How and When German manpower was severely depleted against Soviets ?

[makif130289]

Without Western Allied involvement (assuming they just magically disappear from the war on 22nd June 1941 or thereabouts) Germany has more troops, more aircraft, more trucks, more equipment in general. Meanwhile, the Soviets have less of these things.

Not only can the Germans redirect forces from North Africa/Western Europe to the East, they're also free of the effect of strategic bombing (minus the rather minor Soviet attempts) on their production, and they don't have to commit to the U-Boat war. They also have the opportunity to purchase resources overseas that they could not otherwise import. The Luftwaffe in particular will benefit, as it is kept out of the killing grounds which destroyed it IRL.

The Soviets on the other hand now need to produce more stuff, but have less to produce it with. Lack of imports from lend lease means less raw materials, now some workers have to be redirected onto these tasks. Even if the shortfall is somehow madeup, less workers are now available to produce weaponry, and to fight at the front. On top of that, direct military imports (trucks, boots, tanks, planes, etc...) are also down, so the USSR needs to make up an even bigger shortfall.

Without Western Allied involvement, the chances of the Soviet Union surviving the conflict, let alone winning it singlehanded, are significantly reduced.



The effect of the purge was to provide a discouragement to officers using their initiative, and to de-professionalise the officer corps. What changed? Stalin gave way and let the military run itself again, officers were allowed to use their initiative more and political supervision was reduced. Officers didn't have to look over their shoulder whilst trying to fight anymore, which helped things massively.

Of course there are other factors in the turnaround in Soviet military fortunes, the Germans became massively overstretched, the USSR recovered from the initial defeats and by Winter 41 was able to put up a strong resistance to the Germans (the disasters of Summer 42 were in large part due to disposition of forces).

You are right about magical disappearance point. Sheer existence of Britain as an hostile country was a serious pressure on Germany that tied economic resources on other areas. What i wanted to say was something like this : Churchill defies Germany and refuses to surrender. Americans at war but there is no Lend-Lease Agreement for Soviets. No D-Day, No Operation Husky, Mussolini remains at power, Stalemate after El-Alamein, Strong German air defenses and no strategic bombing campaign. So, basically no Allies threat to Germany other than their existence being a threat. My point is that Soviets would have defeated Germany after Autumn 1942 despite all the conditions listed above. In fact, in Autumn 1942, the Allies didn't really have any significant victory over Germany so even before the beginning of major Allied offensives, Soviets has already sealed Germany's fate in Stalingrad. Anything after that point reduced the cost of victory and duration of war.

Well, Some of the best commanders of WWII were among Soviet generals; Zhukov, Konev, Rokossovsky etc. Maybe, a point could be made that there were many bad commanders, i don't really know most of Soviet commanders. For de-professionalization, was Red Army undisciplined during Barbarossa ? For Stalin interefering in the battles, i really don't have any knowledge of Stalin directly interfering in the battle plans. Hitler personally determined German strategy in Barbarossa and it was a success for him and a loss for Stalin ( in the short term, of course ). To my knowledge, Churchill in fact interfered in the overall military strategy much more than Stalin or Roosevelt, only being behind of Hitler. So, what i am trying to say is that when Stalin really interefered in military operations and when he did so, was it in the good or bad direction ? Things got only worse for the Soviets in 1942 Summer with Germans threatining the oil source of Soviets. Stalin becoming more and more anxious issued his infamous "Not One Step Backwards" order. So, he should have personally interfered with the planning of Operation Uranus too as he still didn't have any reason to relax generals. In the end, it was a decisive victory for Soviets. So, what is the clear-cut line between Soviets losing because of bad commanders + Stalin and Soviets winning because of good commanders like Zhukov + Stalin not interefering anymore ?

 

[Easy-Kill]

You are right about magical disappearance point. Sheer existence of Britain as an hostile country was a serious pressure on Germany that tied economic resources on other areas. What i wanted to say was something like this : Churchill defies Germany and refuses to surrender. Americans at war but there is no Lend-Lease Agreement for Soviets. No D-Day, No Operation Husky, Mussolini remains at power, Stalemate after El-Alamein, Strong German air defenses and no strategic bombing campaign. So, basically no Allies threat to Germany other than their existence being a threat. My point is that Soviets would have defeated Germany after Autumn 1942 despite all the conditions listed above. In fact, in Autumn 1942, the Allies didn't really have any significant victory over Germany so even before the beginning of major Allied offensives, Soviets has already sealed Germany's fate in Stalingrad. Anything after that point reduced the cost of victory and duration of war.

Well, Some of the best commanders of WWII were among Soviet generals; Zhukov, Konev, Rokossovsky etc. Maybe, a point could be made that there were many bad commanders, i don't really know most of Soviet commanders. For de-professionalization, was Red Army undisciplined during Barbarossa ? For Stalin interefering in the battles, i really don't have any knowledge of Stalin directly interfering in the battle plans. Hitler personally determined German strategy in Barbarossa and it was a success for him and a loss for Stalin ( in the short term, of course ). To my knowledge, Churchill in fact interfered in the overall military strategy much more than Stalin or Roosevelt, only being behind of Hitler. So, what i am trying to say is that when Stalin really interefered in military operations and when he did so, was it in the good or bad direction ? Things got only worse for the Soviets in 1942 Summer with Germans threatining the oil source of Soviets. Stalin becoming more and more anxious issued his infamous "Not One Step Backwards" order. So, he should have personally interfered with the planning of Operation Uranus too as he still didn't have any reason to relax generals. In the end, it was a decisive victory for Soviets. So, what is the clear-cut line between Soviets losing because of bad commanders + Stalin and Soviets winning because of good commanders like Zhukov + Stalin not interefering anymore ?

Regardless of the implausibility of a hostile but non aggressive allies, there are some misconceptions in your post.

Firstly, one of the principal causes for the allied strategic success was the allied war council which pushed strategy. The combination of Churchill, Roosevelt, Alanbrooke and Marshall helped to ensure that no one person could interfere and dictate with either strategic or tactical decisions.

On the otherhand, in the early phases of the Nazi-Soviet war, Stalin (who had command experience) and other Soviet Leaders (e.g. Voroshilov) played at being General. What made Stalin an effective leader was that he saw the effectt this was having and allowed the professional soldiers to manage the armies. Hitler started the war allowing the generals to manage and gradually overtook their command.

 

[makif130289]

Regardless of the implausibility of a hostile but non aggressive allies, there are some misconceptions in your post.

Firstly, one of the principal causes for the allied strategic success was the allied war council which pushed strategy. The combination of Churchill, Roosevelt, Alanbrooke and Marshall helped to ensure that no one person could interfere and dictate with either strategic or tactical decisions.

On the otherhand, in the early phases of the Nazi-Soviet war, Stalin (who had command experience) and other Soviet Leaders (e.g. Voroshilov) played at being General. What made Stalin an effective leader was that he saw the effectt this was having and allowed the professional soldiers to manage the armies. Hitler started the war allowing the generals to manage and gradually overtook their command.

Churchill heavily interfered in the British military strategy. Greece disaster was entirely Churchill's idea. He landed troops at Greece when the balance of power in North Africa was precarious. He continuously pressed his generals for a more offensive approach in North Africa. Commando raids were his ideas. There are many examples, it was goddamn Churchill, who can imagine Churchill not planning invasions and battles for every minute of his life. The man was born for this.

Stalin's military career in the Civil War and Polish War was a complete failure. I don't think he had much understanding of military matters. As for Hitler, i am in unorthodox school. In my opinion, Hitler was in fact the best strategist of all WW2 leaders. ( Let's Until he losing his nerves completely in mid-1943, almost all of his decisions proved to be better than any of his commanders. I think bashing Hitler in every way is natural ( and understandable ) result of the crimes committed by his regime.

So, Stalin apparently should have decided somewhere between Summer 1942 and Autumn 1942 that commanders should take control of the Army. When did it happen ? Or Stalin wasn't really interefering that much in military matters except for continuously applying pressure on the generals to perform better.

Until Mid-1943, the Allies were not really a major offensive power. Germans were only defeated at El-Alemein in late 1942 and held out until mid-1943 in Tunisia. At that point, the Allies only served to distract as many German resources as possible. As i said before, this is not an effect to be underestimated but you cannot win a war like this. By mid-1943, Soviet destroyed 6th Army in Stalingrad and was on the verge of dealing the final blow at Kursk. Exctract Lend-Lease program + Allied bombings in 1942-1943 from this, and still in my opinion, the result would be the same. Don't get me wrong, i am not trying to steal WW2 victory for someone. Even Churchill admitted in his WW2 memoirs that the war was essentially won in the Eastern Front. This doesn't mean British defiance in 1940 was meaningless. The Allied effort probably saved millions of lives and shortened the war by a year or two.

One final note is that German production continued to rise until late-1944 despite the Allied bombardment. So, until mid-1943 the air bombardment was not really a big factor.

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

A good strategist ? Hitler ? Maybe he understood some stuff on the tactical/operational level but on the strategic level he was a goner.

 

[gagenater]

I doubt it would have come to that. For one, if America was truly on her own she would have a heck of a time actually bombing the Germans.

Nuke them from Iceland. It's closer to Germany than the real life B-29 bases were to Japan. This is a trivial problem that was dealt with in many different threads.

 

[gagenater]

Those wondering: what decisions did Stalin make that created problems for Russia? The answer is obvious - the deployment of the Red army before the Germans attacked. There were MANY intelligence signals clearly indicating that the Germans planned to attack very soon. A professional experienced general officer corps in the Red army that feels reasonably confident that they won't end up with nooses around their necks would simply not allow the general sorts of deployments the Red army had pre war. At the very least the troops would have been in more defendable locations. More likely they would have mostly been much further from the borders and only assembly and jumping off points (for whatever Russian attack was planned) would be near the borders. The initial German attack in Barbarossa would have been vastly less successful and the Russian army would have immediately been able to counterattack with very considerable force. More than likely the war would have been over in 1943, because the Russians would have beaten the Germans with their pre war army and would not have had to reconstruct it first. Lend lease would be minimal (or maybe not even initiated) because the Russians would have had adequate stocks of equipment on hand.

 

[CruelDwarf]

Those wondering: what decisions did Stalin make that created problems for Russia? The answer is obvious - the deployment of the Red army before the Germans attacked. There were MANY intelligence signals clearly indicating that the Germans planned to attack very soon.

Yes, indeed. The problem is that none of these signals were conclusive and most of them contradicted each other.

A professional experienced general officer corps in the Red army that feels reasonably confident that they won't end up with nooses around their necks would simply not allow the general sorts of deployments the Red army had pre war. At the very least the troops would have been in more defendable locations. More likely they would have mostly been much further from the borders and only assembly and jumping off points (for whatever Russian attack was planned) would be near the borders. The initial German attack in Barbarossa would have been vastly less successful and the Russian army would have immediately been able to counterattack with very considerable force.

Oh, this topic is very popular in russian military history community and known as "ambush/barrier controversity". Firstly. the germans weren't oblivious for Red Army disposition and would adjust accordingly. So there are many failure points in deployment in deep theory:

1. It is just surredering territory to the enemy without a fight. So in practice germans will just start their attack a few dozen kilometers to the east.
2. The resources spended to create fortifications on the border and to improve infrastructure on newly acquired territories are wasted.
3. Germans will use limited soviet military presence in the border regions to infiltrate it with recon and diversion groups well beforehand. And probably will use local anti-soviet sentiments to fuel some sort of rebellion as prelude to war. So most road/railroad infrastructure and bridges will be captured intact.
4. And last but not least - the result of direct clashes between soviet and german units will still the same regardless of the distance from the border. Because Red Army is still unmobilized, undertrained, understaffed and have a major problem with operational mobility of its units.

More than likely the war would have been over in 1943, because the Russians would have beaten the Germans with their pre war army and would not have had to reconstruct it first.

Of course 5-million pre-war Red Army is capable of winning against 8-million Wermacht. You need to fully mobilize the Red Army to win against german onslaught and Red Army mobilization period is at least 40 days even on paper. So you need something to delay germans for at least 40 days. And this can only be a pre-war Red Army and nothing other.

 

[DoomBunny]

You are right about magical disappearance point. Sheer existence of Britain as an hostile country was a serious pressure on Germany that tied economic resources on other areas. What i wanted to say was something like this : Churchill defies Germany and refuses to surrender. Americans at war but there is no Lend-Lease Agreement for Soviets. No D-Day, No Operation Husky, Mussolini remains at power, Stalemate after El-Alamein, Strong German air defenses and no strategic bombing campaign. So, basically no Allies threat to Germany other than their existence being a threat. My point is that Soviets would have defeated Germany after Autumn 1942 despite all the conditions listed above. In fact, in Autumn 1942, the Allies didn't really have any significant victory over Germany so even before the beginning of major Allied offensives, Soviets has already sealed Germany's fate in Stalingrad. Anything after that point reduced the cost of victory and duration of war.

1942?

Well, there's North Africa. And the garrison forces tied up in Western Europe. And a large amount of lend-lease aid. And the beginnings of the Luftwaffe's attrition.

But lets assume that the Soviets still somehow win at Stalingrad, despite having less forces than OTL and the Germans having more, where does that leave them without the Western Allies? Still pretty badly off all things considered. Even with a massive victory to boast of, the Soviets still have massive problems which will cripple their ability to keep fighting. Over 50% of aviation fuel and explosive was imported, along with 363,000 trucks, nearly 15 million pairs of boots, 1900 locomotives and 11,075 railway cars (a massive number compared to domestic production), almost a million miles of telephone wire and 380,000 field telephones, and enough half a pound of food for every Soviet soldier every day of the war. To name but a few things supplied during the war.

Well, Some of the best commanders of WWII were among Soviet generals; Zhukov, Konev, Rokossovsky etc. Maybe, a point could be made that there were many bad commanders, i don't really know most of Soviet commanders.

Which is why things went so much better when these generals were allowed to run the fighting.

For de-professionalization, was Red Army undisciplined during Barbarossa ? For Stalin interefering in the battles, i really don't have any knowledge of Stalin directly interfering in the battle plans.

Undisciplined, no, far from it, far too disciplined. With political officers watching them and strict obedience a requirement, the officers couldn't fight properly.

Hitler personally determined German strategy in Barbarossa and it was a success for him and a loss for Stalin ( in the short term, of course ). To my knowledge, Churchill in fact interfered in the overall military strategy much more than Stalin or Roosevelt, only being behind of Hitler.

All of which is irrelevant.

So, what i am trying to say is that when Stalin really interefered in military operations and when he did so, was it in the good or bad direction ? Things got only worse for the Soviets in 1942 Summer with Germans threatining the oil source of Soviets. Stalin becoming more and more anxious issued his infamous "Not One Step Backwards" order. So, he should have personally interfered with the planning of Operation Uranus too as he still didn't have any reason to relax generals.

While at the same time allowing the officers to get on with the fighting. Which is why the campaign turned out as it did, if Stalin had his way then things would have been different at Stalingrad. The pincer attack would not have taken shape, as Stalin was instead keen on immediately throwing in all his reserves.

In the end, it was a decisive victory for Soviets. So, what is the clear-cut line between Soviets losing because of bad commanders + Stalin and Soviets winning because of good commanders like Zhukov + Stalin not interefering anymore ?

Pretty clear cut in favour of decreased politicization.

 

[Kovax]

The biggest negative effect that Stalin exerted may have been his selection of officers to trust and promote. Putting people like Budyenni (sp?) in command virtually ensured that the Soviets would lose. Leaving more than a Corps of troops to be encircled (Umann pocket?) is not a mark of competence; continuing to send in troops even as the pocket is being closed has to be one of the most stupid moves one could make under the circumstances; continuing to send trains with troops and supplies directly into enemy hands for another week or longer AFTER the pocket has been closed ranks among the "top military blunders" of all time. Competent officers were relieved of command when things went wrong, but Stalin supported this bumbling crony and yes-man fully, despite repeated failures on a grand scale.

 

[Easy-Kill]

Churchill heavily interfered in the British military strategy. Greece disaster was entirely Churchill's idea. He landed troops at Greece when the balance of power in North Africa was precarious. He continuously pressed his generals for a more offensive approach in North Africa. Commando raids were his ideas. There are many examples, it was goddamn Churchill, who can imagine Churchill not planning invasions and battles for every minute of his life. The man was born for this.

I would suggest you read Andrew Robert's "Masters and Commanders" which details the British and then Allied strategic Leadership. As for Greece, Britain was treaty bound to assist Greece in the event of a threat to her independence. As for it being Churchill, he was the head of Government, not a dictator. It was the War Council and Chief of the Imperial General Staff who made the ultimate decisions, not Churchill himself.

Stalin's military career in the Civil War and Polish War was a complete failure. I don't think he had much understanding of military matters.

You do know why Stalingrad was named after him don't you? It was due to his command which resulted in a decisive victory over a superior Tsarist force in the city of Tsaristyn

As for Hitler, i am in unorthodox school. In my opinion, Hitler was in fact the best strategist of all WW2 leaders. ( Let's Until he losing his nerves completely in mid-1943, almost all of his decisions proved to be better than any of his commanders. I think bashing Hitler in every way is natural ( and understandable ) result of the crimes committed by his regime.

Hitlers successes came from applying overwhelming force against unprepared and poorly equipped enemies. This didn't work quite so well when the enemy was similarly equipped, well trained and well motivated. As for being the greatest strategist, if this were true we would be having this conversation in German.

So, Stalin apparently should have decided somewhere between Summer 1942 and Autumn 1942 that commanders should take control of the Army. When did it happen ? Or Stalin wasn't really interefering that much in military matters except for continuously applying pressure on the generals to perform better.

If you are genuinely interested, I would suggest reading Simon Sebag-Montefiore's book on Stalin. His appreciation that the Soviet Old Guard were unable to fight a contemporary war was realised quite early on and in my opinion started with the dismissal of Voroshilov and Stalin's increased reliance on Shaposhnikov.

One final note is that German production continued to rise until late-1944 despite the Allied bombardment. So, until mid-1943 the air bombardment was not really a big factor.

I would suggest Adam Tooze's "Wages of Destruction". He outlines that while absolute production increased, this was principally due to the effect of slave labour, 24hour working and reduced production quality. Often neglected effects of the allied bombing (and blockade) was the logistical strain it placed on Germany. She had neither the raw materials nor logistical ability to support her industry. Far from having no effect, even without the Soviet Union the allied blockade and bombing campaign would likely have caused the economic collapse of Germany and reduced the population to the same troglodytic malnurished state it was in in 1945 (and 1918).

 

[gagenater]

Yes, indeed. The problem is that none of these signals were conclusive and most of them contradicted each other.



Oh, this topic is very popular in russian military history community and known as "ambush/barrier controversity". Firstly. the germans weren't oblivious for Red Army disposition and would adjust accordingly. So there are many failure points in deployment in deep theory:

1. It is just surredering territory to the enemy without a fight. So in practice germans will just start their attack a few dozen kilometers to the east.
2. The resources spended to create fortifications on the border and to improve infrastructure on newly acquired territories are wasted.
3. Germans will use limited soviet military presence in the border regions to infiltrate it with recon and diversion groups well beforehand. And probably will use local anti-soviet sentiments to fuel some sort of rebellion as prelude to war. So most road/railroad infrastructure and bridges will be captured intact.
4. And last but not least - the result of direct clashes between soviet and german units will still the same regardless of the distance from the border. Because Red Army is still unmobilized, undertrained, understaffed and have a major problem with operational mobility of its units.


Of course 5-million pre-war Red Army is capable of winning against 8-million Wermacht. You need to fully mobilize the Red Army to win against german onslaught and Red Army mobilization period is at least 40 days even on paper. So you need something to delay germans for at least 40 days. And this can only be a pre-war Red Army and nothing other.

Yes there were conflicting intelligence signals. Under such circumstances a reasonable thing to do would to be cautious in case your preferred/primary intelligence picture turned out wrong. Stalin chose to ignore all intelligence that conflicted with his belief that the Germans would not attack soon.

Points 1 and 2: the territory was lost so fast that no useful resources were extracted from it in real life anyway. Having some defenses at the border is all well and good but you don't put the bulk of your army in those defenses before a war breaks out. You only put small forces in them and leave the bulk of your active duty forces much further back so that they can respond to any agressive moves by the enemy. Instead what happened was the Germans bypassed large numbers and formations of Russian soldiers who were later forced to surrender.

3 and 4: you don't abandon border areas - just don't put such a large concentration of forces in them. There is no reasonable way the Germans could have gotten a mass infiltration of the soviet borders off successfully.

Also I am definately not suggesting that the USSR would have successfully fought off the Germans at or near the border successfully in 1941. With better force distribution though and more initiative allowed to the red army commanders they could have slowed the German advance much more than they did in real life, and with fewer losses in men and equipment. In real life the German advance obliterated all the forces the USSR had in the west and only the transfer of forces from other parts of the USSR and hastily raised reserve units stopped the tide in 1942. In a scenario where the intial pbase of the defense isn't so badly botched the German advance is blunted by the winter of 1941 much further west than in real life, the soviets have enough troops to hold the German 1942 spring offensive to a standstill and the Russians are able to go on the offensive by summer/early fall of 1942. I see Berlin captured sometime in the fall of 1943.

 

[CruelDwarf]

Yes there were conflicting intelligence signals. Under such circumstances a reasonable thing to do would to be cautious in case your preferred/primary intelligence picture turned out wrong. Stalin chose to ignore all intelligence that conflicted with his belief that the Germans would not attack soon.

It is again isn't true. Stalin viewed german invasion as possible from about of end of april and by the end of may invasion was considered as very immenent. The problem was not with an invasion per se, but with prior german actions. It was expected that germans will either conclude a peace deal of some sorts with british first or will issue an ultimatum/some demands to the Soviet Union. The famous note in the middle of june was strictly about this - to probe germans on "what do you want?"
In the same time divisions were called from internal military districts and transfered to the border. There was a large exercises with calling out of massive amount of reservists too.
By 16th of June there was no practical doubts about german intentions at all. The only question was when, where and what will germans do before declaring hostilities. The germans didn't do anything and just attacked without any demands at all.

Points 1 and 2: the territory was lost so fast that no useful resources were extracted from it in real life anyway. Having some defenses at the border is all well and good but you don't put the bulk of your army in those defenses before a war breaks out. You only put small forces in them and leave the bulk of your active duty forces much further back so that they can respond to any agressive moves by the enemy.

What do you call the bulk of the army? The border itself was covered by 69 divisions. It is more than 20-30 km of frontage per division on average (and they were mostly understength). The only mechanized forces that were deployed on the border were based on Brest just because it was only possible point with enough housing and infrastructure for such forces. Other forces of three border special military districts were deployed about 100-200 km from the border itself. You just cannot deploy your rather short-legged forces further away.

Instead what happened was the Germans bypassed large numbers and formations of Russian soldiers who were later forced to surrender.

It is not what happened in reality. The germans smashed through border defenses with ease (with up to ten times superiority on the main attack points it is not very surprising) but they were off the time-table of "Barbarossa" on the first day already.

3 and 4: you don't abandon border areas - just don't put such a large concentration of forces in them. There is no reasonable way the Germans could have gotten a mass infiltration of the soviet borders off successfully.

As I said earlier - 69 divisions isn't large concentation of force because other side have more than one hundred.

With better force distribution though and more initiative allowed to the red army commanders they could have slowed the German advance much more than they did in real life, and with fewer losses in men and equipment.

Soviet commanders had a field day with initiative during summer'41. Because of simple communication lag and rapid developments on the front. In practice the only thing that Stavka did is ordered the counter-offensive, but contrary to popular belief the counter-offensive was only really reasonable thing to do. Because you cannot either passively defend against foe who have a numerical and firepower superiority over you and you cannot conduct a mobile defense against foe who faster than you both on tactical and operative levels.

In real life the German advance obliterated all the forces the USSR had in the west and only the transfer of forces from other parts of the USSR and hastily raised reserve units stopped the tide in 1942.

It is just inevitable result of disparity of force between already mobilized Wermacht and peace-time Red Army. USSR need to start a mobilization in somewhere around middle or end of april to significantly change balance of forces. But even in this case soviet mobilization will still lag behind Wermacht redeployment.

 

[AegonVLLI]

In my opinion Soviet Union more or less defeated Germany singlehandedly. All the US supplies, invasion of Italy and France and air bombardment of Germany served only for the shortening of war and less losses for Soviet Union. That is not an effect to be underestimated but still it was the Soviets that won the war. They would have still won without the Allies, maybe in 1946, maybe with 25 million losses but the fate was already sealed. Germans completely ran out of steam by Autumn 1942. Soviets heavily outnumbered them ( and that was my original question, When did it happen despite huge losses in 1941 ? ), outmanufactured them and showed the world that they were at least as tenacious as the Germans. Destruction of 6th Army determined the fate of Eastern Front. Did Soviets manage to encircle Germans in Stalingrad with the aid of less-than-one year of lend-lease program ? I highly doubt that. Soviet lack of trucks was a problem but it was exaggerated to highlight US role in victory.

I am not saying that Germany had won easily if it had the SU as the only enemy. But Germany vs USA, GB and SU was certain, whereas Germany vs. SU would have been a very close call. Additionally even if one side had won in the end, the winner would have collapsed due to the enormous losses shortly after. The Nazis had lost control over their conquered empire, the Soviets would be to week to keep their huge minorities together or to subdue the anti-soviet eastern europeans. That would have made the USA the definite superpower, without cold war or dualistic world.

The US could have beaten Germany on its own- the issue of course being the path to victory would be nuclear carpet bombing. Nothing like adding tens of millions more to the butchers bill to achieve victory.

Okay, the USA would not have been able to win against the Third Reich conventionally, as the did in reality.

 

[DarthJF]

Okay, the USA would not have been able to win against the Third Reich conventionally, as the did in reality.

In a life or death struggle US would have won the Germans even with conventional means. But because of geography, US never had to fear a life or death struggle against Germany or having to suffer millions of casualties on a way to victory.

But that doesn't mean they wouldn't have had the capability.

 

[gagenater]

It is again isn't true. Stalin viewed german invasion as possible from about of end of april and by the end of may invasion was considered as very immenent. The problem was not with an invasion per se, but with prior german actions. It was expected that germans will either conclude a peace deal of some sorts with british first or will issue an ultimatum/some demands to the Soviet Union. The famous note in the middle of june was strictly about this - to probe germans on "what do you want?"
In the same time divisions were called from internal military districts and transfered to the border. There was a large exercises with calling out of massive amount of reservists too.
By 16th of June there was no practical doubts about german intentions at all. The only question was when, where and what will germans do before declaring hostilities. The germans didn't do anything and just attacked without any demands at all.

It just seems like it was all too little to late. I haven't studied the intelligence situation as it appeared to the Russians pre war. It would be a fascinating book I bet.

What do you call the bulk of the army? The border itself was covered by 69 divisions. It is more than 20-30 km of frontage per division on average (and they were mostly understength). The only mechanized forces that were deployed on the border were based on Brest just because it was only possible point with enough housing and infrastructure for such forces. Other forces of three border special military districts were deployed about 100-200 km from the border itself. You just cannot deploy your rather short-legged forces further away.

I underlined something you said that I think is critical - the red army wasn't motorized/mechanized in 1941 the way it would be in 1944 and 1945. My idea/thinking would have been to have the main forces perhaps 300-400 km away from the border. Put a much smaller force actually on/near the border - perhaps 20 divisions just enough so that if there is a surprise attack that they can sound the alarm and run away.

It is not what happened in reality. The germans smashed through border defenses with ease (with up to ten times superiority on the main attack points it is not very surprising) but they were off the time-table of "Barbarossa" on the first day already. As I said earlier - 69 divisions isn't large concentation of force because other side have more than one hundred.

And this is the problem. The attacker (in this case the Germans) chooses where they will attack, and can ensure that they will have local superiority where they do it. The Russian border forces (69 divisions versus the German 100) were just big enough to lead a commander to believe that trying to defend might be worth doing, but not nearly big enough to actually do it (which might take 150 divisions or so to prevent the Germans from getting overwhelming local superiority. In a defensive situation where you might get surprised you have two realistic options: Establish VERY strong defenses everywhere at risk so that more or less no matter what happens you won't get overwhelmed in any one place, or establish a very weak perimeter so that you can figure out where the enemy is attacking from, then mobilize your main forces to counterattack or provide a defense further back. The Russians at the start of WWII did neither. They had forces spread out all over the place unable to mutually support each other and easy to defeat in detail.

Soviet commanders had a field day with initiative during summer'41. Because of simple communication lag and rapid developments on the front. In practice the only thing that Stavka did is ordered the counter-offensive, but contrary to popular belief the counter-offensive was only really reasonable thing to do. Because you cannot either passively defend against foe who have a numerical and firepower superiority over you and you cannot conduct a mobile defense against foe who faster than you both on tactical and operative levels.

I completely agree - once the hostilities started the Russians did everything as well as they could, and counterattacking was the only reasonable thing to do. It was the initial disposition of forces that doomed them.

It is just inevitable result of disparity of force between already mobilized Wermacht and peace-time Red Army. USSR need to start a mobilization in somewhere around middle or end of april to significantly change balance of forces. But even in this case soviet mobilization will still lag behind Wermacht redeployment.

Agree - I just think that a general staff that was allowed a little more flexability and initiative the Stalin would have been able to dispose their forces in such a way to prevent such a huge volume of their soldiers and material from being overrun so early in the war. The note you made earlier about the effective radius of action of early war soviet forces is important though. This may have limited the strategic ability of the Russian army to do a whole lot better than they did early in the war.

 

[CruelDwarf]

It just seems like it was all too little to late. I haven't studied the intelligence situation as it appeared to the Russians pre war. It would be a fascinating book I bet.

It is just a problem with translation of russian contemporary research to english. There was no high demand for it apparently.

I underlined something you said that I think is critical - the red army wasn't motorized/mechanized in 1941 the way it would be in 1944 and 1945. My idea/thinking would have been to have the main forces perhaps 300-400 km away from the border.

]
This is just means that USSR abandons practically entire Baltics, half of Belarus and thrid of Ukraine to the enemy without any serious combat. Wermacht will just push through this no mans land in marching columns. And if you will use some troops as "tripwire" they will just be wiped without any practical result because of the same reasons as in our reality.

Put a much smaller force actually on/near the border - perhaps 20 divisions just enough so that if there is a surprise attack that they can sound the alarm and run away.

Red Army cannot run away from Wermacht because german units (even foot ones) are more mobile. So you still sacrificed serious amount of forces but without any gains whatsoever.

In a defensive situation where you might get surprised you have two realistic options: Establish VERY strong defenses everywhere at risk so that more or less no matter what happens you won't get overwhelmed in any one place, or establish a very weak perimeter so that you can figure out where the enemy is attacking from, then mobilize your main forces to counterattack or provide a defense further back

And the Red Army planners did exactly that. They used infantry divisions to cover the border and mechanized corps of Special Military Districts were designated to cutting off the tips of enemy offensives. But there was a few problems with that plan - mechanized corps weren't mobile and durable enough for this role. But this problem cannot be solved by retreating further into Russia. You need to reorganize whole armoured force for that. And such reorganization was planned (again!) after autumn maneuvers.

I completely agree - once the hostilities started the Russians did everything as well as they could, and counterattacking was the only reasonable thing to do. It was the initial disposition of forces that doomed them.

It is not about disposition. It is about unmobilized state of Red Army and its major deficiencies in several areas -such as already mentioned unwieldy mechanized corps organization, serious shortage of proper towing vehicles for divisional and corps-level artillery and thrid failure point was a abyssmal battlefield intelligence/recon because of which soviets regularly failed to identify directions of german main attacks and predict their further actions.
And all of this cannot be remedied by redeployment of existing forces. As in anecdote "if a whorehouse stopped to produce income it is useless to reshuffle the beds, you need to change the working girls".

 

[makif130289]

I would suggest you read Andrew Robert's "Masters and Commanders" which details the British and then Allied strategic Leadership. As for Greece, Britain was treaty bound to assist Greece in the event of a threat to her independence. As for it being Churchill, he was the head of Government, not a dictator. It was the War Council and Chief of the Imperial General Staff who made the ultimate decisions, not Churchill himself.


You do know why Stalingrad was named after him don't you? It was due to his command which resulted in a decisive victory over a superior Tsarist force in the city of Tsaristyn


Hitlers successes came from applying overwhelming force against unprepared and poorly equipped enemies. This didn't work quite so well when the enemy was similarly equipped, well trained and well motivated. As for being the greatest strategist, if this were true we would be having this conversation in German.


If you are genuinely interested, I would suggest reading Simon Sebag-Montefiore's book on Stalin. His appreciation that the Soviet Old Guard were unable to fight a contemporary war was realised quite early on and in my opinion started with the dismissal of Voroshilov and Stalin's increased reliance on Shaposhnikov.


I would suggest Adam Tooze's "Wages of Destruction". He outlines that while absolute production increased, this was principally due to the effect of slave labour, 24hour working and reduced production quality. Often neglected effects of the allied bombing (and blockade) was the logistical strain it placed on Germany. She had neither the raw materials nor logistical ability to support her industry. Far from having no effect, even without the Soviet Union the allied blockade and bombing campaign would likely have caused the economic collapse of Germany and reduced the population to the same troglodytic malnurished state it was in in 1945 (and 1918).

Yes yes, in both Soviet Union and Germany there were some kind of War councils. Churchill's over-intereference is a well known fact, he doesn't need to be a dictator to do that. British commanders didn't want to intervere in Greece as it was clearly destined to be a failure and plus Rommel was pressing hard in North Africa. Churchill dreamt of having a stronghold in Greece something similar to what happened in WWI. His own memoirs are very clear on his willingness to determine military strategy.

Stalingrad was renamed after him because he was bacially a dictator. He didn't really achieve anything useful in the Civil War. If it was for achievement, half of the Soviet cities would have been renamed after Trotsky.

Let's not discuss Hitler now. It is a long debate and very hard to distinguish the truth between the need of being politically correct.

If it was for Shaposhnikov, wouldn't it be much earlier than June 1941 ? So then, Stalin reorganized the Army officers before the war and it was a success ? Is this argument meant to support the Purges not being a major factor in early Soviet defeats ?

You may be right but i am talking about mid-1943. Allied bombing increased exponentially from 1944 to 1945. In 1943, German air defense was not completely down. And in mid-1943 Soviets has already sealed the fate in Stalingrad and Kursk.

 

[makif130289]

In a life or death struggle US would have won the Germans even with conventional means. But because of geography, US never had to fear a life or death struggle against Germany or having to suffer millions of casualties on a way to victory.

But that doesn't mean they wouldn't have had the capability.

Exactly. US wouldn't win such a war, they would simply make some kind of "honourable peace".

 

[Easy-Kill]

Yes yes, in both Soviet Union and Germany there were some kind of War councils. Churchill's over-intereference is a well known fact, he doesn't need to be a dictator to do that. British commanders didn't want to intervere in Greece as it was clearly destined to be a failure and plus Rommel was pressing hard in North Africa. Churchill dreamt of having a stronghold in Greece something similar to what happened in WWI. His own memoirs are very clear on his willingness to determine military strategy.

I don't think that you appreciate how things work in a democracy. In Britain, the Army was subordinate to the government; that is the government as the elected representatives of the people decide what the government does (i.e. what the army will do) while the Army decides how to do it. Churchill could not force the government to do something that the government didn't want to. The CIGS should have had the backbone to oppose the Greece idea ... he didn't. I would again recommend reading Andrew Robert's book in order to understand the intricate relationship between the PM and CIGS (and then the US counterparts following 1945).

Stalingrad was renamed after him because he was bacially a dictator. He didn't really achieve anything useful in the Civil War. If it was for achievement, half of the Soviet cities would have been renamed after Trotsky.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Tsaritsyn

If it was for Shaposhnikov, wouldn't it be much earlier than June 1941 ? So then, Stalin reorganized the Army officers before the war and it was a success ? Is this argument meant to support the Purges not being a major factor in early Soviet defeats ?

I am sorry, but i do not know what you are trying to say. Think about it this way, Germany did not defeat Russia in WW1, it was the collapse of the civilian and military government ... i have no doubt that a more traditionally led force would have been better at the start of the war, the real question would have been whether they would have been as good as the Soviet Force at the end of the war.

You may be right but i am talking about mid-1943. Allied bombing increased exponentially from 1944 to 1945. In 1943, German air defense was not completely down. And in mid-1943 Soviets has already sealed the fate in Stalingrad and Kursk.

No, allied bombing increased exponentially throughout the entire war, but only reached significant numbers in 1944. You also have to remember that there were many other contributing factors in the allied strategy, which was designed to contain Germany and consolidate through to 1942. One good example is that the Battle for Normandy consisted of the largest concentration of German Panzers and Panzer divisions since Kursk. With no allied threat, Norway, France and other areas would have their garrisons significantly reduced. One of the things about the allied strategy is that the Allies could attack in force, in one place, while Germany had to defend everywhere at once.

 

[Swamp Rat]

I think garrisoning forces consist of only small part of Wehrmacht. So, most of the Wehrmacht frontline units should have been fighting in the Eastern Front.

Quite the opposite, especially after the rise of the resistance movements in the occupied countries. In Denmark the German occupation forces consisted of 2 divisions until 1942, then it gradually rose, 160,000 men in 1943 and 180,000 in 1944. And that is just Denmark, a small and relatively easy country to control on account of size and terrain. Then consider all the countries that was occupied by the Germans, some very large, some with difficult terrain and some with much more fierce resistance to suppress.

Occupying hostile nations costs a lot of manpower, a problem the Soviets didn't have to face until very late in the war.