How and When German manpower was severely depleted against Soviets ?

[Henry IX]

Women - the Soviets used women in support and some limited combat roles as well as virtually all their agriculture and manufacturing. During 1941-1942 the Nazis stuck to their policy that women should be looking after the home and breeding more children for the army. As a result the Soviets could conscript a far larger proportion of their men than the Germans could. This combined with the better use of manufacturing capacity by the Soviets and you get the reason for the Red Army's superior ability to repace casualties.

 

[CruelDwarf]

After the epic failure of Army Group Center to take Moscow, which was heavily at the fault of Hitler diverting them to Kiev and then waffling them back to Moscow just in time for the rainy season.

Yep, 500 thousand strong force around Kiev is nothing to worry about. Let's attack Moscow without securing our flank. How can it end wrong?

Hitler decided that he wanted the Soviet oil fields for obvious reasons, plus more Ukrainian farmland, however he waffled once again to reinforce the barely strategic city of Stalingrad right when the Wermarcht was entering the Caucasus. So in the end he got neither. History might have been very different if Stalingrad was still called Volgograd. It was far more of a propaganda target than stragegic. There were many other places on the Volga River to stop supplies going through and the one tank factory in Stalingrad was bombed to ruble quickly and negated the entire strategic value of the town.

Stalingrad was a single most important railroad junction on lower Volga. It was vital for securing northern flank of Army Group A. You just cannot advance on Caucasus without at least blockading Stalingrad.

 

[Henry IX]

Didn't Germany try to increase their number of divisions in the East to finish the Soviets in 1942 ? Or did they just maintain their current numbers ?

The number of divisions increased in 1942 and 1943 but the total number of men on the Eastern Front decreased over that period. It was a classic tactic by Hitler of maufacturing more divisions to make the army seem more powerful without actually improving the situation. This tendency just got worse until you get army groups with 3 or 4 understrength divisions by 1945.

 

[makif130289]

The number of divisions increased in 1942 and 1943 but the total number of men on the Eastern Front decreased over that period. It was a classic tactic by Hitler of maufacturing more divisions to make the army seem more powerful without actually improving the situation. This tendency just got worse until you get army groups with 3 or 4 understrength divisions by 1945.

Yes, but what i meant to ask was that if Germany managed to increase number of troops on the Eastern Front from Summer 1941 to Summer 1942.

 

[Henry IX]

Depends on how you count the numbers... The number of front line soldiers in the German army decreased by about 2 hundred thousand from the beginning of Barbarossa to the beginning of the battle for Stalingrad, although their allies provided significantly more forces to the Eastern Front than that, so the total strength increased. After this point the strength of the German army increased slightly to be around 1 hundred thousand men larger than at the beggining of Barbarossa, by the end of '42. Their forces then declined throughout 1943-1944 losing around 1 million men in total strength by the end of Bagration. In 1942 the number of formations needed to police the rear areas increased significantly so the front line formations weakened. In addition the equipment and ammunition allowences decreased over this period due to a combination of increased commitment in Africa and ammunition usage against the strategic bomber campaign.

In contrast the Red army increased in size by just over 1 million men during 1942 taking its strength to over 6 million men under arms (in the regular army).

 

[trybald]

After the epic failure of Army Group Center to take Moscow, which was heavily at the fault of Hitler diverting them to Kiev and then waffling them back to Moscow just in time for the rainy season. Hitler decided that he wanted the Soviet oil fields for obvious reasons, plus more Ukrainian farmland, however he waffled once again to reinforce the barely strategic city of Stalingrad right when the Wermarcht was entering the Caucasus. So in the end he got neither. History might have been very different if Stalingrad was still called Volgograd. It was far more of a propaganda target than stragegic. There were many other places on the Volga River to stop supplies going through and the one tank factory in Stalingrad was bombed to ruble quickly and negated the entire strategic value of the town.

Leaving those Soviet armies around Kiev alone would practically equate to begging them for a massive counter offensive on the Army Group Centre's rear.

In many aspects Hitler was actually far better strategist than his generals who often couldn't see anything beyond the tips of their noses.

 

[krieger11b]

Stalingrad was a sound strategical target for the Caucasus campaign. It could house a massive ammount of german troops during 1942-1943 winter, easing the dispersed and overstreched supply lines, it's localized in a very good position to defend and taking it would end any soviet dream to try any counter attack in the Caucasus. Marching to the Caucasus without taking in account what's happening around Stalingrad would lead to a worst disaster than in OTL. Without german troops in Stalingrad it'd impossible to evacuate the armies in the Caucasus and the southern front would collapse completely.

Housing is a bit of an issue when you bomb the city to the ground before you even enter it.

Leaving those Soviet armies around Kiev alone would practically equate to begging them for a massive counter offensive on the Army Group Centre's rear.

In many aspects Hitler was actually far better strategist than his generals who often couldn't see anything beyond the tips of their noses.

I can't find any records of Army Group Center being a key role in that campiagn. Adding more troops to an already stretchted supply line wasn't going to help a lot either.

 

[trybald]

Army Group Centre would be the one big red target for a counter offensive once the assault on Moscow begins, like Guderian argued.

 

[Cavalry]

Love to see the stats. From what I know the German only go total war after Stalingrad, that means after that their women begin working at the factories to replace men .

 

[krieger11b]

Army Group Centre would be the one big red target for a counter offensive once the assault on Moscow begins, like Guderian argued.

According to Wiki Guderian argued to not divert AGC to Kiev.

Love to see the stats. From what I know the German only go total war after Stalingrad, that means after that their women begin working at the factories to replace men .

That was Hitlers doing, I mean if invading the largest nation on Earth failed in it's first year, does making pianos really make sense? Many of his staff wanted a total war far earlier, hell even his propaganda minister wanted to, back when it would have made a difference.

After Stalingrad they did more than just use women, they made prostetics for wounded soldiers that enabled them to work in factories.

 

[jamhaw]

According to Wiki Guderian argued to not divert AGC to Kiev.



That was Hitlers doing, I mean if invading the largest nation on Earth failed in it's first year, does making pianos really make sense? Many of his staff wanted a total war far earlier, hell even his propaganda minister wanted to, back when it would have made a difference.

After Stalingrad they did more than just use women, they made prostetics for wounded soldiers that enabled them to work in factories.

Yes making pianos does make sense, Hitler lived through 1918, he was deeply concerned about the possibility of internal collapse from a disaffected public. In retrospect he could have gotten away with an earlier move to total war (though had it happened before major debacles caused the tide of the war to turn I think it could have been more unpopular) but the fundamental goal of keeping the public on side and avoiding a repeat of 1918 was sound.

 

[trybald]

According to Wiki Guderian argued to not divert AGC to Kiev.

Yeah, that's what exactly I am arguing. He and other generals wanted to assault Moscow, leaving massive Soviet forces behind their rear.

 

[unmerged(31881)]

Love to see the stats. From what I know the German only go total war after Stalingrad, that means after that their women begin working at the factories to replace men .

"Total war" was a speech for propaganda purposes.

A Nazi lie trying to dupe people with the message: "okay, now we are gonna get serious!". The fact is Germany's economy had been geared for war earlier and to such a fever pitch it had been on the verge of collapse. See Tooze's Wages of Destruction for [whole lot more] details.

 

[gagenater]

"Total war" was a speech for propaganda purposes.

A Nazi lie trying to dupe people with the message: "okay, now we are gonna get serious!". The fact is Germany's economy had been geared for war earlier and to such a fever pitch it had been on the verge of collapse. See Tooze's Wages of Destruction for [whole lot more] details.

It was near collapse from resource shortages and fiscal conditions. It was nowhere near to making the best possible use of labor though. That's what 'total war' meant in the Nazi German perspective.

 

[TheRomanRuler]

Problem was not lack of soldiers, problem was:
-Germany was huge and occupied countries were mainly hostile, making it actually 3 front war
-Lack of equipment, sometimes Wehrmacht had to borrow weapons from Volkstrum...
-Lack of trained soldiers, this was common for all sides, but if Soviet conscripts broke, there was room to fall back. If Volkstrumman broke, he soon met 'nice allied soldiers' and surrendered to them
-Disorqanisation, Germany had HUGE number of "divisions" becouse many so called political leaders tough it was good idea to create new "Elite-Panzer-Grossdeutschland-Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler-Freikorps" divisions without any equipment or men, meaning they had to be taken elsewhere, experienced German units were taken their weapons and given to Fascist militia, and none of old units were ever dispanded, creating illusion of army of 200 divisions to dictator surrounded by "yes yes man" while he himself was "do this, do that and simoltaniousely do this".
According to some estimates Germany did have 18 millions troopers, but only 800 000 of them were at front lines, meaning few superb units like 116th Panzer Division had to fight day and night while other divisions were completely inexperienced.

+Something that i always miss, forget or am unable to explain properly or get wrong, i have rarely made post that has not needed editing. In fact this yellow text was added via editing second after posting...


EDIT (another...): I advice reading "Berlin 1945" by Anthony Beevor, at least it made me understand just how complicated/confused/more fitting word situation was during last year of the war

 

[Cynical Dreamer]

I would say the decisive moment in the collapse of the German army came between June 1944 and October 1944, with over 900 000 killed (for an estimated 5 million military casualties ). After that, the Luftwaffe was nearly extinct, the enemies were at the gates, the war industry was loosing access to invaluable minerals and resources while the army lost most of it's best soldiers and tanks.

Also, after the assassination attempt on Hitler, pressure on the highest generals and the whole "fortress city" concept doomed the the remains of the Wehrmacht.

 

[krieger11b]

Yes making pianos does make sense, Hitler lived through 1918, he was deeply concerned about the possibility of internal collapse from a disaffected public. In retrospect he could have gotten away with an earlier move to total war (though had it happened before major debacles caused the tide of the war to turn I think it could have been more unpopular) but the fundamental goal of keeping the public on side and avoiding a repeat of 1918 was sound.

1918 was a lot more than a lack of pianos. Germany was getting so desperate they started to tear up the old lead water piping for bullets (not really a bad thing in hindsite, but it wasn't replaced, no running water sucks), and most importantly the people were starting to starve. Going to total war was not going to be anything near as bad as that, unless they start scrapping their new copper water lines to for bullet jacketing

 

[jamhaw]

1918 was a lot more than a lack of pianos. Germany was getting so desperate they started to tear up the old lead water piping for bullets (not really a bad thing in hindsite, but it wasn't replaced, no running water sucks), and most importantly the people were starting to starve. Going to total war was not going to be anything near as bad as that, unless they start scrapping their new copper water lines to for bullet jacketing

Yes but the concept of keeping up homefront morale by prioritising civilians was sound, same with Napoleon. They had recent experience of internal revolution and so they overcompensated.

 

[DoomBunny]

Problem was not lack of soldiers, problem was:
-Germany was huge and occupied countries were mainly hostile, making it actually 3 front war
-Lack of equipment, sometimes Wehrmacht had to borrow weapons from Volkstrum...
-Lack of trained soldiers, this was common for all sides, but if Soviet conscripts broke, there was room to fall back. If Volkstrumman broke, he soon met 'nice allied soldiers' and surrendered to them
-Disorqanisation, Germany had HUGE number of "divisions" becouse many so called political leaders tough it was good idea to create new "Elite-Panzer-Grossdeutschland-Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler-Freikorps" divisions without any equipment or men, meaning they had to be taken elsewhere, experienced German units were taken their weapons and given to Fascist militia, and none of old units were ever dispanded, creating illusion of army of 200 divisions to dictator surrounded by "yes yes man" while he himself was "do this, do that and simoltaniousely do this".
According to some estimates Germany did have 18 millions troopers, but only 800 000 of them were at front lines, meaning few superb units like 116th Panzer Division had to fight day and night while other divisions were completely inexperienced.

+Something that i always miss, forget or am unable to explain properly or get wrong, i have rarely made post that has not needed editing. In fact this yellow text was added via editing second after posting...


EDIT (another...): I advice reading "Berlin 1945" by Anthony Beevor, at least it made me understand just how complicated/confused/more fitting word situation was during last year of the war

This is rather later on than he is talking about.

 

[Dewirix]

Germany used it resources much less efficiently than the USSR.



If they used their steel and coal so inefficiently, I wouldn't be too surprised if they didn't use their manpower very efficiently as well.

I take your point, but I wonder if the above numbers allow for the fact that the Soviets counted repaired tanks towards the number produced?