How could battles like „Midway“ be better represented in HOI4 (non linear outcome)?

[Cpack]

I’m just thinking. At the battle of Midway, 4 Japanese carrier were sunk (out of 4) and only 1 US carrier (out of 3). If you simulate this situation in HOI3, the battle system is way too much “predefined” maybe except of the “critical hit” factor and the result would be very similar every time.
What I would like to see is some more factors, which influence and outcome of a battle more than just ship and leader stats.
F.e. make the intelligence more important for a battle outcome or the reconnaissance ability. Not sure if I can bring up my point, but in HOI3, if you fight with 1 against 4 carriers f.e. the outcome was never a win for 1 CV against 4 CV (sure it’s hard and tech level has an impact)

 

[Alex_brunius]

I’m just thinking. At the battle of Midway, 4 Japanese carrier were sunk (out of 4) and only 1 US carrier (out of 3). If you simulate this situation in HOI3, the battle system is way too much “predefined” maybe except of the “critical hit” factor and the result would be very similar every time.

I don't agree. Carrier battle randomness is actually one of the stronger points of the HoI3 mechanics since the airplanes take turns in pounding the other fleet for around 4 hours.

So one side will open up naval striking the other ( determined IIRC by chance, doctrine, positioning and leaderskill ). This alone gives a huge advantage but then we have the factors of surprise (+75% modifier), nighttime (-50%) and weather ( up to -99% ) that can change the balance greatly in one or the other directions.

On top of this the "critical hit" that is 10% chance to do 10 times damage and almost oneshot whatever that CAG happens to be shooting at.

It is certainly possible to duplicate the result of Midway in HoI3 if one side with 3 CVs opens up with critical hits, surprise and daytime attack in good weather it can result in the other side losing or taking crippling damage to their CVs in the span of a single day.

Id also like to point out that USA was not really such a big underdog at Midway that most historians make it out to be. USA had roughly 230 Carrier airplanes and 130 land based up against the 250 Japanese Carrier based airplanes giving USA a numerical superiority of over 40% in aircraft numbers, and almost no disadvantage in terms of Carrier air.

What I would like to see is some more factors, which influence and outcome of a battle more than just ship and leader stats.
F.e. make the intelligence more important for a battle outcome or the reconnaissance ability. Not sure if I can bring up my point, but in HOI3, if you fight with 1 against 4 carriers f.e. the outcome was never a win for 1 CV against 4 CV (sure it’s hard and tech level has an impact)

With the latest expansion of HoI3 intelligence do play a very important role, but it works more like reconnaissance should ( giving you the ability to follow the enemy taskforce on the map using military intel ).

Sure more work can be done in the areas of intel and air recon, I am the first to agree with that... but do you really think that 1 CV should be able to defeat 4 CV in any sort of realistic setting? Are there any historical examples of 1:4 numerical disadvantage of airplanes still coming out ahead in a clash?

 

[Cpack]

You're right, 1 vs 4 is a bad example. I'm only wondering after having several naval battles USA vs. JAP in multiplayer, we never had a real surprise in several battles, always the fleet which was the "expected" stronger one also won the battle.

 

[Alex_brunius]

You're right, 1 vs 4 is a bad example. I'm only wondering after having several naval battles USA vs. JAP in multiplayer, we never had a real surprise in several battles, always the fleet which was the "expected" stronger one also won the battle.

Yes the game mechanics break down when you get too large fleets since this lowers efficiency and produce long drawn out battles with -80% combat efficiency due to stacking on both sides.

With more then 10-15 ships on each side the less room individual critical hits and randomness shows and the Battles can turn into several days long grinds instead.

Many MP groups have some houserules against using to large super stacks to prevent this from happening.

 

[aphrochine]

I've always thought the best thing that can be done to Air and Naval battles in HOI is to remove the "1 Battle per Province" restriction. This would allow multi-threaded battles and would better represent how those types of engagements went down. Add in some logic about who attacks what, and there go...then you can effectivley place hard caps on fleet/air force size and control scaling issues with balance.

 

[Big Nev]

Something else that HoI doesn’t represent very well is the frequent one hit kill for a CV. OK, there’s a critical hit chance of doing a lot of damage but, in reality, several carriers were either sunk or so badly damaged as to be completely out of the fight for long periods.

Yes, Midway was a huge CF for the IJN, but carriers (which could be very vulnerable during operations) were getting taken-out by single aircraft even quite late in the war. Even with all the damage control procedures implemented by the USN, one of the Essex class (was it Franklin?) got hit with a pair of 250 kg bombs in early 45. Only the bomb that went through her flight deck caused significant damage. Aircraft in her hanger were destroyed and blew up, the fires & explosions spread to her flight deck where more armed & fuelled aircraft blew up. She was so badly damaged that she had to be towed away by a cruiser and, although eventually repaired, took no further part in the war.

And this is by no means an isolated case.

If a CV gets caught with its pants down, it was usually the last thing it does. Carrier warfare was savage & very unpredictable. This 4:1 idea. It's actually possible. The aircraft from the 4 could get lost, arrive over their target while it was in a storm, get torn-up by a well executed CAP or be just out of range if the 1 had retired after launching. As has been proven, it only takes one bomb or one torpedo to eliminate a CV.

 

[Alex_brunius]

This 4:1 idea. It's actually possible. The aircraft from the 4 could get lost, arrive over their target while it was in a storm, get torn-up by a well executed CAP or be just out of range if the 1 had retired after launching. As has been proven, it only takes one bomb or one torpedo to eliminate a CV.

Keep in mind that air launched torpedoes generally were smaller then submarine launched torpedoes though.


If we continue with Midway as an example and only one instead of 3 US Airgroups of dive bombers had attacked the Japanese Carriers at Midway they would statistically only have been able to knock out one of them instead of 3. This is also assuming that the 3 times smaller amount of torpedo bombers still could have delayed the Japanese launch and disrupted the CAP to the same degree as historically which is quite a big assumption.


What happens next is that the Japanese retaliates with 3 working carriers instead of 1, and 3 times more zeros slaughtering whatever remaining dive bombers try to straggle homewards low on fuel. Historically the Japanese counter-attack with 1 airgroup disabled 1 US Carrier, so no reason a much larger strike could not pull this off as well as clear the waters of most other US ships in the area.


Even a "well executed CAP" from a single Carrier is not likely to stop an attack of 3-4 hostile Carriers. Once again Midway provides the example with the last Japanese remaining carriers CAP simply getting overwhelmed despite having superior A6M fighters, superior experience, but inferior numbers.

To win with 1:4 disadvantage you would not just need to get lucky, you would need to get lucky several times in a row while your enemy is unlucky several times in a row. Always possible but extremely unlikely.

 

[Cpack]

What also comes into my mind was the fact (atm in my game as Japan) that if you have a superior fleet, the outcome is mostly all or nothing. I mean it's not "I lost 2 capitals and 3 screens and the US lost 4 capitals and 6 screens", its more like I lost nothing and you lost all.
I'm wondering, at the moment, I as Japan have 12 ships lost in total (1943) and the US has lost 165 ships, even my tech is not really superior to USA. So there's no real challenge...

 

[Alex_brunius]

What also comes into my mind was the fact (atm in my game as Japan) that if you have a superior fleet, the outcome is mostly all or nothing. I mean it's not "I lost 2 capitals and 3 screens and the US lost 4 capitals and 6 screens", its more like I lost nothing and you lost all.

Isn't this historical though?
From 1943 onward the USN fleets engaged or at least their carrier-airpower was pretty much always vastly superior, and they did not lose many ships at all. Their result is probably comparable to yours ( 10 times or more enemy ships sunk ).

I'm wondering, at the moment, I as Japan have 12 ships lost in total (1943) and the US has lost 165 ships, even my tech is not really superior to USA. So there's no real challenge...

IMO that is not so much of a game-mechanics problem since it works fine in multiplayer versus equally skilled opponents, it is an AI problem that they can't field fleets that threaten yours.

 

[Secret Master]

If a CV gets caught with its pants down, it was usually the last thing it does. Carrier warfare was savage & very unpredictable.

If I had my way, the hangar tech for CVs in HOI3 would have been retooled in service of a "carrier vulnerability" mechanic. Carriers with low tech/low hangar techs would have much higher chances for critical hits to simulate what you are talking about. The hangar tech (and probably some doctrines) would progressively lower this chance so that later carriers would not be nearly so vulnerable. But even at max techs, it would mean that carriers have a higher chance of sustaining crippling damage.

If bombs are rolling around on the deck, you don't need as many bombs or torpedoes to sink a carrier as was used to sink Yamato. One will be quite sufficient to kill Akagi.

 

[Alex_brunius]

If I had my way, the hangar tech for CVs in HOI3 would have been retooled in service of a "carrier vulnerability" mechanic. Carriers with low tech/low hangar techs would have much higher chances for critical hits to simulate what you are talking about. The hangar tech (and probably some doctrines) would progressively lower this chance so that later carriers would not be nearly so vulnerable. But even at max techs, it would mean that carriers have a higher chance of sustaining crippling damage.

If bombs are rolling around on the deck, you don't need as many bombs or torpedoes to sink a carrier as was used to sink Yamato. One will be quite sufficient to kill Akagi.

Damage control should be more of a doctrine then a design tech though IMO ( or perhaps both ).

How about a Damage control doctrine requiring actual combat experience to research efficiently, that once it is researched unlocks the ability to design newer generations of Carriers built with damage control in mind

 

[plasticpanzers]

'tag' remove Japanese carriers 'tag' back to US as player....

 

[Big Nev]

If I had my way, the hangar tech for CVs in HOI3 would have been retooled in service of a "carrier vulnerability" mechanic. Carriers with low tech/low hangar techs would have much higher chances for critical hits to simulate what you are talking about. The hangar tech (and probably some doctrines) would progressively lower this chance so that later carriers would not be nearly so vulnerable. But even at max techs, it would mean that carriers have a higher chance of sustaining crippling damage.

If bombs are rolling around on the deck, you don't need as many bombs or torpedoes to sink a carrier as was used to sink Yamato. One will be quite sufficient to kill Akagi.

This.

Damage control should be more of a doctrine then a design tech though IMO ( or perhaps both ).

How about a Damage control doctrine requiring actual combat experience to research efficiently, that once it is researched unlocks the ability to design newer generations of Carriers built with damage control in mind

And this.

Combined with the other thing I keep harping on about with regard to where the armoured deck is. Flight or Hangar.

Bombs of a size that put US or Japanese carriers out of action (or out of the war) frequently just bounced off Brit' CVs.

I'll stand corrected, but I think most CV's were crippled by bombs. A few were sunk by torpedoes or surface gunfire but I think bombs followed by fire accounted for the vast majority of CVs being taken out of action some of which were only to be sunk by torpedoes later after being crippled.

 

[plasticpanzers]

I was reading a series of articles on the effectiveness of the British armored decks with US unarmored decks. All the UK CVs that
were either hit by bombs or kamakazes had a byproduct of the hit causing such structural damage to the hull below the armored
flight deck that the ships were considered useless by wars end. That UK CV design then followed US design in post war carriers
and all the armored deck carriers were scrapped or retired then scrapped soon after the wars end. The UK came to the conclusion
that the armored deck was effective in stopping bombs from penetrating generally but that the subsequent hull damage was in all
cases unrepairable to the pre hit condition and rendered the ships less and less effective during combat whereas US design with a
well developed repair system was superior in the long run such as the damage to the USS Franklin being totally repairable.

The reports were from a US Naval engineer site and I will try and find it again.
found it! (easier search than I thought! lol!)
http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-030.htm

 

[Big Nev]

Thanks Plastic.

I love this sort of stuff.

 

[Rubidium]

Damage control should be more of a doctrine then a design tech though IMO ( or perhaps both ).

How about a Damage control doctrine requiring actual combat experience to research efficiently, that once it is researched unlocks the ability to design newer generations of Carriers built with damage control in mind

But damage control is actually one of the things that can be practiced to some degree without combat. US damage control, even in the beginning of the war, was vastly superior to its Japanese equivalent; indeed, that was one of the key advantages that the US had early in the war. That was due to the emphasis the USN had put even pre-war on training in that area, to the point at which it has been joked that damage control was practically a religion.

It's one reason (besides propaganda) you had so many instances of stories of "heroic US sailors managing to haul their badly damaged ships to port" versus quite a few cases of Japanese ships being lost from survivable hits due to bad damage control. Not because the Japanese navy was incompetent (far from it) but due to the different areas of emphasis in training.

 

[Alex_brunius]

Key word being research efficiently ( meaning it is totally possible to research as USA in peacetime due to their vastly superior research capacity ).