaries would contain explosives, although they looked identical to the ordinary explosives. This was to discourage adults and children from throwing the incendiaries out of the building in an attempt to save their homes from incineration. Things are very different morally now than they were back then. Now days if you say "the Earth is round", you risk being accused of being an evil Nazi, because that was what the Nazi's said. Back then the rule was: if the Nazi's did it, it was OK for us to do it.

germans immediately bombed the cities of whichever nation they declared war on without any hesitation. except britain and france, at the start.