Heyday and Fall of Ērānšahr

[Kurfürst]

Thanks for the appreciation. After my stroke, I had a long leave from work and I had plenty of time to advance with the writing. But I'm back at work now and I'm finding it very difficult to find the time. I'm carrying sequels from the stroke, and I have trouble concentrating for long periods of time and I need to sleep more (both because I tire more easily and because of doctor's orders). I intend to retake the narrative, but considering the situation, I can't promise anything.

Health is of course a priority! Take your time, we can wait.

 

[Semper Victor]

I am a little late but about Dara:
I disagree regarding Persian numerical superiority as is described by Procopius. Belisarius description of Persian infantry is not incorrect as it becomes clear at the ending stage of battle that these were not a fighting force. Since Persians intention was to put a siege to Dara they brought with them workers to the bidding, it was a practice that they always used, meaning using farmers as siege workers in sieges and giving them wicker shields.
However in this instance instead of siege they got a pitched battle and for some reason be it just actually showing numerical superiority or something else they gave them spears and put them in ranks. But obviously this force was not a fighting force so infantry was never used in battle and this superiority was not tactical but maybe rather strategical in order to put fear in Romans. Regardless the actual fighting force must have been closer to Roman numbers.

The reason for not moving the center was also a matter of following practice that existed at least from time of Sassanids founder. Center of army should only move if center of enemy moves, if not the center should stay where it is.

About Mazdaki Massacre the most complete source regarding the whole incident which is several pages long puts the killing at the time of Kawad himself but it states that this was done by his son Khosrow which was against Mazdak and his followers and made them want to actually kill Khosrow. They also did try to kill Kawad in a fire temple which failed.
I guess others sources just ignored Kawad role in this because the actual thing is done by Khosrow and as you said they did intend to ignore Kawad in favor of His son i also suppose there must be another reason as is stated by some modern authors that perhaps there was two killings, one in time of Kawad and second in time of his son and at Kawos rebellion. In that case a confusion is understandable.

Sorry for the late reply; I hadn't noticed your post until now. Procopius offers quite solid numbers in his works (I have commented already about it elsewhere in this thread), so I'm inclined to believe him in this respect. What is an inference by modern historians from Procopius' account is the composition of the Sasanian army at Dara; abd I also tend to agree with them. Dara was the main base of the Roman Field Army of the East, and being located so close to Nisibis, it is to be expected that the Sasanians knew very well that the whole of Belisarius' army would be there; so trying to besiege a well-fortified city defended by a large field army with a smaller force would've been quite unwise. The Sasanians would've needed some "peasant infantry" to carry out the siege as you point out, but they had to take into account the possibility of Belisarius opposing them in the open (as it happened), so they would've needed a field force at least as strong as the Romans had, and even bigger if they really wanted to carry the siege out.

As for Mazdak's uprising, I am aware of the points you raise (I also addressed them elsewhere in this thread and the previous one), but I still tend to agree with Crone's proposed reconstruction of the events. Perso-Arabic sources sbout Mazdak are far removed in time from the events, so we must take into account Syriac and Greek sources, even if they offer a sketchy account that seems to come at blows in some moments with later Islamic sources, which suffer in all cases from severe crhonological issues.

 

[Nabed]

Regarding Procopius, we should also take into consideration that his numbers for the Callinicum are not trustworthy, as other sources seem to offer higher number for Romans, and of course if we take a look at his own account we can see he states both of armies were about 20000 and both have 5000 arabs with them, how many times such equity happens anyway? not to mention some of other problems in all of his works, including changing the date of Anoszads revolt in his History Of Wars which was published after the Persian wars.So we can presume he is quit capable of changing numbers and facts when it's suits him. as this is already evident in this Secret History when we compare it to his previous books.
Back to Dara, while Dara was built by Romans with the intention of using it as a base similar to Nisibis and while this was surely understood by Persians i am pretty sure at the time they didn't put much thought to it, until they faced the difficulties and defeats later on. you should also take into consideration two things, first Persians did not thought that they were going to face a pitched battle(it surely crossed their minds but it was not a strong possibly none less) and second exactly because of distance between Nisibis and Dara, they could always request more troops if they were needed(either for the siege or pitched battle).
I am not saying the Persian force was not larger, but the way is described is obviously false! i like to bring another point forward. as commander you always never count numbers of your fallen enemy first because you do not need to report the exact figure to your superiors, the exact figure that you should actually report are the numbers of your own dead which interesting enough Procopius never gives any! why is that? was it so low that he decided to not too? if so then why other historian which give detailed account like himself meaning Agathias and Ammianus give figure like 60-250 dead in some battles? wouldn't a low number of death being more glorifying, had A better reporting value? or was it that he didn't have access to that data? judging by his position this is very unreasonable.
My point is the description of these battles even on tactical part of is by no means without propaganda. he claims at start of his books that he is a witness and therefore much reliable but half of events which he describes he was not present at all and those that he was, he doesn't give the complete picture or falsifies the data.
Regardless he is the best source that we have but by no means, he is reliable when it comes to his favorite subjects before he wrote the secret history.

 

[Semper Victor]

Regarding Procopius, we should also take into consideration that his numbers for the Callinicum are not trustworthy, as other sources seem to offer higher number for Romans, and of course if we take a look at his own account we can see he states both of armies were about 20000 and both have 5000 arabs with them, how many times such equity happens anyway? not to mention some of other problems in all of his works, including changing the date of Anoszads revolt in his History Of Wars which was published after the Persian wars.So we can presume he is quit capable of changing numbers and facts when it's suits him. as this is already evident in this Secret History when we compare it to his previous books.
Back to Dara, while Dara was built by Romans with the intention of using it as a base similar to Nisibis and while this was surely understood by Persians i am pretty sure at the time they didn't put much thought to it, until they faced the difficulties and defeats later on. you should also take into consideration two things, first Persians did not thought that they were going to face a pitched battle(it surely crossed their minds but it was not a strong possibly none less) and second exactly because of distance between Nisibis and Dara, they could always request more troops if they were needed(either for the siege or pitched battle).
I am not saying the Persian force was not larger, but the way is described is obviously false! i like to bring another point forward. as commander you always never count numbers of your fallen enemy first because you do not need to report the exact figure to your superiors, the exact figure that you should actually report are the numbers of your own dead which interesting enough Procopius never gives any! why is that? was it so low that he decided to not too? if so then why other historian which give detailed account like himself meaning Agathias and Ammianus give figure like 60-250 dead in some battles? wouldn't a low number of death being more glorifying, had A better reporting value? or was it that he didn't have access to that data? judging by his position this is very unreasonable.
My point is the description of these battles even on tactical part of is by no means without propaganda. he claims at start of his books that he is a witness and therefore much reliable but half of events which he describes he was not present at all and those that he was, he doesn't give the complete picture or falsifies the data.
Regardless he is the best source that we have but by no means, he is reliable when it comes to his favorite subjects before he wrote the secret history.

We have only two sources for the battle of Callinicum; Procopius and John Malalas. They don't disagree that much about numbers; the main disagreements between both accounts happen in the development of the battle itself and the campaign that preceded it. As for the number of 20,000 men, it's a number that appears very frequently in ancient accounts. For example, it was the size of a Republican consular army (two Roman and two allied legions), and historians considered that this was also the standard force of the permanent mobile armies of the late Roman Empire. 20,000 Romans at Callinicum, reinforced by 5,000 Arab foederati, seems to me a perfectly plausible number. As for the numbers of the Sasanian army in this battle, Procopius clearly states that they were outnumbered by the Romans, and Malalas agrees with him. So, I fail to see where and why should we doubt Procopius' account in this respect.

As for the intentions of the Sasanians against Dara, the Roman accounts (not just Procopius) state that they intended to take the city, and it makes perfect sense. The building of Dara by Anastasius had largely neutralized the Sasanian advantage of having their main base so near the border, and Kawad I had complained repeatedly before this war broke out to Anastasius I and Justin I that the building of Dara was a breach of old diplomatic agreements between both empires. Launching a direct attack against Dara at this point of the war makes sense (the war had been largely indecisive until then, and it was Kawad I and not Justinian I who was fighting "around the clock"); it wasn't the first time they had done so. And in this former attempt, the Roman field army had already left the walls of Dara and attacked the Sasanian encampment at Thannuris. The battle ended with a Roman defeat, but apparently the Sasanian losses were serious enough as to force them to abandon their plans for a siege. With these recent events in mind, a renewed Sasanian attack against Dara but with forces large enough to ensure that the Romans would not be able to defeat them in open field makes a lot of sense. Notice also how Belisarius (and Hermogenes), who at Thannuris had not hesitated to attack the Sasanian fortified encampment, now chose to fortify himself in the open, near the walls of Dara; this further reinforces Procopius' claim about the Sasanian numerical advantage.

Procopius was perfectly able to twist events when it suited him (and I point several examples in the posts of this thread) but his account of the Iberian War is quite trustworthy. It's by no means comparable to the Secret History; that is a work he wrote in his old age (surely after Justinian I's death, and maybe even after Justin II's death) and was the work of an embittered old man who decided to "settle accounts" with Justinian, Theodora and everyone who, in his mind, had failed to recognize his merits and promote his rise among the ranks of the imperial bureaucracy. From a historical point of view, that work is a literary vendetta by an aged, deranged functionary, and little else.