How and When German manpower was severely depleted against Soviets ?

[makif130289]

I was just looking at populations of Soviet Union and Germany. Germany in 1939 had 80 million people while Soviets had 160 million people. So we can assume Soviets had twice as much manpower as Germany.

In 1941, Germany attacked Soviets and occupied very large of chunk of Soviet Union until winter. ( So, several millions of Soviet manpower lost ). Also, two primary additions to German war effort in my opinion, Romania and Hungary had populations of 9 million and 13 million respectively. Additionally, German kill ratio was more than 2:1 until 1941 Winter and later not that good still better than 1:1 until at least collapse fo Stalingrad.

Germany didn't have to spare important amount of resources to other areas until the invasion of Sicily in mid-1943. I think garrisoning forces consist of only small part of Wehrmacht. So, most of the Wehrmacht frontline units should have been fighting in the Eastern Front.

So, in my extremely simple calculation, German manpower situation shouldn't be that bad compared to Soviets. But IRL, When Germans commenced Summer-1942 offensives, they were outnumbered heavily everywhere on the front. Wikipedia says : 1.3 million Axis vs 2.7 million Soviets, this is even worse than demographic comparison of both countries ( 80 million vs 160 million ). How did it come to that point in spite of spectacular victories during 1941, additions from Romania and Hungary, great casualties and population loss of Soviets during early-Barbarossa ?

 

[jamhaw]

I think part of the problem was simply logistics, the Germans had very long lines of supply which made it more difficult to maintain troops so far from home.

 

[joak]

Not a definitive explanation, but:

(1) As you are just going by total population, you assume Soviets start around 2:1 ahead (at least in potential.) This means a 2:1 kill ratio does not make things better for the Germans. It keeps them at parity. Your estimate that it got closer to 1:1 means the Germans were losing ground even though they were 'winning.' (Imagine the Germans start with 1 million, the Soviets with 2 million, then take away 1 million from each . . . ) Given the horrific casualties the Germans were indeed getting chewed up faster than the Russians.
(2) Not all Germans were on the front lines in 1942. Even if you discount garrisons they had just advanced over a large area and so would have extended supply lines.
(3) The Soviet situation was the opposite. I just looked up the wiki numbers you mentioned; they included a million "reserve" troops. The sort who would be the low quality troops you keep at home and use for garrisoning, and only show up for battle if the battle is in your homeland.
(4) Many of military age men in occupied areas would have been in the army already, and/or evacuated with the heavy machinery, so the loss of occupied areas isn't going to be as significant as it would seem from raw numbers.

 

[makif130289]

Not a definitive explanation, but:

(1) As you are just going by total population, you assume Soviets start around 2:1 ahead (at least in potential.) This means a 2:1 kill ratio does not make things better for the Germans. It keeps them at parity. Your estimate that it got closer to 1:1 means the Germans were losing ground even though they were 'winning.' (Imagine the Germans start with 1 million, the Soviets with 2 million, then take away 1 million from each . . . ) Given the horrific casualties the Germans were indeed getting chewed up faster than the Russians.
(2) Not all Germans were on the front lines in 1942. Even if you discount garrisons they had just advanced over a large area and so would have extended supply lines.
(3) The Soviet situation was the opposite. I just looked up the wiki numbers you mentioned; they included a million "reserve" troops. The sort who would be the low quality troops you keep at home and use for garrisoning, and only show up for battle if the battle is in your homeland.
(4) Many of military age men in occupied areas would have been in the army already, and/or evacuated with the heavy machinery, so the loss of occupied areas isn't going to be as significant as it would seem from raw numbers.

1) Soviets started with 2:1.
2) 2:1 detoriarated a little bit with Germans spreading garrisons and reserves to occupied regions. But this again should be compensated to a degree with Soviet divisions in Manchuria.
3) Romanian and Hungarian troops should narrow down 2:1 ratio a little bit more.
4) During early Barbarossa, Soviets lost both massive amount of divisions and population. German kill ratio was much better than 2:1. Only Battle of Kiev costed around 600k soldiers.
5) Then in 1942 summer, i expect something close to 1.5:1 but the ratio is even worse with 2.1:1 like Germans achieved nothing during early-Barbarossa.

How did Russians become "Red Horde" ? What do i miss ?

 

[DarthJF]

I'd suspect that Soviet ability to outproduce Germany meant they could also mobilise a higher portion of their population into combat units. It doesn't matter how much population you have if you can't have rifles, tanks and ammunition for them to fight with.

 

[Lord Finnish]

You speak about kill ratios, remember that a wounded soldier is a casualty as well. If a soldier loses his leg he isn't much use even though he's still alive.

 

[makif130289]

You speak about kill ratios, remember that a wounded soldier is a casualty as well. If a soldier loses his leg he isn't much use even though he's still alive.

You are right, i should have said "casualty ratios". I think it should be correlated to kill ratio too. So, 2:1 kill ratio should be roughly equal to 2:1 wounded ratio.

 

[Denkt]

I did some caculations with the wikipedia casuilties in ww2 and got something like this:
The European war so not taken account for Japan and such, Finland casuilties counted towards axis.
84% of the axis forces deaths was in eastern front.
88% of the allied forces deaths was in the eastern front.
Also both Soviets and its enemies captured around 5 milion from each others.
Its hard to say then Germany had taken to great manpower losses, however its likley it got worse each day that passed, quality of the german forces likley dropped alot from 1941 to 1945.

 

[makif130289]

I did some caculations with the wikipedia casuilties in ww2 and got something like this:
The European war so not taken account for Japan and such, Finland casuilties counted towards axis.
84% of the axis forces deaths was in eastern front.
88% of the allied forces deaths was in the eastern front.
Also both Soviets and its enemies captured around 5 milion from each others.
Its hard to say then Germany had taken to great manpower losses, however its likley it got worse each day that passed, quality of the german forces likley dropped alot from 1941 to 1945.

I am talking about pre-Stalingrad situation. German losses of Stalingrad, Kursk and Bagration brought casualty ratios between Germans and Soviets closer. My question is how couldn't Germans obtain a more fair fight in terms of numbers from Summer 1942 to the collapse of Stalingrad ?

Germany destroyed tons of Soviet forces in 1941, Romania and Hungary provided dozens of divisions, Finland tied down a lot of Soviet divisions in the North and still a ratio worse than 2:1. I think Germany could have pulled off 1942 Offensives if it wasn't heavily outnumbered. German war machine was much more efficient than Soviets' afterall.

 

[Calad]

How did Russians become "Red Horde" ? What do i miss ?

Production. Soviets had mass production on better level than Germany. Also Germany had many fronts while Soviets had only one. Also US basically fed Soviets with leand-lease program so on the end of the war Soviets simply had more machines than Germany.

Germany also had supply problems, Hitler's insane command and lack of fuel.

 

[makif130289]

Production. Soviets had mass production on better level than Germany. Also Germany had many fronts while Soviets had only one. Also US basically fed Soviets with leand-lease program so on the end of the war Soviets simply had more machines than Germany.

Germany also had supply problems, Hitler's insane command and lack of fuel.

So you say essentially it was not a manpower problem, but production and logistics problem.

 

[Kovax]

It's also a matter of who you're willing to draft. The Soviet army was noted for passing through a village, and leaving behind it only old men, young children, and several "voluntary" women's work details. All of the able-bodied men were conscripted on the spot, without training or adequate equipment. When you're accepting the most productive 10% or more of your population into the army, it's a serious blow to the economy, and makes it difficult for the remaining population to even provide itself with the minimums of food and other essentials for survival; when you're willing to drag 25% or more of your population from given areas into the army, it's catastrophic. As those areas were overrun by the Germans, they ceased to be a "problem" for the Soviets. The Soviets were willing to pay that price in the lives of its own people, Germany hadn't reached that point of desperation, yet.

Also, Hitler remarked to one of his general (late 1942?) that it didn't seem like the same German army that had blitzed Poland and overrun so much of the Soviet Union only a short time ago. The generals' reply was "That army lies in shallow graves scattered across Poland and the Russian steppe". The highly trained, well disciplined, and opportunistic army of 1939-41 was all but replaced by new conscripts with shorter training, and less individual initiative and freedom of action. In essence, while the quantity of troops did not change drastically in ratio, and may have even shifted marginally in favor of Germany during the first year of the campaign, the quality of troops began to even out, making the Soviet numerical superiority far more meaningful.

 

[DoomBunny]

Romania and Bulgaria had populations of 9 million and 13 million respectively.

Bulgaria didn't commit troops, Romanian ones were of... dubious value.

Germany didn't have to spare important amount of resources to other areas until the invasion of Sicily in mid-1943. I think garrisoning forces consist of only small part of Wehrmacht. So, most of the Wehrmach frontline units should have been fighting in the Eastern Front.

Garrisons are needed for; France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Bohemia-Moravia, Poland, Denmark, Norway, Yugoslavia, Greece, and the occupied lands in the East. Norway and Yugoslavia in particular are massive (needlessly massive) drains. There's also North Africa (which draws a relatively small combat force, but a lot of logistical support), the Tunis campaign (which ranks amongst the stupidest moves ever pulled in the Second World War), and the need for field forces to repel invasion in say, France (because garrison troops aren't really up to that job).

Oh, and you've also got to keep a whole bunch of fighters, men, guns and other equipment back home. Because bombers.

So, in my extremely simple calculation, German manpower situation shouldn't be that bad compared to Soviets. But IRL, When Germans commenced Summer-1942 offensives, they were outnumbered heavily everywhere on the front. Wikipedia says : 1.3 million Axis vs 2.7 million Soviets, this is even worse than demographic comparison of both countries ( 80 million vs 160 million ). How did it come to that point in spite of spectacular victories during 1941, additions from Romania and Hungary, great casualties and population loss of Soviets during early-Barbarossa ?

Germany has more responsibilities elsewhere. Germany isn't as committed to the war as the USSR. Germany IIRC has a larger % of its population in industry. Many Soviets fled the occupied areas/were brought into the forces, so aren't automatically discounted by occupation. The USSR received aid from elsewhere, therefore it could commit more of its population to the fight than otherwise possible. Germany's didn't commit all they might have. Red Army is just generally big.

Oh, and numbers don't necessarily tell the whole story.

Only Battle of Kiev costed around 600k soldiers.

Kiev is a stand-out event.

 

[Calad]

So you say essentially it was not a manpower problem, but production and logistics problem.

Yes. It makes a huge difference does your troops walk or travel by vehicles.

For Soviets the war was everything because in Nazi ideology they were to be slaves or dead. So soviets took this war much more seriously than Germans and totally mobilized whole nation, every resource for war. Germans did this much more later.

 

[Lord Finnish]

Yes. It makes a huge difference does your troops walk or travel by vehicles.

For Soviets the war was everything because in Nazi ideology they were to be slaves or dead. So soviets took this war much more seriously than Germans and totally mobilized whole nation, every resource for war. Germans did this much more later.

Someone once put it well, to see how the Soviets felt in 1941 imagine if Bush had declared in 2003 that the goal of Iraq War would be the extermination of the the Iraqi people.

 

[knul]

Germany used it resources much less efficiently than the USSR.

[quote='Why the Allies won' (Richard Overy), p. 222]
In the Soviet Case 8 millions tons of steel and 90 millions tons of coals in 1943 were translated into 48,000 heavy artillery pieces and 24,000 tanks; Germany in the same year turned 30 millions tons of steel and 340 million tons of coal into 27,000 heavy guns and 17,000 tanks.
[/quote]

If they used their steel and coal so inefficiently, I wouldn't be too surprised if they didn't use their manpower very efficiently as well.

 

[Tamerlan]

One of the things that happened between mid-1941 and mid-1942 is Pearl Harbour : the Soviets could relocate their reserves from Siberia to the European front.

 

[makif130289]

One of the things that happened between mid-1941 and mid-1942 is Pearl Harbour : the Soviets could relocate their reserves from Siberia to the European front.

Didn't Germany try to increase their number of divisions in the East to finish the Soviets in 1942 ? Or did they just maintain their current numbers ?

 

[krieger11b]

Didn't Germany try to increase their number of divisions in the East to finish the Soviets in 1942 ? Or did they just maintain their current numbers ?

After the epic failure of Army Group Center to take Moscow, which was heavily at the fault of Hitler diverting them to Kiev and then waffling them back to Moscow just in time for the rainy season. Hitler decided that he wanted the Soviet oil fields for obvious reasons, plus more Ukrainian farmland, however he waffled once again to reinforce the barely strategic city of Stalingrad right when the Wermarcht was entering the Caucasus. So in the end he got neither. History might have been very different if Stalingrad was still called Volgograd. It was far more of a propaganda target than stragegic. There were many other places on the Volga River to stop supplies going through and the one tank factory in Stalingrad was bombed to ruble quickly and negated the entire strategic value of the town.

 

[KaiserBeer]

Stalingrad was a sound strategical target for the Caucasus campaign. It could house a massive ammount of german troops during 1942-1943 winter, easing the dispersed and overstreched supply lines, it's localized in a very good position to defend and taking it would end any soviet dream to try any counter attack in the Caucasus. Marching to the Caucasus without taking in account what's happening around Stalingrad would lead to a worst disaster than in OTL. Without german troops in Stalingrad it'd impossible to evacuate the armies in the Caucasus and the southern front would collapse completely.