I am not in agreement to after war analysis of WW2 Strategic Bombing

[krieger11b]

I am not in agreement to after war analysis of WW2 Strategic Bombing being ineffective. The German war industry on paper was growing despite the bombings, however it does not seem to take the following in effect:

Taking critical fighters from the Eastern Front.

The millions killed or tied up in cleanup, repair, and fire fighting from bombings.

Some factories were hard to replace. The German version of the Mosquito never went into production because the special factory for the resin and glue was bombed and never replaced.

Any attacked oil reserves would never be replaced.

The V-3 cannon was destroyed before it came online from strategic bombers, which were the only bombers that could carry heavy enough bombs to do it. That alone had the capability of knocking out the UK's will to fight. It would have totally obliterated London.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/V-3_cannon

Most of the late war wonder weapons were in service too late, or not at all because of allied bombing.

Logistics in the Eastern Front, already a migraine of a job, were made into a nightmare because most of the major rail hubs in German were blown to hell.

Now I have heard attacking the electric grid and power plants would have been far more effective, and working in the power industry I can see why, it wouldn't take very heavy bombs, and replacing power lines would have taken forever. Power plants take a REALLY long time to build or repair compared to a factory, way more than most people think.

 

[Zebedee]

Several modern historians agree with you - including those who specialise in the strategic bombing campaign and those who specialise in studies of the economic impact of the campaign.

The British send one man and a dog to do their analysis. They really weren't that bothered about doing it properly and it showed in their post-war analysis. The US relied greatly upon the views of Speer for their analysis. Speer's testimony needs to be taken with a great deal of salt.

Even so, the analysis still supports strategic bombing if one stops and thinks about how destroying existing industrial capacity also destroys potential industrial capacity, and that the RAF and USAAF flatlined the German economy at a time when Germany had mobilised every single resource for an unsustainable drive for production. It's not just a case of reducing total overall German production by 10% over the duration of the war, it's that the Germans had to use resources to maintain that existing level of production rather than using those resources to increase levels as they needed to do.

 

[unmerged(10262)]

Well there can be no doubt that the UK strategical bombing was less effective than its US counterpart. And honestly to me it seems like in particular the early campaigns over for example Berlin was horrible inefficient. And everything after the second half of 1944 was simply to late to have any major effect. If you compare the costs 1943 to second half of 1944 then it is even dubious if the campaigns cost more than they damaged (something which is rather embarrassing for more or less dropping large bombs over expensive things).

The millions killed or tied up in cleanup, repair, and fire fighting from bombings.

Maybe some chemical weapons could have done this job better... war is as famously said a little to important to be left to generals...

 

[Zebedee]

Well there can be no doubt that the UK strategical bombing was less effective than its US counterpart

Actually the other way round. By the time the USAAF got beyond bombing coastal regions of France, the Germans had managed to diversify their economy and to build-up sufficient stockpiles that only wholesale disruption really had any impact. Not that the USAAF's claims of bombing more accurately had any relation to anything but the tests they did with the Norden bombsights in the clear skies of the USA's testing ranges The USAAF's results were actually far worse than the RAF's until they started utilising RAF equipment to locate where they were and RAF standing operating practices such as toggle bombing at the command of the best navigator in a unit.

 

[Jos de trol]

The V-3 cannon was destroyed before it came online from strategic bombers, which were the only bombers that could carry heavy enough bombs to do it. That alone had the capability of knocking out the UK's will to fight. It would have totally obliterated London.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/V-3_cannon

why do you think this weapon would have been so effective? judging from that wikipedia link it would have been pretty ineffective, as big superguns often are

I do agree that strategic bombing was effective, on top of what you said it also forced the germans to put a lot of AA guns in the home territories which otherwise could have been put to frontline use

 

[unmerged(20077)]

This is a bit of a strawman being knocked down: nobody's arguing that the strategic bombing had no effect whatsoever, or that it actually increased the capacity of the Third Reich to wage war - the question is whether the resources devoted to heavy bombing campaigns were more effective than what else could have been done.

 

[Zebedee]

This is a bit of a strawman being knocked down: nobody's arguing that the strategic bombing had no effect whatsoever, or that it actually increased the capacity of the Third Reich to wage war - the question is whether the resources devoted to heavy bombing campaigns were more effective than what else could have been done.

Surely the premise of that question relies upon there being something more effective that could have been done and/or that the resources allocated to the strategic bombing came at the cost of other areas of the war effort?

I'm not sure that this holds true beyond one or two brief moments in the war (eg long range bombers not being assigned to covering the Atlantic prior to the US built long range aircraft arriving). The USA's industrial muscles hadn't even been extended fully by the time of the war's end. And Britain's economy hadn't been anywhere like as stretched as the German or Soviet economies and so comparisons of numbers have to take into account that Britain still had a bit more petrol in the tank and the USA had not only petrol in the tank but an oil well in the back garden

 

[krieger11b]

I don't think that was much else to for allies to spend money and materials on other than strategic bombers, they had to wait until the soviets bled the Wermarcht dry.

 

[Easy-Kill]

I don't think that was much else to for allies to spend money and materials on other than strategic bombers, they had to wait until the soviets bled the Wermarcht dry.

North Africa, Italy (knocking them out of the war), The battle of the Atlantic, Iraq/Syria, Madagascar, Persia were all fought and won before the strategic bombardment campaign really sucked up tremendous resources.

Not to mention ensuring political and diplomatic ties to compliment the vast naval and air armada required to put the allies in a situation were victory was not merely hopeful, but practically guaranteed. The soviets did indeed bleed the German manpower pool dry, but they would never have been able to throw this many divisions against the (western)allies.

 

[Acheron]

One thing I would like to add: apart from fighters, the Germans apparently also used a heck lot of AA guns against the bobmers.
And whiel you all may think of the famous 88, some even bigger calibres were in use. Now I wonder, where these also usable as AT-wepaons? If not then, German had to produce guns usable only against bobmers and maintain and feed factories producing them, instead of guns for ground combat.

In my eyes though, the most important effetc of the bombing camapign was the preclusion of another Dolchstosslegende or "Stab-in-the-back" legend so popular after the first World War. "We were actually winning the war, but lost it because at the last moment some leftish non-miliary types betrayed us" probably doesn't sound very convincing after you have lived in rubble for a year.

 

[unmerged(86439)]

The V-3 cannon was destroyed before it came online from strategic bombers, which were the only bombers that could carry heavy enough bombs to do it. That alone had the capability of knocking out the UK's will to fight. It would have totally obliterated London.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/V-3_cannon

How would a gun firing shells with a weight of 140 kg towards the same point knock the worlds largest country out of the war, when it was about a year from winning it?

The bomber raids on Berlin (and other major cities), with thousands of heavy bombers each dropping several tons of bombs, did not knock out Germany's will to fight. Rather, it "motivated" the soldiers and civilians to fight even harder.

Some factories were hard to replace. The German version of the Mosquito never went into production because the special factory for the resin and glue was bombed and never replaced.

Have you red Speer? The bombing of the factories themselves were quite inefficient. Prioritised production, like the rockets, still went on fairly unaffected by bombing.

 

[Generalmotors]

Air war is a fantasy. In 1945 as today. Infantry wins a war.

 

[Zebedee]

Air war is a fantasy. In 1945 as today. Infantry wins a war.

Japan?


----

Have you red Speer? The bombing of the factories themselves were quite inefficient. Prioritised production, like the rockets, still went on fairly unaffected by bombing.

Speer's analysis is interesting. It changes depending on whether you read his memoirs, his interrogation records or the internal memos he produced during the war. The internal memos written during the war are the complete opposite to his post-war memories of how things were. We know Speer told a lot of fibs in his memoirs, we know that he told a lot of fibs in his interrogations for Nuremburg; would it be reasonable to suggest that the things he wrote during the war might be the truth? Especially if those wartime views agree with the latest comprehensive analysis of the German war economy? (cf Tooze, The Wages of Destruction).

 

[Smirfy]

This is a bit of a strawman being knocked down: nobody's arguing that the strategic bombing had no effect whatsoever, or that it actually increased the capacity of the Third Reich to wage war - the question is whether the resources devoted to heavy bombing campaigns were more effective than what else could have been done.

As I have said before on the matter I like to interpret the statistics this way. Both Germany and Japan believed strategic bombing was a big enough threat to dictate their strategy even if the genuises writing after the war say it was an epic fail. Crete, Crimea, Operation Steinbock, Phillipine Sea, Operation Ichi-Go all were implemented to protect themselves from strategic bombing

All the effort expended in the V programs, look at the very name Vergeltungswaffen. Vengeance for what? The systematic destruction of Germany by Bombers. Would more Tanks, aircraft or guns not have been a greater help for Germany?

 

[unity100]

Of course strategic bombing was effective.

those who object to it being effective generally look up on german industry figures and say 'hey, it was fairly undisrupted'.

the reality is quite different. the figures are fairly normal, and even increase at times, but, it is not a normal increase.

when they saw they were rather losing the war, germans activated their industry capacity that was lying rather dormant. and also heavily started to use slave labor. they were making 'slaves' work until they died while giving them little food. naturally industry output faltered little, or went down little, and at times even increased.

pathetic.

tho, still, if allies didnt destroy that capacity, germans would still go that route at some point.

its rather silly to say that it didnt have any effect though. see, you destroy a goddamn factory. and it still has no effect ? come on.

 

[Rich Oliver]

I believe there has been a strong political bias to the judgements about the effectiveness of the allied bombing campaign. WWII is the “good war” par excellence, and the terror bombing of German cities isn’t convenient for simplistic modern political narratives. It can’t be denied that the bombing actually took place, but it can be denied that the strategic bombing played the integral part of the allied victory that it did.

Strategic bombing was hugely disruptive and created huge costs for the German war economy. Although it was probably correct to withdraw the heavy bombers from Germany in the first half of 44, to target the Northern France and Benelux infrastructure and support the Normandy Landings, this certainly gave a hugely valuable respite to Germany, Not only to repair and rebuild, but to disperse, camouflage and bury their most vital industries and build up their defences. Without this respite the effects of the campaign would have been decisive much earlier. In addition in the latter part of the war Germany’s war effort was not sustainable and it held on by consuming its stocks of weapons and reserves of raw materials and part manufactured goods. If the war in Europe had continued longer, the decisive effects of the strategic bombing campaign would again have become more obvious.

The most effective way of damaging the enemy though, was the firestorm. It potentially caused huge loss of life and immense destruction of infrastructure, whether commercial or workers homes, for a relatively small investment of attacking resources. Given a sufficient investment of labour and resources by the defender train lines could be quickly repaired, bridges reopened and power cables put back up. My Father who worked as a POW in the Munich marshalling yards was amazed by how quickly things were got working again. However a city centre operates as the economic brain of a local area and what the British analysts noted about Coventry, was that the City had still not returned to normal functioning many months after the bombing. It was the bombing of Coventry and other German attacks which came close to creating firestorms that inspired the strategists of Bomber command. They realised that the Germans had failed to get sufficient concentration in space and time. The British achieved it with devastating results at Hamburg, Kassel, Leipzig, Dresden and others.

 

[keck]

Surely the premise of that question relies upon there being something more effective that could have been done and/or that the resources allocated to the strategic bombing came at the cost of other areas of the war effort?

I'm not sure that this holds true beyond one or two brief moments in the war (eg long range bombers not being assigned to covering the Atlantic prior to the US built long range aircraft arriving). The USA's industrial muscles hadn't even been extended fully by the time of the war's end. And Britain's economy hadn't been anywhere like as stretched as the German or Soviet economies and so comparisons of numbers have to take into account that Britain still had a bit more petrol in the tank and the USA had not only petrol in the tank but an oil well in the back garden

This I think is the crux of the argument. It had an effect because the cost to the UK and US of doing it was less than the effects on Germany (even if the balance is negative i.e that cost more in resources than it destroyed, Germany had more to lose and less in reserve) Thus, as a stop gap measure while awaiting for the opportunity (troop levels, training, equipment, techs,etc) to launch an amphibious invasion and fight on the ground, it WAS effective. Then there is the fact that the US and UK were likely waiting to see the results of the war in the East and war in the PAcific before launching into western Europe, so again, strategic bombing even if it ties up a lot of resources and personnel (not an issue when like the US you have near unlimited amounts) SHOWS your allies (in this case USSR) that you are doing something!

As to whether there were other plausible solutions for the resources tied up in strategic bombing, I am not sure. I believe that it had an effect on Germany, IMO it just wasn't a defining one (compared with say fighting the soviets or running out of specialised materials).

 

[krieger11b]

One thing I would like to add: apart from fighters, the Germans apparently also used a heck lot of AA guns against the bobmers.
And whiel you all may think of the famous 88, some even bigger calibres were in use. Now I wonder, where these also usable as AT-wepaons? If not then, German had to produce guns usable only against bobmers and maintain and feed factories producing them, instead of guns for ground combat.

This is an important aspect. Hitler had some delusion that the carpet bombing would end or something because he insisted that the great majority of Flak guns used to protect cities were the more mobile kind that could be sent to the Eastern Front later.

The Germans had the best anti-aircraft guns in the war, the 12.8 cm Flak40, this was a monster of gun, far more effective against bombers than the 88mm Flack 18. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/12.8_cm_FlaK_40 This monster not only had a higher altitude it could shoot at, and a much bigger shell than the 88m, but it also flew 3 times faster, making aiming much easier.

However it was squandered by Hitler only allowing a few to be produced because they were not useful on the front. They were far more cost effective than fighters, especially against escorted bombers. They were the main armament of the famous Flack Towers.

 

[unmerged(10262)]

I believe there has been a strong political bias to the judgements about the effectiveness of the allied bombing campaign. WWII is the “good war” par excellence, and the terror bombing of German cities isn’t convenient for simplistic modern political narratives. It can’t be denied that the bombing actually took place, but it can be denied that the strategic bombing played the integral part of the allied victory that it did.


Strategic bombing was hugely disruptive and created huge costs for the German war economy. Although it was probably correct to withdraw the heavy bombers from Germany in the first half of 44, to target the Northern France and Benelux infrastructure and support the Normandy Landings, this certainly gave a hugely valuable respite to Germany, Not only to repair and rebuild, but to disperse, camouflage and bury their most vital industries and build up their defences. Without this respite the effects of the campaign would have been decisive much earlier. In addition in the latter part of the war Germany’s war effort was not sustainable and it held on by consuming its stocks of weapons and reserves of raw materials and part manufactured goods. If the war in Europe had continued longer, the decisive effects of the strategic bombing campaign would again have become more obvious.

The main reason it didnt have a huge effect is because it was to late. You even talk imp+licitly about it being decisive late in 1944... Of course the effect would have become far more obvious if the war continued, it didnt though. Most of the bombed factories had already produced 70-90% of all weapons they where going to produce in the war.

The most effective way of damaging the enemy though, was the firestorm. It potentially caused huge loss of life and immense destruction of infrastructure, whether commercial or workers homes, for a relatively small investment of attacking resources. Given a sufficient investment of labour and resources by the defender train lines could be quickly repaired, bridges reopened and power cables put back up. My Father who worked as a POW in the Munich marshalling yards was amazed by how quickly things were got working again. However a city centre operates as the economic brain of a local area and what the British analysts noted about Coventry, was that the City had still not returned to normal functioning many months after the bombing. It was the bombing of Coventry and other German attacks which came close to creating firestorms that inspired the strategists of Bomber command. They realised that the Germans had failed to get sufficient concentration in space and time. The British achieved it with devastating results at Hamburg, Kassel, Leipzig, Dresden and others.

Rebuilding residential areas was obvious very low on the German priority list, so low I would guess that not a single apartment house was rebuilt the last year of the war (at least not by the government). Sure it caused great hardship but the Germans certainly made sure to spend the scant resources they had on the factories you describe. And how did it affect that end of the war that you made life unbearable for the population the last 6 months, the factories were elsewhere the soldiers where elsewhere. Bombing cities in 1945 had no effect of the outcome of the war whatsoever and it seems painfully obvious that the resources and air planes would have been better spent for tactical uses, something that also was the result of the analysis after the war.

And then I once again ignore that fire-bombing city centres simply is indiscriminate killing of women and children when they are sleeping...

 

[Zebedee]

Rebuilding residential areas was obvious very low on the German priority list

Ah, that had been low on the priority list since 1933 so no change there - makes sense in a way if your plans are to send out tens of millions of people to live east of the Oder after the war has been won. Building civillian shelters only fell off the agenda in 42 though. True fact: more was spent on Hitler's bunker in Berlin than in the entirety of Germany on civillian shelters in the last three years of the war. Rarely gets mentioned that - odd too, your nation is under intense aerial bombardment but you actually cutback on building civillian shelters? Anyways, morality dangerous area...

So instead here's an interesting snippet of info about how effective Bomber Command actually was.

From February 1942 (when Speer took over) until May 1943, the German armaments industry as a whole grew by 5.5% per month. If it had continued at that rate of growth, then by February 1944 it would have grown by over 600% in two years.

Instead, from May 1943 until February 1944, the German armaments industry grew at an average rate of 0% per month. ie it stopped growing. I guesstimate this lack of growth to have been equivalent to seven months of peak German monthly production in 1942. That's just the lack of growth, lost potential, not including the cost of actually maintaining production at the level reached in May 1943 for a year.

In very, very rough numbers that lost production is equal to 3000+ AFVs not built (5% of total German production throughout the war), 18000 or so planes not built (10% of German production throughout the war) etc. etc.

Just lost production from one year as a direct result of Bomber Command hitting the Ruhr for five months. Doesn't include the cost of fighting off Bomber Command (c.25% of Germany's armaments output), doesn't include the extra costs to repair the damage sufficiently to maintain production (eg something like 3.2 million tons of steel had to be reallocated that year to repair the damage - that's twice the amount of steel allocated to the Heer for production in 1942). Just things not made because Bomber Command finally had the aircraft to be able to mount a five month campaign against the Ruhr industries.

Tooze reckons that if Bomber Command hadn't switched targets to Berlin in August 1943, the results would have been even greater and calls that decision one of the biggest mistakes of the war.

I think the men of the RAF and USAAF contributed greatly to the downfall of Nazi Germany.

source: Tooze, The Wages of Destruction. His source is Wagenfeuhr's index of armaments production, who prepared those statistics for Speer.