You gotta remember, they lost what 400,000 men in North Africa? When you couple that with the need to garrison Europe... the Soviets were just able to kill Germans with their manpower.
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But i mean 1942 summer. At that point, commitment to African front wasn't so big.
According to the quotes numbers, the U.S.S.R. used it coal and steel 4-8 times more efficient than the Germans. Even if half the Soviet production was just repair, it would still mean they used their resources significantly better.
I do not have statistics on the manhours needed to produce Soviet and German armor and guns, but I wouldn't be surprised to see that Soviet manpower was more productive than German. The German economic high-level organisation was terrible for most of the war. Speed (*EDIT* I meant Speer) did improve it later on but too little, too late.
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It was not but reasonable close.Also Soviet stuff needed much less manpower in general to produce. The British did get most out of a manpoer hour btw. As a sidenote the biggest industry expansion compared to where they started was done by the Japanese by a huge margin.
There seems to be some consensus that a 1943 T-34/76 took 3,700 man hours to build, which compares very favourably to Panthers and Tigers (Bovington Tank Museum claims 55,000 man hours for a Panther). Pz. IIIs and IVs are closer to the Soviet figures.
It is not true. Pz IV (its earlier modifications were worst in this regard) was very complex tank to build and in practice "Panther" was a simplier and more streamlined desgin. In practice "Panther" wasn't much costlier than Pz IV both in terms of money and manhours. This idea about that accepting "Panther" as main medium tank was a bad decision is another result of overreliance on german memoirs in post-war historical studies.
Problem was, the same large diameter turret ring that gave the Panzer III and IV the advantage of a 3-man turret (gunner, loader commander), a command cupola for improved visibility while "buttoned up", and the option of later up-gunning (which kept the Panzer III and IV in the war and relevant for a lot longer), was also one of the most expensive parts to machine, and took a lot of large and exotic equipment a long time to cut into final shape. After Germany over-ran some of the Soviet factories, the Soviets eventually came up with a crude and cheap way of cutting turret rings using wooden fixtures with electrical arc cutters to burn away the excess metal. The Germans started to build a lot more StuG turretless SPGs to cut down the cost and time.
Yeah, I goofed on the Pz IV - I'm still trying to track down figures, but no luck as yet.
The Pz III went from 4,000 man hours early war to 2,000 late war, but wasn't much use at that point.
British Cromwells apparently took 5,640 man hours to build, which is actually an improvement over the Covenanter (6,900 man hours) and the Crusader (6,050 man hours).
Source
Well, DoomBunny has pretty much summed up the reason. Not all, or close to all, the German men in military age were availible for the frontline of the eastern front.
First of all Kriegsmarine wanted it's fair share of manpower 404,000 in 1941, up to 580,000 in 1942, 780,000 in 1943 and peaking at 810,000 in 1944. Now USSR had a navy on its own, but it never needed much more manpower than what it had at the outbreak of the war (400-450,000).
Secondly roughly 30% of the Heer's divisions were tied down in occupied areas in July -41. That number fell a little in 1942 (down to 25% although many of them were not at full strength), but on the other hand a large chunk of the forces in east had to do garrison duty too, effectively more than eating up the gains from releasing troops from occupied areas (about 1.1 million were tied down doing garrison/anti partisan duty in the east). So in the summer of 1942 about 2 million of the Heer's manpower were tied down other places than the frontline in the east. The Red Army kept the number of troops in the Far East to well under a million men. The total calculation should indicate that the Heer would be outnumbered more than 2:1 at the frontline since Germany has to spread the manpower out more than USSR has to.
The same problem occurs to some degree for Luftwaffe that had to split it forces, unlike USSR that could focus the bulk of their forces fighting the Germans.
As for 1942 summer offensive, those numbers are for the southern part of the front, not the total number of troops along the total frontline. Total frontline troops would probably be about double for both sides (I would have to look up the precise numbers)
Also by the later war the Soviet Union wasn't anywhere near the inexperienced and poorly led force it was at the beginning of the war.
This is a common misconception. The Soviet force was actually very well equipped, with superior tanks and vastly numerically superior troops, many of whom were veterans of the victorious campaign against Finland's "unbreakable defensive line". The Soviets were simply surprise attacked while not gearing up to defend. They were preparing...to do something else. They ended up losing a large portion of their armed forces, and yet still won the war pretty much singlehandedly. Hitler, Mannerheim and the other Eastern European leaders were simply not ready for the massive amounts of materiel that the Soviets could churn out, and already had churned out. Most European nations didn't even realize military production on such a massive scale by what amounted to forced laborers was even possible.
Superior tanks, on paper perhaps yes. Equal in the air as well, on paper at least. In fact on paper alone, the Soviets should have crushed the Germans fairly quickly. They had more stuff, and a lot of their stuff was, at first glance, equal or better than the German equivelant.
But in practice, not all Soviet forces were using the latest gear, and those that were using the latest gear were plagued by issues of doctrine, command and technology (radios, etc...). They're also lacking in experience compared to the Germans, many of whom have fought through Poland and France.
As for winning the war single-handed, that's not really the case. Certainly, the Soviets carry the bulk of the land fighting against the Western Axis throughout the war, and between 1941 and 1944 in particular, but the Western Allies certainly contribute. In the air, they provide the primary reason for the Luftwaffe's destruction and reduce Germany to rubble. On land, they provide an important distraction and inflict significant defeats in North Africa. They also help equip the USSR and allow it to achieve the production figures it reaches through supply of goods and materials.
But in practice, not all Soviet forces were using the latest gear, and those that were using the latest gear were plagued by issues of doctrine, command and technology (radios, etc...). They're also lacking in experience compared to the Germans, many of whom have fought through Poland and France.
As for winning the war single-handed, that's not really the case. Certainly, the Soviets carry the bulk of the land fighting against the Western Axis throughout the war, and between 1941 and 1944 in particular, but the Western Allies certainly contribute. In the air, they provide the primary reason for the Luftwaffe's destruction and reduce Germany to rubble. On land, they provide an important distraction and inflict significant defeats in North Africa. They also help equip the USSR and allow it to achieve the production figures it reaches through supply of goods and materials.
I would be careful with the exact numbers. Even though Hitler claimed to liberate only germans, he also conquered a significant group of non-germans even before september 1939, which tied up additionally troops for garrison duty.
Alone to keep all the conquered territories in line took an ernormous amount of manpower while volunteers and forced labour from the conquered populations helped little.
Also, germany had around 2 million more women than men, which didn't help if you consider the german reluctance towards the female workforce.
And that was before the vast areas of soviet land also needed to be guarded. Every mile the Wehrmacht advanced made their situation worse, while the only chance to win was to advance even more.
The Red Army wasn't as bad as the world believed it would be, but is was still not very good. Stalins purges significantly reduced the effictiveness of the leadership and the equipment wasn't as good as the soviet leaders wanted it to be. Stalin would surely have waited 1 or 2 years to attack, because he knew his army wasn't ready, while on the same time he wasn't ready to see his precious treaty with Hitler to fall apart.
In the end they won, but the losses were horrible and the victory was far from singlehandedly. No nation was able to beat Germany alone. The Soviets needed the industrial help from their allies, whereas the western nations needed the rough manpower the communist regime could deliver without regard to their own population. The USA wanted to bring the Nazis down, but I doubt the Americans would have tolerated 13 million dead soldiers and had rather signed a truce than fight to the last.
The US could have beaten Germany on its own- the issue of course being the path to victory would be nuclear carpet bombing. Nothing like adding tens of millions more to the butchers bill to achieve victory.
I doubt it would have come to that. For one, if America was truly on her own she would have a heck of a time actually bombing the Germans.
In my opinion Soviet Union more or less defeated Germany singlehandedly. All the US supplies, invasion of Italy and France and air bombardment of Germany served only for the shortening of war and less losses for Soviet Union. That is not an effect to be underestimated but still it was the Soviets that won the war. They would have still won without the Allies, maybe in 1946, maybe with 25 million losses but the fate was already sealed. Germans completely ran out of steam by Autumn 1942. Soviets heavily outnumbered them ( and that was my original question, When did it happen despite huge losses in 1941 ? ), outmanufactured them and showed the world that they were at least as tenacious as the Germans. Destruction of 6th Army determined the fate of Eastern Front. Did Soviets manage to encircle Germans in Stalingrad with the aid of less-than-one year of lend-lease program ? I highly doubt that. Soviet lack of trucks was a problem but it was exaggerated to highlight US role in victory.
Let's be honest though if Stalin hadn't purged the military they'd probably have done far far better, while they still would have lost a massive number of troops (after all the Soviet army would still be underequipped), the war could've been wrapped up around 1944.
I am not convinced about if Soviets really performed very badly in 1941 because of Stalin's purge. Stalin purged officers, so the question is did Soviet commanders perform very badly in 1941 ? What are the examples of disasters caused by Soviet commanders ? ( Except for ridiculous Kulik, of course) And what changed in one year so that Soviets were then suddenly able to execute their own successful offensives. We know very well that ordinary Soviet soldiers resisted to the last man from Day 1 of the invasion. Germans were shocked about that tenacity and they thought that was the savagery of Asia that drove them to fight to a last man. So, apparently Stalin's purge didn't affect masses of ordinary Soviet soldiers.
Of course there is not one decisive factor for Soviet failures in 1941/1942. The final question is what are the percentages of factors like: Complete surprise, German experience in armored warfare from previous battles and lack of Soviet experince in that field, More effective German fighting ( we know German Army was the most efficient force among all participants of WWII ) Stalin purge of officers, Soviets being in offensive positions ( as claimed by some authors ) etc. ? In my humble opinion, most important factors were the first three of them in the list with decreasing importance.
I always answer for reasoning like this: "next time I want to improve my organization I will execute all of my managers".
Without Western Allied involvement (assuming they just magically disappear from the war on 22nd June 1941 or thereabouts) Germany has more troops, more aircraft, more trucks, more equipment in general. Meanwhile, the Soviets have less of these things.
Not only can the Germans redirect forces from North Africa/Western Europe to the East, they're also free of the effect of strategic bombing (minus the rather minor Soviet attempts) on their production, and they don't have to commit to the U-Boat war. They also have the opportunity to purchase resources overseas that they could not otherwise import. The Luftwaffe in particular will benefit, as it is kept out of the killing grounds which destroyed it IRL.
The Soviets on the other hand now need to produce more stuff, but have less to produce it with. Lack of imports from lend lease means less raw materials, now some workers have to be redirected onto these tasks. Even if the shortfall is somehow madeup, less workers are now available to produce weaponry, and to fight at the front. On top of that, direct military imports (trucks, boots, tanks, planes, etc...) are also down, so the USSR needs to make up an even bigger shortfall.
Without Western Allied involvement, the chances of the Soviet Union surviving the conflict, let alone winning it singlehanded, are significantly reduced.
The effect of the purge was to provide a discouragement to officers using their initiative, and to de-professionalise the officer corps. What changed? Stalin gave way and let the military run itself again, officers were allowed to use their initiative more and political supervision was reduced. Officers didn't have to look over their shoulder whilst trying to fight anymore, which helped things massively.
Of course there are other factors in the turnaround in Soviet military fortunes, the Germans became massively overstretched, the USSR recovered from the initial defeats and by Winter 41 was able to put up a strong resistance to the Germans (the disasters of Summer 42 were in large part due to disposition of forces).
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